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ABSTRACT 
The study is a theoretical excursus in the political sociology of language which discusses how features 
of the world-polity and world-economy intersect in such a way within the current world system as to 
affect linguistic practices in the religious domain in South Africa. Language practice in congregations 
provide the empirical data for this discussion. Data was collected through a survey of 60 racially 
integrated and multilingual Christian congregations from nine denominations across South Africa. 
Levels of linguistic and racial integration were measured according to an integration index, which 
shows that racial integration of these congregations is far more advanced than linguistic integration. 
The dominance of English over indigenous languages became evident in all cases. This pattern is 
interpreted in terms of global institutional factors which support the dominance of English. The theory 
of John Meyer, John Boli, and colleagues forms the central analytical framework, in which global 
norms are perceived to create isomorphism across nation-states. These insights are combined with 
others from world-economy and globalization theories. Accordingly, formal and popular, global and 
local ideologies are seen to articulate with one other, so contributing to cultural and structural 
isomorphism across state and civil institutions. In particular I suggest that a language ideology which 
favours English operates among elites as well as among the general populace. Consequently English 
is regarded, globally as locally, as a language of access to employment, commerce and status. For this 
reason isomorphism between linguistic practices which devalues indigenous languages is visible 
between South Africa and other African nation-states. A similar isomorphism between linguistic 
ideology and practices also occurs between institutions within South Africa. 
The emerging hegemony of English in South Africa is connected to similar processes operating 
elsewhere, and so can be linked to features of the world system. The diffusion of core cultures, which 
accompanied the expansion of the world-economy, continues to occur through the adoption of global 
mass education and religious institutions by non-core states. Along with the dispersement of the 
Western model of the nation-state came the increasing importance of having a constitution as 
foundation stone. Language rights were instituted in constitutions as part of the globalization of human 
rights, as happened in South Africa. Compared to the previous constitution, the latter reflects the 
increasing integration of South Africa into the world polity and its global norms of equality. 
As globalization produces heterogeneity and homogeneity, the dominant trend towards linguistic 
homogeneity (English) is countered by a weaker option for inclusion of multilingualism (e.g. through 
accommodation of indigenous languages). In Africa this produces African-Western individuals, lending 
some support to the notion that globalization produces hybridization. 
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OPSOMMING 
Die studie is 'n teoretiese verkenning, vanuit die vertrekpunt van die politieke sosiologie van taal, van 
hoe aspekte van die wereld-politiese en wereld-ekonomiese bestel mekaar ontmoet binne die huidige 
wereldstelsel op so 'n wyse dat taalgebruik in die religieuse domein in Suid-Afrika indirek beinvloed 
word. Taalgebruik in gemeentes verskaf die empiriese data vir hierdie bespreking. Data is versa mel 
deur 'n opname van 60 rasgemengde en veeltalige gemeentes van nege denominasies landswyd. 
Vlakke van taal- en ras-integrasie is gemeet aan 'n integrasie-skaal, wat aantoon dat ras-integrasie 
binne sulke gemeentes meer gevorderd is as taal-integrasie. 
Die oorheersing deur Engels van inheemse tale is duidelik in al 60 gevalle. Hierdie patroon word vertolk 
na aanleiding van globale institusionele faktore wat die oorheersing van Engels ondersteun. Die teorie 
van John Meyer, John Boli en kollegas word in die studie gebruik as sentrale analitiese raamwerk wat 
daarop dui dat globale norme isomorfisme bewerkstellig tussen nasie-state. Hierdie insigte word by 
ander vanuit wereld-ekonomiese en globalisasie teoriee gevoeg. Daarvolgens kombineer formele en 
populere, globale en plaaslike ideologiee met mekaar om tot kulturele en strukturele isomorfisme tussen 
staats- en ander maatskaplike instellings by te dra. Meer spesifiek voer ek aan dat 'n taal-ideologie wat 
Engels bevoordeel onder lede van die elite asook onder die algemene bevolking ontstaan het. Gevolglik 
word Engels wereldwyd en plaaslik gesien as 'n taal wat toegang verleen tot werk, handelsgeleenthede 
en status. Dit veroorsaak dat isomorfisme in taalpraktyk tussen Suid-Afrika en ander Afrika-Iande 
voorkom wat inheemse tale verontreg. 'n Soortgelyke isomorfisme tussen taal-ideologie en -praktyke 
kom ook voor tussen staats- en ander maatskaplike instellings binne Suid-Afrika. 
Die toenemende heerskappy van Engels in Suid-Afrika is gekoppel aan soortgelyke prosesse wat elders 
plaasvind, wat daarom beskou kan word as deel van sekere aspekte van die wereldstelsel. Die globale 
verspreiding van die kulture van dominante lande, wat saamgeval het met die uitbreiding van die 
wereld-ekonomie, word voortgesit deur die grootskaalse aanvaarding van globale massa-opvoeding en 
godsdienstige instellings deur nie-dominante lande. Soos die Westerse model van die nasie-staat 
versprei, neem die fundamentele belangrikheid van'n grondwet ook toe. Taalregte word in grondwette 
institusionaliseer as deel van die globale uitbreiding van menseregte, soos die geval is in Suid-Afrika. 
In vergelyking met die vorige grondwet reflekteer die huidige een die toenemende integrasie van Suid-
Afrika binne die wereld-politiese bestel en tot die norme van gelykheid binne daardie bestel. 
Omdat globalisasie beide verskeidenheid en eenvormigheid aanmoedig, word die heersende tendens 
na eentaligheid (Engels) teengewerk deur'n swakker opsie vir veeltaligheid (bv. deur aanvaarding van 
inheemse tale). In Afrika is die gevolg individue wat beide Westers en Afrikane is, wat 'n mate van 
steun verleen aan die idee dat globalisasie 'n vermenging van plaaslike en globale eienskappe 
bewerkstellig. 
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- CHAPTER ONE -
INTRODUCTION, METHODOLOGY AND TERMINOLOGY 
1. LANGUAGE AND CONGREGATION IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATION 
Language, like race and class, has always been near the heart of political developments in South 
Africa. As a state policy, apartheid segregated all major institutions legally, resulting in enforced 
residential and social segregation between 1948 and the mid-1980s. Contact between race groups 
was extremely limited, usually to formal work environments; while linguistic diversity was dampened 
under a bilingual language policy which favoured English and Afrikaans. During apartheid South African 
Christian churches became just as segregated as other social institutions, with few exceptions. 
Under the apartheid government, choice of language became an enforced marker of ethnic and cultural 
identities, and so one of the mechanisms which regulated relations between groups created in this way 
(compare Benjamin 1994). Subsequently language preference was linked to political ideologies, so that 
language itself was perceived to be an instrument of oppression or liberation, as illustrated by the June 
16, 1976 Soweto uprising against the compulsory use of Afrikaans (alongside English) for 
examinations in black schools. As ethno-political marker, choice of language could even have fatal 
consequences, as Zulu-speakers discovered during the Inkatha/ANC war on the Witwatersrand in the 
early 1 990s' . 
Currently, the new post-1994 South. African regime implicitly endorses non-racialism and 
multiculturalism as twin national ideologies which underpin frequent exhortations to nation-building. 
Non-racialism encourages racial integration within the same institution across all sectors of society, 
from education to economic institutions, most notably in the affirmative action quotas of the recent 
Labour Equity Bill. Non-racialism can be defined as an ideology which attempts to "eliminate overtly 
racist discourse", including "language uses which perpetuate the ideologies of racism and patriarchy" 
through "unnecessary references to such labels" (Benjamin 1994:100,106). 
Multiculturalism emerges in the recognition of eleven officiallanguages2 in the new 1996 Constitution, 
in contrast to the two official European-derived languages of the past (English and Afrikaans). The 
preamble of the 1996 Constitution also implicitly recognizes the rights of all South Africans to practice 
'. This is not to suggest that the conflict had to do with language itself, but to note that language is an easily 
identifiable badge of identity (cf. 8amgbose 1994:34). Conflict attributed to language diversity at base is usually about 
economic and political inequality (Tollefson 1991 :205). 
2. Afrikaans, English, Sepedi, SeSotho, SeTswana, Shangaan, XiTsonga, TshiVenda, Siswati, isiZulu, isiXhosa. 
1 
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2 Language, Nation, & Congregation 
multilingual and multicultural South African society through state· policies. The ultimate goal is to 
integrate the nation through the creation of a national identity (identification with being a South 
African) which fosters loyalty to the state. 
In this way space is created for renegotiating or discarding ascribed and enforced identities, such as 
race. Concretely, people are drawn together into settings and relations which previously were 
ideologically and geographically difficult to structure, where they can renegotiate or discard ascribed 
and enforced identities, such as race or language. 
The question whether state ideologies will sanction or suppress cultural and linguistic diversity can be 
examined in public institutions such as parliament, state departments, the national broadcaster, and 
schools and universities. These have arguably been most directly affected, in accordance with the 
degree of control available to the state. Certainly, the policies of the Government of National Unity 
recognizes the rights of all South Africans to practice their respective languages and cultures. Eleven 
official languages are acknowledged in the new 1996 Constitution, in contrast to the two official 
European-derived languages of the past (English and Afrikaans). Other aspects of language policy have 
only recently been implemented, such as the establishment of the Pan-South African Language Board 
(PANSALB). 
But how is diversity structured in voluntary non-governmental organisations which fall outside of the 
formal control of the state, and so provide an ideal setting in which to demonstrate informal, 
grass-roots ideologies and counter-ideologies? And how can such attempts at managing diversity be 
explained by reference to national and global trends? What choices are made about language in a 
voluntary organisation without a formal language policy? How are tho·se formerly classified as 
belonging to different race groups incorporated in decision-making structures where there is no formal 
policy of affirmative action? And how is cultural diversity accommodated in social interaction where 
no guidelines exist for those responsible for leadership? 
To answer the above questions I have chosen to focus on multicultural and multilingual Christian 
congregations, which, as religious institutions in a newly secular state, fall outside direct control of 
state policy as far as e.g. language usage is concerned3 • While others have examined integrating 
congregations in South Africa (Massie 1993), or language and race at the denominational level 
(Kritzinger 1995, Zaaiman 1994), mine is the first attempt to examine language usage in South African 
congregations, as far as I am aware. Theoretically the languages used in church services (e.g. English, 
3. David Brown shares a similar interest in institutions that fall outside state control, by studying language usage in 
the mining industry. An important difference between mining and a focus on congregations is that the former has an 
explicit language policy, namely compulsory acquisition of the pidgin Fanagolo (Brown 1988, 1992; 1995; see 
Mesthrie 1992) 
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Zulu) are much more open to negotiation than those used in public sector organizations. At the same 
time, churches are not unconnected to other dynamics and institutions, and their members do not 
leave either ideological persuasions or social identities at the door. 
The central concerns of my study is with language usage in racially and linguistically diverse 
congregations; with what the choice of language/s reveals about the relations between language 
groups; and with how this configuration can be explained in terms of theories which describe the 
interconnectedness of the local and the global in terms of a single global system or field. I am 
interested in how religious institutions are affected by extra-institutional factors which function at 
national and global levels. For this reason I examine language choice in a voluntary organisation 
without a formal language policy, as providing an ideal setting which demonstrates the interaction of 
meso- and macro-factors. 
There is some evidence that the state's formal multilingual policy conflicts with an existing informal 
monolingual language ideology, as I discuss in Chapter Five. This would explain why the evidence in 
the public sector is so ambivalent, a subject I referred to elsewhere (Venter 1996). 
The apparent option for English - a former colonial language - in public domains, places language 
practice in South Africa within a pattern well established across Africa by elites, who tend to favour 
European languages above indigenous ones (Prah 1993). Most African states are exoglossic, 
dominated by European languages (English, French, Portuguese) as the national language; yet European 
languages are usually spoken by a small elite comprising ~fewer than 20 per cent" (Kaschula and 
Anthonissen 1995: 1 02, 103). Endoglossic states include "Tanzania (Swahili), Somalia (Somali), Ethiopia 
(Amharic), Sudan (Arabic), and Guinea" (with eight languages, e.g. Fula; Manding) (Kaschula and 
Anthonissen 1995: 1 02). Other states which have indigenous languages (but which do not actively 
promote their use) include "Botswana (Tswana), Burundi (Rundi), Lesotho (Sotho), Malawi (Chewa), 
Rwanda (Kinyarwanda), and Swaziland (siSwati)" (Kaschula and Anthonissen 1995: 1 02). 
Non-racialism and nation-building, as the basis for nonracial, multilingual and multicultural policies, 
represent local attempts to address two paradoxical global trends: (a) increasing pressure for equality 
of opportunity for all (i.e. social equity), and (b) insistence on recognition of cultural differences (see 
Rex 1986: 120). This requires a delicate balancing act between the "politics of equal dignity" and the 
"politics of difference" (Charles Taylor 1994:37-44). The conundrum is that equality usually requires 
cultural assimilation, mediated by those institutions controlled by a dominant cultural group; yet this 
very process inevitably diminishes cultural diversity (Eriksen 1993:143; Rex 1986:120). In South 
Africa equality of opportunity translates into affirmative action, i.e. racial integration; while the 
accommodation of cultural differences takes the form of a muted multiculturalism. 
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An episode on the issues-based television discussion programme "Future Imperfect" clearly 
demonstrated how language preference is affected by a conflict between the politics of equity and of 
difference, in the form of a contestation between mono- and multilingualism. About two years ago Ms 
Anna Boshoff, wife of rightwing leader Carel Boshoff, caused a furore on "Future Imperfect" for 
insisting on speaking in Afrikaans to other participants, on the basis that it was her constitutional right. 
She instantly became the focus of the programme, and was browbeaten until she finally yielded and 
spoke in English. No doubt the positions assumed by the participants on this issue were based on the 
supportive role of white Afrikaans-speakers in the past for apartheid, Ms Boshoff's own current 
Volkstaat persuasions, and the experiences of the other participants of apartheid informed their 
responses. Yet their attitudes flew in the face of resolutions which emphasize "the right of the 
individual to communicate in the language of her/his choice", such as was adopted at the 1992 ANC 
national conference (Benjamin 1994: 1 08). 
The above incident demonstrates several other issues that I would like to explore with reference to 
how language preference links to the perceptions and interrelations between groups of people. First, 
language preference (i.e. which language one chooses to speak) is not necessarily a neutral option, 
but often co-occurs with contestations of power. Second, language preference is a function of a 
language ideology, which determines the attitudes of different language groups towards one another, 
as well as structuring relations between groups in a status hierarchy. In turn, language status is linked 
to language organization and the resources available for its vitality (see Van Binsbergen 1994:167). 
Third, language usage as part of a social identity is largely dependent on the institutional setting within 
which it takes place. The type of setting, in conjunction w.ith the ideology, determines specific types 
of representation, with certain linguistic identities deemed appropriate and others not. These notions 
are well-known to socio-linguists in one form or another. 
In what follows I will in Chapter One introduce the research problem, clarify terms, and outline the 
methodology used. I work~d inductively both in gathering the data and in formulating a theoretical 
framework with which to analyse the information. That is why I do not start by formulating hypotheses 
which not only inform the research question but are also, against the backdrop of a particular theory, 
tested against data. Instead, I end with hypotheses that require further operationalisation. 
Chapter Two introduces the general orientating framework of political sociology of language, which 
includes issues relating to cultural hegemony in the context of nation-building. Chapter Three reviews 
different approaches used to analyse the world system, and advances reasons for the selection of 
world-economic and world-polity theories. In Chapter Four I supply a summary of the distribution of 
language and race groups within the denominations relevant to this study, and outline the levels of 
linguistic diversity and integration in 60 congregations. Chapter Five examines the extent to which the 
pattern in these congregations correspond to national patterns observed in other surveys, which in turn 
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are compared to practices of other African states as part of their nation-building projects. 
In Chapter Six I offer some analytical conclusions, arguing that language practice in South Africa 
converges in a way that suggests a developing hegemony of English, as evident from state and non-
state domains. This seems to be the outcome of three factors: 
a language ideology, institutionalized during the colonial epoch by colonists, during the anti-
apartheid era by the liberation movements, and in the current climate practised (but not officially 
espoused) by the elites and supported by the general populace. Beyond these agencies, the 
dominance of a non-indigenous language can be explained in terms of a cultural extension of the 
economic hegemonies of Britain and the USA in the world-economy; 
- the global norms of the world-polity, as expressed in the globalized ideal of the nation-state, which 
favour the use of a single language in nation-building as demonstrated in the periphera.1 region of 
Africa. I emphasise that the world-polity promotes institutional isomorphism between different 
nation-states, as well as between institutions within the same society; 
- interaction of macro- and meso-factors which differentially affects institutional change within a 
society. 
My major argument throughout is that in South Africa informal understandings have emerged (and 
continue to do so) which - by and large - negate formal multilingual and multicultural policies, while 
supporting non-racialism in state as well as in civil society institutions. I anchor this argument primarily 
- but not exclusively - on the existence of a language ideology which runs counter to the spirit of 
multilingualism. This is what I believe the empirical data on congregations illustrates. The language 
ideology which establishes the dominance of English is linked to global processes and norms. 
2. TERMINOLOGY AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
In the first section below I spell out the central research question and briefly outline the terminology 
and theories that it implies, which are taken up in later sections. Then I discuss in more detail 
terminology used throughout the study. 
2.1 Research question 
The central research question driving this study is "how can a world system perspective help to explain 
the degree of linguistic integration in racially-diverse congregations?" Due to the inductive method that 
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I followed the research question emerged only after the data was collected4 • The question was 
prompted by my interest in understanding local phenomena from a world system perspective, and in 
turn prompted the construction of the two theoretical bases of the study. On the one hand I had to 
formulate what a world system approach was; and on the other I had to conceive a political theory of 
language. As I considerd the economic features of the world-system approach (with a hyphen) to be 
inadequate, due to its lack of explicit attention to religion and culture, an obvious theoretical task was 
to construct a more general world system perspective. A second theoretical project was to find a 
starting block for a discussion which would enable me to indicate the political aspects of language 
choice, and to set up potential linkages with the world system perspective. 
At an explicit level I intend with the question to discern the macro~sociological trends and forces that 
impact on a meso-level unit of analysis (racially-diverse congregations) to produce a particular socio-
cultural outcome (language practice). Language practice has elicited a plethora of studies on the micro-
level. Of these I refer to David Laitin's rational choice theory in Chapter Two, and to similar South 
African research in Chapter Five. While these researchers do attend to wider societal forces, their 
analysis fails to connect conclusions to global processes and structures, so revealing only half the 
elephant. I will attempt to show how this weakness can be corrected through attention to global 
economic structures and global cultural (institutional) processes. The legitimacy of selecting macro-
analytical above micro-level perspectives will be taken up in the section on validity, below, as well as 
in the discussion of what counts as legitimate analysis of an event or structure in global terms. 
At an implicit level the research question indicates a primary theoretical intention to analyse the 
empirical data presented in terms of two further theoretical issues. Language practice in racially-diverse 
congregations serve to illustrate empirically what is essentially a theoretical discussion. The first 
theoretical issue is whether the central claim posed by all world system theories - that the global 
structures and organizes the local, in a dialectic and reflexive manner - can be sustained. The second 
issue concerns the question whether the particular theories that I chose can be used to analyse 
relatively arbitrarily selected local phenomena. The two issues are related: the assumption of the first 
(interconnectedness of most phenomena) begs the question in the second (whether any local 
phenomenon contains traces of the global, and vice versa). The latter problem concerns what can be 
excluded from a world system analysis, what does not count as legitimate analysis. If all phenomena 
are globally interrelated, then micro-sociology faces serious challenges. 
While two world system theories guide my analysis, the data collection and description was informed 
by the theoretical orientation formed by the political sociology of language. That means, to borrow 
4. The data was collected with a particular question in mind, namely whether racially-diverse congregations could 
provide models on which others could build. The assumptions on which the question was based, that congregations 
were at different stages of a linear development process, proved unreliable. 
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from Goke-Pariola5 , that I explore how language use in the religious domain can be interpreted in 
terms of the struggle for power and the legitimation of particular cultural ideologies in other domains, 
in the context of explicit and implicit language policies and group agenda, through the operation of 
nOh-explicit sanctions. This implies that my unit of analysis is congregations as social organizations. 
As befits the political sociology of language, themes under consideration include (a) the complex 
pattern of factors through which congregants have been socialized into a language ideology, which 
(often implicitly) determines decisions about language practice in integrating congregations; (b) the 
extent to which language use converge with or diverge from government policy; (c) the implications 
for the power differentials between English and indigenous languages (see Goke-Pariola 1993: 127); 
and (d) "the implications of language choice and the dominant ideology of the English language" for 
the definition of the relationship between South Africa and the outside world, both Africa and global. 
My assumption, like that of Goke-Pariola (1993:21), is that language use establishes and defines 
power differentials between different groups within congregations, and is related to similar interactions 
in South African society. Congregations not only exhibit the effects of linguistic socialization and 
informally support or oppose government policies in this regard, but also contribute to language 
socialization. 
To summarise, the research question tries to unlock the puzzle of how to explain the dominance of 
English over indigenous languages in a particular domain, which may even be numerically dominated 
by African language speakers. Goke-Pariola outlines how this can be done in relation to setting and 
also hints at the wider forces at work. He notes that in the African context the use of European or 
indigenous languages is largely determined by context. While indigenous languages are usually 
preferred for intragroup situations, formal and informal "factors of setting" - such as work and 
role-relationship of equality or inferiority - determine the choices of participants (Goke-Pariola 
1993:150). 
In religious settings what is important "is not what language is used to worship in what religion ... but 
rather if there is choice, and what such choice may say about the individual, or class, in relation to 
power, or ideology" (Goke-Pariola 1993: 138). The African middle class provides "the meeting ground 
and the major battleground for the power and ideological conflicts between European and African 
languages, between Western and African world views. Occupying a schizophrenic middle ground, the 
middle class is constructing its identity via a simultaneous rejection of the indigenous .. and the 
acceptance of the Western; a process which generates new cultural values in fashion, literature, 
religion, political consciousness, and a sharpening gendering contradiction" (Goke-Pariola 1993:20). 
5. Goke-Pariola's work answers his question in terms of "the struggle for power and the legitimation of particular 
cultural ideologies carried on outside the school system?" (Goke-Pariola 1993: 127). 
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Goke-Pariola's introduction of the notion of language,ideology into the discussion prompted me to pay 
attention - in attempting to answer the research question - to the role of the state. This is because 
language ideologies, like the policies that follow from them, serve the "interests of the state and the 
groups that dominate it" -language "is embedded in the rise of the state" (Tollefson 1991 :200,202). 
That is why a global framework "which emphasizes power and competing interests" is necessary so 
that "the impact of language policy upon the organization and function of society" can be understood 
(Tollefson 1991 :200). From this perspective, state language policy can either threaten non-dominant 
groups, who will try and organize against it; or benefit dominant group members (Tollefson 1991 :200). 
As a result one should ask "What role does language policy play in the function of the state? What are 
the consequences of language policies in the lives of individuals? These should be the fundamental 
questions that guide the effort to understand the relationships between language policy, social 
organization, and political power" (Tollefson 1991 :202. 
Apart from state policies, language education is another mechanism through which relations of power 
function to restrict minority languages to specific domains. Economic inequality is created and 
sustained where the state constructs conditions "which make it virtually impossible for some citizens 
to acquire the language competence they need. This occurs when groups that hold power enjoy 
economic and political advantages based upon their exclusive language proficiency" (Tollefson 
1991 :200,202,203). 
2.2 TERMINOLOGY 
World system is a central organizing concept in this study, and refers to the outcome of global 
political, cultural, and economic processes and forces which increasingly draw the world into a single 
global society. These processes are collectively understood to drive globalization, simultaneously 
generating homogenising and differentiating (anti-systemic) movements. World system, as I use it, is 
similar to global formation and world-system, but distinct from both as it privileges insights from world-
polity studies. 
By world system I mean the global whole, produced by the interconnection and interdependence of 
economic, political, and cultural (institutional) values, exchanges, consumption, structures and 
organization. In this study I will rely primarily on John Meyer and John Boli's world-polity theory for 
analysis, and secondarily on Immanuel Wallerstein's world-economy theory. In addition I will include 
in an eclectic manner one or two of the central features of Roland Robertson's globalisation theory. 
My choice for world-economy (Wallerstein's world-system) and for world-polity is motivated by the 
centrality of these features in the world system. While my emphasis indicate their relevance to this 
study, I do not mean to reduce the world system to these two only. Nor is my selection meant to 
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invalidate other world system theories. 
I wholly agree with Holton that the world system should be described in terms of the intersection of 
economy and culture, thus ensuring multidimensionality. "Reductionist general theories that seek a 
political-economic or cultural explanation of any global phenomenon seem especially weak ... the 
culture of a particular epoch, group, or nation cannot necessarily be read off from a purely political-
economic understanding any more than cultural analysis can explain all patterns of political-economic 
activity" (Holton 1998:195). 
In general, a world system perspective refers to "the recognition of a collective reality at the world 
level that structures the long-term interaction of individual nation-states and national economies" 
(Boswell and Bergesen 1987:4). But that global reality is multidimensional, so that global formation -
"the post-war global institutionalization of political-economic structures" (Holton 1998: 194) - affects 
but does not control national economies, polities, and cultures. Similarly, while the world-economy 
dominates globalization and the world system, the independent functions of a world culture or a world-
polity should not be neglected. 
To avoid confusion, I will use world-economy to refer to the economic features of the world system 
as indicated by "world-system" theorists. I acknowledge the importance of structure in the global 
formation, and of the significance of the world-economy in producing that structure through 
increasingly dense financial and trade networks. I also recognize that to a large extent the 
world-economy as a totality encompasses most system-wide dynamics (Boswell and Bergesen 
1987:4). I also accept that a threefold structure of the global division of labour exists in the form of 
a periphery, semi-periphery, and core. Yet I find the arguments for some independent functioning of 
cultural and political logics equally compelling, as I discuss in Chapter Three, and so reject the notion 
that the world system is structured by a single economic logic. 
By world-polity I mean a system of nation states which operates in terms of global norms, a world 
(political) culture (Meyer 1980: 1 09; compare Robertson 1994: 105). The full scope of world-polity 
theory is more fully discussed in Chapter Three, as is the nature of world culture. "World culture" or 
"global culture" is still a matter of contention and confusion within most attempts to explain the world 
system, although Boli's suggestion of a distinction between core culture and global culture may provide 
a way forward. These arguments are also taken up in Chapter Three. Robertson's globalization theory 
concentrates on the construction of global meanings, and so implies a world culture. Yet Holton claims 
that globalization theories still offer unsatisfactory explanations of cultural dynamics due to their 
underdeveloped nature, entailing "general programmatic statements ..... little more than broad 
orientations to analysis" (Holton 1998:196). Apart from Meyer and Boli-Bennett's work, theories about 
culture in the world system are seldom applied and remain highly abstract. Consequently I fuse the 
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concepts and theories of world-economy and world-polity in the backbone of my arguments, 
supplemented by insights from other scholars when necessary. 
By diverse I refer in general terms to the presence within a congregation of an unspecified number of 
people of colour, and to the presence of more than one language group of indeterminate size. A crucial 
factor is that in either case diversity is conceived in terms of people who regularly attend services; i.e. 
who are members of the congregation. In other words, a congregation is racially diverse when a person 
who in the past had been categorised as black, "coloured", or from Indian or Asian descent, regularly 
attends the congregation in question. A congregation could be considered significantly diverse if such 
a group makes up 20 % or more of a congregation which was previously constituted primarily by 
whites. This is not a wholly satisfactory conceptualization: for instance, it appears to be too sensitive 
to small numbers. For example, a congregation in which one person who speaks Zulu and the rest 
English would be considered linguistically diverse. I distinguish between being diverse and integrated, 
as I discuss more fully below. For purposes of argument throughout the study, integration is a more 
important concept than diversity. 
In this study integrating congregations refer to congregations which display some (unspecified) level 
of linguistic and racial diversity. Congregation refers to the average number of those people (i.e. the 
"congregants"), no longer of school going age, who attended all services on all Sundays during March 
1 997 for the purpose of participating in Christian worship. By linguistic integration I have in mind the 
extent to which particular languages are selected and used in the congregational activities of racially-
diverse congregations. 
Integrating is used in this text ina general, broad sense to mean "racially and/or ethnically-mixed" and 
- by implication - linguistically and culturally diverse. More accurately: these forms of diversity show 
a proportional increase when measured over time; demonstrating an ongoing process of integration. 
Integrated is used in a second specific and limited sense to mean an ideal type of congregation with 
a (relatively) stable racial/ethnic mix, in which the diversity of members is represented at all levels of 
decision-making, and allowed to affect the content and structure of the service. Accordingly, both the 
general and specific meanings can be considered as stages in a process, with mixing as a first and 
integration as a later stage, as long as these are not seen as necessarily sequential in any particular 
direction. Congregations can be founded as relatively fully integrated institutions and remain so, or 
deteriorate to a relatively mixed but unintegrated configuration. But congregations which remain merely 
mixed, without attempting to integrate structures and processes, will function assimilatively, with a 
particular culture, class, race, or language group as the target. 
The integrating and integrative distinctions can be used to indicate the direction in which integrating 
congregations can develop; i.e. in assimilative or integrative ways. The assertions of Kathleen Heugh 
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about language usage at a national level can be applied to describe possible trajectories: 
a) In assimilative congregations marginalised groups are subordinated "under a dominant group", 
despite appearing to draw together diverse groups into a whole. Assimilation results in a hierarchical 
configuration in which "marginalised groups are always at the disadvantage of the culture, language 
and value system of the dominant group" (Heugh 1995:330). Although such congregations contain 
e.g. first language speakers from different groups, English dominates. Such a diglossic situation (in 
which English retains a higher status than other languages) retains inequality, and promotes "a belief 
that language is a problem" (Heugh 1995:331). An overt or covert language policy of a laissez-faire 
nature (or a language-as-human-right policy) which does not contain an effective implementation 
strategy will have the same result, as in such situations language is often treated as a passive rather 
than a positive right (Heugh 1995:331). Even where congregations aim to integrate, the process can 
be subverted by assimilationist tendencies emanating from the dominant classes (compare Heugh 
1995:340). 
b) In integrative congregations integration proceeds from "a recognition of a racially and culturally 
pluralistic society ... in which cultures, languages, and races interrelate so as to bring strength, depth, 
and diversity to the whole. Integration should not mean, or require, the giving up of one's accent, 
songs, or life-style, but it can be the framework in which diversity is shared and appreciated by all" 
(Davis and White 1980: 1 00). In short, integration is achieved through "the drawing together of 
disparate groups, their languages, cultures and value systems, and the establishing of a system in 
which all can coexist interdependently" (Heugh 1995:330). 
In the South African context the question is whether English as language of choice in congregations 
(as in society at large) aids assimilation or not. I believe that the conclusion'that in Africa only "a lingua 
franca is likely to act as an assimilating factor and attract speakers of other languages, even to the 
degree of language shift" is not nuanced enough. Cultural assimilation occurs at different levels and 
at an uneven rate. Brandel-Syrier has shown that education and religion play primary roles in promoting 
cultural - and political - assimilation. Language is only one dimension of culture, so that the presence 
or absence of language shift by itself cannot be the sole indicator of assimilation. By the same token 
language "'alone cannot be expected to bring about national unity or to ensure the loyalty of the 
citizens to the state'" (Kashoki 19826 , quoted in Mansour 1993:127). 
It is necessary to define wl:lat is meant by an institution, and to relate that to what is understood by 
an organization, as the discussion moves in the final chapter towards constructing a theory of 
institutional change. An institution can be defined as complex systems of social relationships and 
6. Kashoki, M E 1982. Achieving nationhood through language: the challenge of Namibia. Third World 
Quarterly 4, 2: 282-290. Also see Kashoki, M E 1982. Rural and Urban Multilingualism in Zambia: 
Some Trends. International Journal of the Sociology of Language 34: 137-166. 
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norms (e.g. private property, marriage) which structure major forms of social relations such as systems 
of education, politics, economics, family and law. Institutional characteristics include stability, 
universality, crystallized human needs, variability, interrelation, and systematization of roles. Berger 
and Luckmann (1967) defined an institution as a social construction of reality - more specifically, as 
a set of socially sanctioned activities which develop slowly over time, until they are treated as 
objective and external, and affect social action (referred to in Granovetter and Swedberg 1992: 1 7,19). 
Language will refer to the vernacular of a particular (ethnic) speech-community, i.e. English, Afrikaans, 
Zulu, and so on. Categorizations like these inevitably involve some degree of objectification, which 
belies the complexities found in reality. 
Language practice refers to the language/s in which the congregation has, by consent or default, 
chosen to conduct its activities. Strictly speaking, language use expresses the "preference" of the 
congregational leadership only; but I argue that by accepting the status quo the congregation is also 
indicating their preference. While it is possible that some congregants see themselves as lacking the 
power to challenge existing practices, or do not see the need to do so, the outcome still expresses the 
language preference of the leadership. For this reason I use language choice or language use 
interchangeably with language preference. 
Language ideology is the set of ideas which supports and promotes the use of a particular language 
within a particular social setting in line with the economic and political interests of the members of a 
particular class (Tollefson 1991: 132). Language ideology functions to rationalize or justify perceptions 
of language use, by making usage seem natural and universal, and neglecting the historical context 
(Woolard and Schieffelin 1994:57-58). To suggest that the majority of South Africans prefer English 
as a consequence of the operation of a language ideology raises the question whether any 
contradictions should be ascribed to internal inconsistencies within the same ideology, or whether in 
fact two separate ideologies operate side by side. On the other hand, on what grounds can this 
preference be described as an ideology, rather than an expression of social values? 
Ideology means a general consensus of ideas which affects social behaviour. While a dominant 
ideology usually serves to promote the interests of the ruling class, dominance does not exclude 
contending ideologies, which remain possible - if often ineffective. On the other hand dominant 
ideologies are Janus-faced, in that they can be turned against the interests of those that promote 
them7 • I agree with Eagleton's (1991) assertions in this regard: ideology functions at different levels, 
is internally not completely consistent. I argue that the integrative, action-oriented, and universalizing 
functions of ideology are most clearly operative in language preference. 
7. I am grateful to John Boli for pointing this out in a review of this study. 
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Eagleton defines ideology in six sequential ways: 
a. "the general material process of production of ideas, beliefs and values in social life" , a politically 
and epistemologically neutral term which is narrower than the definition of culture as "all of the 
practices and institutions of a form of life'!; it refers to the way people engage in social practices rather 
than the institutions in which such practices are located (Eagleton 1991 :28); 
b. "ideas and beliefs which symbolize the conditions and life-experiences of a specific, socially 
significant group or class" (Eagleton 1991 :29); 
c. "the promotion and legitimation of the interests of such social groups in the face of oPPosing 
interests" - i.e. which is action-oriented (vs. reflective), suasive (vs. veridical), with an emphasises on 
relational or conflictive dimensions with regards to "the reproduction of social power as a whole" 
(Eagleton 1991 :29); 
d. "the promotion and legitimation of sectoral interests ... of a dominant social power" in such a way 
that it unites social formations while "securing the complicity of subordinated classes" without the 
latter losing their ability to function as rational actors (Eagleton 1991 :30); 
e. "ideas and beliefs which help to legitimate the interests of a ruling group or class specifically by 
distortion and dissimulation8 " (Eagleton 1991 :30); 
f. "false or deceptive beliefs" arising "from the material structure of society as a whole"(Eagleton 
1991:30). 
Nation-building is generally used as a synonym for state-building and for national integration, and 
involves a struggle "for the institutionalized domination over society by a ruling cadre" (Laitin 1992:9). 
Strictly speaking, state and nation-building can be distinguished: Laitin (1992) argues that (a) 
nation-building is "the project of cultural homogenization of the tribes who live within the boundaries 
of the internationally accepted state boundaries" (Laitin 1992:8). Within this paradigm the nation is 
identified "in foreign terms", with the former colonial language as the preferred lingua franca for "most 
newly independent states" (Laitin 1992:9). On the other hand (b) state-building is the establishment 
of organizations to maintain order and extract resources. Laitin argues that rulers are more interested 
in state-building than nation-building, although they "use the symbols of a nation" (Laitin 1992:9). 
The nation/state-building distinction allows language conflict to be viewed as concerned "with the 
terms of the state's domination over society" - not in terms of modernising elites opposing traditionalist 
societal groups. Language, as one aspect of "the nation ... gets pulled into the battle for the 
institutionalized domination over society by a ruling cadre"; i.e. state-building (Laitin 1992:9). The 
struggle between elite groups at best takes the form of a symbolic struggle across various 
socio-political domains to obtain power, revealed by e.g the use of particular languages or varieties 
8. Eagleton notes that this definition does not imply that some political ideas are not ideological, and does not help 
to define the activities of opposition groups (Eagleton 1991 :30). 
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(Goke-Pariola 1993:65). Language policies are the outcome of such symbolic conflicts, between e.g. 
a Westernised elite class "who have mastered English .. and whose interests largely coincide with 
those of Western political powers", and various ethnic elites (Goke-Pariola 1993:65). 
A ruling ~Iite is not monolithi~ in composition, and comprises only one of several competing groups,. 
along with other individuals, ethnies, and ideologies (Goke-Pariola 1993:59). The elite "at times speak 
as champions of their own mother tongue" (i.e. for cultural integrity), and at other times "passionately 
advocate ... a single, indigenous language as official language" (Laitin 1992:4). Obviously the political 
agenda behind elite discourse is often to promote the interests of their own ethnic group (Goke-Pariola 
1993:60,64). 
The nation/state-building distinction has some utility in the South African context, as the state's 
nation-building policies cannot be said to promote cultural homogenization. Yet Laitin's distinction 
seems to exclude nation-building as an attempt to manage the diversity of post-colonial African states 
while creating a single overarching national identity. Institution-building (Laitin's state-building) should 
be seen as a subset of this process (Goke-Pariola 1993, 8amgbose 1991: 10). 
Multiculturalism refers to an ideology which promotes the acceptance of cultural variety within the 
same unit, such as a pluralistic society, while acknowledging that unequal relationships exist between 
dominant and subordinate cultures. I use "multiculturalism" to indicate "a radical social transformative 
perspective", which addresses the functional and status aspects of languages (Heugh 1995:330). 
Race was retained because it remains an operational social construct in the South African context, 
despite ideological and technical problems involved. Racial composition adds a different dynamic to 
the functioning of a congregation or denomination, and so is worthy of isolation (see De Gruchy 
1986:246). Although some would no doubt prefer non-racial terms, I am convinced that a focus on 
race is essential to expose overt and covert racist patterns of behaviour. While racism is not implictly 
in focus throughout the study, another related form of discrimination is, where language forms the 
operational construct. 
3. METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLING PROCEDURE 
As noted above, I conducted the study by means of inductive methods that operated at two levels. 
First in the collection of data, then in the construction of a theoretical framework to interpret the data. 
The reasons for this way of working are that not only does no political sociology of language as such 
exist, but neither is there an existing world system window from which questions about language and 
religion can be viewed. As a result the structure of this study may appear somewhat unorthodox. 
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While I could have written the study as though it was a deducive work, this would not only have been 
dishonest but would also not have done justice to the data. 
3.1 Methodological strategies 
The empirical data for this study was collected as part of research conducted between 1995 and 
1997. I was particularly interested in finding congregations with high levels of racial and high levels 
of linguistic diversity. The unit of analysis was congregations, a meso-level phenomenon, but various 
aspects of demography and diversity that affect congregations at the macro- and micro-levels were 
included. Although the research approach was qualitative, I attempted to gather a representative 
sample across the three denominations selected. 
I lean towards a nomothetic perspective, wanting to explain similarities within different congregations 
by reference to the global structure. Yet this does not mean that idiographic elements are not present; 
particularly as I consider the 60 cases as a single case study in order to place them within a world 
system perspective. 
My investigation proceeded from an implicit action and advocacy research, in which the researcher 
identifies with and promotes the cause of the research subjects. One of my personal goals is to 
empower culturally mixed congregations to deal with their diversity through exposure to information 
about other congregations which face comparable issues. Broadly speaking, participatory researchers 
believe that the researcher must use his/her information to empower those who are being researched. 
This clearly places participatory research on the opposite side of the spectrum from those who argue 
that researchers should play a "neutral" role, attempting to not directly affect what is being 
researched. This does not mean that participatory research is non-reflexive: it includes the position that 
unless researchers deliberately counteract the inequalities of class, race and gender, their research can 
reproduce these. 
3.1 .1 Sampling procedure 
The rationale for the inclusion of three of the four major denominations turned on size of affiliation and 
non-segregationist ideology. Individual congregations were selected primarily for being racially diverse. 
The three major "English-speaking" Christian denominations include the Anglicans (Church of the 
Province of South Africa), Methodists (Methodist Church of South Africa), and Roman Catholics (see 
Table 1). In addition a major Pentecostal-Charismatic grouping was also' included as representing 
different theological and structural traditions, namely the International Federation (formerly 
"Fellowship") of Christian Churches. 
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Table 1: Size of largest denominations represented in study, 1992 estimates 
Denomination 
Anglican 
Catholic 
Methodist 
IFCC# 
Source: Froise 1992. 
Affiliation 
2000000 
2 750000 
2500000 
400000 
Number of churches 
1 200 
875 parishes 
6450 
600 
Note: # IFCC = International Federation of Christian Churches. 
Number of clergy 
12 bishops 
1 300 priests 
32 bishops 
1 280 priests 
941 ministers 
900 ministers 
As Table 2 shows, the three major denominations represented in the sample have a combined 
affiliation of 7,25 million people - about 26% of the total SA population, and 28% of all South African 
Christians (unless otherwise indicated, figures reflect the Human Science Research Council's 1993 
Omnibus Survey). 
Table 2: Affiliation as percentage of the total South African population, 1960-1993 
1960 1970 1980 1993 
# Anglican 8.78% 7.87% 6.48% 5.98% 
Methodist 10.68% 10.58% 8.49% 9.52% 
Catholic 6.73% 8.71 % 9.47% 10.18% 
Source: HSRC Omnibus Survey 1993. Used by permission of the Sociology Departments of 
Huguenot College and the University of Pretoria. 
Note: # Includes the Church of the Province of South Africa as well as the Church of 
England. 
, 
In order to elicit names of integrating congregations, telephone interviews were first conducted with 
denominational church officials to compile a list of regional church officials (e.g. bishops or 
administrative secretaries). This produced a list of 56 denominational officials to which faxes 
requesting information on racially and culturally integrating churches were sent: 1 5 Anglican diocesan 
administrators; 11 Methodist bishops (excluding the presiding bishop); 30 Catholic bishops (including 
5 archbishops and one auxiliary bishop). 
Regional church officials were requested by fax to forward the addresses of congregations in their 
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areas which they believed contained "significant mixes of people from different race or language 
groups". Where no responses were forthcoming a second fax was sent, and as far as funds would 
allow this was followed up by a telephone reminder. Yet some church officials did not respond at all, 
most notably the Catholic Bishop of Johannesburg (Bishop R J Orsmond), while his counterpart the 
former Methodist Bishop of South Western Transvaal (Bishop Peter Storey) sent the official list of 
bishops' names, not congregations - despite two attempts to get him to do so. A subsequent informal 
conversation with the present presiding MCSA bishop, Rev H Mvume Dandala, ascertained that few 
congregations in the Johannesburg area were attempting this transition. 
The names of 222 congregations were forwarded, and considered to constitute the sampling universe. 
They represented the total number of denominational sub-regions fairly well: 
a. Catholics: 12 out of 27 diocese and archdiocese (Oudtshoorn, Eshowe, Kroonstad, Bethlehem, Port 
Elizabeth, Keetmanshoop, Rustenburg, Kimberley, Pietermaritzburg, Queenstown, Aliwal North, 
Keimoes, Marianhill, Kokstad, Klerksdorp, Witbank, Ingwavuma, De Aar, Dundee, Tzaneen; as well as 
the Archdiocese of Bloemfontein, of Cape Town, of Durban, of Johannesburg, of Pretoria - excluding 
Windhoek, Manzini, Gaborone, Rundu); 
b. Anglicans: 11 out of 12 diocese (Kimberley-Kuruman, George, Natal, Pretoria, St Mark, Christ the 
King, Grahamstown, Johannesburg, Klerksdorp, Zululand, Umzimvubu); 
c. Methodist Districts: 6 out of 11 (Cape of Good Hope, Grahamstown, Queenstown, Kimberley and 
Bloemfontein, Northern Free State and Lesotho, Natal Coastal, Natal West, South Western Transvaal, 
South Eastern Transvaal and Swaziland, Limpopo, Clarkebury - excluding Mozambique and Namibia 
Districts) . 
The Catholic congregations were concentrated mainly in three diocese, namely the Diocese of 
Oudtshoorn (19 congregations), Diocese of Dundee (12), and the Archdiocese of Durban (18). The 
highest concentrations of Anglican congregations were from the Diocese of Johannesburg (10 
congregations), and the Diocese of Natal (10). Methodist candidates were clustered in the District of 
the Cape of Good Hope (12 congregations), District of the Limpopo (12), and Natal West (12). 
As Table 3 on the next page show, the final sample contained representation from the following church 
regions: 7 out of 27 Catholic diocese and archdiocese (Durban, Pretoria, Eshowe, Kimberley, Kokstad, 
Kroonstad, Dundee); 8 out of 12 Anglican diocese (Cape of Good Hope District, Kimberley-Kuruman, 
Natal, Pretoria, St Mark, Diocese of Christ the King, Johannesburg, Klerksdorp, Zululand, 
Grahamstown); and 3 out of 11 Methodist Districts (Cape of Good Hope, Natal West District, 
Limpopo). 
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Table 3: Denominations by provinces, church regions and number of congregations In = 60) Source: Own Data, 1997. 
Provinces CPSA RC MCSA IFCC PCSA IND FreeMeth Subtotal 
Dioceses of: Dioceses of: District of: 
Western Cape 2 Cape Town 2 Good 3 3 1 11 
Hope 
Eastern Cape Grahamstown 1 1 2 
Northern Cape Kimberley-Kuruman 2 2 
Free State Kroonstad 3 3 
Gauteng Pretoria 1 ArchDiocese of 2 1 6 
Christ the .King Pretoria 
2 
Kwazulu- Natal 5 Kokstad 1 Natal 4 1 1 24 
Natal Zulu land 2 Eshowe 1 West 
Dundee 3 
ArchDiocese of 
Durban 6 
North West Klerksdorp 1 1 
Northern Province Limpopo 1 1 2 
Mapumalanga St Mark 4 4 
Unknown 2 2 1 5 
Total: 22 20 9 6 , , , 60 
--- - -----------
18 
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3.1.2 Construction of questionnaire 
The initial questionnaire was based on the Handbook for Congregational Studies (Carroll e.a. 1986) 
and underwent three versions during the pilot study before being finalised. Because of the difference 
between questions in a pilot study regarding language and musical preferences and those of the final 
survey, little data can be compared across the two surveys. 
As Appendix One shows, the final questionnaire divided into two major sections, of which the first 
probed current levels of diversity (Questions 1-10), and the second the demographic profile of 
congregations (Questions 11-22). As some of the questions are discussed in greater detail below under 
the rubric of operationalization, I will here just discuss general features of the questionnaire as a whole. 
In designing it I tried to take into account the limited time that congregational leaders have by keeping 
the questionnaire as short as possible. For this reason many responses were limited to marking one 
answer. At the same time I tried to include open-ended responses where these seemed most relevant. 
In Section One, Question 1 - which probed most influential forms of diversity - combined multiple 
response options with the possibility of open-ended answers (see Appendix One). The options were 
included because in my experience some congregations resent the implication that a particular issue 
(e.g. racial integration) would be a problem for them, while they may want to focus on another (e.g. 
cultural incorporation). Other questions which left room for open-ended responses included Question 
3 which delved into effects of cultural diversity, and Question 6 which related to general processes 
of cultural integration. Two SUb-questions probed whether structures were developed by congregations 
in response to increased cultural diversity (Question 6.1); and asked respondents to indicate examples 
of such structures (Question 6.2). Additional SUb-questions enquired about the date when this occurred 
(Question 6.3), and the consequences (Question 6.4). Cultural diversity was defined in the 
questionnaire as "styles of singing, praying, communion, decision-making". 
Congregants' perceptions of diversity were probed by the question "Do people comment on diversity; 
if yes, negatively; or otherwise?" (Question 2). This query was analytically related to Questions 3, 6, 
9 (interaction between diverse groups) and 10 (diversity of congregation). I assumed that congregants 
who felt that increased diversity should not change the way in which the congregation functions would 
not make any attempt to adopt new structures or processes. 
The two questions which together form the spinal column of this study are Question 4, which queries 
the level of linguistic diversity in congregational services, and Question 10, which probed the level of 
racial diversity in congregational structures (e.g. leadership) and functioning (e.g. services). A number 
of related questions where intended to test whether contextual geographic (rather than external 
institutional) variables were linked to diversity and integration. These included Question 7, which 
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attends to the levels of diversity in neighbourhoods around congregations, and Question 16 (Section 
Two), distance for congregants to the Sunday meeting place. Question 19 (Section Two) was linked 
to linguistic integration, as it probed the number of speakers of different first languages. Questions 
which related to racial integration included those on racial composition of the congregation (Question 
21), and those which periodized racial integration (Question 22). 
"Culture" was - somewhat problematically and clumsily - spelled out as including "language, music 
styles, and ways of understanding life". I formulated this assumption in the question: "Do people in 
your congregation think that cultural diversity (language, music styles, and ways of understanding life) 
should change the way that the congregation is run; yes or no?" (Question 3). Obviously I am not 
suggesting that these reified, static perceptions prevent people from constructing the contents of 
culture in an ongoing and fluid way, nor am I ignoring the difficulties involved in tying language to 
culture, as I discuss in Chapter Two. 
But my perception, formed in workshops with churches, is that congregants do tend to perceive 
culture in this way, even where they are aware of its temporal fluidity. I checked my assumption by 
eliciting open examples to a later question "Have any structures or processes been developed to deal 
with cultural diversity in your congregation, yes or no?", with "structures or processes" defined as 
"styles of singing, praying, communion, decision-making" (Question 6). As expected, the examples 
supplied most often reflected language, associated with hymns, sermons, liturgy. This could be 
ascribed to the effect of the preceding questions. Nevertheless, due to the difficulties with these 
questions, I decided not to read too much into these answers, and they do not form a substantial part 
of my arguments. 
Section Two consisted of questions relating to the general demographic profile of congregants (see 
Appendix One). Of these, questions relating to congregational size (Question 11.3), separate services 
(Question 11.5), distance for congregants to the Sunday meeting place (Question 16), number of first 
language speakers (Question 19), racial composition (Question 21), and periodization of racial 
integration (Question 22) seemed particular relevant, as discussed above. Congregational size has been 
indicated in some congregational studies literature as an independent variable that affects the dynamics 
of congregations. Whether separate services were held or not is related to the strategies of 
congregations to deal with increasing racial and cultural diversity, and so links up with Questions 1 
to 3, as well as 6,7 and 10. 
As many responses depended on how well congregational leaders knew their congregations. As the 
accuracy of their answers could not be ascertained, answers were treated as general guidelines rather 
than as hard facts. I discuss this issue in more detail under Section 3.2.2, Validity and reliability of 
data, below. 
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3.1.3 Data collection strategy 
An initial s.mall-scale pilot study was conducted between December 1995 and January 1996, involving 
36 congregations. The aim of the pilot study was to test the questionnaire and to obtain information 
to guide further research. Addresses of suitable congregations were obtained by means of a snowball 
method. Table 4 represents a summary of the data collection strategy for both the pilot and final 
surveys. 
Table 4: Summary of data collection strategy 
Pilot Final Total: 
Study Study 
Number of denominational officials contacted for information 3 56 59 
Number of congregations identified 36 222 230* 
Number of questionnaires mailed out 24 222 246 
Number of questionnaires received 24 75 91* 
Interviews by telephone 24 12 36 
Interviews by telephone and face-to-face (included in figure above) 7 - 7 
Number of congregations involved in workshops 36 - 36 
Notes: * Includes congregations from the pilot study who were also part of the final survey 
Three data-gathering methods were used, comprising: a postal survey of 24 congregations; workshops 
initially involving 36 congregations were held in Pretoria (1996), Durban (1996), Cape Town (1995 
and 1996). The purpose of the workshop was twofold: to share information from a 1994 study of 
mixed congregations (Venter 1994), and to gather information from congregations in a setting 
conducive to face-to-face questions. In addition three workshops were conducted in Cape Town 
(1996) on the historical process of racial incorporation in three Anglican congregations which claim 
to have been racially mixed since inception (St Paul's CPSA Rondebosch, Holy Trinity CPSA Kalk Bay, 
St Saviour's CPSA Claremont). Lastly I conducted telephone interviews with 23 clergy and a Methodist 
bishop. Not all congregations involved in the pilot study were included in the final phase on which this 
study rests. 
Twenty-three of the 24 congregations involved in the survey participated in the four workshops. Eight 
of these were not included in the final survey, due to my perception that they would balk at being 
involved in a third research event. 
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The final survey was initiated in March 1997, and comprised a postal survey of 222 congregations and 
12 telephone interviews. In the survey clergy were asked to complete a questionnaire with the 
assistance of at least 5 lay leaders (see Appendix One: Questionnaire). Rough estimates were 
accepted. Congregations were reminded of the deadline by post card, mailed out three weeks (April 
1997) after the initial questionnaire went out. This was followed up by telephone reminders starting 
about two weeks later, which were also used to conduct interviews. Twelve telephone interviews were 
conducted with clergy to provide greater clarity. 
The final survey yielded 60 valid cases out of 75 received, resulting in a final response rate of 34% 
when measured against the universe of 222. Seven dominations were represented, i.e. the Church of 
the Province (CPSA), the Roman Catholic Church (RC)' Methodist Church (MCSA), the 
(pentecostal-oriented) International Federation of Christian Churches (IFCC) and one Independent, one 
Presbyterian, one Free Methodist Church. Of the 60 cases, 35% (21) were congregations of the CPSA, 
33% (20) of the RC, 15% (9) of the MCSA, while 10% '(6) belonged to the IFCC. These 60 
congregations represent an estimated total of 18 586 people,. a substantial figure, of whom the 
Charismatic-Pentecostal IFCC and Catholics make up the two single largest groups at 50.16% and 
30.35% respectively, as Table 5 demonstrates. 
Table 5: Number of congregants as percentage of sample 
Denomination Congregants % of sample 
Anglican 2 193 11.8% 
Catholic 5640 30.35% 
Methodist 1 195 6.43% 
Subtotal: 9028 48.57% 
IFCC 9322 50.16% 
FreeMeth 56 .30% 
INO 100 .54% 
PCSA 80 .43% 
Subtotal 9558 51.43% 
Total: 18586 100% 
Source: Own Data, 1997. 
Seven dominations were represented in the 60 congregations. i.e. the Church of the Province (CPSA)' 
the Roman Catholic Church (RC), Methodist Church (MCSA), the (pentecostal-oriented) International 
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Fellowship of Christian Churches (IFCC) and one case each of Independent, Presbyterian, and Free 
Methodist Churches. Table 6 demonstrates that of the 60 cases, 35% (21) were congregations of the 
Church of the Province of South Africa (CPSA), 33% (20) of the Roman Catholic Church (RC), 15% 
(9) of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa, while 10% (6) belonged to the International Fellowship 
of Christian Churches (IFCC). 
Table 6: Number of congregations by denomination (N = 60) 
Denomination Number of cases Percent 
Anglican 21 35% 
Catholic 20 33.3% 
Methodist 9 15% 
IFCC 6 10% 
PCSA 1 1.7% 
Full Gospel 1 1.7% 
Independent 1 1.7% 
Free Methodist 1 1.7% 
Source: Own Data, 1997. 
3.2 Analytical strategy 
Clearly my analysis centres on one particular social phenomenon (language practice) in a single unit 
of analysis (racially-mixed congregations). Yet the analysis itself moves between three different levels 
(national society, the African region, and the global system), regarded as necessary for a more 
complete perception of the processes which structure language practice. Obviously the methods used 
to analyse the three levels differ from those used to understand the unit of analysis. 
At the congregational level of analysis first-hand empirical data was collected on this unit of analysis 
using the methods described above. The twin problems that all congregations in the sample have to 
deal with is that of race and of language. I choose to treat the first as the independent and the second 
as the dependent variable, so that my initial question was "what happens to language diversity in 
racially-diverse congregations?" The analysis of this data was placed within a national framework, and 
similarities between its configuration and other nation-states as sub-units of the Sub-Saharan Africa 
region considered. 
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But when I shifted to the regional level of analysis, empirical data became tertiary, while at the global 
level I depended on theories on the world system, which did not always have an explicit empirical 
base. Race becomes less important than language at these levels, due to the scarcity of social science 
research·on the effect of race and ethnicity on religious structures. While an equally small amount of 
work has been done on the reciprocity between language and religious structures, quite a corpus of 
work has evolved on language in relation to structures of state and of stratification. 
Under these conditions my initial question became secondary, so that the new primary question 
became "can what happens to language diversity in racially-diverse congregations be explained in 
terms of the world system?" Again I was faced with the lack of literature on language and religion in 
the world-system; which forced me to look at other global perspectives which pay attention to the role 
of culture within the current world system (without the hyphen). 
Equally important is the fact that while I want to say something theoretical about the interaction 
between the global and the local, my study focuses on a particular local phenomenon which I wish to 
relate to the global. In other words, mine is not a study of the world system as such, but of the 
possible effects of the world system on the local. 
3.2.1 Operationalising congregational diversity and integration 
In order to better represent the data on congregations, I distinguish between diversity and integration, 
and then use these to develop measures of the degree to which each is present. Questions were 
included in the survey which probed the extent of internal and external diversity (and possible 
interrelation between them), as well as the degree of integration (and possible effect on structures and 
interaction) . 
Diversity answers the question "Are any differences present? n, while integration addresses the 
question "How are these differences included?" The difficulty is that once integration has happened, 
at whatever level and to whatever degree, it becomes part of the diversity in the congregation. By the 
same token, integration cannot happen before some form of diversity is present. As a result, the 
integration-diversity distinction cannot be maintained strictly, yet this does not undermine its 
usefulness completely. Conceptually integration refers to processes which incorporate differences in 
social structures, so that diversity is the outcome. From this perspective diversity is a more passive 
and integration a more active process. 
Diversity within a congregation was operationalised by means of several questions relating to the type 
of diversity that influences the functioning of the congregation (Question 1 in the questionnaire - see 
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Appendix A), members' valuations of diversity (Questions 2 and 3), home languages of congregants 
(Question 19), nationalities of congregants (Question 20), and racial composition of congregation 
(Question 21). Socio-economic status was determined with regards to gender, age, marital status, 
income, occupation, and education (Questions 12-18). In addition, level and type of external diversity 
were measured by the presence or otherwise of racial, linguistic, and cultural mix in the surrounding 
neighbourhood (Question 7). Of particular interest was whether the degree of internal diversity 
(composition of the congregation) related to levels of external diversity (composition of the 
neighbourhood), with distance that congregants lived from the congregation's meeting place as 
intervening variable (Question 16). 
Integration was conceptualised along three axes: racial integration (Question 10); linguistic integration 
(Questions 1 and 4); and musical integration (Question 5). Respondents were asked to outline the 
processes that led to this threefold integration (Question 22 and 6) and to identify any changes that 
happened as a result (Question 6). The extent of linguistic integration in each congregation was 
determined as occurring in terms of a linguistic-diversity index comprising 5 categories, namely number 
of languages spoken in sermons, hymns, liturgy, praying, and readings (Question 4). Seven 
congregations reported a linguistic-integration index of 10 (out of a maximum of 15)' and four (7,4%) 
indicated an index between 11 and 14. Level of racial integration was measured in terms of lay 
leadership, outreach programmes, and home groups (Question 10). 
I assumed that the level of integration was interrelated to the level of diversity. So, in measuring racial 
integration of leadership, I had to take into account the extent of racial diversity present in the 
congregation, as lay leadership (in contrast to clergy) must be appointed from among the congregants. 
A congregation with only two race groups is unlikely to have three races represented on its leadership; 
it will be structurally integrated to the extend that both race groups are represented on the leadership. 
By the same token a congregation with a mixture of race groups in its membership, but lacking racial. 
representation in leadership, cannot be considered to be integrated along that dimension. The 
interrelatedness of integration and diversity was tested in questions relating to linguistic and racial 
interactions in formal and informal contexts (Questions 8 and 9). 
3.2.2 Validity and reliability of data 
While the small scale of my finai sample of 60 congregations precludes generalizations in the strict 
sense of the word, the cases do provide broad enough evidence to comment on general patterns. This 
is especially true where the data is supported by numerous already completed studies of related 
phenomena in society, such as language preference. Given the macro-level focus of this study, 
investigation at the micro-level was precluded. 
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Beyond crude quantitative analysis more complex statistical operations were precluded due to two 
factors: data was drawn from a non-probability sample, that represented the impressions of leaders 
of congregations. The accuracy of the leaders' impressions could not be ascertained, nor whether they 
followed the recommended procedure of consulting with five others in answering questions. Reliability 
of some questions seemed highly problematic, and these were generally disregarded; for example, 
questions from Section Two in the questionnaire which asked respondents to estimate age groups, 
occupations, and education. 
In defence of my data-gathering strategy I must indicate, however, that certain congregations, to my 
knowledge, do attempt to keep accurate records of such matters as Sunday attendance. Some 
research has also indicated that clergy's impressions of their congregations can be relatively accurate. 
This seems to be bourne out by the remarkable stability of data over the fourteen months that passed 
between the pilot and final surveys for congregations which had participated in both, like Fort Beaufort 
Presbyterian Church. On the other hand, in one instance where the clergy-person clearly did not follow 
the procedures for completing the questionnaire, and bad instead asked individual leaders to complete 
questionnaires by themselves, resp0r:'ses were highly divergent. 
I conclude with a brief comment on the reliability of the data on the crucial variable in the study, 
namely the number of languages used in services. Should this data not also be dismissed because it 
is based on clergy estimates? I would argue not. Clergy are usually directly involved in the planning 
of services, and themselves officiate during the services. And so the probability that clergy llliouid 
inaccurately report the number of languages that they themselves would have to use is exceedingly 
small. Reliability is increased by the straightforward nature of Question 4 on language use (see 
Appendix A), which allows little room for inaccurate interpretation. 
In the analysis of the data in Chapter Four the qualitative information from the interviews and 
workshops is combined with the general quantitative picture provided by the survey. 
3.2.3 Legitimacy of analytical method 
In this section I consider two central questions of relevance to this study: first, what are the correct 
ways of studying the world-system? and, second, when can a particular instance legitimately be 
analysed within the world-system paradigm? While the first question raises the issue of validity, the 
second relates to falsifiability. An important general question is whether the jump from local cases to 
global structures and back involves a legitimate use of methods. Specifically, is the movement from 
local practices, to global processes not an ecological error, in which two phenomena operating at 
different levels are incorrectly treated as if they belong to the same category? 
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In what follows I will utilise Chase-Dunn (1989) to address first the issue of research methods, in order 
to locate my own approach in a wider debate, and to consider the validity of the methods that I 
employ. Next I consider issues relating to falsifiability. In this way I attempt to address both 
methodological questions along with their underlying issues. 
My intention to analyse integrative processes against the widest possible scope raises questions 
regarding the validity of my interpretations. In short, how can I know that language practice in a local 
institution is affected by global structures, agencies, and norms? As outlined in the previous section, 
I intend to show "how social structure affects a group's language attitudes", for example by 
cumulatively affecting language choice in such a way that indigenous languages eventually are 
devalued (compare Kulick 1992:8). 
Similar studies - with reference to language shift - have identified the relevance of macro-sociological 
forces such as "migration, industrialization, urbanization, proletarianization, and government policies". 
But theories which highlight macro-sociological causative factors have been criticized as "mechanical", 
and as possessing limited explanatory and predictive abilities (Kulick 1992:8). How can this be 
avoided? 
Chase-Dunn (1989:310) maintains that studies of other units of analysis such as individuals, 
organizations, classes, states, zones, etc. are not "irrelevant for our understanding of the 
world-system. Indeed, our conception of the world-system as a holistic structure includes these 
levels." He continues that "some world-system processes must be studied by examining smaller units 
of analysis". This begs the question whether my study of congregations falls into the latter category; 
or could language practice have been equally well-explained by other means? 
As a result of opting for a macro-meso approach, critics may argue that I neglect micro-level individual 
agency, particularly congregational language use as the outcome of cumulative choices exercised by 
lay members. While I do factor individual choice into the analytical theory that I develop, it is true that 
individual motivations behind language use in congregations remain empirically unsubstantiated, and 
were not methodologically catered for in my survey. My method of data gathering took the form of 
questionnaires completed by leadership groups, with some individual interviews for clarification. What 
my study lacks is attention to individual congregants and their attitude towards target language, 
interaction with language teachers, age, ability to learn a language, and level of education (see 
Tollefson 1991 :27). 
The assumptions behind the micro-approach is "that the key to understanding social systems is the 
individual ... that individual decisions are predictable but free; and that the proper focus of social 
research is the analysis of individual decisions" (Tollefson 1991 :28). Analysis which favour 
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micro-variables "located within the individual" as analytic tools to explain language behaviour, has 
been characterised as "neoclassic" (Tollefson 1991 :26). Kulick argues that a micro-sociological study 
allows for a focus on "shifts in personal and group values and goals" in a community setting (Kulick 
1992:19). 
A key explanatory device in neoclassic micro-perspective is accommodation theory, often used to 
explain language behaviour between individuals from different ethnic groups. Accommodation theory 
combines key terms (convergence9 , divergence, speech maintenance, psychological convergence) 
with four social-psychological theories (Tollefson 1991 :70-71). The latter include (a) similarity 
attraction theory, which states that "people are attracted to those whom they perceive as having 
similar beliefs, values and attitudes"; (b) social exchange theory, which argues that people make 
language decisions about convergence or divergence freely, based on their cost-benefits analysis; (c) 
causal attribution theory, which presumes that people have individual motives for language decisions; 
(d) ingroup distinctiveness theory, which explains linguistic and cultural differences as favourable to 
the group (Tollefson 1991 :71-72). Using the above constructs, accommodation theory can predict e.g. 
language loss in terms of the perceived low levels of ethno-linguistic vitality of a group (Tollefson 
1 991 : 71 ). Ethno-linguistic vitality is understood to be determined by status variables (the economic 
resources, status, and prestige available to a group and its language); demographic variables (number 
of first-language speakers, relative distribution in relation to other speakers, population trends); and 
institutional support ("representation of speakers of a language in formal and informal institutions") 
(Tollefson 1991 :71). 
In the light of the above, I now list the reasons why I chose a macro-analysis which could include 
meso-level organizations, and discuss what remains unexplained as a result of this approach. The term 
meso-level is best understood in comparison to micro- or macro-level. Smelser (1997) maintains that 
the micro-level emphasises the individual in relation to the social, while macro-level analysis examines 
the state and society as a whole. By contrast, the meso-level refers to entities such as communities, 
voluntary associations, political parties, and trade unions. For Smelser there are actually four levels of 
sociological analyses, as he adds the global, which refers to suprastate aspects of the social system. 
Ferree and Hall (1994) discuss the three levels as part of stratification theory. Accordingly, gender is 
perceied as a micro-phenomenon which results from socialization, to race as a meso-factor which 
involves group interaction, and class as a macro-phenomenon which can be used for cross-national 
comparisons. Instead, Ferree and Hall propose that feminist theory incorporates an alternative model 
9. Convergence refers to the attempt by a speaker to make his speech more similar to that of another speaker; 
divergence is the opposite; maintenance indicates no change; and psychological convergence refers to the unintended 
outcome when a speaker intends to converge but achieves the opposite. Convergence or divergence can be upwards 
or downwards, depending on whether the adjustment is made by a speaker with higher or one with lower status 
(Tollefson 1991 :70). 
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which analyses these phenomena at all three levels as interactive processes. 
First, my methodology focuses on how leadership - not members - perceive and structure diversity. 
This enables me at the theoretical level to compare diversity management strategies in state and 
church, which are effected by leadership. In the case of the state, diversity is managed through formal 
policy, which is supported by a covert or overt ideology. In the case of the congregations diversity is 
dealt with through decision-making processes, supported by the organizational culture of the 
congregation and its denomination. 
Second, I doubt whether the inclusion of a survey of individual congregants' language preferences 
would provide any additional information to what has already b~en discovered in several studies, 
particularly with reference to black congregants. South African individuals have been polled in 
state-influenced organisations like schools and universities, e.g. De Klerk's study of Rhodes students; 
Prah's 1993 study of six Southern African universities, including the predominantly black Universities 
of the Transkei, and of the Western Cape. Studies of the general public have been conducted by the 
HSRC and the SABC, and more recently, Idasa. If those samples were representative, then given the 
lack of evidence to the contrary, it is neither theoretically unreasonable nor statistically irresponsible 
to assume that the same sentiments that motivate respondents in these studies are also present in the 
congregants. In addition, the ANC's Language Policy Considerations (1992) claimed that "large 
sections of black urban communities have already pressurised primary schools into beginning with 
English as the medium of instruction from day one" (Heugh 1995:341, Brown 1998). 
Third, the neoclassic micro-variable approach has been critiqued as also containing inadequacies. 
Factors that are external to the individual (and by extension to language policies) are not considered, 
while appropriateness, equity or fairness are not addressed (Tollefson 1991 :28). Historical and 
structural factors are underestimated, and "the political and economic interests that benefit" are not 
weighed (Tollefson 1991 :28). For these reasons the neoclassical model cannot explain "formation and 
development of language communities"; nor variations in a group's ability to retain a first language or 
not. More importantly for my study, micro-variables cannot explain "how, and under what conditions, 
planning decisions bring about linguistic change", as it views most such changes as "natural" 
(Tollefson 1991 :29). 
Of course a synthesis is possible which traces how micro-processes intervene between macro-
sociological factors and so affect congregants' use of language (cf. Kulick 1992:8). From this 
perspective what is crucial is how macro-sociological change "has come to be interpreted in a way that 
dramatically effects everyday language use in a community" (Kulick 1992:9,12). But such 
ethnographic attention to individual motivation, due to my choice of unit of analysis (congregations), 
lack of time and of finances, was ultimately beyond the scope of my study. Any comments I make 
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which infer individual decisions about language use should be taken as remaining at the level of 
theoretical speculation based on existing studies, so that my arguments remain empirically informed 
- even if at second-hand. 
But in the final analysis I preferred a world system perspective because it not only incorporates micro-
macro-interactions, but world-polity theory in particular allows for attention to meso-level 
organizations. A world system perspective also offers a helpful synthesis of individual, national, and 
global levels of analysis which can be applied to my subject. Theorists like Peter Beyer have posited 
a global culture, a global polity, and a global economy which combine to form a single global society. 
Spybey has also used both individual and global levels of analysis in which individuals feature strongly 
as agents within global economic, nation-state, communications, and world order structures, which 
in turn affect them. Holton argues that Robertson's model of the interactions between individual 
selves, nation-states, the world system of societies, and humankind in the global field offers the most 
fruitful analytical avenue. These suggestions will be more fully described in the theoretical section 
below, and applied in the concluding chapter. 
3.2.4 Contributions of this study 
A last objection, which applies to the nature of this study as a doctoral dissertation, is whether I offer 
anything new to the extensive literature on language politics. This seems a particularly apt protest as 
my contention (that the status of English, bolstered by macro-factors, suppresses the use of 
indigenous languages) has been in circulation for some time. 
The novelty and value of my contribution is rather in the way that I apply existing theories to South 
Africa, for instance in pulling together existing arguments in the concept of language ideology, and in 
interpreting data through a world systems perspective. This has not been considered in South Africa 
before, particularly not in a way that combines meso- and macro-level features (compare Reagan 1986, 
1995 for application to the macro-level). My emphasis on non-state institutions is also unique, given 
the usual preference for domains under more or less direct state control. 
But the real contribution lies in the data on integrating congregations in South Africa, which have rarely 
been considered (only three works exist, with another focusing on Zimbabwe), and certainly not on 
a national scale. The endeavour to combine empirical data on religion at the congregational level with 
theories on state-construction is also rare. Finally, the attempt to construct an ecological theory that 
explains levels of diversity in integrating congregations as a function of macro- and meso-factors, 
which differentially affect institutional change within a society, is also original in its application to 
South Africa. 
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter introduced the motivations behind the study, defined the basic terminology, and spelled 
out the primary purpose: to identify macro-structural constraints on and enablers of linguistic 
integration in Christian congregations. In my focus on congregations I am especially interested in those 
groups who do not speak English as first languages, particularly black congregants. As my emphasis 
is on language integration, a distinction was drawn between diversity (plurality) and integration 
(incorporation of diversity) to aid data collection and analysis. Linguistic integration refers to the extent 
to which the plurality of languages present among the congregants are selected and used in 
congregational activities. 
The overall goal of the study is to construct a macro-level theoretical framework - a world system 
perspective - which offers a coherent explanation of meso-level data, built on the question why 
non-English languages do not achieve greater prominence in racially-integrating congregations. An 
overview is provided of the survey methods used, which consisted of postal surveys conducted in two 
phases. 
In the chapters that follow I move towards the goal by using political sociology of language as primary 
theoretical orientation, and by constructing a world system perspective, primarily from the central 
elements of world-polity theory, and secondarily from aspects of world-economy and world-economy 
theories. 
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Chapter Outline 
- CHAPTER TWO -
ORIENTATING FRAMEWORK: 
THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE 
In addressing language and power as central issues, my study falls, broadly speaking, within the 
\ 
political sociology of language as orientating framework, which in turn leads to the selection of world 
system theories for analysis of my data. Chapter Two provides a broad overview of this orientation, 
including central features, specific emphases, and utility for analyses of nation-building in Africa. The 
discussion also serves to problematise the notion of language practice, and in this way guides 
discussion in other chapters. 
This chapter charts new territory through synthesising the works of several authors into a political 
sociology of language, a subfield which combines aspects of political sociology with sociolinguistics. 
This includes sociolinguists such as Fishman (1977), sociologists like De Swaan (1989), 
. anthropologists like Fardon & Furniss (1 994), and political scientists like Laitin (1 986). As far as I am 
aware a political sociology of language has not been treated in any systematic or full manner, although 
it was first suggested in 1975 in the title of Ali Mazrui's The political sociology of the English language 
- but not defined in any way. Such an enterprise is clearly beyond the scope of this study, so that I 
confine myself in what follows to outlining the central theoretical features of political sociology of 
language. I will limit myself to discussing such terms as are most relevant to this study. 
In general terms a political sociolo~y of lan~uage is concerned with how lan~ua~e reflects power 
differentials between groups of language speakers, such that within the same society some groups are 
rendered at a disadvantage compared to others. 
As befits a study which attempts to place language practice in South Africa in a regional, African, and 
a global perspective, most of the theoretical texts that I use are by Africans, or by other scholars who 
focus on Africa. A primary example of the former is the work of Goke-Pariola (1993), who combines 
attention to language with a focus on power within states. An example of the latter is provided by the 
empirical work of David Laitin (1993), who produced an influential book on language repertoires and 
state construction in Africa (1992), as well as on hegemony and culture (1986). While I deliberately 
opt to base my synthesis on an Afro-centric and empirical focus, I also include other relevant 
theoretical contributions, such as the notion of linguicism, developed in separate and joint texts by 
Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas (1992, 1996). 
The overal aim of the discussion in this chapter is to clarify the link between political sociology of 
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In broad terms both world-economy and political sociology of language attend to the stratifying 
functions of power differentials. What is needed is a more explicit bridge between the world-economy 
as contributory source, and the dominance of English as a world language - a subject I explore in 
Chapter Six. By the same token a connection can be established between world-polity and political 
sociology of language by paying attention to the role ascribed in both to institutional rules. What is 
needed is for the narrower emphasis within political sociology of language on intra-national rule-making 
to be extended to the global level through world-polity theory. In short, establishing potential threeway 
linkages is not enough: the test for successful theoretical conjuncture such as this is that the sum of 
the parts must be greater than the whole. 
Although not conceived or executed in terms of a specific theory, three particular theoretical 
perspectives were used with which to triangulate the parameters and direction of my study. Broadly 
speaking I was from the start interested in the political aspects of language usage; and found much 
in the political sociology of language to guide my thinking. As I point out in more detail in Chapter 
Three, I found that theories of the world system helped me to identify the norms which structure the 
global and local political significance of language practice and ideology, as well as the processes which 
influence both. In turn, neo-institutionalism supplied isomorphism as mechanism which enables global 
norms to be diffused across states and within each society. The emphasis on the impact of power on 
the organizational forms of society in both political sociology of language and in world system theories 
provides a way through which the two can be linked. 
In the sections below I first address the focus of a political sociology of language, as expressed in 
terms such as language choice, language planning, language policy, and language use. Next I refer to 
the forms through which language and power are mediated and their outcomes. I conclude with a 
relatively full discussion of Laitin's theories of the articulation of notions of power and language in 
African state construction through a process of language rationalization. An evaluation of his work 
provides a bridge to the theoretical considerations of world system perspectives in Chapter Three, and 
to empirical discussions of African nation-building in Chapter Five. 
The theories of authors like Goke-Pariola and Laitin sensitize us to the manner in which a state can 
structure patterns of organization so that similar configurations of language and power appear at 
different levels of society (here, churches as representative of civil society). This theme will be picked 
up again in a more empirical manner in Chapter Five, where I discuss how certain studies alert us to 
the role played by language in national state-building projects in Africa, particularly Southern Africa 
as South Africa's regional context. I recognize that "state apparatuses function at numerous levels 
(from the national to the local), and the political aspects of language and ethnicity are not necessarily 
consistent between these situations" (Fardon & Furniss 1 994: 1 9). 
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1. CONCERNS OF A POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE 
The division of this section corresponds broadly to the two senses of "rule-making and rule enforcing 
activities" in political sociology, as spelled out by Goke-Pariola (1993:7). 
In Section 1.1, a political sociology of language is shown to articulate with discourses on language 
choice, language planning, and language policy. All are concerned with rule-making and rule enforcing 
in the broader sense, that is, with "the patterned co-variation of political and social behavior on the 
one hand, and language behaviour and preference on the other". Such an emphasis can lead to a 
consideration of how, who, or what produces the conventions that determine the "expressive 
resources" available to particular groups or languages. As a social institution, language not only 
reflects social structures "but also structures social reality" (Goke-Pariola 1993:7). 
In Section 1.2. I describe how in political sociology of language rule-making activities are seen to 
configure language practice (language use). The concern is with rule-making activities in a narrower 
sense, as they apply to sociolinguistic groups (e.g the speech community) or to their subunits (e.g. the 
work place). The emphasis can lead to a consideration of "who speaks what language/dialect to 
whom, and when, and what are the consequences of breaking the sociolinguistic rules" (Goke-Pariola 
1993:7). 
A consideration of sociolinguistic rules and their sources may lead to a discussion of a language 
situation, formed from "above" by the interaction of language choice, language planning, and language 
policy, or from "below" by language practice. Language situation refers to a "total configuration of 
language use", including "how many and what kinds of languages are currently spoken, by how many 
people, and under what circumstances, as well as the attitudes and beliefs about languages held by 
the population" (Goke-Pariola 1993:95). 
1 .1 Language choice, language planning, language policy 
In terms of the above definition of the broader sense of rule-making and rule-enforcing, language 
choice, language planning, and language policy refer to three themes that a political sociology of 
language could pursue. 
A discussion of language choice could emphasise linguistic diversity in a specific context; linkages 
between languages and development; and the intersection of language policy with language planning. 
The latter will be considered separately. 
The linguistic context forms the focus of the first route, with regards to the prevalence and influence 
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of other languages on language choice. So, for example, Fordham (1994:67) differentiates between 
possible linguistic contextual configurations relating to choice of language of instruction: (a) where 
there is no linguistic majority (e.g. Nigeria or Papua New Guinea); (b) where a locally developed lingua 
franca exists (e.g. Swahili); (c) where a predominant indigenous language occurs (e.g. Quechua in 
Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia; or Somali); (d) where multiple languages with literary and religious 
traditions are used (e.g. India with "over 1000 languages using twelve or more scripts" and 14 official 
languages") . 
A second route could discuss language choice through attention to development and international 
linkages. Fordhan:' (1994:68), for instance, points to debates on multilingualism in relation to economic 
development (compare Reagan 1995:320). In one debate some claim that multilingualism is a barrier 
to development, while in a second others argue that world languages are necessary to maintain 
international dialogue. As space prevents deeper exploration of these debates, suffice to outline 
Fordham's responses: i.e. that countries like Singapore with four official languages have shown that 
multilingualism does not present an inherent barrier. In addition, the multilingual nature of most 
nation-states, and the low GDP of some homogenous states, indicate that other factors are involved 
here (Bamgbose 1991 :36-37). The integration of the European Union shows that it is not necessary 
for the whole of any particular population to know a world language for that country to maintain 
international dialogue. 
While multilingualism bears no direct relationship to development, the same cannot be said about 
literacy. Bamgbose (1991 :38-54) points out that literacy and communication link language with 
socio-economic development. Where literacy rates are higher, so are economic indicators. And when 
literacy and communication occur in indigenous languages, information is able to reach the masses 
more effectively than if portrayed in Languages of Wider Communication (L WCs)' - a language that 
is "widely known among speakers of other languages" (Bamgbose 1991 :20). While LWCs are 
unavoidable evils for transporting "ideas, concepts, and technology", it is equally necessary that "such 
concepts must be transmitted to the masses in the language that they can understand", as the 
Japanese case shows (Bamgbose 1991 :51). 
Language planning is a political and ideological enterprise, pursued consciously in order to address 
language status or language development (corpus planning) in the future, and involves decision-making 
processes (Reagan 1992:320; 324; Bamgbose 1991:109-110). As a process language planning 
involves" (a) fact-finding, (b) establishment and articulation of goals and strategies; (c) implementation; 
(d) evaluation" (Reagan 1992:320). A good policy must be desirable, effective, just, and viable 
(Reagan 1992:320). In the South African context examples of language status issues relate to "the 
'. The opposite concept is of a Language of Narrower Communication such as Dutch, Danish, Czech (Bamgbose 
1991:20). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Orientating framework: Political Sociology of Language 37 
role and place" of English, Afrikaans, and African languages (Reagan 1992:324). 
For Tollefson (1991 :16) [top-down] language-planning refers to "the institutionalization of language 
as a basis for distinctions among social groups (classes) ... one mechanism for locating language 
within social structure so that language determines who has access to political power and economic 
resources". From this perspective the interests of ruling classes are tied to economic structure, so that 
language planning in effect contribute to the division of labour. That is why "there is no evidence that 
ESL [English as Second Language] ... leads to upward mobility"; instead clues point in the opposite 
direction: at the integration of marginal groups into the peripheral economy (Tollefson 1991:132-3). 
By implication a "successfully empowering language policy would then be in conflict with economic 
interests" (Heugh 1992:332). 
Language policy concerns language choice as a result of the state acting as decision-maker, while 
implementation is mostly left to linguistic experts such as linguists or teachers (Bamgbose 1 991 : 11 0). 
In a political sociology of language discussions here could refer to types, influences, and outcomes of 
policy. For example, Bamgbose (1991: 110-111) distinguishes between these types of language policy: 
official (concerning languages and .their functions recognised by the state), educational (regarding 
languages used by education institutions as subjects or media), and general ("unofficial government 
recognition or tolerance of languages used in mass communication, business and contacts with 
foreigners"). Language status decisions are policy decisions (i.e. "a programme of action on the role 
or status of a language in a given community"), as they have economic and political effects, and so 
usually involve state decrees. He adds that language policy in Africa has been characterised by one 
or more of the following: "avoidance, vagueness, arbitrariness, fluctuation, and declaration without 
implementation" (Bamgbose 1991: 111). 
And Heugh (1992:332) presents an example of a discussion of the influences and outcomes of 
language policy. In relation to influences on the implementation of language policy, she argues that 
the politics of the economy, linguicism (see below for discussion), and perceptions of language will 
playa role as either problem or resource. These establish "a deep-level infrastructural hegemony of 
ruling classes". The potential outcomes of language policies depend on their inherent assumptions: "(a) 
if the language policy does not match up with the explicit goals of the state, the one is likely to 
undermine the other; (b) if effective language planning procedures are not put in place, the policy will 
not be implemented; (c) if the language policy is in conflic;:t with the more hidden political and economic 
infrastructure, it will be undermined; and (d) if the articulation and implementation of language policy 
are entirely top-down rather than accommodating of bottom-up processes, then the needs of the 
people on the ground will not be met" . 
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1.2 Language practice, ethnic identity and setting 
In this section we consider the narrower sense of rule-making activities which determine language 
practice (use) - that is, what language is spoken by which groups in what particular domains, as well 
as the consequences of breaking these. In such discussions, political sociology of language often 
emphasises social identity. Questions about the relationship between language and social identity 
(especially ethnic identity), and the ways in which both relate to setting then emerge. 
In what follows I review four contesting viewpoints within political sociology of language regarding 
the relationship between language, ethnic identity, and setting. These range from imputing some 
secondary role to language in the construction of identity, to linking language directly to ethnic 
identity. I will use Bamgbose's (1991 : 11-12) summary of the debates along four dimensions, according 
to which language is regarded as most or least important; or as occupying one among many roles; or 
indeed a varying role. 
In viewpoint one language is seen as the most important feature in the construction of difference and 
the maintenance of boundaries between groups. Here ethnic identity correlates directly with language. 
For example, Van Binsbergen (1994: 168) claims that "among all possible culturally produced materials, 
it is primarily language on which ethnicity feeds and thrives". The advantage of linking ethnicity to 
language is that "it throws a conceptual bridge between macro-SOCiological factors seen to bring about 
social change and the ways in which those fa~tors come to influence people's perceptions and 
strategies" (Kulick 1992: 1 0). Language may be used to promote ethnicization, for instance in a 
"ideological and organizational response to incorporation in a national political space", in which social 
mechanisms for accommodation (e.g. intermarriage) are overwhelmed through the power or numbers 
of "the other". Driven by a sense of alienation, ethnicization also occurs in the context of material 
disempowerment at the hands of an alien political power (such as the colonial state) and a foreign 
economic mode (such as capitalism) (Van Binsbergen 1994: 1 70). 
In viewpoint two approach language is seen as unimportant in the construction of ethnic identity, as 
the latter rests on a priori sentiments of belonging which defines "we" over against "them". According 
to this perspective, language can be discarded along with other markers without the surrender of 
ethnic identity (Bamgbose 1991: 12). This is essentially a -counter-argument to viewpoint one, and 
implies that a direct relationship does not always occur. Different ethnic groups can share the same 
language, while a particular group can lose their vernacular and yet retain their ethnicity (e.g. the Irish 
or Scots) (Kulick 1992: 10). But this position can also be countered, by pointing to the symbolic value 
of language which may continue to be evoked even (or particularly) in its absence in order to retain 
a sense of group identity. Such a strategy is still evoked by the Nigerian Fulani, even though they 
speak mostly Hausa instead of their native Fulfulde (Bamgbose 1 991 : 11 ,12). 
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In viewpoint three language is seen as one among several other factors which together function to 
produce ethnicity (Bamgbose 1991: 12). Here language is central, but not directly or necessarily related 
to identity, which may, for instance, be largely determined by setting. Identity is seen as constituted 
by a cluster of elements which, taken together or separately, may also determine the strength and 
direction of identity. A religious setting may dampen political, linguistic, and racial aspects of identity, 
but raise racial consciousness as when a white person visits a black church. The relevance of this 
discussion is obvious: what does the use of a language in a congregation say about the cultural or 
ethnic identity of the members - if anything? Do congregations function to suppress linguistic identity, 
and if so, is this the function of a language ideology, or a religious ideology, or of the relations of 
power within the wider society, as reflected in the congregation? Or some combination of all? 
In this study several settings are relevant, most obviously institutional (state, religion, language, and 
- more obliquely - education), physical (buildings), and geographical (neighbourhood, region, global) 
settings. My study links setting to the issue of what language use signifies in South Africa. Is a choice 
to use English in a congregation merely an expression of pragmatic concern? Or of symbolic 
contestation? I suggest that the two issues cannot easily be separated, as pragmatic concerns are 
dictated - to varying degrees - by the symbolic power of a particular language. Fardon & Furniss admit 
that language choice in multilingual settings invites misunderstandings: what is pragmatic "from one 
perspective might be interpreted ideologically from another" (1994:22). 
In viewpoint four language is accorded a variable role at different stages (Bamgbose 1991 : 12). When 
communities bind themselves together by use of one language, minorities refer to larger or more 
powerful groups which determine the scope of their language use, while ethnic groups mobilize the 
symbolic value of language in nationalism (Bamgbose 1991 :12). The assumption is that group identity 
progresses through various stages. 
All four the above approaches focus on the function of language in intergroup relations. The analytic 
advantage is that status differences can then be identified as causative factors which lead to changes 
in language use (e.g. language shift), resulting in two outcomes, namely diglossia or assimilation. For 
example, Kulick (1992: 11) maintains that speakers of a language with "stigmatized status" can switch 
between two languages depending on their desire to signal solidarity or prestige. Or, stigmatised 
speakers can shed their identity by rejecting their native language and by adopting another higher 
status language as their vernacular. In effect this means to assimilate an alternative ethnicity. Yet even 
such descriptions do not explain the "processes through which this desire [to alter ethnic identity] 
comes to transform their interactions with one another". 
An alternative approach is to look at the function of language in intragroup language behaviour. In this 
perspective ethnicity is not always analytically relevant, and is actually a relatively weak heuristic 
device to explain language behaviour. Changes in language usage cannot always be explained by 
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reference to the relative ranking of various ethnic groups on the basis of socio-economic difference 
(i.e. status). In Kulick's study of an isolated rural area, language usage still evoked hierarchical 
differences but within the same group. Gapun villagers distinguished between individuals stigmatized 
as unable to participate in "the modernization process", and those who demonstrate possession of the 
approved status (i.e. able to participate) (Kulick 1992:10). Instead of surrendering the vernacular, the 
strategy to deal with status differentiation is to add "another language to one's communicative 
repertoire" (Kulick 1992: 11). 
Kulick (1992) claims that the study of intragroup language behaviour requires attention be paid to e.g. 
language transmission from parents to children where intra-generational language shift is under way. 
Language shift is indicated where transmission is not completed, so that children no longer learn their 
former vernacular. Yet no work has been done on language socialization2 "of the first generation of 
non-vernacular-speaking children" (Kulick 1992:12). Yet it is probable that children's language 
acquisition is influenced by a number of factors other than parental decisions and reactions, e.g. the 
role of siblings (Kulick 1992: 13, 14). 
Researchers on intragroup language practice tend to emphasise the role of parents, who are portrayed 
as either (a) "consciously and explicitly" deciding "not to teach their children their own vernacular" 
or, (b) more passively, as deciding "not to encourage their children to learn the vernacular, even if they 
continue to use it among themselves" (Kulick 1992: 12). Parental behaviour in both instances is 
explained as resulting from their evaluation of "the relative prestige of the vernacular in relation to a 
language of wider currency". Consequently parents decide that "their children' do not need' to learn 
the vernacular to get by in society or they are concerned that the child's school language may suffer" 
(Kulick 1992:12). 
The above discussion raises several questions in relation to my study. Should I refer to ethnicity or not 
to explain language usage in congregations? (After all, ethnicity has been among one of the most 
debated conceptualisations of social and political identity in the social sciences.) Is intergroup or 
intragroup distinctions more salient? Where non-English first-language speakers prefer to speak English 
'- rather than their vernacular, does this indicate language shift? In answering these, can I invoke ethnic 
differences as a causative factor? Or should my analysis describe the use of English as an attempt to 
change intragroup status through an add-on lingua franca? 
As fuller discussion of these concerns will be reserved for the two last chapters of this study, I will 
here just indicate some of the themes that I spell out later. To analyse the use of English as an attempt 
2. Language socialization refers to "the use of language in socialization and socialization to use language" (Kulick 
1992: 13, 14). 
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to change intragroup status seems, at first blush, valid for black congregants who prefer to speak 
English. But the answer really hinges on whether the outcome is diglossic; i.e. whether or not two 
languages are restricted to separate domains (e.g. family and religion). In Kulick's description of the 
Gapun, the preferred language strategy could not be classified as diglossia, as both languages occurred 
across various domains. With regards to the question about language shift, at present the South 
African evidence does not appear to support the conclusion that a wholesale shift is under way in 
situations where English is preferred by non-English first-language speakers (see Section 2.1.2 in 
Chapter Five). 
Finally, the geographical dimension of the socio-politics of language is often neglected as a setting in 
discussions of the macro-factors that affect language usage (compare Bamgbose 1991), although the 
centre of attention in geolinguistics (e.g. Williams 1991).ln this section I will discuss some attempts 
to rectify this situation; apply their insights to the historical development of languages in South Africa; 
and finally move on to the implications for an analysis of integrating congregations. 
Mansour (1993) uses West Africa to argue that language usage is affected by the geographic features 
of a region, especially when linked to trade organization 3 • She contends that a language which comes 
to dominate a trade route in a terrain relatively unmarked by geographic encumbrances (e.g. 
mountains, desert, water) will "naturally" lead to a centralised state formation, the emergence of a 
lingua franca, and linguistic assimilation of smaller languages. In the case of West Africa the 
intervention of colonists (particularly missionary linguists and others) arrested this development, and 
led to the fragmentation not only of lingua francas but other language groups as well. On the other 
hand broken terrain (by mountains, swamps, river deltas) favours the development of decentralised 
and egalitarian political organizations, characterised by marked linguistic differences. This situation will 
be worsened in a context of slave trade, when refugees fleeing to such areas add to the linguistic 
diversity already there. In certain parts of West Africa trade did not necessarily lead to the 
development of biculturalism, for instance where middle men engaged in silent trade. According to this 
method, commodities would be left in an open area by one group, and exchanged for other 
commodities by the middle men, without verbal contact. Mansour's work shows a curious lack of 
attention to power relations, leading her to claim that sociolinguists should remain unmoved by 
language shift 
Cartwright (1991) offers further insight into how attention to territory can be used to explain language 
usage. He uses the centre-periphery distinction to demonstrate on the basis of empirical research in 
Canada the conditions which affect bicultural interaction between peripheral groups within a specific 
3. Hammond-Tooke (1993) also argued that historically specific political and spatial arrangements 
corresponded to features of terrain in South Africa, but the implications for language usage seems not 
to have received much attention from local scholars. 
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region. Cartwright conceptualises a cultural transition zone, which can emerge on the territorial (and 
socio-cultural?) boundaries between two major ethnic groups, resulting in biculturalism and 
bilingualism. Cultural transition zones function to decrease social and cognitive distances between the 
major cultural groups. The transition zone is marked by the development of bicultural institutions, in 
which languages are either shared, or followed independently in the same building. For example, 
churches provide services "in both languages simultaneously", while institutions emerge "in which the 
two ethnic groups interact in each other's language" (Cartwright 1991 :243). 
Applied to my study, Cartwright's insights demands attention to where integrating congregations 
emerge, and what function they fulfil there. Integrating congregations that emerge in multilingual urban 
situations function as social-cultural transitional zones. The question is whether their emergence 
outside of metropolitan areas coincide with ethno-linguistic boundaries? 
2. LANGUAGE & POWER CONTESTATIONS AS ORGANIZING THEMES OF A POLITICAL 
SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE 
This section concerns the forms through which language and power are mediated (e.g. political 
ideology, culture, language ideology) as well as the outcomes (e.g. hegemony). Sociology, language, 
and politics intersect in relation to "the utilization and development" of power, which pervades almost 
all social relations and interactions, including language preference (Goke-Pariola 1993:6). Politics 
"concerns the exercise of power in social situations, its structuring, as well as its legitimation within 
social groups" (Goke-Pariola 1993:7). The "politics of language necessarily involves relations between 
languages" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:6). Language, "more than any other part of institutionalized 
culture", has the "capability of encoding and displaying identity or alienness in social interaction" 
(Fardon & Furniss 1994:6). 
Language and power (defined as the ability to influence someone, or to effect a particular outcome) 
are related in several ways (Goke-Pariola 1993: 9-10): 
a. access to language or to a particular variety "is often a prerequisite to power, with e.g. a 
standard dialect corresponding to social class and power"; 
b. language "serves as a marker or means of social power" through e.g. the particular status 
ascribed to it, which in turn is often "the result of uneven distribution of cultural capital"; 
c. the "relative power of varieties of a language" demonstrates social stratification, with p,articular 
languages (or varieties) accorded specialised functions and domains. For instance, in a diglossic 
situation a "high status" language is "used for religious activities, letters, political speeches, lectures, 
news broadcasts, and newspaper editorials" (Le. realising social values of "power and formality"); 
while a "low status" language "is used to give instructions to servants, waiters, workmen, in family 
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conversations, and with friends" (i.e. realising the values of "solidarity and spontaneity"). 
In order to ascertain the intersection of power and language, Goke-Pariola (1993) maintains, the 
researcher should pay attention to social and historical contexts, and note who influences whom. 
Language "may serve as a means of power in several ways", e.g. through persuasion; manipulation, 
or ideology (Goke-Pariola 1993: 1 0). Power through language use may be exerted consciously or 
unintentionally, so that the user's social influence is determined by the effect s/he has (Goke-Pariola 
1993:11). 
2.1 Objectifying relations between strong and weak languages 
Language debates, such as those that intersect within a political sociology of language, involve 
processes of analysis in which languages could become objectified; that is, viewed as relatively 
autonomous objects. As an object, language is ascribed properties such as "systematicity, 
distinctiveness, closure, and independence" (Fardon & Furniss 1994: 1 0). Objectification becomes 
particularly apparent "when language is committed to writing for the first time" (Van Binsbergen 
1994: 169). The politics of language is sometimes objectified as "a hegemonic relation between strong 
and weak languages by virtue of the positions of their speakers" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:8). This form 
of objectification involves viewing features external to language (political or economic power) as 
intrinsic to it. 
Different types of objectification occur according to whether languages are viewed spatially, 
functionally, as a commodity, or as discourse: 
a. Spatial objectification of language can happen "in terms of genealogies or lists", as often happens 
in policy discourses (Fardon & Furniss 1994: 13). In policy discourses languages are objectified spatially 
when they are ranked ordinally according to number of mother tongue speakers; or according to 
number of those competent in specific languages; or as genealogically linked language families (Fardon 
& Furniss 1 994: 1 2). The sense of objectivity in policies is achieved by participating in globally available 
"discourses of human rights, economic utility and governmental efficiency, as well as aesthetic 
expression and the authenticity of personal and collective identities" (Fardon & Furniss 1994: 1 0). 
b. Functional objectification takes the form of "allotting different languages [to] sectoral uses" for 
definite purposes (Fardon & Furniss 1994: 13). Functional allocation is achieved either formally by the 
state, or informally through the "common recognition that particular language practices are required 
for ... the 'language of the hearth', or 'language of religion'". The function of language is linked to 
notions of appropriateness for particular levels, in terms of the social position occupied by speakers. 
This also involves "extra-linguistic questions" about the implications of speaking a particular language, 
"in practical and/or symbolic terms" (Fardon & Furniss 1994: 14). 
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c. From the perspective of language as a commodity, objectification enables language to be viewed 
as "potentially available to all who desire it", but "in practice accessible in different forms to separate 
and often specialized and privileged sectors of a community". The degree to which language is 
inaccessible depends on "unequal educational opportunities, regional remoteness from the source of 
diffusion, and differential access incurred through differences of status, gender, age, and ethnic origin" 
(Parkin 1994:228). 
Language objectification usually occurs in portrayals which imply that certain languages are weaker 
than others. The weak-strong distinction can be problematised in several ways. It could be argued that 
relative strength between languages is determined by context, not by the characteristics of any 
particular language itself. Strength depends on who controls the. discourse of others in a particular 
context (Fardon & Furniss 1994:9; cf. Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:63). Also, in a multilingual 
context like Africa, a language can be both "strong and weak according to context" (Fardon & Furniss 
1994:9). Spatial and functional objectification are both potentially "divisive", dividing people "along 
lines of educational background, rural/urban separation, class, religion and familial socialization, 
gender" (Fardon & Furniss 1 994: 14). 
The danger of objectification for the social analyst is the mistake of viewing language as an 
independent variable in ethnicization, instead of one of the dynamic elements "of collective symbolic 
reproduction (e.g. "a cult, a vision of the past)" which is shaped by that process itself. During 
pre-colonial periods objectification was fluid, but "intensified in a context of political and economic 
incorporation - the very cradle also of ethnicity" (Van Binsbergen 1994: 169). 
d. Discursive analysis may better describe the "local level practices and the power relations they 
entail" than spatial or functional forms of objectification (Fardon & Furniss 1994: 15). While discursive 
analysis does not eliminate the problem altogether, language is objectified in terms of focus on the 
linguistic interactions of individuals, on "discourse about discourse" (Fardon & Furniss 1994: 15). 
Discursive analyses "may typically distinguish circumstance in which a mother tongue is used from 
situations in which varying types of multilingualism or polyglossia prevail. But extended situations 
conducted only in the mother tongue may be diminishing as a proportion of all language events .... 
close investigations of the linguistic parameters of socialization may readily dispel the notion of 
uncontaminated 'authenticity' ... may complicate accounts of sectoral usage" (Fardon & Furniss 
1994: 1 5). Debates about language are seldom really about language, but rather relate to discourses 
about language (Fardon & Furniss 1994:9). Discussion should instead centre on discourse, so that the 
debate can be pulled inside language. The debate then involves "discourses instantiated in language" 
which can be represented as discursive realities (Fardon & Furniss 1994: 1 0,12). 
Despite the above, Van Binsbergen argues that it "is difficult to see how any language could maintain 
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a minimum stability and persistence over time ... if objectification did not already exist in some 
inchoate form" (1994: 169). The process of objectification is conducted as much by native speakers 
as by outsiders or administrators and educationalists (Van Binsbergen 1994: 168). 
2.2 Language, ideology, and language ideology 
In the discussion below the dialogical nature of links between language, culture, and ideology, 
contested features in a political sociology of language, are outlined and problematised, and the notion 
of language ideology conceptualised. I pay particular attention to language ideology, which forms a 
central part of one line of my argument about the dominance of English in South Africa's public 
institutions. An important question is whether language is merely a neutral vehicle, with the potential 
of acting as a ferry to an ideology, or whether it is intrinsically ideologically laden. 
Language and culture are usually portrayed as intricately linked, as language is an indispensable agent 
in the transfer of culture between generations (Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:21). The link between 
language and culture has two implications: "a person must know enough about the culture of another 
person in order to communicate effectively in multicultural contact"; and "culture, as a form of social 
behaviour which is explained in terms of societal values, cannot exist in a vacuum and has no life apart 
from culture [society?]" (Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:21). 
At face value this line of thought seems close to viewpoint one in Section 1.2, above, which links 
language to the establishment of especially ethnic identity, and so to ethnic culture. But the difference 
is that any culture needs to be transmitted in some form, and language does become involved at some 
point. The emphasis is on the general process of acculturation, rather than on a specific form of 
identity that is established as an outcome. 
Yet, as we have discussed in Section 1.2, language boundaries do not necessarily coincide with 
cultural boundaries, as language need not "represent the boundary of a group" (Herbert 1992:4). "To 
postulate unified groups with their so-called 'standxard' languages which are meant to portray the 
identity of a so-called ethnic group is often a fallacy" (Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:99). Those who 
ignore this warning run the same danger as those responsible for the creation of homelands, or as 
those who first portrayed North Sotho and Tswana, and Swati and (Kangwane) Zulu as different 
languages (Herbert 1992:3). These were political acts with little basis in linguistic reality (Kaschula & 
Anthonissen 1995:99). 
The discussion so far requires that we reintroduce the notion of ideology; for how we conceptualize 
the relationship between language and culture will determine how we perceive the relationship 
between language and ideology. As I indicated in Chapter One, one of the perceptions of ideology is 
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of '''a set of articulations that derive from a system of beliefs and symbols embedded in popular 
consciousness, reinforced by civil ritual, and codified in the social order" (Goke-Pariola 1993: 1 0, 
quoting Paul Roberge 1990: 134). In this sense ideology refers to "the entire broad spectrum of cultural 
behaviour" (Goke-Pariola 1993: 1 0). 
There are at least three contested conceptualisations of the relationship of language and ideology in 
a political sociology of language, which I review below. These range from the perception that language 
is ideologically neutral to a strong argument which states the opposite. The fact that these 
perspectives are often tied to a particular position regarding a specific language, demonstrates that 
here we are dealing with ideologies which intrude into a debate about ideologies. Or, to put the 
argument into concepts discussed more fully in the next chapter, dealing with the intrusion of global 
norms and values into theory. 
According to the first position, language is ideologically neutral. This notion is usually put forward by 
those who maintain that English is neutral - a group which, according to Kamwangamalu & Chisanga 
(1996:286-7), includes Alexandre (19724), Kachru (19765 , 19826), and Mazrui (1975). Bra Kachru 
is credited with doing the groundwork for the acceptance of non-native or "New Englishes". Kachru 
argues that in India an Indian English evolved, which is so enmeshed with Indian culture that it is used 
to maintain distinct Indian patterns of life (Kachru 1983: 112, 124, 139-1407 , quoted in Kamwangamalu 
& Chisanga 1996:287). A similar argument is that language itself '''is not inherently oppressive; its 
role is defined by the people wh.o wield it and the social forces which act upon it'" (Meintjies 
1989: 168 , quoted in Benjamin 1994: 100). Others argue that English is a practical and necessary 
vehicle for the transmission of modernization. 
In the second conceptualisation language transmits ideology. Scholars argue here that language, "as 
an embodiment of culture, transmits the ideological beliefs of those who possess a language" 
(Goke-Pariola 1993: 14; compare Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:17-21 for discussion). The point is not 
that language structures reality, so that reality and language are aspects of the same entity (as the 
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis maintains); but that it structures experiences and perceptions of reality. 
Ideology is promoted through the way that (a) a speaker's language structures the hearer's experience 
4. Alexandre, P 1972. An introduction to languages and language in Africa. Translated by F A Leary. London: 
Heinemann. 
5. Kachru, B B 1976. Models of English for the Third World: white man's linguistic burden or language pragmatics? 
TESOL Quarterly 10: 221-239. 
6. Kachru, B Bled) 1982. The other tongue: English across cultures. London: Pergamon Press. 
7. Kachru, B B 1983. The Indianization of English: the English language in India. New York: Oxford University Press. 
8. Meintjies, F 1989. Language and labour in South Africa. Staff rider 8,3: 15-27. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Orientating framework: Political Sociology of Language 47 
of the message; (b) a language conceptualizes reality, which affects all who acquire it; (c) the status 
accorded a language denotes the "relative status and power of a particular group" (Goke-Pariola 
1993:11). 
In the third argument language itself is ideologically laden. Scholars adhering to this position insist that 
the use of language do structure reality, as certain African commentators argue, for example 
Goke-Pariola (1993) and Bamgbose (1991 :23). Goke-Pariola asserts that the very English textbooks 
through which the language is acquired reflect the structure of BritishlAmerican and Western societies. 
He demonstrates his argument by examples from textbooks used in Nigeria, which contain, first, 
examples which make Europe or the US the ultimate reference point (cf. 108,112). In addition these 
textbooks promote Western-style institutions, such as marital relations (monogamy vs polygamy), 
religion (draw examples from Christianity or Islam rather than indigenous religion), and kinship 
concepts (e.g. someone called "father" in an African language now becomes merely an "uncle" (cf. 
116,119). The result of such a devaluation of African institutions is that greater social distance is 
created between relatives through the English kinship notions, which "redefine interpersonal 
relationships" (Goke-Pariola 1993: 119). In Goke-Pariola's opinion, Africans who imbibe these Western 
values embedded within the English language have ceased to be African. 
Clearly Goke-Pariola is not speaking of a political ideology transmitted by language as a medium, as 
argued by Flaitz (1988), but he maintains, instead, that language itself is ideological in nature. Barton 
(1994:4) agrees with Goke-Pariola, saying "It is not just that English is spreading, but that ... English 
becomes an imported literacy bringing its own practices with it and consequently stifling indigenous 
or local literacies". "As English spreads throughout the world, British and American conceptions of 
literacy get exported in the same way as other goods and services are being exported, harmonised, 
standardised; and in particular it is western school practices which are becoming more dominant" 
(Barton 1994:6). The effect that English literacy programmes can have is considerable when placed 
in the context that "of the more than 4000 spoken languages in the world, only 300 have a developed 
orthography ... and less than 100 have significant written literature" (Fordham 1994:65). 
Goke-Pariola develops his argument further through Pierre Bourdieu's understanding of language "as 
a means of achieving symbolic power". Bourdieu's understanding is based on how habitus ("structured 
socially acquired sets of dispositions in any area of a person's life") interacts with the market ("the 
specific structured space [with concomitant sanctions] in which people interact" on the basis of 
various kinds of capital - economic, cultural, symbolic - that they have accumulated). In short, 
"linguistic choices are conditioned by the demands of the target social field/market (audience)", so that 
"every linguistic interaction displays 'the social structure that it both expresses and helps to create'" 
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(Goke-Pariola 1993: 17, referring to Bourdieu 1991 9). 
Goke-Pariola uses Bourdieu's theory to argue that to "acquire English as a Second Language" is to 
participate in "the transmission and regeneration of values" which ensures "the legitimacy of a given 
political order" (colonial, New World), while providing "a limited degree of solidarity" among the 
learners. "Language outcomes matter, because they are inherently matters of ideology and power" 
(Goke-Pariola 1993: 18). 
So far the discussion has emphasised the relationship between language and ideology as independent 
concepts, but now we turn to consider the two as merged into the single notion of language ideology. 
Having defined the matter in the first chapter, the stress here is on the features and outcomes of 
language ideology. 
Language ideology contains several components, as demonstrated in the movements for and against 
English as sole official language in the USA. Underlying the English-only ideology are the assumptions 
that: (a) "language diversity is inherently disunifying"; (b) "English language competence is a measure 
of loyalty to the nation"; (c) anyone who wants to learn English can, given sufficient motivation; (d) 
"English language competence leads to upward mobility"; (e) "Language is rightfully excluded from 
protection under laws barring discrimination" (Tollefson 1991: 132). 
A language ideology which favours English serves those who speak English; those who support it claim 
"for themselves significant advantages in competition for education, employment, and political power" . 
Although rhetoric varies, "the effort to sustain a privileged position for English has a similar motivation 
in the First and Third Worlds" (Tollefson 1991:152). As elsewhere, English is "a major criterion for 
employment, as well as for access to the key institutions dominating ... economic and political life" 
(Tollefson 1991 :153). In such a setting English also dominates government, the media, education, 
business (Tollefson 1991: 154). 
One way out of the impasse between the opposing views about language and ideology is to accept 
Tollefson's assertion that while language itself is neutral, it always relates to strategies of power 
(1991 :203). Although "language cannot be the source of equality or inequality", it functions as "a tool 
for them" (Tollefson 1991:183). This implies that learning a language is not an ideologically neutral 
act, but is caused by unequal relationships of power which cannot be resolved at the linguistic or 
educational levels only (Tollefson 1 991 : 210). 
Tollefson cites the intersection of language and education in the Philippines and in Australia to bolster 
9. Bourdieu, P 1 991 . Language and symbolic power. Translated by Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
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his argument. When "language is a gatekeeper for employment and higher education, it may become 
a powerful tool for sustaining inequality and hegemony", he states~ In the Philippines "English is 
, 
associated with a rigid class structure characterized by extremes of wealth and poverty" (Tollefson 
1991 :137). In such settings a dual level education system usually exists which prepares poorer 
school-Ieavers for low-wage jobs (Tollefson 1991 :138). In Australia the economic system requires 
low-skilled workers, and an education system which fails to adequately transmit English ensures that 
a sufficient number are available (Tollefson 1991 :185). "In this way, language is a form of covert state 
control of labour" (Tollefson 1 991 : 184). 
While the general trend of Tollefson's description of a dual level education system rings true for South 
Africa, his reasons do not. South Africa's location in the world-economy as a declining semi-periphery, 
as I argue in Chapter Five, means that there is little need for low-skilled labour here. Other causes have 
to be found, perhaps in the global arena outside the economy. 
2.3 Linguicism 
While the above discussion has identified language ideology as a set of ideas which supports the use 
of a particular language, the type of language ideology which informs relations between a dominant 
and subordinate languages has been characterised as linguicism. 
Linguicism refers to "ideologies and structures which are used to legitimate, effectuate, and reproduce 
an unequal division of power and resources (both material and non-material) between groups which 
are defined on the basis of language (on the basis of their mother tongues)" (Skutnabb-Kangas & 
Cummins 1988:13). Within a political sociology of language linguicism is usually perceived to be 
attached to two viewpoints. Accordingly, multilingualism is seen as a problem, divisive, and as the 
cause of intellectual deficiency; or, monolingual ism is seen as the norm (Heugh 1992:333). 
Heugh perceives a link between linguicism and African education systems. Linguicism "operates 
covertly to ensure that the Third World educational systems, by following Western models, tend to 
advantage a small elite and disadvantage the majority". "Subtractive or transitional programmes and 
curricula make little provision for the transfer of knowledge and cognition from the first language to 
the second, and this is likely to impair cognitive development" (Heugh 1992:333). In subtractive 
bilingualism "the first language is removed from the educational environment of the student", and may 
imply that a language shift is underway towards a prestigious language, and that a first language has 
little educational value. Linguicism can be countered by an active programme of additive bilingualism, 
"in which a second and even third language is added to the students' repertoire" while "sustaining the 
first or primary language system throughout the schooling process" (Heugh 1992:334). 
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2.4 Language and cultural hegemony 
What remains to be outlined in our exploration of a political sociology of language is to indicate the 
mechanisms by which a particular language ideology achieves hegemony and to situate the topic of 
language preference within a wider discourse of nation-building. 
One way of moving forward is provided by Laitin (1986)' who introduces the notion of a language 
subsystem into the discussion, and establishes a linkage between culture and hegemony. Laitin 
(1986: 13) defines a subsystem as "aspects of collective life which (a) are shared across classes; (b) 
differentiate a collectivity from other collectivities; (c) are not necessary for species survival; (d) have 
continuity amid economic change; (e) provide significance to events, and goals for collective action; 
(f) rely on the production and use of symbols; and (g) become institutionalized into 'systems' of 
patterned activity".' The conception of a subsystem forms a central element in the neo-functionalist 
paradigm, in which religion, language, art, and kinship are all seen as cultural subsystems. This 
perspective has two advantages: it enables theorists to view culture in terms of social stability, and 
to argue that change in one subsystem affects all other subsystems - as Clifford Geertz proposed. 
Next Laitin adapts and applies Antonio Gramsci's conceptualization of hegemony10 to culture, in order 
to explain the conditions under which certain ideologies achieve salience in specific subsystems. First 
it is "necessary to determine the arenas of symbolic production that have the power to infuse other 
subsystems and to restrict the relevance of symbolic structures embedded in potentially competing 
subsystems" (Laitin 1986:177). Also important is to grasp that "elites in all subsystems attempt to 
direct the flows of symbols" (Laitin 1986: 176). Subsystems "create their own commonsensical visions 
of political reality and suggest for their members what political problems are worth fighting about". In 
other words, subsystems have implicit preference functions (Laitin 1986: 177). As symbols are 
inherently ambiguous, cultures cannot directly determine values, are fluid, and have restricted 
relevance (Laitin 1986: 178). 
For Laitin the utility of the hegemony-culture conceptualization is that it provides a way out of the 
impasse about the role of culture in ethnic group mobilization in primordialism-instrumentalismdebates. 
In the primordialism paradigm (or essentialism), identity is accepted as a given, and cultural functions 
are conceptualized in terms of a neo-functionalist systems perspective. Society is seen as a social 
system, consisting of a collection of subsystems which seek overall equilibrium by adjusting their 
10. Hegemony is "the political forging - whether through coercion or elite bargaining - and institutionalization of a 
pattern of group activity in a state and the concurrent idealization of that schema into a dominant symbolic framework 
that reigns as common sense" (Laitin 1986: 183). 
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values towards one another in a homeostatic manner. Culture is influential, deeply embedded, and, in 
the form of symbols, affects economic and political behaviour (Laitin 1986: 11). 
In the instrumentalism paradigm, identities are accepted as fluid, cultural symbols which are shared 
and exploited for specific purposes; namely to achieve wealth or power. Individuals are rational agents 
who calculate their choices according to elementary micro-economics of the potential losses and gains 
which could be incurred as a result - as argued by Abner Cohen and Jeremy Bentham (Laitin 1986: 12). 
Cohen's theory is that culture provides a shared set of markers which can be exploited as an economic 
and political resource, e.g. in obtaining credit, or in mobilizing political groups (Laitin 1986:178). When 
political strategies are rationally pursued the result - at the macro-sociological level - is the formation 
of reified cultural groups (Laitin 1986: 177). 
For Laitin the instrumentalist application of rational choice theory fails to explain continuity as well a.s 
culturist explanations do. While rational choice defines identities as often fluid, it cannot explain why' 
certain identities remain stable over time, nor why "the range of calculated choices is far more 
restricted than the range of possible choices" (Laitin 1986: 179). But in later work Laitin himself 
appears to over-emphasize the micro-economic and rational aspects of individual decision-making to 
explain outcomes between groups (1992). 
Laitin's solution starts with adding the notion of "points" to that of values, which he combines with 
the concepts subsystem and hegemony to construct a dynamic explanatory model to replace existing 
homeostatic models. He argues that each culture contains points of concern which are regarded as 
important, yet not necessarily resolved (Laitin 1986: 180): Instead of always tending towards value 
congruence, cultural subsystems contain incongruent values to each other. When hegemony is 
established, a particular cultural subsystem (or one of its aspects) achieves privileged status over 
against others, which do not necessarily stop functioning but instead are seen as irrelevant in particular 
contexts. The privileged subsystem functions as the dominant locus of symbolic reproduction in 
society (Laitin 1986:181). Non-congruent and non-preferred subsystems are potential sources of 
counter hegemony. "Hegemony can create a dominant subsystem; it cannot create a congruent and 
harmonious social system" (Laitin 1986:183). 
Laitin demonstrates his own approach by analysing the selections of particular identities in Nigeria. 
Specifically, he asks why religious identity did not become divisive in Yorubaland, as it did elsewhere 
in Nigeria. Using interaction between Muslim Yorubas and Christians and other groups in the legislative 
assembly as a case study, he argues that identification with ancestral cities (i.e. tribes) outweighs 
other claims of identity. The Yoruba could possibly have subordinated "tribal" identity (Yoruba) to 
"religious identity" (Muslim), but did not. As a result religious identities are not seen as relevant to 
political organization among the Yoruba. At first his argument appears to confirm the essentialist 
argument; yet Laitin shows how the importance of the ancestral cities were reified during the colonial 
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period. Models of authority (gerontocracy) in the cultural subsystem of the ancestral city of the Yoruba 
differ from those in the religious subsystem (procedural or charismatic) (Laitin 1986:181). 
Laitin then ties together the elements of subsystem and culture with the dynamics of the state. A state 
can use power "to create a cultural framework in a society", as the state functions independently to 
the other subsystems. So hegemony can also be established by the state, when it seeks to select and 
support "different strands of culture, and thereby ... to make those strands the privileged loci of 
symbolic production - a form of cultural hegemony" (Laitin 1986:174). People "will act collectively 
along the preferred framework if there are benefits to be accrued for so doing" (Laitin 1986: 182). A 
subsystem can also gain privilege as a result of political foundings such as external hegemony (e.g. 
British indirect rule and English), in which cultural elites are co-opted, so reinforcing their cultural 
subsystem and extending their commonsensical notions of political relationships into the political arena 
(Laitin 1986:182). 
Although Laitin does not consciously define strategies that could be assumed by elites seeking internal 
hegemony, the following seems to be a close facsimile: "The 'political culture' of a society can be 
thought of as a function of the 'points of concern' embedded in the dominant cultural subsystem. 
Political elites in any society will act strategically and ideologically in the hope of defining and 
delimiting which strands of their society's culture should become dominant. Those who are successful 
in. establishing a dominant cultural framework form a 'hegemonic bloc' ... the new elites will 
themselves become (often unwilling) subjects of their own past cultural choices ... [which impact on] 
the subsequent choices of both elites and masses" (Laitin J 986:171). This illustrates the influence of 
culture on political subsystems. 
Laitin concludes that the "first challenge to theorists of culture is to embed their analysis more fully 
into the surrounding social and political realities. The cultural independent variable must be defined in 
a manner in which it relates to other social subsystems. In the study of language as a cultural 
subsystem, for example, the semantics of a particular language may be less relevant for a theory of 
political outcomes than its 'pragmatics'''(Laitin 1986:173). 
Applied to the South Africa context, Laitin's work suggests that black political elites in the ANC have 
managed to establish the hegemony of English (a strand from a previously dominant culture) in the 
language subsystem. The value of indigenous languages remain intact in the private sphere, and so 
provide the basis for potential counter hegemonies. Establishing or altering language preference in 
congregations are political strategies, i.e. it restricts the range of options available. At the same time, 
Laitin's theory helps explain why most black members usually appear not to be interested in 
establishing their own languages: linguistic identity is not a basis for political mobilisation. 
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Fardon & Furniss have questioned whether Laitin's assumption, that legitimate state organs will 
implement language decisions in the process of state-building, holds true. They warn that "alternative 
scenarios of the disintegration of the state, control of its remaining powers by factional interests, and 
a general decline in statal ability to sponsor developments of national scope are all too readily to hand. 
The formulation of state policy on language may transpire to be a symbolic political contest with only 
tangential effects upon the development of discursive practices adopted by most people, most of the 
time" (Fardon & Furniss 1 994: 19). 
They also consider Laitin's vision of the relations of hegemony as existing between languages 
problematic. Rather, the hegemonic relation exists "between social agents who are empowered or 
disempowered under specific conditions of language", through "the imposition on others of discourses 
and practises to ,do with language" (Fardon & Furniss 1994: 16). For this reason they criticise the 
argument - promoted by Skutnabb-Kangas (1990:7-8) - that because languages should have equal 
rights, one should not dominate the other. They argue instead that rights attach to people (Fardon & 
Furniss 1 994: 1 7). 
Fardon & Furniss (1 994: 1 7) also claim that a discussion of hegemony implies another problematic 
distinction, namely that between state and civil society. While the distinction enables one to examine 
the "shifting analytical status of the state", the difference between the two concepts "is highly 
contestable" and cannot be maintained "in the same form across contexts". The paradox that the state 
is both weak and strong can be highlighted in relation to language by noting that the state can sponsor 
(often conflicting) programmatic and pragmatic policies. Programmatic language sponsorship refers to 
"the official policy of the state expressed in its regulations about recruitment, education, the judicial 
process, the media". Pragmatic sponsorship refers to "those effects in and through language that the 
policy of the state brings about". 
While the state can sponsor particular programmes, "it cannot legislate a desired situation into being 
nor can it determine how people will interpret the changes". Failure to understand this leads to the 
state "programmatically sponsoring one set of initiatives while pragmatically reinforcing another, 
whether by intention or not" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:18). Instead of ignoring the political interests 
attached to international, national, and regional languages, "policy makers would be well advised to 
offer each ... some endorsement in both policy and practice". An important issue is whether the state 
"can afford to implement its policy, or indeed have the political means or will to do so" (Fardon & 
Furniss 1 994: 1 9). 
In short, the state "is severely constrained in its programmatic sponsorship of language change". 
Examples of these constraints include "the post-pluralist nature of the civil society to be changed, the 
degree to which civil society has captured the state, the linkages between national issues and a variety 
of regional and global projects over which slight influence can be exercised, and the degree that state 
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policies pragmatically encourage outcomes contrary to their programmes" (Fardon & Furniss 1 994: 21). 
In terms of my study, the above raises the question whether the language policies of the South African 
state are in opposition to, or in agreement with the sentiments of civil society. A related question is 
whether the chicken of elite discourse (expressed by the leadership of the exiled liberation movements) 
on English as language of preference preceded mass discontent, focused on the entrenchment of 
Afrikaans during apartheid. If the first, then the directional assumption of Fardon & Furniss implicit in 
the notion of pragmatic sponsorship (that state policies affect civil society) holds true; if the latter, 
then not. 
I would argue that the state's praxis, which entrenches the status of English (as opposed to its 
policies), proceeds from sentiments expressed by the majority, and is supported by the organs of civil 
society. For instance, the consensus in research is that most (urban?) blacks prefer to use English as 
language of public discourse, as I outline in Chapter Five. Where discontent rears its head the issue 
is not about the status of English, but about the exclusion of minority languages from state policy -
and the implications that this has for e.g. land claims with an ethnic base. This is not to imply that 
counter-tendencies are not afoot; the paradoxical simultaneous endorsement of multilingualism and the 
promotion of English as global language also emerge in local forms. 
3. LANGUAGE AND NATION-BUILDING AS AN APPLICATION OF A POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF 
LANGUAGE 
Laitin (1992) argues that a discussion of language usage should be situated within state-building 
efforts, as part of which the state will regulate language choice in public domains. This means a focus 
on the dialectic between state and individuals. While the state extends "administrative control over 
society", accompanied by specifications regarding language usage in official domains, individuals 
express their preference for certain languages (Laitin 1.992:6). 
Similarly, Goke-Pariola states how important it is to examine the "interplay between language and 
power in the national polity" via explicit government policies. These show "the intention of those in 
power", their use of language as political tool to advance the agenda of their group or the entire 
nation. The practice of the populace is "usually at variance with government's stated policy", because 
of "pragmatic educational considerations"; "psychological disposition of the colonized" as result of 
"the manner of colonization"; and "the dominant ideology of colonial capitalism" (Goke-Pariola 
1993:95). The functional uses of language within certain domains are delimited by "government policy, 
setting, topic, and individual choice" - where the latter is "a function of individual needs as well as of 
the larger cultural issues of group or ethnic identity" (Goke-Pariola 1993:96). 
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Economic development is usually part of any nation-building project. Strategies to aid national 
integration include "power-sharing through zoning of political and bureaucratic posts, a legal 
requirement for a multi-ethnic base for political parties, special programmes .... ideologies to raise 
national consciousness" and the use of various national symbols (Bamgbose 1991: 10). In such a 
setting a plurality of languages and ethnicities are perceived as hindrances (Bamgbose 1991: 14). 
Linguistic diversity is often dealt with through a state strategy of language standardisation or 
rationalisation to increase the sense of unity ((Bamgbose 1991: 14). 
The question of how language situations lead to specific language deciSions in the context of state-
building continues to receive attention from scholars. So, for example, Joshua Fishman (1971; referred 
to in Laitin 1992) attempted to classify three types of state-building in terms of the absence or 
presence of a Great Tradition in the existing cultural situation: 
a. In a Type A nation there is consensus that a Great Tradition which can serve an integrative 
function is absent, leading to the accommodation of a foreign Language of Wider (and technical) 
Communication, e.g. in Cameroon, Ghana, Gambia, Tanzania. 
b. In a Type B nation there is consensus that a single Great Tradition is at hand to provide the 
symbolic elements necessary for "nationwide identification", leading to "the replacement of a colonial 
language with a indigenous lingua franca", although a LWC may fulfil a transitional role, as in Ethiopia. 
c. In a Type C nation numerous - often conflicting - Great Traditions exist, requiring strong central 
co-ordination of "regional pressures for the development of regional vernaculars", as happened in India 
and Malaysia (Laitin 1992:21; Bamgbose 1991:20-21). 
Fishman's typology has been criticized for being static and apolitical (Laitin 1992:21), and for ignoring 
the strong role of nationalist languages - which overrides efficiency as primary concern (Bamgbose 
1991:21). 
Laitin's attempt to construct a dynamic model of the role of language in state-building, emphasising 
state action and its outcomes, are discussed in the two sections that follow. For Laitin the 
consolidation of a modern state often takes the form of language rationalization (section 3.1); which 
has various results but tend to favour a "3-plus-or-minus-l language outcome" (section 3.2). 
3.1 Language rationalization 
According to Laitin (1992:9) language rationalization refers to "the territorial specification of a common 
language for purposes of efficient administration and rule". Where language rationalization occurs as 
part of the consolidation of a modern state, a single language will be enforced (Laitin 1992:9). 
In other words, language rationalization refers to the use of state power, in the form of regulations and 
state education, to standardize language usage through policies which can transform multilingual 
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societies into monolingual nation-states. Such language policies usually stipulate the domains and the 
language to be used within them, resulting in the prevalence of one particular language (Laitin 
1992: 10). Japan, France, and Spain are examples of countries where language rationalization was 
successfully implemented through political struggle (Laitin 1992:11). 
For Bamgbose, language rationalization proceeds from two false assumptions: that multilingualism 
"always divides" and monolingualism "always unites"; so that "national integration is believed to be 
possible only through one national or official language" . Espousal of a common language is regarded 
as necessary for "socio-cultural cohesion and political unity". Yet Bamgbose has argued that other 
factors have to be present first before language can fulfil such a function; "political, economic, 
educational and social arrangements must be such that the different groups in the polity feel a sense 
of belonging and a conviction that their needs and aspirations are being met" (1994:33). 
Because of the prevalence of multilingualism in Africa, language rationalization affects the language 
repertoire of individuals (Laitin 1992: 19). A language repertoire refers to "the set of languages that a 
citizen must know in order to take advantage of a wide range of mobility opportunities in his or her 
own country. The language repertoire of an entire citizenry consists in the set of languages that the 
model citizen must know in order to play an active role in family, society, economy, and polity", and 
which impact on status in a local community, job mobility in wider society, and functional 
communication between a political administration and the individual (Laitin 1992:4,8). As a result of 
language rationalization the following is likely to happen: situational code switching - where persons 
will, in particular social domains, switch between their mother tongue and a dominant language; and 
symbolic (metaphorical) code switching - where individuals use the dominant language among 
themselves or in non-official domains. The latter signals "a possible change in socio-cultural identity" 
(Laitin 1992:11). 
Multilingualism is not eliminated at the sub-state level as a result of language rationalization. Nor does 
the existence of a single speech community imply monolingualism, as dialects can diverge quite 
extenSively within the same language (Laitin 1992: 11). Usually one of these come to be considered 
as the standard form; in the case of Xhosa, for instance, dialects such as Hlubi or Baca are 
disadvantaged over against the preferred dialect of Thembu, as spoken by the Gcaleka (Kaschula & 
Anthonissen 1995: 58,100). Where language rationalization has occurred, language revitalization can 
still happen, particularly where economic advancement develops to a greater extent in a peripheral than 
in a central (dominant) region (the case with e.g. Catalan and Flemish; Laitin 1992: 17). Strong 
within-region rationalization will then emerge in inverse proportion to the weakening of statewide 
rationalization. Language revitalization can also happen in former colonial countries, e.g. Finnish in 
Finland. Not all revival movements achieve success, as the case of the Celtic languages in the United 
Kingdom shows (Laitin 1992: 17). 
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But language rationalization does lead to language domination, in the form of either diglossia or 
hegemony. In a diglossic society, citizens view the use of the language promoted by the state as 
"natural and proper" in official domains, while viewing their regional languages as backward and 
applicable to low-status or unofficial domains only (Laitin 1992: 16; see discussion above on Kulick 
1992 for an alternative view). By contrast language hegemony occurs when all normal interchange 
occurs in the dominant language, with "vestiges of the regional language used only occasionally to 
establish local solidarity". This leads to language death, which, when generalized, results in 'language 
hegemony'. According to Laitin the latter was achieved in France, China, and Great Britain (Laitin 
1992:16). 
Not all modern states are "rationalized as one-country, one-language states". For example, in 
Switzerland rationalization happened at the sub-state (regional) level without a single national state 
language; yet a common national identity was still achieved (Laitin 1992: 12, 14-15). 
3.2 Conditions under which the state affects cultural change 
State rationalization "implies cultural change .... [because of] state-building processes, people may 
alter their sense of national identity, their religion, and their language" (Laitin 1992:24). Language 
rationalization is part of state rationalization, the process by which the state establishes "efficient and 
orderly rule" through the establishment of e.g. borders, a calendar, weights, unit of measure, and 
currency. 
Several arguments have been advanced to specify the conditions under which cultural change occurs 
under state guidance, and we consider those of Geertz and Deutsch before reviewing Laitin's attempt. 
Clifford Geertz (1973) suggested that in new states an integrative revolution occurred which changed 
primordial (blood) to civil ties. Integration is supported by state force and ideology, so that various 
distinct primordial communities can be contained ", under a single sovereignty'" (Geertz 1 973: 2 7 711 , 
quoted in Laitin 1992:25). Geertz does not specify the conditions and mechanisms involved in such 
a change; which means his work cannot help answer the question "under what conditions did change 
in language repertoire lead to a new social or political identity?" (Laitin 1992:26); 
Karl Deutsch (1953) conceived of nation-building in terms of a cybernetic theory of communication, 
which has either social mobility or assimilation as consequences. Social mobility is a process through 
which people are brought into wider circles of communication, so creating society; that is, a group 
11. Geertz, C 1973. The interpretation of cultures: selected essays. New York: Basic Books. 
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"made economically interdependent by the division of labour". The primary thrust of social mobility 
is differentiation. Assimilation is a process in which people receive quantitatively more information 
relevant to the whole of society than to their particular group. Community is created by shared values 
("a common filtering of information") which arise in response to internal and external stimuli (Laitin 
1992:28). The primary thrust of assimilation is unification, and so is associated with cultural 
homogenization. 
According to Deutsch's theory, states are successful to the extent that they process and transmit 
information, while adjusting their behaviour accordingly (Laitin 1992:27). Deutsch's ideas are similar 
to Luhmann's on communication. In terms of theoretical adequacy, Laitin concludes, cybernetic 
interpretations can account for both primordiality and instrumentalism: "cultural communities are 
primordially linked because they have for longer periods shared a common communications filter"; but 
they can change as a result of exposure to new filters and communications networks. 
In contrast to Deutsch and Geertz, Laitin adapts game theory to "strategic theory" to explain the 
conditions under which the state affects cultural change. He notes the strategic choices made by state 
and regional actors in a dialectic relationship with various language groups. Each set of actors act in 
accordance with their own interests, while taking the possible choices others may make into 
consideration. The first step for the analyst is to note the possible choices and the "payoffs" of state 
language policies in relation to the aggregate of individual choices made by the general populace. His 
method allows him to pay attention to agency and structure, as well as to accommodate Geertz' and 
Deutsch's insights. 
Laitin combines strategic theory with what he terms" 3-plus-or-minus-1Ianguage outcomes" to explain 
similarities and differences in certain states, e.g. India. For Laitin India presents an example of a 
non-rational strategic choice, as federal state politicians wanted to administer government in Hindi, 
but were countered by a bureaucracy, institutionalized in the colonial period, which preferred English. 
At the same time regional politicians prefer local vernaculars to Hindi. The outcome is that language 
is neither rationalized nor indigenised, as the state functions in English and Hindi, and the populace in 
local vernaculars. Laitin maintains that the rational choice for the state would have been English, which 
would have been accepted by the bureaucrats, and would have allowed regional politicians the option 
of a non-Hindi language of wider communication, while acknowledging local vernaculars in symbolic 
(cultural, kinship) domains (Laitin 1992:39-45). 
From a theoretical perspective, the study of language choice relates to the debate about the impact 
of modernisation on Africa; whether here, as elsewhere, the end result will be a reduction in the 
number of indigenous languages (Laitin 1992:4). The choice of a former colonial language as LWC 
rests on its function in advancing modernization. Like Laitin, 8amgbose suggests that the choice of 
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a national language rests on its acceptability to the majority, number of speakers, ability to promote 
vertical integration, function in relation to nationalism or nationism, and language development status 
(Bamgbose 1991:19,27). I need to unpack some of these terms in order to proceed with the 
discussion. Vertical integration refers to a process which aims to create solidarity between different 
language or ethnic groups in a praticular society. By contrast horizontal integration creates solidarity 
between various strata of the same group. Nationism refers to "constructing, consolidating, and 
governing what is a geo-political, but not necessarily a sociocultural, entity"; while nationalism is "the 
feeling of members of a sociocultural unit ... that they are united and identified with others who share 
a common history, culture, religion, and language" (Goke-Pariola 1993:57). The implications of these 
terms are picked up again in Chapter Five, particularly in Sections 1.1 and 1.2. 
Based on these factors, in Nigeria Arabic would receive a higher score than a LWC, while majority 
indigenous languages would rate lower, but higher than minority languages, an artificial language, or 
a pidgin (Bamgbose 1991 :26-29). On the other hand, language usage relates to issues such as 
democracy, equality, economic growth, and cultural autonomy (Laitin 1992:4). 
Judging by the number of books on the subject, "the problematic relation of the state and language 
remains a major focus of current discussion" in Africa, "canalized around the ideal of a single national 
language" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:5). By contrast, in Europe and America, "recent writers have 
emphasized the diminishing pertinence of the national state", shifting instead to "the emergence of 
regional and global frameworks for analysis" (Fardon & Furniss 1994: 5). Europeans, through their 
insistence on the coincidence of ethnicity and state boundaries, managed to avoid issues of 
multilingualism while globalizing the "terms language and political identity" (Fardon & Furniss 
1994:5-6) 
Chapter Five will return to issues of state language policies in relation to nation-building in sub-Saharan 
Africa, illustrated by reference to empirical cases. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A political sociology of language was constructed within four intersecting dimensions, formed by social 
identity (linguistic, ethnic), ideology (nationism, language ideology), power (relative status of language 
groups, relative positions of nation-states in the world-economy), and setting (church, state, region, 
globe). These dimensions serve as forms through which language and power are mediated. How they 
converge or diverge to affect integration in congregations is the hidden theme of this study, but 
emerges most consciously in the final chapter. 
The intertwined concept of a language ideology and the centrality of the state in supporting it is a 
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central, explicit theme that was introduced here and which flows through the study. The analytical 
framework constructed in Chapter Three enables us to view this theme in a global framework. While 
a globalized language may be ideologically neutral, learning it is always an ideologically laden act, 
which always relates to strategies of power. Linguicism was identified as a type of language ideology 
which informs relations between a dominant and subordinate languages. 
A particular language ideology achieves hegemony within nation-building, as Laitin's work illustrates. 
While not unproblematic, his work shows how important analysis of the role of the state is, while it 
also hints at the need to go beyond the nation-state as level of analysis. On the one hand he does 
show that linguistic dominance can be traced to state activities under certain conditions. Yet his 
discussion of subsystems also provides a way of linking the dominance of English in the language 
subsytem to external hegemony of English-speaking core states in the global system, as I argue more 
fully in Chapter Six. Hence the need in Chapter Three to reflect on those global theories which best 
suit the analysis of language practice across and within nation-states. 
Laitin's suggestion that cultural subsystems do not necessarily move towards value congruence but 
contain incongruent values to each other is important. As I indicate in Chapter Three, the functionalist 
paradigm that underpins the neo-Marxist facade of world-system scholars causes difficulties precisely 
because they insist that culture should play an integrative role. Because they assign a primary 
integrative role to the world-economy, they conclude that no unified world culture exists. As a result, 
world-system theorists have to define the nature and role of a world culture or a dominant core culture 
away. 
The state is both weak and strong in relation to language, as revealed by differences between state 
sponsored programmatic (policy) and pragmatic policies, as Fardon & Furniss argued. The question of 
where this weakness and strength derives from can only be answered in world-polity and world-
economy terms. As I will show in Chapters Three and Six, the notion of loose coupling from neo-
institutionalism also helps to explain the disparity between policy and practice. Laitin outlined how 
language rationalization is part of state rationalization, and that the rational choice for the state often 
is to choose English at the national level, and to acknowledge local vernaculars in symbolic (cultural, 
kinship) domains. 
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- CHAPTER THREE -
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: WORLD-ECONOMY, 
GLOBALIZATION, AND WORLD-POLITY 
In Chapter Three I evaluate and select from three major perspectives on the world system, namely that 
of Wallerstein, Robertson, and Meyer e.a., and refer to two minor approaches in passing (i.e. Frank, 
Luhmann) 1 • As the subheadings indicate, these three include globalization, world-system (as distinct 
from world system), and world-polity orientations. Each subsection reprises salient aspects of a 
particular theory, especially as it relates to culture and the nation-state, as well as major critiques. In 
the final subsection I evaluate the relevance of these theories for this study, and argue that the world-
polity approach represents the general analytical framework which best fits in with the political 
sociology of language. The world-polity approach promises most help in tying language usage to 
nation-building; and in relating both institutions to the features and dynamics of the world system. 
Yet I incorporate some of the concepts from the other approaches in eclectic fashion as necessary. 
I subscribe to the view that the world system is primarily integrated economically, but also underwrite 
the notion that the world system as a whole consists of a world-polity and a world-economy. These 
function dialectically and relatively independently alongside the world-economy, as discussed by John 
Meyer and his colleagues. My eclecticism stems from what Robert Holton describes as analytical 
"scepticism towards the claims of any general theory to explain the observable historical, economic, 
political, and cultural features of globalization". 
Space and relevance preclude a full overview of the burgeoning literature on globalization, world-
system/s, global order, and world society below. I also do not attempt to discuss the full complexities 
of the various theoretical viewpoints, but extract only those which together describe the basic features 
and dynamics of the present world system. In general my purpose is to isolate aspects which can be 
used to demonstrate possible linkages between global tendencies and local societal institutions. 
A peculiar problem with most world system theories is their lack of attention to religion, a result of a 
general unde.rvaluing of culture in favour of over-stressing global economy or polity. By contrast, 
globalization theories tend to stress cultural dimensions, and so appear to hold out most relevance for 
this study. Yet global and local cultures cannot be understood in isolation from the fundamental 
structural dimensions of the world-economy or the world-polity. 
1. These are not the only possible approaches; for instance Thompson (1983) also lists Modelski's long cycles of world 
leadership. 
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At first (and second!) glance there appears to be as many globalization and world-system theories as 
there are theorists. This seems partly due to the variety of academic disciplines (Frank (1993) lists 
more than twelve) in which similar ideas have been percolating more or less simultaneously, and partly 
due to the difficulty involved in describing the complexity of global reality. As a result, n globalization n , 
like n world-system n , not only means different things to different people - but divergent terms are also 
used to describe similar processes or features. 
Within sociology Wallerstein's views dominate world-system approaches, alongside the - as yet -
minority world system position of Frank and others; while Robertson's work dominates globalization 
perspectives. World-system perspectives have been well-critiqued by Chase-Dunn (1989), albeit 
sympathetically, and placed in religious perspective by Beyer (1994). Wallerstein is perceived to stress 
the economic dimension of the present capitalist world-system to the exclusion of the cultural, 
Robertson the cultural dimensions of processes of globalization. Frank avers (with Gills) that there is 
and has always been only one single world system. The major difference between the Wallersteinian 
and Frankian positions are their respective stresses on disjuncture and continuity between the present 
and earlier world systems. 
A central question which surfaces often in critiques of both world-economy and globalization is 
whether the world system exists outside the control of its own units or not. Wallerstein and Friedman2 
argue respectively that neither the world-economy nor the global system is controlled by any global 
actor; whether a nation-state or global institutions like the World Bank or United Nations. While the 
world-economy may have been aggressively promoted by the European region, it is no longer 
controlled by any core state or group of states. A similar argument holds true for any of the non-
economic dimensions of the world system. While initially British and later USA cultures achieved 
successive hegemony in the world system, globalized American culture is no longer controlled by the 
USA. This does not mean that actors play no part: Spy bey insists that a world society is created 
through the institutionalization and reproduction of globalization by individuals. People who buy from 
McDonalds contribute to the McDonaldization of the globe. While McMichael (1996) accepts the 
significance of actors, he contends that globalization is a historical-political project driven by the state 
managers of the core in conjunction with their counterparts in the periphery. The relation of the world-
economy to globalization is a comparative question which indicates the contestation between the two 
perspectives. Robertson maintains that the world-economy is merely an aspect of globalization, while 
Friedman asserts to the contrary that globalization is produced by the global system. 
Yet there does seem to be some mutual theoretical interplay. Spybey (1996:156) indicates that 
2. Friedman (1995:80) says that local structures articulate with global processes to form the world system. Global 
cultural-institutional forms like states, markets, and movements "are produced and reproduced by the global local 
articulations of the world system". 
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Robertson's central concept of universalisation-particularisation was developed from Wallerstein's idea 
of" universalism through particularism, and particularism through universalism" (Wallerstein 1 984: 1 67). 
According to Friedman there is some agreement between Wallerstein and Robertson regarding the 
globalization of nationalism. Yet such agreements should not paper over differences which exist. 
Because Robertson always includes references to the religious domain, his views seem most 
compatible with a study involving religious phenomena. But my approach is more eclectic, as I prefer 
to use the insights from a variety of authors. 
1. WORLD-SYSTEM THEORY: ECONOMIC STRUCTURE IN THE WORLD SYSTEM 
1 .1 Development of world-system theory 
Hopkins (1979) traces the development of world-system theories to the earlier modernization 
approaches of the 1940s and 1950s, which emphasised long-run, large scale, comparative social 
change. The view that modernization scholars held of social change (all nation-states passed through 
the same development path) came under attack from two directions. First, dependence theorists 
argued that "the well-being of advanced states" depended on "the advantageous relations they have 
had with less-developed states", which would have to negotiate a different path to development. 
Second, imperialism theorists maintained that the development of "advanced" states are structurally 
dependent upon the underdevelopment of other states. They "implied that a single basic set of general 
economic processes underlies the world's uneven development", acting hand-in-hand with national and 
transnational political and economic processes. The economic process which drove "modern social 
change" was later explicitly identified as a single capitalist world-economy which originated in 
sixteenth century Europe. Although several authors proposed the idea, it was "propounded most fully 
and most forcefully by Wallerstein" (Hopkins 1979:22-23). 
The participation of various scholars under the "world-system" rubric should not disguise the 
differences that exist between what has been described as contending approaches (Thompson 1983). 
Winckler (1979) shows that at least three alternative conceptions exist of where states are to be 
located within the world-system, which differ markedly in some respects from one another. For 
instance, in one portrayal seven states form part of the core (USA, Western Europe, Japan, Canada, 
Australia, USSR, China, and Eastern Europe), the others respectively include four (USA, the European 
Community, Japan, USSR) and two (USA, USSR) (Winckler 1979:57). Nederveen Pieterse (1995:47) 
demonstrates how five "perspectives relevant to globalization" differ according to the timeframe they 
suggest for its inception; varying from the 1 500s to 1960. 
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1.2 Economic structure of the world-system 
Hopkins (1979:23-24) outlines an early perspective on the structure of the world-system (synonymous 
with world-economy) as comprising a single expanding economy (discernible through international 
trade, organised in terms of accumulation by core zones from the peripheries), a growing system of 
nation-states (which attempt to expand their influence over one another and other areas through an 
interstate system), and a single division of labour. A central contradiction marks the system: the 
development of a single economy over against the formation of separate states. 
The world-system develops out of the articulation between the processes of (a) the axial division and 
integration of labour on a global scale, and of (b) the formation "and deformation" of nation states. The 
articulation of these processes encourages "the network of relations among political formations (states, 
colonies, etc.)" to be "patterned like the network of relation among production-accumulation zones 
\ 
(core-periphery), and vice versa" (Hopkins 1979:24). As a result, economic and political location 
usually coincide: strong states emerge in the core, weak ones in the periphery (Hopkins 1979:25). 
Hopkins' ideas will be picked up again under the rubric "institutional isomorphism" in the last section 
of this chapter, and his ideas are implicitly critiqued in the review of Meyer's ideas, below. 
More recently Wallerstein used a threefold summation of the structure of the world-system, sometimes 
expanded to twelve criteria, but in all cases comprising "an axial division of labour involving integrated 
labor processes" geared to the "ceaseless accumulation of capital" (Wallerstein 1993:293). 
W~lIerstein's "descriptive trinity" consists of core-periphery relations, A & B cycles of expansion and 
stagnation or contraction, and rivalry between core states for hegemony. Apart from the preceding 
three, the other nine characteristics of the capitalist world-economy include: a semi-peripheral zone; 
continued existence of non-wage labour; a co-inherence of the boundaries of the world-system and 
an interstate system; an origin in the 1 500s; an expansion from Europe to the globe; non-primordiality 
of states, ethnic groups, and households; racism and sexism as organizing principles; anti-systemic 
movements that "simultaneously undermine and reinforce this system"; cycles prompted by the 
contradictions of the system (quoted in Frank 1993:203). 
For Wallerstein, then, the world system is a world-economy with a single division of labour but multiple 
polities and cultures, which emerged in Western Europe in the 15th century3. He views capitalism as 
based on the integration of relations of production through the exchange of commodities into a world 
division of labour, geared towards the ceaseless accumulation of capital. This allows him to view 
unfree labour relations - instead of the free wage-labour posited by Marx - as compatible with the 
3. See Friedman (1994) and Frank & Gills (1993) for alternative argument: that the world became a global system 
through trade and conquest long before the middle 1500s - Wallerstein's point of departure. 
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world-economy (Holton 1998:24). Subsequently, Wallerstein can conceive of 400 hundred years of 
economic history as based on the increasing dominance of a single mode of production, instead of the 
plethora of modes advanced by Marxists. 
Wallerstein distinguishes between three spatial structures (zones) in the world-economy (compare 
Nederveen Pieterse 1988:251). Core states are complex, exhibiting mixed economies and combining 
high technologies with high wages. Periphery nation-states supply the core with staples and raw 
materials, and are characterised by low wage labour and low technology. Semi-periphery states (e.g. 
Brazil) form a permeable barrier between the core and periphery, exploiting the periphery and being 
exploited by the core. The semi-periphery prevents wholesale revolt thus stabilising the system, 
demonstrating that in essence Wallerstein conceives of the nation-states within the world-system as 
classes (Beyer 1994:17). Core states redistribute wealth internally in order to protect the vested 
interests of the ruling class. Periphery states are generally-speaking weak, as their ruling classes are 
often complicitous with the ruling class of core states, who also subvert the peripheries through 
various measures (Beyer 1994: 18). 
For Wallerstein nation-states are a "dependent function" of "a single logic of the world-economy" 
(Beyer 1994: 18). The world-economy led to the rise of the modern nation-state, and created three 
geographical divisions: the periphery, the semi-periphery, and the core. States do not control the 
world-economy but are themselves controlled by it (Beyer 1994: 17). The position of a nation-state in 
the global division of labour determines its place (in the core, periphery, semi-periphery), strength, and 
its position in the class structure of the world-economy. So, for example, semi-peripheral areas 
function as a middle class. The world-economy is driven by class conflict, disguised as racial or ethnic 
conflict by a global "ideas-system". 
The world-economy is characterised by certain temporal dynamics, namely cycles, trends, emergence 
and collapse (Nederveen Pieterse 1988:251). Cyclical trends, occur through class conflict between 
those who benefit from it, and those who do not (Beyer 1994: 18). But cycles also result from the 
contradictions within the capitalist mode of production. Capitalism needs "constant expansion to 
maintain profit margins", and new economic opportunities have to be found continually - "often in 
different areas" (Beyer 1994:19). This process causes economic upturns and downswings (Beyer 
1 994: 1 9). Linear trends also occur from one type of social system to another, which will in the future 
lead to a new type of system, mediated by anti-systemic agents (e.g. socialist movements; Beyer 
1994:20). 
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1.3 Critique of world-system theory 
1.3.1 Substantive criticisms: a systems-theory without a system 
Wallerstein's conceptualization of the world-economy has been critiqued extensively, as befits a 
dominant paradigm (compare Bergesen, Beyer, Boyne, Chase-Dunn, Holton, Graaff, Lechner, 
Nederveen Pieterse, Winckler). These criticisms centre on metatheory, economic reductionism, notions 
of system, mode of production, and relations to globalization. 
Bergesen (1980, 1990; also Lechner 1989) has argued against the utilitarian metatheoretical 
perspective inherent in world-system theory. Accordingly, world-economy theorists derive the features 
of the whole system from the interaction between its units. For Bergesen this is simply historically 
inaccurate, as features of colonial states after independence were patently based on an already 
existing inter-state system. In other words, units of the world-system derive their aspects from the 
system itself. Bergesen also criticises the over-economistic emphasis, which leads to inaccurate 
representations in which forceful domination over peripheral peoples (e.g. the Aztecs) inadvertently 
becomes disguised as "unequal exchange". 
Frequent criticisms centre on Wallerstein's supposed neglect of non-economic dimensions of the world-
system (compare Lechner 1989, Boyne 1990, Robertson 1992). Wallerstein's counter-argument is to 
deny the ontological autonomy of the political, economic, and cultural spheres (Wallerstein 1990:63). 
And Friedman (1995:69) writes that while world system theorists emphasise economic structures, this 
does not necessarily prevent them from dealing adequately with culture. He argues that the time-space 
compression involved in globalization is driven by capital accumulation. Friedman, like Holton, believes 
that Robertson is equally guilty of sidelining economic, political, and structural features of the world 
system (Friedman 1995:70). 
Various commentators (e.g. Winckler 1979; Zolberg 1983; Graaff 1990) have questioned the lack of 
specificity accorded to "system". Nederveen Pieterse (1988:251) calls Wallerstein'S approach "a 
theory of the world system without a system theory". 
Chirot4 (1977:48-54) claims that Wallerstein's conceptualization is not systemic "because it does not 
identify rational interests sufficient to account for. the behavior of individual actors and the dynamics 
of the system as a whole". Graaff (1990 claims that Wallerstein's world system appears closed (as 
does Nederveen Pieterse, 1988:251), un i-dimensional (global) and mononodal, as subsystems are 
conceived as having discrete boundaries within a single system. In addition the system derives from 
4. Chirot, D. 1977. Social change in the twentieth century. New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanivich, quoted in Winckler 
1979:56. 
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historical conjuncture, which implies a relatively strong degree of determinism. Instead, "a system is 
better seen as a node with a surrounding (fairly ragged) field of influence". Graaff draws on Giddens5 
(1984:164-5, quoted in Graaff 1990:5) to argue that systems are "'constituted by the intersection of 
multiple social systems'" which operate simultaneously. The core-periphery system then contains 
dynamics operating "at different levels superimposed 'on top of' each other", as well as "a number 
of nodes existing 'next to' one another" (Graaff 1990:5). 
Particularly problematic is Wallerstein's insistence that a single mode of production characterises the 
world-economy, which envelops pre-capitalist modes so that both core and periphery are linked by a 
single system. Critics claim that Wallerstein here obscures the stages and processes of integration by 
which other economic systems were integrated into the dominant capitalist system, thus collapsing 
them into one. By contrast, modes of production theory posed the persistence of pre-capitalist modes 
within the systemic domination of the capitalist mode (Graaff 1990: 11.12). The degree to which these 
modes co-vary explains how peripheries differ from one another. Graaff (1990: 14) argues for a 
synthesis in which persisting older forms of modes of production combine pre-capitalist and capitalist 
features in a distinct peripheral mode of production. As a result persisting pre-capitalist modes have 
been "structured and recast by insertion into a capitalist context" (Graaff 1990: 15). 
Zolberg (1983) questions when and whether world systems theory is appropriate to use. He asks what 
theoretical contributions a comparison of relations of production in 1479 to those in 1979 can make. 
For him the timespan includes too many variables to make propositions specific enough to achieve 
theoretical significance. To seek to explain some phenomena through "the arduous formalization of a 
world-system" is sometimes simply a question of overkill and thus an inefficient research strategy. In 
such instances "the world-system conceptualization may in fact obfuscate rather than clarify" (Zolberg 
1983:275). 
Boli-Bennett (1980) rejects the class analysis inherent in world-system theory. He finds little support 
for the role of traditionally conceived classes, as new technocratic classes ("state bureaucrats, 
techniciens, corporate executives, experts") have arisen in both the core and periphery which do not 
own the means of production, but do control it. The means of production now have been expanded 
to include "production of knowledge, information processing methods, organizational management 
techniques, propaganda". He concludes that "the historically important classes .... are now of 
secondary importance only" (Boli-Bennett 1980:80). Boli-Bennett also does not accept that state 
dominance depends only on locality in the world-system, which in turn affects the level of internal 
development. Here he is in agreement with Thomas & Meyer (1980)' who believe that the state 
system itself has become hegemonic. "It is external to particular local interest patterns and 
organizations in independent societies, and it is authoritative apart from particular economic or social 
5. Giddens, A 1984. The constitution of society: outline of the theory of structuration. Berkeley: UCLA Press. 
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interests", such as specific elites (Thomas & Meyer 1980: 142). 
For Robertson (1991) globalization theory not only preceded world-system theories, but represents an 
alternative which "have very little to do" with the latter. He sketches the distinctions between 
globalization and world-systems theories in a summary of the relevance of religion to globalization 
theory. For Robertson the economic base of world-systems theory is "but one aspect of one dimension 
of the overall process of globalization", namely global internationalization ("the expansion and 
consolidation of the international system"). Zolberg (1983:274) similarly claims that the world-system 
is "a component of some larger global entity". The other three processes, which together make up 
globalization, include "global societalization (the global generalization of a particular conception of the 
modern form of society); global individualization (the global generalization of a conception of the 
modern person); and global humanization (the global diffusion of a conception of a homogenous, but 
gender-distinguished, humankind)" (Robertson, 1991 :282, italics in original text). 
By contrast to Robertson, Friedman believes that a global system incorporates globalization, thus 
differentiating between these terms. Globalization refers to a duality of objective and subjective 
processes, which promote an increasing interdependence and an intensifying awareness of that 
interconnectedness (Robertson 1992:8; Friedman 1995:70). By global system Friedman (1995:73-4) 
means "a definite set of dynamic properties, including the formation of centre/periphery structures, 
their expansion, contraction, fragmentation and re-establishment throughout cycles of shifting 
hegemony". This system produces a global arena, the precondition for globalization - and so for the 
formation of globally generated local identities, such as ethnicities and nation-states. 
Holton (1998: 196) concludes that while "theories of capitalist global dominance have much 
explanatory power" they are "unable to explain the limits to multinational power set by the robustness -
of the nation-state and by political and cultural resistance to corporate power". 
1.3.2 Alternative conceptualization: a world system "without the hyphen" 
A more temporal-spatial critique argues for continuity of the present world-economy with older and 
Oriental world systems, instead of Wallerstein's notion of a decisive 16th century European 
disjuncture. This argument is exemplified most vociferously by Andre Gunder Frank and colleagues, 
with more tempered contributions by Jonathan Friedman (1994), Janet Abu-Lughod (1989, 1993), and 
Chris Chase-Dunn & Tom Hall (1994). A similar line of thought is sustained in (largely anthropological) 
treatises of world civilizations, such as Wilkinson (1993)' s claim that a central global civilization exists, 
which originated in the Middle East around 1500 BC. Holton (1998:25-33) contains a brief review of 
most of these major texts. 
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Frank and Gills (1993) argue, with Ekholm and Friedman, that measured in terms of capital 
accumulation through an extensive trade network only a single world system has existed for more than 
five thousand years. For Frank and Gills a major problem with world-system analysis is that the mode 
of production (capitalist mode, or core-periphery modes) is taken as the fundamental feature of the 
whole system (compare Graaff 1990 and Nederveen Pieterse 1988 for similar arguments). In their 
analysis, accumulation rather than production is central, and so there has been no decisive 16th 
century break as argued by world-system theorists. Instead, a world system has existed for over 5 000 
years. 
The notion that the origins of the world system lies in the East rather than Europe, has most recently 
been taken up by Frank in Re-Orient: global economy in the asian age (1998). According to reviewers, 
Frank argues that Europe is a latecomer, and only managed to buy its way into the Eastern world 
system at a later stage. In this Frank supports but goes beyond Abu-Lughod (1993)'s argument that 
a world system existed, based in the East, which bound together the East and Europe. The rise of the 
West, both these authors argue, followed on the demise of the East. A similar argument was made by 
William McNeill (1963)6, who suggested the existence of a Eurasian ecumene in which European and 
Asian regions interacted in a multidirectional manner. But Holton rejects this argument, "There is no 
evolutionary necessity for a fully fledged global economy to emerge directly from earlier historical 
episodes of global economic interconnection" (Holton 1998:26). He stresses discontinuity (expansion, 
crisis, contraction, collapse) alongside continuity as mechanisms of change. 
The above evidence points to the arbitrariness of choosing to focus on one world system, historical 
period, or geographic region rather than on others. At the same time arguments about which system 
was first is to engage in infinite, and ultimately pointless, regression (Zolberg 1983:275). The evidence 
also draws attention to what critics perceive as Eurocentrism in world-economic analyses, and instead 
advances "the centrality of non-Western sources of dynamism in areas such as trade, technology, and 
science" (Holton 1998:31). 
2. GLOBALIZATION THEORIES: CULTURAL PROCESSES IN THE WORLD SYSTEM 
Roland Robertson describes globalization as a process which results in a global culture operating within 
a global field. According to Beyer (1994:27) Robertson defines globalization as '''the overall process 
by which the entire world becomes increasingly interdependent, so as to yield a 'single place' ... a 
world society'''. Consequently "subunits of the global system can constitute themselves only with 
reference to this encompassing whole. This is what Robertson means by relativization". So for 
6. McNeill, W 1963. The rise of the West: a history of the human community. New York: New American Library; 
referred to by Zolberg (1983:274). 
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Robertson globalization is a process concerned with globally understood forms of meaning, i.e. the 
awareness of globality. That is, by global culture is understood consciousness of interpenetrating 
global system, and the consequences of this awareness, not the extension and hegemony of a 
particular local culture. 
For Roland Robertson globalization has a strong cultural effect, in that all forms of identity is affected. 
Globalization relativizes identities: national identities can now be constructed only by reference to "the 
global system of societies", while individual identities have to refer to "humankind". In other words, 
globalization universalizes the particular (distinct national/individual identities) and particularises the 
universal (global order/humankind) (Beyer 1994:27,28). 
The globalization process involves a paradox: (a) the world becomes a single place, in which (b) the 
expectation exists that societies '''should have distinct identities'" (Beyer 1994:28). The process is 
not supported by a single dominant image of global order, supplied by a world culture. Instead, 
societies construct their own images (national identities), which not only reflect what the world should 
be like, but conflict with those of others (Beyer 1994:27). In their attempts to deal with these 
conflicting images, a global culture is produced around the idea that the world is a global whole (Beyer 
1994:27). 
Globalization for Robertson constitutes a global field, not a system, in which paradoxical and cognitive 
interactions take place in terms of selves, humankind, national societies, and the world system of 
societies as reference points. The interactions point simultaneously at "tensions between conflicting 
principles" and opportunities to resolve them. 
Robertson's global field retains agency while bridging "the micro-macro divide in understandings of 
globalization" (Holton 1998:188-89). At the same time Robertson allows forthe paradoxical.interaction 
of the "universalization of particularism" and the "particularization of universalism" (1992: 1 00). By 
"universalization of particularism", Holton (1998:192) explains, Robertson refers to two features of 
the global field. First, to the universal acceptance of the legitimacy of assertions of difference -
whether on the basis of communal or individual claims. The latter is revealed in, for example, the 
proliferation of ethnies or alternative lifestyles. Second, to "the diffusion of particularistic practices on 
an increasingly global scale", such as revealed by the almost universal acceptance of the nation-state 
which at the same time encompasses particular interests. By the "particularization of universalism" 
Holton understands Robertson to refer to how universal notions are given concrete form in, for 
instance, "conceptions of rights or forms of political mobilization". Robertson's mutually interacting 
processes distinguishes his work from modernisation theory, "which assumed that universalism would 
triumph", and world-system theory, which reduces "the problem to one of capitalism and its 
discontents" .(Holton 1998: 193). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Analytical framework: World-economy, world-polity, and globalization 71 
Robertson's work readily lends itself to an emphasis on agency because in essence he operates with 
an implicit symbolic interaction perspective (Simpson 1991 :16; Garrett 1992:299; Robertson 
1992:320). Structuration bridges the agency-structure opposition by indicating that agents create 
structures which constrain and enable actors in a ongoing dialectic and reflexive manner, thus affecting 
their continuous construction. Spybey argues that global institutions can only be reproduced by 
individual agents, without whom they would cease to exist. For example, individual consumers have 
to make and buy globalized products, so contributing both to the globality of such items but also 
constituting themselves as global actors. Similarly individuals accept the nation-state as a global 
organizing principle, so constituting themselves as global citizens and perpetuating its diffusion. 
Spybey perhaps overstates individual agency to the detriment of collective agency, in which individuals 
together make decisions on behalf of groups or organizations. The dialectic between global agents and 
structures is an important aspect to consider when evaluating the local effects of the global. 
The primary feature of globalization theory is that its unit of analysis is the entire globe, perceived as 
a single social system with distinct properties which constrains and enables all other social forms such 
as polities and cultures. What happens in anyone society "occurs only in interrelationship with what 
happens in other societies with which it is closely associated". Yet "similar forces of change will have 
different effects on different societies" - hence structural differentiation emerges between states in the 
world-system (Beyer 1994: 14,16). 
2.1 Globalization: homogenization, heterogenization, or hybridization? 
For Robertson (1991 :283) globalization does not presume a harmoniously integrated whole, neither 
a progression towards a better world" nor a homogenizing process. With reference to the latter, 
Robertson precludes recovery of mechanical solidarity through globalization as he believes that "any 
sociocultural entity must manifest variety in order to perpetuate itself". Globalization encourages 
diversity and similarity, in the form of "heterogeneity-within-homogeneity, or 
difference-within-identity", so that localism-universalism have become globalized modes of thinking 
- even when they occur in opposition to one another (Robertson 1991: 283-84). 
Robertson disagrees that globalization is a consequence of modernity7 as Giddens have proposed; 
instead, he links globality to modernity. The linkage of modernity and globalization suggests that the 
former leads through a series of historical processes to the latter, and inherently causes 
homogenisation. Both assumptions are incorrect, according to Robertson. Modernity is generally 
associated with successive temporal processes, which ignores the fact that at least three types of 
modernity developed relatively autonomously in non-Western contexts, through: annihilation of 
7. Friedman (1995:69) agrees that modernity is "a product of the modern world system". 
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indigenous peoples (New World); reaction to external challenge (Asia); and colonial imposition (Africa). 
In fact, Robertson refers to globality as a spatial condition, in which geographically distinct 
'civilisations' interpenetrate. He views globality as necessary for the diffusion of modernization 
(Robertson 1995:26-27). Spybey (1996:155) finds Robertson's insistence that modernization and 
globalization be kept separate inconsequential. 
Globalization forces religious organizations to respond to the subsequent condition of globality 
(Robertson 1991 :284). As a result "the whole world is a constraining as well as an enabling setting 
for ... intrasocietal or intracivilizational affairs". Instead of opposing homogenization and 
heterogenization to one another researchers should attend to empirical examples which indicate a 
combination of the interpenetration of the universal and the particular (Robertson 1995:27). 
Nederveen Pieterse (1995) indicates that globalization can have two cultural outcomes: globalization-
as-homogenization or globalization-as-hybridization.lnstead, Friedman (1 995: 78) distinguishes between 
stronger and weaker types of globalization. Stronger globalization leads to the homogenization of local 
contexts into universal meanings, so that the same meaning is ascribed to global objects regardless 
of the location within the system of those who so attribute meaning. Weaker globalization occurs 
where the universal is assimilated into local meanings. 
Friedman (1994) suggests a third, structural possibility, namely globalization-as-fragmention at the 
political and economic level; similar to Samir Amin's notions of multipolarity within the world-system. 
In Friedman's opinion globalization can act as centrifugal process which decentralizes power and 
capital, resulting not in the disintegration of the world system but in its radical realignment. 
Fundamental changes are brought about by a decentralisation of capital, which weakens the centre 
while strengthening the periphery (Friedman 1994). The decline of hegemony leads to the 
fragmentation of homogeny, and so to an increase in expressions of different cultural and social 
identities. Whether viewed in" terms of centrifugal or centripetal conceptualizations of the world 
system, the notion that a shift in the world system is underway since the 1970s seems widely 
supported (compare Featherstone 1990). 
By contrast Clark (1997) suggests that globalization and fragmention (e.g. regionalism) are opposing 
tendencies. Nederveen Pieterse would deny this, as he conceives heterogenization and homogenization 
as opposite poles which occur along a continuum (Nederveen Pieterse 1995:62). Friedman (1995) 
explains the operations of homogenizing tendencies in global systemic terms which suggest 
conjuncture where Appadurai would posit disjuncture. Homogenization co-occurs as part of the 
centralization and heterogenization of the decentralisation of accumulation. "The globalization of 
fundamentalisms and of powerful nationalisms is part of the same process, the violent eruption of 
cultural identities in the wake of declining modernist identity" (Friedman (1995:84). 
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The discussion of homogeneity-heterogeneity and the universal-local in the context of globalization 
poses analytical issues which need to be resolved in my study. Is the dominance of the English 
language in South African institutions an example of the homogenizing effect of globalization, with the 
retention of indigenous languages in the private sphere as a weak form of heterogenization? Or would 
it be better to consider racially-integrating congregations as demonstrating a universalizing tendency 
as opposed to the localizing strategies employed in indigenous-language congregations? And is the 
discrepancy in the public sphere between multilingual ideologies and monolingual practices an example 
of localized adaptations of universal norms? 
For Spybey (1996) globalization was initially instituted through the implantation of modern Western 
institutions throughout the world - an early form of modernity. In addition modern forms of 
communication, economy, polity, and tourism substantially increased the diffusion and density of 
global awareness. Like Spybey, Niklas Luhmann emphasises the role of communication in establishing 
a global society. For Luhmann a the world system is global because communication "extends 
continuously around the globe", while it is a society (or social system), in which actions occur, based 
on meaningful communication (Beyer 1994: 30,33). And, "increasingly, meaningful communication can 
and often does take place between any two points" (Beyer 1994:30). Communication, in turn, depends 
on relatively stable social structures, based on expectations (Beyer 1994:36). The kind of 
communication that has become globalized is cognitive or adaptive; e.g. scientific, technical, news, 
travel (Beyer 1994:36). Modernisation leads to globalization, and so to a world society (Beyer 
1994:38). 
For Luhmann one of the most important shifts between pre-modern to modern societies is from a 
normative to a cognitive (learning) way of responding to disappointed expectations (Beyer 1994: 3 7). 
Learning is increasingly important in modern social structures (Beyer 1994:36). Another shift is from 
the dominance of stratified differentiation to that of functional differentiation (Beyer 1994:34): 
i. In stratified differentiation people are ranked on the basis of status, so that their actions are 
interpreted according to strata membership. Stratified societies are characterised by the dominance 
of a ruling stratum, who control most of the power. The boundaries of society are determined by "the 
reach of their communication" (Beyer 1994:35); 
ii. In functional differentiation people and their actions are categorised on the basis of the function 
that they fulfil in specific (political, economic, educational, religious) systems (Beyer 1994:35). Such 
systems "specialise in specific modes of communication" (Beyer 1994:37). By implication this sets 
boundaries which are relatively independent from one another, so that one system cannot control 
others (Beyer 1994: 38). The "only boundary that remains possible for the encompassing societal 
system is then the globe itself" (Beyer 1994:38). World society is characterised by "the dominance 
of functionally differentiated subsystems" (Beyer 1994:40). 
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2.2 Glocalization 
In globalization terms Christian congregations as well as language practice represent globalized 
institutions which are affected by the dual dynamic inherent in glocalization (Robertson 1995). This 
term refers to the simultaneous drive towards global cultural homogeneity and adaptation to local 
heterogeneity. Linguistic integration of congregations can serve as a test-case for the latter two 
processes: my impression is that they illustrate the first (movement towards global identity, active 
reproduction of a global institution) better than the second. This argument will have to be weighed up 
against glocalization, and the related notion of hybridization. 
Hybridization, unlike glocalization, allows for attention to the operation of power relations, without 
precluding a more neutral evaluation of the eventual outcome (Nederveen Pieterse 1995). In addition 
hybridization allows for a non-Eurocentric perspective in which the dominated do exercise some power, 
so permitting for a view in which peripheral Asian, Latin American, and African cultures can influence 
Western forms as well as one other. Such an outcome can be described as interculturality, in which 
e.g. African cultural forms contribute to Western forms and vice versa. 
2.3 Critique of Robertson's globalization theory 
Holton (1998: 187-192) finds much to commend in Robertson's theory, particularly its 
multidimensionality and multidirectional interactionism. By multidimensionality Holton refers to 
Robertson's rejection of a single logic in favour of a inclusion of economic, political, and cultural 
dimensions, "together with multiple centres of action and multiple players" (individuals, nation-states). 
Multidirectional interactionism refers to globalization's intensification of the local-universal dialectic, 
which forces all actors to be cognisant of "transnational processes and institutions". But local actors 
can affect global processes; for instance, global consumer capitalism is forced to adjust to local 
particularistic demand (Holton 1998: 194). This perspective is what Spybey draws on in his 
conceptualization of world society. 
Yet Robertson fails to draw explicit attention to inequalities of power, resources, and information 
between actors in the global field - though he is aware of this problem. This devaluation results partly 
from his exclusive cO,ncern "with cognitive issues to do with how the globe is understood and how 
that understanding reflects and embodies the connected issues of universalization and particularization" 
(Holton 1998:194). Consequentially Robertson "neglects the post-war global institutionalization of 
political-economic structures .... including the way in which the 'global', 'national', and 'local' are both 
organized and understood". In this way, Horton concludes, global awareness is not connected to global 
political economy. So Wallerstein's weakness is Robertson's strength, and vice versa. 
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3. WORLD-POLITY THEORY: INSTITUTIONS AS CULTURAL FRAMEWORKS OF THE WORLD 
SYSTEM 
Boli, Meyer, and others argue that world-polity and world-economy function independently to a degree, 
and that world-polity is governed by global norms, a global culture. Their insistence on the constitutive 
effect of norms is drawn from new institutional theory, and so I first review the development and 
contents of this approach, which I take to be an underlying metatheory of the world-polity perspective. 
Next I outline the basic arguments which are used by world-polity analysts to indicate the political-
institutional structure of the world-system. This section ends with a brief critique of world-polity 
theory. 
3.1 New institutionalism as metatheory of world-polity theory 
World-polity theory is embedded within a wider theoretical framework, namely new institutionalism, 
and utilises institutional isomorphism as a central concept. According to Hall & Taylor (1996:939) 
institutionalism explains how institutions affect individual behaviour, so answering the questions nhow 
do actors behave, what do institutions do, and .why do institutions persist over timen. Applied to the 
world system, institutionalists maintain that international, state and substate organizations are 
structured and behave in convergent ways due to the operation of global institutional (or, cultural) 
factors (compare Finnemore 1996:337). 
Institutional analysis have in the past diverged, depending on whether they regarded institutions to 
have been created to meet specific tasks, or to satisfy particular norms. New institutionalists came to 
emphasise the second approach, arguing that institutions are valued because they contain symbolic 
elements which legitimate their incorporation in organizations (cf. Granovetter & Swedberg 1992: 15). 
By contrast, economists often favoured the first approach which indicated that social and other 
institutions are generated to solve particular problems efficiently and rationally. This perspective tends 
to neglect the role of powerful role players and prevailing norms (Granovetter & Swedberg 1992: 16). 
Research on so-called path-dependent development shows that it is not the most efficient solutions 
that are adopted by organizations (e.g. the organization of keys on a computer's keyboard). Instead, 
the process can be the outcome of chance elements which interfere at an early stage, often influenced 
as much by social as the historical development of market forces, technology, politics, and society 
(Granovetter & Swedberg 1992:.17,18). 
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New institutionalists8 argue that the institutional environment exercises an isomorphic effect on 
organizations. The environment includes "norms, standards, and expectations held by relevant 
stakeholders and common to all inhabitants of the organizational field" (Kraatz & Zajac 1996:812). Due 
to the constraining effects of institutional environments, organizations tend towards homogeneity 
through a process of institutional isomorphism. As organizational fields - the complex formed by 
interactive patterns between an organization and other organizations to which it relates - become more 
defined (structurated), they exert a strong homogenizing influence on organizations. Consequently, 
organizations tend "to adopt uniform, institutionalized structures and practices that conform to the 
mandate of the institutional environment" (Kraatz & Zajac 1996:813). Change is inhibited through the 
inertia generated by organizations' need to be legitimized by the institutional environment, which 
precludes "certain choices of action". This is known as the legitimacy imperative (Kraatz & Zajac 
1996:813). 
In other words, institutionalism examines the ways in which the institutional context affects individuals 
and groups in the formation of their strategies to obtain particular goals (Koelble 1995:236). In terms 
of the environment-organization interaction, neo-institutionalism rejects both "technical" and functional 
theoretical explanations associated with the adaptation of organizations to their environments (Kraatz 
& Zajac 1996:813). Adaptive theories stress the importance of general and local technical 
environments ("customers, suppliers, competitors, regulatory groups") in affecting change in the 
practices and structures of organizations (Kraatz & Zajac 1996:812,15). By contrast neo-
institutionalism emphasises "'organizational conformity with social rules and rituals'" (Kraatz & Zajac 
1996:813, quoting Orru, Biggart, & Hamilton 1991:361). 
New institutionalism is not a unified approach, but takes rational choice, historical, and sociological 
forms, which are employed somewhat differently by economists, political scientists, and sociologists 
(Cook & Levi 1990; Koelble 1995; Hall & Taylor 1996; Lowndes 1996; Hirsch 1997; cf. Sjostrand 
1993:6; Granovetter & Swedberg 1992). I will briefly summarise the major components of each form 
of institutionalism, noting particularly the interrelationship between institutions and behaviour, and 
outline their views on how institutions emerge and change. 
Rational choice institutionalism borrows the idea of exchange from economics to emphasise that 
individual preference and action result from actors who strategically calculate the costs and benefits 
of outcomes in terms of what serves their best interests (Koelble 1995:232). The repeated interactions 
of utility-maximising social actors create institutions to ensure stability, contain transaction costs, and 
encourage co-operative behaviour (Koelble 1995:239). So co-operative behaviour leads to the 
8. New institutionalism differs from" old" institutionalism in two ways: the newer formdownplays actors' rationality 
(Powell & DiMaggio) and emphasises (cross-country) comparative systemic analysis through the isolation of 
intermediate institutions (Steinmo, Thelen, & Longstreth) (Koelble 1995:237). 
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emergence of institutions (Koelble 1995:240)' partly as a result of the "power of decision makers to 
provide benefits, sanctions, and incentives for others" and to monitor "possible noncompliants" 
(Koelble 1995:241). Institutions further the interests of actors who at the same time are constrained 
by them; that is, institutions are intervening variables which affect but do not determine individual 
choices and actions (Koelble 1995:232,237). Institutional change comes about when individuals 
seeking change become more effective than those who oppose change (Koelble 1995:241). Rational 
choice institutionalism often underpins the work of economists (e.g. Douglass North) and political 
scientists (e.g. Cook & Levi 1990; Laitin 1993). 
Historical institutionalism maintains that institutions emerge to legitimate "certain rules of conduct and 
behavior which concern power relations and the establishment of social and cultural norms". 
Institutions are formal or informal routines, norms, conventions, "Sets of rules and procedures which 
define the appropriateness" of choices or actions (Koelble 1995:233). They are associated with 
organizations, and embedded in organizational structures (particularly of the polity) (Hall & Taylor 
1996:938). Although affected by "collective and individual choices", institutions are independent 
variables which determine individual actions (Koelble 1995:232,237) . Individuals make decisions based 
on preferences influenced by the institutional context, the outcome of "the interaction among various 
groups, interests, ideas, and institutional structures" (Koelble 1995:232). Decisions emerge from 
bounded rationality - that is, people do not have full information and cannot totally anticipate the 
consequences of their decisions (Koelble 1995:234). Actors "may make wrong choices and frequently 
do not see their interest clearly" (Koelble 1995:238). 
Historical institutionalism within political science goes beyond group theory, which states that politics 
is about conflict between groups for scarce resources, and structural functionalism with its emphasis 
on "polity as an overall system of interacting parts" (Hall & Taylor 1996:937). Instead historical 
institutionalists argue for the primacy of "the institutional organization of the polity" in "structuring 
collective behavior"; i.e. emphasise structural aspects (Hall & Taylor 1996:937). For some the state 
is not a neutral agent intervening between competing interests, but a complex of institutions which 
structure relations and outcomes among various organized interests through e.g. public policy (Hall & 
Taylor 1996:938). 
For historical institutionalist like Peter Hall the structural and institutional context which influenced 
economic institutions in France and Britain includes "the organization of labor, the state, capital, the 
political system, and the position of the country in the international economy" (Koelble 1995:236). The 
notion of bounded innovation seems particularly relevant to my study, suggesting that "a novel idea 
will succeed only as far as it is compatible with the institutional context" (Koelble 1995:238). 
According to Thelen and Steinmo there are at least four stimuli for institutional change: (a) change in 
the socio-political context, e.g. with different institutions becoming more important than before; (b) 
new actors which use existing institutions to their advantage; (c) established actors who create new 
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goals for existing institutions; and (d) "actors within the institutions adapt to institutional changes" 
(referred to in Koelble 1995:238). In short, institutional change results from "conflicts over interests, 
ideas, and power" (Koelble 1995:238) . 
.. 
Sociological institutionalism views institutions - which include "conventions and customs" - as 
dependent on macro-factors such as culture and society; i.e. institutions are dependent variables which 
determine individual actions (Koelble 1995:232,234). Actors choose actions based on their 
institutionally-guided perceptions of their appropriateness to particular contexts (Koelble 1995:234). 
Individuals are embedded in so many relationships that utility-maximising and rational explanations 
become almost impossible (Koelble 1995:235). Organizations choose particular cultural or symbolic 
systems "which are then reflected in the structures, functions, and goals of the organization as well 
as the rationality of individuals within the organization and institution" (Koelble 1995:235). 
In this view the mechanisms of change are either extra-institutional or intra-institutional - e.g. through 
antagonistic actors who oppose one another in the same institution (Koelble 1995:235). Isomorphism 
is an important extra-institutional mechanism for change, in the form either of (a) competition between 
organizations for resources, customers, niches (competitive isomorphism); or (b) of responses to other 
organizations for "political power and institutional legitimacy" (institutional isomorphism) (DiMaggio 
& Powell 1991 :66). Institutional isomorphism is driven by coercive, mimetic, or normative 
mechanisms: (a) coercive isomorphism is characterised by relations of force, persuasion, or collusion 
which are exercised formally or informally both by organizations on dependent organizations as well 
as by cultural expectations; (b) mimetic isomorphism results from uncertainty generated within or 
outside the org.anization; (c) normative isomorphism "stems primarily from professionalization" 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1991 :70). In short, isomorphism explains the "diffusion of certain departments 
and operating procedures to interorganizational influences, conformity and the persuasiveness of 
cultural accounts" (DiMaggio & Powell 1991: 13). 
How do notions of institutions and institutional isomorphism relate to globalization? Spybey (1996) 
offers several insights into how this can be done. His central thesis is that simultaneous reproduction 
and reflexivity exists between the global and the local; a clear adaptation of Robertson's idea of the 
particularization of the universal and the universalization of the particular. Institutions are globalized 
and accepted by humans, but altered in line with local needs. 
3.2 Political-institutional structure of the world-polity 
The world-polity approach by Meyer, Boli, and associates contrast with Wallerstein's insistence that 
a single economic logic drives the world-system, from which all other features such as the nation-state 
derive. 
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For John Meyer the global order consists of a system of nation states which operates in terms of a 
world political culture (Meyer 1980: 109; compare Robertson 1994: 1 05). A nation-state's internal 
strength is not determined by its position in the division of labour of the world-economy. Instead, the 
degree to which it conforms to world norms determines whether its legitimacy is accepted by other 
states (Beyer 1994:23). Legitimacy is a reward for conforming to two particular world cultural norms: 
equality and progress, and allows states to expand their control over more and more aspects of their 
citizen's lives. States that profess conformity to these norms are allowed enormous internal powers, 
and also monopolies of legitimated violence. Obviously affirmations of conformity as such are neither 
wholly sufficient nor the sole contributing factor to legitimacy. Nevertheless, such claims enable 
strong, centralized states to develop in the periphery as much as in the core (Beyer 1994:23). At the 
same time state control is increasingly exercised over civil society. And, "states continually take on 
new tasks they never thought to consider before" (Boli 1999, personal communication). Boli (1980) 
supports Meyer's ideas by showing that across the world system, state domination is increasing, 
regardless of a state's position in the core-periphery hierarchy. 
In other words, a world-polity functions independently of the world-economic system, as illustrated 
by the internal dynamics of states. That is, it contains two logics: polity and economics. The world-
polity is decentralised, and held together by a world culture (Beyer 1994:25). Meyer's arguments are 
made possible by his theoretical distinction between polity and economy, based on different systems 
of value creation (Beyer 1994:22). The economy creates value through commodification, while polity 
creates value through collective authority, by constructing and bestowing value on selected activities. 
These values are not determined by market forces, but by the authority of the polity. For example, the 
state as a dominant agent of collective authority can place a high value on social services. Polities 
include religious and cultural organisations (Beyer 1994:22). 
In similar vein to Meyer and colleagues, Lechner defines global order as regular (i.e. structured) 
interaction between a number of significant actors or institutions "across the globe" whose actions 
are governed by a minimally shared cultural conception of globality (Lechner 1991 :263). Globality 
refers to a sense of belonging to and participating in a single global cultural arena. Once this construct 
of a global order becomes accepted as real, it has real consequences. In brief, "globalization is the 
process by which a new social order comes about on a global scale", through "the institutionalization 
of a global (social and cultural) order". Lechner argues that a central emphasis in world system analysis 
should be on how global order is achieved through the institutionalization of global forms of thought 
and action. This requires specification as to what is institutionalized (Lechner 1991 :269). A second 
emphasis should be on the possible alternative global orders, and the historical processes that lead to 
the emergence of this particular world system (Lechner 1991 :264). 
Meyer argues that the "notion of a powerful world-polity enables us to explain a number of features 
of the world system that are highly problematic for theories depicting the world simply as an economic 
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exchange system". These include: political stability of the interstate system; continued modernization 
of peripheries; the global shift to tertiary (service) sectors; 
Due to normative rules which control the world-polity, isomorphism occurs between societies (Meyer 
1980: 11 0). Nation-states conform to one another and to the global norms: "surprisingly similar 
institutions of modernity (e.g. state services, educational systems) appear in all sorts of societies" -
all involving "rapid state growth". An argument made by Thomas & Meyer (1980) in the context of 
expanded strong states is worth considering here. They imply that many ideas and structures which 
exist in most nation-states (e.g. what defines strong states) arise from - and are sustained by - forces 
external to their particular societies. Internal groups which support these "derive their coherence less 
from the natural play of forces within society than from the operation and legitimating rules of the 
system as a whole"; i.e. by world culture (Thomas & Meyer 1980: 142). According to Thomas & Meyer 
(1980: 145-6), nation-building in newer states is a different proposition to that which took place in 
Europe and the USA. They thematize the former processes as being imposed in the form of national 
interests and identities by the state from the top downwards, and leading to increasingly stronger state 
organizations. 
Boli (1987:78-80) explains isomorphism by indicating how the expansion of the authority (legitimacy) 
of a nation state occurs via processes of integration in the world system. Three related processes 
takes place, namely systemic integration, national integration, and pluralization of the power of nation-
states at the centre of the system. Systemic integration is the continuous integration of the world 
system through increasing trade linkages and "flows of value" between states. National integration 
is the continuous integration of more nation-states into the world system by the same processes. 
Integration contributes to a pluralization of the power of core states, a decrease in hegemony measured 
as percentage of world trade. Both integration and pluralization "aids the expansion of the state in 
peripheral countries" (Boli 1987:80). Because no country can achieve hegemony, core control of the 
periphery is weakened, competition among core states increases, and peripheral states increasingly 
"take their cues from the more implicit but ever-present directives contained in the overarching world 
polity" (Boli 1987:80). As a result Boli's cross-national research demonstrated that state authority, as 
defined in constitutions, "is most expanded in the semiperipheral states and least expanded in the 
central states" (Boli 1987:83,90). 
Boli (1980:87) defines integration into the world system as the extent to which: (a) "the local economy 
is oriented to the world economy ... (b) local politics reflect developments in world politics", and (c) 
world culture is present. Location of a particular nation-state in the world system thus depends on the 
degree of systemic integration as well as the level of its own integration into that structure. The more 
integrated into the world system a state is, the likelier it is to exhibit the ideologies, organizational 
forms (e.g. dominant states) and institutions of the world-polity - and so of its core states. As a reSUlt, 
some countries can be peripheral in the world-economy yet be highly integrated into world ideology, 
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as revealed by state dominance. On the other hand some core countries (e.g. the USA, Canada) may 
be loosely integrated into the system and so have less dominant states. That is, "two peripheral 
countries with roughly the same level of economic/technical development might have states with quite 
different levels of authority and organization if one country is highly integrated into the world structure 
while the other is largely isolated from it. In this comparison, the former should have the more 
expanded state" (Boli-Bennett 1987:79). 
Boli (1980:88,87) argues that a "corpus of world ideology" exists within the world system, consisting 
of "a fairly coherent set of ideological and organizational standards for national behaviour9 • These 
include standards that define external and internal success in the system, as well as those which 
define the mechanisms by which success is to be achieved. External standards consist of "economic 
predominance, geopolitical influence, national autonomy". . Internal standards are "highly 
institutionalized" but differ in the extent to which they have been adopted by elites and incorporated 
into local ideologies. Accordingly internal success is determined by increases in Gross National Product 
and personal income, high levels of literacy and schooling, extensive political participation, adherence 
to human rights, "restrained use of official violence .... some degree of advanced technological 
development", and forms of cultural expression that enhances national prestige in the world system. 
Mechanisms for achieving these standards comprise mass education, "mobilized citizenry, considerable 
investment in research and development, strong identification with national goals and priorities on the 
part of citizens". But "the chief underlying mechanism ... must be an increasingly dominant state that 
organizes society around projects that will satisfy world standards (Boli-Bennett 1980:88). 
A raft of ideologies can become dominant within the world system, and is then differentially distributed 
- via political and economic elites - over the subunits of the system, thus integrating different states 
to varying degrees. World ideology is also diffused via economic organizations, mass media, global 
intellectual movements (including tertiary education). Training leads to a transfer of "specific 
organizational forms and techniques for implementing these ideologies. Similarly, multinational 
corporations impose organizational forms and techniques in the economic sector that can be 
transferred to the political realm and employed by the state" (Boli 1980:89). The presence of ideologies 
and organizational forms do not necessarily translate into actual implementation, but require certain 
political conditions (e.g. little civil society resistance, elites willing to extend state powers) (Boli 
1980:90). World religions also represent transnational organizational forms and ideologies, which 
probably affect the general populace more than they do elites. 
To summarise, Boli (1980:91-92) maintains that the world system has become increasingly integrated 
9. Boli's arguments need to be adjusted to political developments since 1980, as statism (state socialism) was a 
predominant ideology in the world system at that time (e.g. Boli 1980:88). The rollback of the welfare state under 
Reaganism and Thatcherism - which continues in a different guise in Europe and the USA, cast doubts on parts of his 
argument. Some argue that neo-liberalism has achieved near-hegemony in the world system. 
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since 1900, with accompanying effects. Increasing integration is demonstrable through stronger 
linkages via e.g. international treaties; rising economic interdependence; multiplying exchanges (of 
commodities, students, tourists, films, scientific and technological information). The first effect is that 
the overall system develops economically and technologically. While peripheries remain relatively 
worse off, they are not stagnant either; this explains the involvement of some peripheries in the 
development of high technology commodities (e.g. software development in India). Second, all nation 
states become more integrated into the system. Third, the integration of the system is reciprocally 
linked to the pluralization of power in the centre. The more pluralization occurs, the more competition 
exists between core countries; the more integration occurs, the more pluralization takes place. The 
better integrated the system becomes, the more power is evenly distributed throughout core countries, 
so that monopoly is no longer as possible as it was in the colonial period. Centre pluralization 
.. operates to the advantage of the periphery rather than the central countries". 
3.3 Critique of world-polity theory 
No sustained criticism of world-polity theory has emerged, in contrast to the world-economy 
perspective. Meyer himself (1999b) explains that scholars whose point of departure consists of "very 
strong pictures of actorhood" tend to criticize world-polity theory "on two basic fronts. First, we are 
thought to greatly understate the roles of power and interest in the formation of collective institutions. 
Second, we are thought to understate the roles of power and interest in producing subunit 
conformity". The latter criticism takes two forms: too little attention to coercion; and lack of specificity 
accorded mechanisms which involve a "fairly rational and purposive actor". 
Finnemore (1996) spells out some of the above critique in greater detail from a political science and 
international relations perspective. For her the first difficulty lies in the lack of attention by Meyer, Boli 
and associates to the causal or change mechanisms of world culture. Instead they emphasise 
correlation between units of the system, or between units and system-wide phenomena, from which 
they assume world cultural causes. Case studies which trace the origins, processes, and mechanisms 
of diffusion are missing. This skews their work towards an overemphasis on structure and a neglect 
of a more dialectic relationship with agency (Finnemore 1996:339). 
The lack of attention to historical case studies leads world-polity perspective to overstate the extent 
to which isomorphism is caused by the cognitive element of institutions, Finnemore suggests. An 
account of the spread of Western culture, the modern state, human rights, or market economies must 
instead pay careful attention to the role played by coercion, contestation, violence, and leadership in 
this process (Finnemore 1996:339). While cognitive processes are undeniably important, "they are by 
no means the only forces at work". "Cultural rules are often established not by persuasion or cognitive 
processes of institutionalization but by force and fiat". The examples she cites include the three 
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centuries of Protestant wars in Europe that preceded the dominance of Western Christianity and ethnic 
cleansing in Bosnia and Rwanda (Finnemore 1996:340). 
A second difficulty for Finnemore (1996:340) is that institutionalists tend to overstate the mutually 
reinforcing nature of the major elements specified as constituting world culture. As a result the 
tensions and contradictions between these Western cultural rules (Western rationality, progress, 
equality. bureaucracy. markets) that constrain their isomorphic effects are submerged. For example. 
economic progress and equity are "two pillars of the normative structure" which "often pull in opposite 
directions .... Contradictions among dominant cultural norms mean that social institutions are 
continually being contested, albeit to varying degrees at different times" (Finnemore 1996:341). Such 
tensions may lead to mobilization on the basis of normative claims that were compromised as a result 
of contestation. Finnemore implies that glocalization should be in focus. as tensions between 
competing world norms may be resolved so as to reflect an admixture of local and international norms, 
"contingent on local circumstances and personalities". In turn. as the case of Japanese management 
principles illustrate, such glocal institutional compromises are fed back from the periphery to the core. 
In conclusion. while Finnemore acknowledges the central insight of isomorphism. she argues that 
global institutionalists need to specify "sources of instability, conflict, or opposition". While "global 
norms may create similar structures and push both people and states towards similar behavior at given 
times". contestation among central global norms causes instability in the outcomes. and raises 
questions regarding why certain norms are adapted instead of others. 
These arguments will be taken into consideration in the Selection of features from the three world 
system theories in the next two sections. 
4. RELEVANT FEATURES OF A WORLD SYSTEM FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING 
LANGUAGE AND RELIGION IN THE NATION-STATE 
An eclectic theory for the analysis of language configurations in congregations is best constructed by 
synthesizing those elements from the various theories which overlap, or by selecting those most 
relevant to this study. The theme of this study dictates that particular attention be given to how 
culture and religion as well as the nature and role of the state is conceptualized. Instead of forming 
a blueprint this section explores relevant concepts with which the analysis of Chapter Six will be 
triangulated. While I retain central notions from both world-polity and world-economy theories, I 
accentuate the former. 
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4.1 The dialectic interaction of world-polity and world-economy in the world system 
I am particularly interested in isolating features of the world system which condition social change,_ 
social stratification, and the formation of nation-states. My focus should be self-explanatory. First, the 
analysis of racial and linguistic integration of congregations presupposes institutional change, 
embedded within larger, global scale social changes. Second, the outcome of linguistic interaction can 
be explained in terms of social stratification, propelled by processes which divide and integrate labour 
in the world-economy. For instance, the dominance of English is at once a global symptom and 
contributing factor to a class-based division of labour. Acceptance of this dominance signals an 
attempt to move up in the local division of labour, as defined by the world-economy. Third, the 
formation of post-colonial nation-states, and the accompanying ideologies of nation-building (like non-
racialism and multiculturalism), relate to the expansion and structures of nation-states as globalized 
units in the world-economy. 
The above analytical focus justifies my retention of both world-polity and world-economy theories, a 
move also suggested by their connectedness to dependency theory as early source; although both 
ultimately go beyond it. World-polity's emphasis on the constitutive aspects of global institutions 
enables theorists to posit a link between the economic and political aspects of the world system. In 
this institutionalists draw not merely upon an earlier Weberian tradition, but also on dependency 
theory, which originated in the 1950s from within the UN Economic Commission for Latin America 
(Boli-Bennett 1980). 
The similarities between dependency and world-economy perspectives should be clear from a 
comparison of the basic tenets of the former. According to dependency theorists the world division 
of labour is based on three principles: exchange of periphery raw materials for manufactured goods 
from the core; economic dominance of the periphery by the core; continued economic advantage for 
the core, translated into more efficient production and military-technical superiority (Boli-Bennett 
1980:82). Here level of internal development depends on a nation-state' slocation in the world-system, 
and on whether the necessary resources for state dominance are available. In this perspective internal 
dominance enables external domination (Boli-Bennett 1980:83). In class terms an alliance of 
commercial, industrial, and financial elites controls core states either directly or indirectly; with a view 
to promoting a strong state which can look after their interests in the world-economy. In peripheries 
export-oriented elites, usually in control of primary production, emerge and form alliances with elites 
of core states. They prefer weaker states which cannot interfere with their interests; Chile has 
historically served as an example (Boli-Bennett 1980:84). 
Among the central notions that I accentuate are Thomas & Meyer (1980)' s ideas about state expansion 
- which Boli-Bennett (1993) links to integration into the world system - and those of Chase-Dunn 
(1989) (reviewed in section 4.2, below). These notions are particularly relevant to the arguments about 
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nation-building in Africa that I make in Chapters Five and Six. As Boli's arguments were already 
covered in detail, I merely note their implications below. 
Thomas & Meyer observed that state expansion, increased state dominance, or deliberate changes in 
regime are all part of nation-building, which has as a prime goal stability. As nation-states receive their 
legitimacy primarily from external sanctions, "the lack of integrating national symbols and loyalties 
[are] a bigger problem than in an earlier world .... and have much more to legitimate" (Thomas & 
Meyer 1980: 143-144). A feature of the world system is that peripheral states have "the same world-
culturally-defined obligations as an advanced one, but with fewer social and organizational sources", 
so that peripheries make national plans "that cannot be implemented, and defines forms of national 
and international justice that cannot be sustained" . This often causes turbulence in peripheral regimes, 
which tends to create stronger states. In short, such regimes appear to have failure built-in (Thomas 
& Meyer 1980:145,147). 
The importance of external legitimation becomes visible when even internal groups which oppose 
particular regimes seek external support for their struggles. In South African history the ANC's struggle 
was at times based on foreign soil and the movement also received support from various external 
transnational and national entities. Even in the post-1994 period some groups have also sought greater 
rights by appealing to external sources, such as attempts to establish linkages between Griqua/Nama 
and First Nation groups in Canada, as observed at a Institute for Democratic Alternatives for South 
Africa (ldasa) conference in 1995. The latter event was obviously also highly significant in terms of 
the international platform that it presented, which linked the local to the global. 
Boli's arguments about state expansion and integration have at least two effects. First, his work 
prompts a focus on the extent that the state dominates civil society institutions. My case study of 
language practice in a non-state institution shows that state domination needs not be achieved by 
direct coercion if it resonates with existing popular ideologies. The actions of the South African state -
as opposed to its policies - demonstrate two diverging ideologies regarding language/culture. 
Individuals in non-state institutions are presented with two options between which they can 
legitimately choose. However, the state's option for participation in the global economy and the 
functioning of the word-economy itself bias choice towards non-indigenous languages. Second, Boli's 
delineation of institutional isomorphism implies that this process is likelier to occur if South Africa is 
reasonably well-integrated into the world system - despite its semi-peripheral position in the world-
economy. As Chapter Five shows, the extent to which South Africa's political and economic elites are 
embracing economic globalization reveals that this class has already adopted global ideologies and are 
moving the state in that direction. While still economically a semi-periphery, South Africa's elites are 
closely integrated into the world system, including the global polity. 
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4.2 Global culture, global society and globalization in the world system 
Attention to global culture as a central feature of the world system is prompted by its role in driving 
isomorphism, but also by the difficulty of separating world culture from the world-economy or from 
the world polity. 
But what is meant by global culture is contested. While Meyer and colleagues link global culture to 
global polity, others consider the possibility of global culture/s as an autonomous entity. Such 
discussions tend to be couched in terms of the homogenizing effect of global culture; often viewed 
negatively in terms of Westernization or Americanization. Some deny the very possibility of a global 
culture, on the basis that such a notion depends on a unitary world society or global political structure. 
World-system theorists have been taken to task for inattention to the place of culture in the world 
system (Holton 1998, Boyne 1990, see Lechner 1989:15 for discussion). 
World-system theorists frequently disregard the structure and function of culture in the world system, 
as noted in section 1 of this chapter. Their inattention is prompted by various interpretations of 
"culture" and of "world culture"; and by their perceptions about the extent to which global culture links 
to other features of the world system. In the discussion above, disagreements emerged whether global 
culture links to subsystemic formations such as the nation-state or to system-wide structures like the 
world-economy. Meyer and colleagues like Boli argue strongly that global norms operate independently 
of the world-economy, and determine the legitimacy and structures of nation-states within a global 
polity. By contrast, Wallerstein considers a global ideas system to legitimate the world division of 
labour. 
For example Chase-Dunn (1989:88) concludes that "world culture and normative integration play 
secondary rather than primary roles in the reproduction of contemporary world order because of the 
nature of the capitalist mode of production". The primary integrative role is fulfilled "by political-military 
power and market interdependence". While the economic base does not mechanically produce the 
superstructure, the "nature and structure of world culture depend on more potent economic and 
political institutions" (Chase-Dunn 1989: 1 05). 
The integrative role of markets is supported by the interstate system ("a military-political balance of 
coercive power"), while world culture "operates to legitimate commodity production and the interstate 
system" (Chase-Dunn 1989: 1 04). The function of world culture here seems similar to Wallerstein's 
notion of a global "ideas-system", which disguises class conflict in the world-economy as racial or 
ethnic conflict. Wallerstein regards the emergence of an ideas-system as a dependent function of the 
world-economy, with the purpose of overcoming contradictions in the system. The world-economy 
requires both the removal of all social barriers which hinder the operation of the market, and the 
unequal distribution of wealth necessary for the accumulation of capital. The universalistic-egalitarian 
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ideas promoted by the first requirement is countered by particularistic-inegalitarian notions generated 
by the ideas-system, such as race, ethnicity, and nationalism (Beyer 1994: 18). These cultural notions 
are so pervasive that antisystemic movements which oppose the world-economy cannot but take them 
into account (Beyer 1994: 18). 
Although Chase-Dunn accepts that world culture may not playa secondary role in all systems, or at 
all times, he maintains that in the modern world-system normative mechanisms do not playa central 
role. Yet, consciousness may playa role in transforming it through "the normative assertion of these 
collective [human] values" and the construction of a socialist world polity (Chase-Dunn 1989:105). 
The importance of cultural institutions within large scale socio-economic systems varies according to 
type of integration which distinguishes them, argues Chase-Dunn. He identifies three types, which can 
be combined in different ways in a world-system, with varying emphasis as follows (Chase-Dunn 
1989:90-92): Normative social systems10 contain modes of production and exchange "based on 
consensually held norms of reciprocal obligation". Such societies tend to be classless (unranked) and 
stateless, and to have "belief systems which define roles and regulate interaction". Examples include 
families, a "kin-based mode of production", and Wallerstein's mini-systems. Politically coercive social 
systems are "integrated by political institutions (e.g. states) which gather goods by means of taxation 
or tribute payments", through the use of "threats and coercion". Such societies tend to have both 
classes and states, and combine political-military rule with institutional authority. Religion legitimates 
"the rule of the temple and the palace". Wallerstein's world empire is one example of this type. 
Market-based social systems are integrated by competitive" buying and selling of commodities in price-
setting markets". Integration is driven by the specialization and subsequent interdependence of 
producers. Wallerstein's world-economy comprises an example. 
Within the present world-system, normative solidarity - the integration of families, communities, and 
nations - do play some role. Through the medium of e.g. families, normative integration reproduces the 
labour force, and helps to create and sustain individual and group identities (local communities, 
ethnicities, national identities). Yet as a whole the world-system "is not held together by consensual 
understanding" nor by "reciprocal obligations". Instead, "exchange is organized as market trade of 
commodities and as interorganizational and interstate political bargaining" (Chase-Dunn 1989:93). 
Nationalism is a prime example of normative integration (through an institutionalised ideology) which 
still plays a fundamental role in the functioning of the world-economy. It legitimates competitive 
10. Parsons is among those who advocated that a global system exists which is normatively integrated around 
"international law, shared assumptions about the desirability of economic development, rational bureaucratic 
organization, and political democracy". For Parsons "all social systems are, by definition, normatively based"; i.e. 
contain" shared assumptions about proper rules of behavior" (Chase-Dunn, 1989:90, referring to Parson's 1961 article 
"Order and community in the international system"). 
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production, the use of force by the state to protect "market share interests". At the same time 
nationalism undercuts internal class conflicts; within the core and periphery it binds workers to the 
national interests of the ruling classes and so prevents transnational class solidarity (Chase-Dunn 
1989:94). Nation-building, "the formation of national solidarities out of formerly separate collective 
identities, is itself a product of the long-run operation of the interstate system and the commodity 
economy" . In "terms of collective identity" core nation states are better integrated, due to the colonial 
policy of pitting peripheral ethnicities against one another which simultaneously facilitated development 
of core identities (Chase-Dunn 1989:98). 
But even markets presuppose minimal normative relations of "expectations about fair trade and the 
protocols of diplomatic interaction". In these ways a world culture "facilitates the linkage of different 
cultural regions by market interdependence". Other important ways in which ideology accompanies 
political and economic institutions include legitimation of wage inequalities (Chase-Dunn 1989:95,96). 
Chase-Dunn (1989:97,98,99) argues that world culture is "fragmented into national cultures", weakly 
institutionalised, and has no functions across the whole system. Instead, culture serves merely to 
integrate individual nation-states - its primarily role. While nation states are normatively integrated, the 
world-system itself is multicultural, multinational, and primarily economically integrated. No single 
language or culture straddles the globe, and non-Western traditional belief or cultural systems are 
invoked to counter the influence of western cultures (Chase-Dunn 1989:98,102). 
Chase-Dunn (1989:97,98,99) rejects claims that international law institutionalises global norms, as 
he believes that legal structures enforce global normative regulations, such as the World Court, are 
often ignored with impunity (Chase-Dunn 1989:99,100,104). While the interstate regime does exhibit 
some consensus, deviance does not invite shame or punishment to the extent that one would expect 
if global norms had become institutionalized (Chase-Dunn 1989:98,104). Chase-Dunn (1989: 1 00) 
concludes that "while normative regulation may have increased", no single culture exists across the 
world-system. If a world culture does exist, it should be thought of as complex and heterogenous, with 
national cultures operating as subcultures. 
Lechner (1991 :265) points to international law as a prime instance of "the quintessential 
institutionalized normative order", and so a globalized feature of the modern world system. 
International law not only determines who qualifies as actors in the world system (as pointed out by 
Meyer 1 980), but also helps determine the relative strength of state-actors through enabling the 
extension of internal control, thus leading to strong states which form part of the core (as argued by 
Wallerstein, who neglects international law) (Lechner 1991 :266). 
That Lechner's ideas should not be dismissed summarily is clear from the way they support other 
views on the world system, not only those of Meyer and Boli, but also that of Robertson. Lechner 
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moves Robertson's ideas regarding relativization from "cultural developments among elites", to how 
this is expressed in "the rules governing global interaction and in global institutions". This would 
include the relationship between states, the rights of individuals in relation to the state, or the rights 
of individuals as human beings. In short, the "notion of humankind is increasingly treated in natural 
law-like fashion as a fundamental principle from which rights and duties can be derived". Here Lechner 
refers to the formulation of new global categories and how "their relationships are institutionally 
specified, at the very least in the form of norms governing the use of the category of humanity in 
concrete contexts" - although also including "global mediation structures, such as international 
organizations". Global order "is made possible by the normative regulation of the main components 
of the global situation in relation to each other", backed up by global institutions. One such "a global 
normative model for social integration" is 'society' (Lechner 1991 :269-70). 
The position that a global culture does not exist, or at best functions very weakly, incorrectly 
extrapolates from the notion of cultures-as-Iocal-community-based-practices-and-resources, and 
overemphasises continuity. Chase-Dunn, for example, assumes that culture serves to integrate society 
around a consensus based on norms, and so by extension global culture should provide a global 
consensus within the world-economy. By culture Chase-Dunn refers to consciousness and symbolic 
systems (i.e. to ideology) in the sense of belief systems; this is the narrower denotation of the term 
which, broadly speaking, refers to "a constellation of socially constructed practices" (Chase-Dunn 
1989:89). 
By contrast Meyer advocates a strong world culture, which he links directly to the world polity. "Meyer 
claims that certain values, primarily those of economic progress and rationality, are institutionalized 
as normative rules in the world polity" (Chase-Dunn 1989:103). Meyer's concept of world culture 
refers to "'a shared and binding set of rules endogenous to any given society''', located in individuals, 
elites, and world institutions such as "interstate relations, lending agencies, world cultural elite 
definitions and organization, transnational bodies" (Meyer 1987:50). Thomas & Meyer (1980: 142) 
assert that "an expanded world culture defines progress and equality as goals", and legitimates states 
as the mechanisms by which these should be achieved. 
Yet world-economy theorists do acknowledge that obvious isomorphisms have been produced within 
the world-system. For Chase-Dunn the mechanisms are "cultural imperialism and the ideological 
hegemony of European religion, politics, economics, and science" (Chase-Dunn 1989:98). Consensual 
symbolic systems are emerging globally in the form of "certain underlying cultural themes", which are 
"at the least shared by national elites everywhere" (Chase-Dunn 1989:98,100). Most notable among 
these are the notions of a world system, of political equality, of development (including education), 
of rational bureaucracy, and of the nation state. Certain structures and institutions have become 
accepted at the state level worldwide. For example, John Meyer has shown how nation states have 
expanded their education systems between 1950 and 1970, without comparable economic 
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development (Chase-Dunn 1989: 1 02). 
English have achieved some dominance due to the successive hegemony of Britain and the USA within 
the world-system, accompanied by aggressive support for this language (Chase-Dunn 1989: 1 00). Core 
culture "has been promoted in an effort to legitimate core-periphery exploitation" (Chase-Dunn 
1989: 1 02). As a result the number of spoken natural languages across the earth have declined, while 
synthetic languages like mathematics and science have expanded transnationally. But Chase-Dunn 
(1989: 1 01-1 02) denies that cultural imperialism plays a central role in the world-system, as cultural 
resistance remains far more viable than changing "the position of a nation in the economic and 
political-military hierarchy". "Participation in the world market ... does not demand much in the way 
of cultural uniformity" (Chase-Dunn 1989: 1 03). In the above senses, some norms and aspects of 
western culture have become globalized and institutionalized. 
There is, then, some accord between world-polity and world-economy theorist on some features of 
the world-system, and these will be pursued in the analysis persented in the last chapters. Regardless 
of differences about the nature of global culture, there seems to be a measure of agreement that global 
culture exists translocally. Nation-building is perceived by both camps to result from an institutionalised 
ideology· which legitimates the functioning of the world-economy. And finally, few seem to doubt that 
obvious isomorphisms have been produced within the world-system. 
4.3 Locating religion in the world system 
As this study concerns the intersection of global and local institutions in a subunit of a religious 
institution, it is important to address the question of how religion is seen to interact with the world 
system. The nature of the interaction can be viewed in three ways. The first considers the possible 
contribution that religious institutions make to globalization processes. The second concerns the 
reverse, the effects of the global system on religious institutions. A third approach discerns the 
dialectic dynamics of these two processes. The focus in this study on congregations in their interaction 
with national and global forces presupposes the importance of all three, but runs counter to the usual 
centrality accorded to secularization in the second approach, which views it as a consequence of 
globalization. I review some of the major arguments here because I will return to them later, to argue 
that religion not only contributed to the globalization of Western cultural norms, arid so to hegemony, 
but that, paradoxically, the institutionalization of such norms fed into anti-systemic attitudes and so 
contributed to heterogeneity. 
Garrett & Robertson (1991 :xii-xiii) propose that any approach will depend on how one views the 
interrelatedness of religion with other aspects of the world system - such as social order, economic, 
cultural identity, and socialising agents. For these scholars the global social order is constituted by 
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states, political parties, ideologies, cultural symbols, society, and "patterns of political legitimation" . 
Economic institutions are formed by businesses, unions, organizations, welfare systems, and" attitudes 
to work". Cultural identity includes national bodies, ethnies, classes, associations, interest groups, and 
the media; while socialising agents comprise "the family, neighborhood, reference groups, peer 
groups". While the articulation of religious elements with these components are historically 
demonstrable, in an increasingly differentiated and pluralizing post-modern world the relationships are 
admittedly complex (Garrett & Robertson 1991 : xiii) . 
For example, secularization can be viewed as related to global processes in different ways (Garrett & 
Robertson 1991 :xii-xiv). Some would argue that globalization results in "deep structural 
secularization", which will mean the "inevitable eclipse of religious hegemony". Others view religion 
as having been exorcised from the macro-structural to the micro"structural realm where it provides 
symbolic sustenance to individuals. Or, European secularization can be seen as a special case, 
premised on a particular alliance of religious and class elites in a specific political context. Then it 
follows that outside of Northern Europe "modernity and religious decline have not been coterminous" 
(Garrett & Robertson 1991 :xiv). This sentiment is echoed in Jules-Rosette's (1989:156-7) evaluation 
of new African religious movements as cultural responses to modernising and secularising influences. 
Lechner accepts that the current world system is essentially secular, despite recognizing that 
counter-evidence exists in the form of religious revivals, high levels of belief, or continued salience of 
religious institutions. Unfortunately he fails to support his argument in any way. He does point out that 
in the past certain religions not only functioned "as global institutions", nor merely existed as limited 
world systems (e.g. the Holy Roman Empire), but also played causal roles in establishing the world 
system. Lechner warns against the danger of idealist perceptions of the world system which highlights 
values to the exclusion of other categories, which may emerge when religion is considered in global 
terms (Lechner 1991 :265). 
In short, Lechner (1991 :272) argues that religion plays an important role in processes of 
institutionalization as "an obvious source of values". Then the question is what the role of religion/s 
are in the institutionalization of global values. Where differences of values occur, this may hinder such 
institutionalization 11. 
Simpson believes that Robertson's perspective on the role of religion in the world system contains 
great flexibility and has the advantage of explicitly thematizing religion. For example, Robertson departs 
from the received notion of modernization as he proposes the possibility of a "new typological social 
11. Lechner (1991:273-76) summarizes competing arguments in this regard, and provides counter-examples. Some 
claim that diverse cultural value systems exist which hinder universal understanding. Moreover, these differences 
support a range of political structures which "prevent the institutionalization of a legally grounded global order" - and, 
by implication, of global order (Lechner 1991 :274). 
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complex"; which combines "symbols, structures, and cultural elements of Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft". This allows Robertson not only to include institutional differentiation but also to imagine 
"the 'recombination' of autonomous institutions", so that in globalization processes religion can be 
viewed as "seeking institutional ' partnerships'" (Simpson 1 991 : 1 3). 
Yet, like Robertson, Simpson argues that no single thematization is adequate. All the major theories 
are defensible, including those which emphasise "exchange processes" (Wallerstein), "myths of 
progress" (Meyer), "logic of interaction and perception operating within an admixture of traditional and 
modern institutions that perforce lead to the direction of co-operative systems or systems governed 
by the tempered conflict of pluralism" (Robertson) (Simpson 1 991 : 14; compare Beyer 1 994: 28). 
For Simpson (1991: 15), Wallerstein's theory "raises the question of the structure of the relationship 
between religion and other institutions at the global level". Wallerstein seems to regard religion, like 
culture, as "structurally dependent on processes of exchange". Questions which is left unanswered 
here include whether the envisaged relationship between economic and religious institutions is 
necessary, and the extend to which that relationship varies across time and space. 
Meyer's contribution brings to the fore the conditions under which certain ideas ('myths', according 
to Simpson) come to "organize a context of action". This follows from Meyer's conclusion that, in the 
contemporary world system, "the myths of progress and science" possess "the greatest organizing 
capacity". Simpson maintains that Robertson's perspective does not exclusively concern the role of 
religion in globalization, but the construction and perception of identities at different levels "in the field 
of global interaction". Religion is important because of its function as one of several major generators 
of frames of reference in identity formation (Simpson 1991: 1 5). 
Simpson concludes that a theory which combines aspects of Wallerstein, Meyer, and Robertson's 
analyses should be attempted, which outlines "the structure of institutions and their relationship to 
exchange processes, the. varying capacities of different types of myth to organize action, and the 
dynamics of symbolic interaction between selves, societies, and the system of nation-states at the 
global level" (Simpson 1 991 : 16). 
What would such a combined examination of global processes involve from a methodological 
perspective? 
For Lechner (1991 :264) "the problem of institutionalization of global forms of thought and action needs 
to be at the heart of world system analysis. Two other issues to address is (a) the historical process 
which produced (b) this particular world system". Research requires a focus on how the cultural 
construct (globality) achieves social form (Lechner 1991 :263). That is, a study of "globally 
institutionalized modes of communication and association which involve interaction on an 
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unprecedented scale .. guided by normative principles of unprecedented scope". Lechner argues that 
to explain global order as "natural" in either utilitarian notions (i.e. of outcomes of interactions), or of 
idealist notions (i.e. as outcomes of sacred principles) is unacceptable. 
Garrett & Robertson (1991 :xiv) maintain that theories of globalization "must define the role of cultural 
factors in establishing the parameters of that order by which the world is apprehended as ' one place'" . 
This implies that the role of religious elements must be explained, a task which again provides a variety 
of responses. First, theorists who argue that cultural factors have a limited role in globalization tend 
to side with radical secularists, while those who acknowledge the function of culture tend - at the least 
- to be more ambivalent (Garrett & Robertson 1991 :xiv). Second, theorists who accept that globality 
comprises norms. but not those directly linked to religious sources, (e.g. international law). Third. 
those who accept the basic secularity of globalization, but admit that religions can occupy certain 
niches in the world order. Fourth, those who believe that religions contribute "significantly to the 
development of patterns of universal order", though in forms not directly associated with 
denominational organizations (Garrett & Robertson 1991: xv). 
The consequences of globalization can be viewed as including unavoidable participation in global 
projects (such as "democracy") and events; and also as the generation of specific "nation-states, 
ethnic groups, language communities, religious enclaves" and so on as a means of preserving 
identities. Insistence on national sovereignty can be read as a manifestation of global involvement 
(Garrett & Robertson 1991 :xix). 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Chapter Three served to provide the base for later analyses, and so links backwards to the introduction 
and theoretical discussion as well as forwards to the concluding chapter. Any consideration of local 
social change should be considered against the global system to see whether it was prompted by 
I 
developments at that level. World system theories form the widest possible macro-framework against 
which to measure changes in local phenomena. The relevance of world system and globalization 
approaches is that they enable me to construct a macro-sociological lens through which to view my 
conclusions in the final chapter. 
My retention and synthesis of world-economy and world-polity into an analytical framework are 
prompted by the agreement on various issues between the three perceptions of the world system that 
were discussed in this chapter. These include the importance of an ideas system (Wallerstein) similar 
to the conceptualization of global norms (Meyer, Boli). World-economy and world-polity theorists also 
seem to agree on the relevance of location in overall system, while they differ on how this is to be 
defined. Both perspectives accord some significance to cultural hegemony, the role of the nation-state 
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in nation-building, and the absence of a central actor in the world system. The structural similarities 
between world-polity and world-economy theories should not disguise the differences between them 
(compare (Finnemore 1996:328). 
World system theories provide a tool kit of concepts suitable to this study. From globalization comes 
the notions of glocalization and the inherent dialectical tension of heterogeneity and homogeneity; and 
from world-economy, the centrality of geographic stratification (i.e. core-periphery relations). World-
polity provides the central analytical concepts in this study, namely institutionalism, particularly the 
concepts of institutional ecology and isomorphism. In Chapter Six this tool kit will be applied to show 
how the macro-institutional environment (an idea derived from institutional ecology) and isomorphism 
affect linguistic diversity. 
Isomorphic change is central to what I intend to argue: that congregations as social organizations tend 
to respond to conditions in a particular socio-political environment by usually becoming more alike 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1991 :66). My focus on the state also makes coercive mechanisms relevant, that 
is, laws or ideologies set by the state which lead to the institutionalization of similar rules in 
organizational structures (compare DiMaggio & Powell 1991 :68). Yet the influence of the other 
mechanisms cannot be dismissed: mimetic isomorphism is partly caused by the presence of individuals 
in churches who are also political beings. And normative isomorphism emerges in the apparent lack 
of attention in seminaries to preparing clergy to manage racial and linguistic integration. Institutionalism 
and its focus on isomorphism are relevant as I wish to include analysis of the nation-state and world 
system. A focus on institutions can increase our understanding of how patterns of language usage 
occur as a result of un/conscious decisions, shaped by external factors, which establish in/formal rules 
within congregations. According to Koelble (1995:236) institutions "shape the preferences and goals" 
of decision-makers, distribute power among the actors, and so affect outcomes. This recalls the 
discussion of rule-making in Chapter Two. 
My emphasis on structure brings my work more in line with "new" historical institutionalists (who 
focus on structure) than with rational choice theorists (who emphasise individual action), just as my 
accentuation of the world system and the nation-state aligns me with sociological institutionalists who 
stress larger frames of reference. Within Scott's typology of institutional approaches, my study can 
be said to fit into the examination of variance at the meso-level and macro-level, although under the 
latter I include the global. Variance theories attempt to describe causal relationship between variables 
to determine why a particular outcome occurred. Generally the efficiency of independent variables -
considered sufficient and necessary to particular outcomes - is isolated 12 ; although the object of 
12. By contrast process theories deal with sequences of events which are considered necessary but not sufficient 
contributors to outcomes. The emphasis is on time sequences, and the question is how did this outcome come about 
(83). 
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inquiry could focus on whether institutional factors are independent (why do institutions develop?) or 
dependent (what are the effects of institutions on organizations). 
The world system is generally conceived as emerging out of increased density of interactions, usually 
of either an economic or political nature. What is often missed is that all forms of interaction has to 
be transacted through the medium of language, frequently the supracentrallanguage of the hegemonic 
core state. This is often the case with economic or academic interactions. In this sense a global· 
system evolves from increasing linguistic interaction and interdependence. The world-economy and 
the world-polity is thus tied together by a global language system, as De Swaan (1989) has noted. 
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Chapter Outline 
- CHAPTER FOUR -
LANGUAGE PRACTICE IN 
RACIALLY INTEGRATING CONGREGATIONS 
The primary function of this chapter is to highlight linguistic integration, yet I include an emphasis on 
racial diversity due to its guiding role as independent variable in the selection of congregations for this 
study. More specifically, levels of linguistic integration are analysed in order to establish linkages 
between findings here, with discussions of nation-building (Chapter Five) and of the global forces 
which affect it (Chapters Three and Six). Chapter Four, then, is pivotal in providing the central 
empirical threads which are to be woven into the theoretical discussion. Another function of retaining 
a dual emphasis on race and language is to examine the existence and significance of any links 
between levels of integration. 
In order to present a more coherent picture of the atomised quantitative data from the survey, two 
strategies will be followed, involving case studies. Reference will be made to relevant aspects of the 
same congregations in each of the sections, in order to supply illustrative strands which can be traced 
throughout the chapter and so tie the whole together. At the end of the chapter more elaborate mini-
case studies of these six congregations will be presented. These strategies are also prompted by the 
nature of the data: impressions of leadership about the congregations render higher level quantitative 
analysis inadvisable. 
A feature of the chapter is that generalisations are. substantiated by reference to specific 
congregations, and filled out by detailed mini-case studies. Without exception, the 60 congregations 
included in this study are all examples of congregations which have either (a) always been diverse, or 
(b) are formerly white congregations which have recently become diverse. What the state is in black 
multilingual congregations still remains to be investigated. What little I know about them suggest that 
due to the multilingual facility of black South Africans, black congregations in multilingual settings will 
have thoroughly bilingual services. The exceptions would be those in highly homogenous contexts. 
In Chapter Four I will outline the current levels of racial, musical, and language integration in the 
congregations surveyed. The first section profiles the racial and linguistic composition of the three 
major denominations emphasised in this study, and includes a brief history of the development of racial 
diversity in South African churches over the last hundred and eighty years. No direct connection exists 
between the racial composition of denominations and their congregations, due to the geographic 
segregation of ascribed race groups under apartheid. 
Next I describe the current levels of racial, musical, and linguistic integration, concluding that relatively 
low levels of diversity exist. When the analysis moves up to the question of integration, the picture 
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of integration among congregations, nine years after the abandonment of the Group Areas Act, needs 
explanation. The continuous effect of external structural constraints, and the institutionalised 
reproduction of the previous status quo, appear likely. While the racial and linguistic distribution of the 
South African population (described in Table 20, Chapter Five) is unequally distributed over the 
denominations, the picture is even more skewed in the congregations. Section 2.1 discusses how 
congregants evaluate diversity, and indicates their responses to diversity. 
I now turn to a discussion of how race and language functioned in the history of the three major 
denominations in this study. 
1. LANGUAGE AND RACE IN DENOMINATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
First I describe the current levels of linguistic and racial diversity in Anglican, Methodist, and Catholic 
Churches in South Africa, followed by the distribution of languages across the denominations. 
1 .1 A general history of the development of racial diversity 
In this brief general history of how South African churches became racially and culturally diverse my 
primary focus is on the three major English-speaking Christian denominations who claim never to have 
followed segregationist policies. These include the Anglicans (Church of the Province of South Africa), 
Methodists (Methodist Church of South Africa), and Catholics. Despite the linguistic label, in these 
denominations blacks and black languages proportionally outweigh other language and racial 
categories. What follows is based on work I published elsewhere (Venter 1994b, 1995, 1998). 
Racially-integrated congregations are rare in South Africa today, due mostly to the political policy of 
residential and social segregation enforced by the apartheid regime between 1948 and 1990. Only 
3 %' of all Anglican, Methodist, and Catholic churches in the whole of South Africa was identified by 
regional church officials as "significantly racially integrated and culturally diverse" in the 1997 survey 
on which this study is based. This translates into a projected 255 churches out of a possible 7 650 
churches in the Anglican and Methodist churches alone (figures for the Catholic church could not be 
obtained). 
I argued previously that "the formation of racially-mixed congregations can be described in terms of 
pre-apartheid, mid-apartheid, and post-apartheid periods. Congregations which emerge during the first 
and last periods de-emphasise race, in contrast to congregations formed in the second period, which 
exhibit a more explicit focus on race as basis for integration". 
'. This is an estimate based on returns of a postal survey, and people may simply not have responded. 
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"In the pre-apartheid era the class distinctions exercised by colonists in the 19th century resulted in 
ethnically segregated institutions such as schools, churches, and eventually suburbs. A small number 
of congregations were integrated at the membership level, while leadership was the exclusive preserve 
of white male landowners. Ironically, the master-servant relationship not only functioned to integrate 
these congregations but also resulted in segregated seating for different race and class groups. Class 
coincided largely with race, and was reinforced by the experience of slavery" (Venter 1998:67). 
Yet between the 17th to 19th centuries most denominations in the first colonised region of South 
Africa, the Cape of Good Hope (today the Western Cape), expressed the ideal of racially-mixed 
services (Venter 1994b). Some congregations put the ideal into practice until about 1872. 
For example, in the Anglican church (then still part of the Church of England) in Cape Town, mixed 
services were implied in the hope expressed by a newly-arrived Anglican clergyman in ca. 1848 "that 
masters and mistresses and others having influence over the coloured population will use their 
exertions' to induce them to attend" (Langham-Carter 1977:56). Before the building of the Anglican 
mission chapels in Cape Town, people of colour (e.g. Malay converts) attended communion at St 
George's Cathedral in 1854, as they still did by 1877, according to a report by Archdeacon Lightfoot 
(Barnett-Clarke 1908:183). This general attitude still prevailed by 1879, as evident from the actions 
of Henry Bousfield, the Anglican Bishop of Pretoria, who "dealt sharply with one congregation which 
attempted to exclude Africans from its services" (Hinchliff 1968:155L 
Similarly the Catholic parishes of the Cape of the 1880s "included both European and coloured" 
(Brown 1960:204). The Catholic Church "recognized no colour bar from the earliest times, all Catholics 
sharing the same building and joining in the same worship". Where separation occurred (e.g. of black 
miners in the Transvaal of the 1890s) it was because of "difficulties of language and distance" (Brain 
1991 :71). This inclusiveness has been attributed to the Catholic assimilationist thinking, exhibited in 
the Spanish and Portuguese colonies of the South and Central Americas, where mission was "an 
extension of Christian civilisation" (Brown 1960:204). 
But the ideal was not always translated into reality, even for the extremely small number of 
English-speaking congregations who were racially-diverse from their inception due to the incorporation 
of servants/slaves. Racial incorporation was often skewed by separated seating arrangements for 
different races, the occasional turning away of people of colour, and by the overriding equation of 
white civilisation and culture with Christianity (compare Villa-Vicencio 1988:43,47,54; Maimela 
1988:323; Goedhals 1989: 1 08). By 1951 a Catholic priest justified segregated seating ("special 
places") "for Europeans, Coloureds and Bantu", provided "they are all admitted to the same 
communion rail" (Schimlek 1951:159). Segregated seating became unofficial Catholic practice until 
the 1970s. 
The Anglican pew-rent system resulted not only in a class division, and fewer free seats for poor white 
and black people, but also caused church officials to be prejudiced against those unable to support the 
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maintenance of the building in this way. Anglican Archdeacon Merriman witnessed the turning away 
of three Malays from a 1848 service at St George's (Anglican) Cathedral in Cape Town (Goedhals 
1989:108). The completion of St Paul's mission in 1880, was applauded for potentially draining away 
some coloured people. Nicholas Merriman, first Anglican Archdeacon of the Eastern Cape, noted with 
disapproval that only whites attended Trinity Church, Cape Town in 1848, which "looked just like a 
smart London congregation" (Goedhals 1989:108). 
Escalating pressure on the denominations' ideal came through increasing institutional segregation and 
the extension of class differentiation to the lower classes during the 19th century. De facto 
segregation in schools had existed "from the first half of the 19th century". The Anglicans had schools 
for the offspring of coloureds at Bishopscourt, and for those of African chiefs at Zonnebloem (Hinchliff 
1968:36). By the mid-1880s this practice had extended to hospitals, prisons, and asylums. The effect 
was to separate poor whites from other groups (Bickford-Smith 1989:48; compare Brown 1960: 224)). 
At base of this developing ideology of racial discrimination in the guise of liberalism was increasing 
industrialisation (e.g. of mining) and the "mineral revolution" since the 1870s (discovery of copper, 
diamonds, gold, coal). The liberal sentiments2 which influenced the English-speaking churches from 
the 1880s emphasised the worth of individuals regardless of race; but paradoxically also maintained 
white power and social control (Goedhals 1989: 111). Like the Dutch Reformed Church, the English-
speaking churches mirrored the ideals of the dominant society (Villa-Vicencio 1988:22; Saayman 
1990:28; compare Cochrane 1990:95). From the end of the 19th century onwards, segregation had 
developed into a (ully-fledged racist ideology as "the dominant political emphasis in colonial policy", 
combined with a labour-repressive economic system of capitalism (Cochrane 1987:48,62). 
This evolving political economy affected mission policy that in effect played an important role in the 
supply of labour, for which segregation was deemed necessary. Labour needs dictated by political 
interests determined mission polky at the turn of the century, and would again in the 1920s (Villa-
Vicencio 1988:72). Missions' emphasis on "economic individualism" and tithes on the one hand 
functioned to co-opt black peasants into a labour market controlled by whites. On the other hand 
government taxes introduced a monetary economy and subsequently drove black farmers into 
industries and mining (compare Goedhals 1989:106; compare Kiernan 1990:15,16; Cochrane 
1987:24). The emphasis on Western technologies and methods of production implicit in mission policy 
also created a a market for items manufactured by the British (Villa-Vicencio 1988:44, quoting John 
Philip of the LMS). 
Mission policy divided mission work along racial lines almost from the start, so reflecting the influence 
2 ... Liberal convictions include a belief in the importance and dignity of the individual without regard to colour, culture, 
creed and sex; emphasis on equality of opportunity, freedom of thought, conscience, speech, movement and 
association, and the rule of law; and the conviction that society can achieve political stability, economic prosperity 
and social justice by human effort and evolutionary pace" (Goedhals 1989:112). 
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of "racial structuring of society" on theological reasoning (compare Saayman 1990:29). While clergy 
looked after settler parishes, from the mid-1880s missionaries were appointed with the sole purpose 
of preaching to the (black) heathen (Cawood 1964:20; Kritzinger 1994: 180). The results were 
segregated services and later on segregated buildings for settler parishes and 'native missions'; as in 
the Dutch Reformed Church, so too in the Anglican, Methodist, and Catholic traditions (Goedhals 
1989:109; Hinchliff 1963:194; Brain 1991 :133-136). And once the "tribes" across the Orange River 
were thought of in 1840, the inclusive pattern of Catholic mission changed to segregated missions, 
as European civilisation was considered unlikely to dominate there (Brown 1960:204; see Oosthuizen 
1968:15). 
When the white National Party assumed power in 1948, four racial identities were legally recognised, 
namely "whites", "coloureds", "Asians", and "blacks"; each including several ethnic groups. Each 
South African was assigned to one of these four categories. The distinction made enforced 
discrimination possible between the whites and other groups. Residential segregation was enforced 
and racial intermarriage forbidden, so that interpersonal contact was severely curtailed and individual 
prejudice strengthened. Thus culminated a process initiated by colonial rulers in cities like Cape Town, 
Kimberley, Port Elizabeth, and Durban3 during the previous century (Venter 1998:67). 
Despite their vocal opposition to legislated discrimination, the English-speaking churches generally 
exhibited a pragmatic compliance to racial segregation. By 1964, Anglicans, Methodists, Catholics, 
and Presbyterians admitted that "people of different races do not normally worship together in the 
same church" (Cawood 1964:58,61,52,76,92). Segregated congregations became the rule well into 
the 1980s. Churches like St Mary's Anglican Cathedral in central Johannesburg which became 
integrated in 1957, were among the few exceptions. When colonial segregation hardened into 
apartheid policies, the churches were already compromised by more than 70 years of segregated 
practice (Cawood 1964). In a supremely ironic twist of history, the initial ideal of mixed services was 
now inverted. 
In the mid-apartheid period of the 1960s a new form of deliberately racially-diverse congregations 
emerged, providing a pattern that was repeated in the 1970s and again in the 1980s. 
Local congregations that were deliberately racially-mixed first emerged in the 1960s, in explicit 
defiance of the apartheid system. The idea seems to have been first formulated by Rev Rob J D 
Robertson in 1958, who formally proposed it in 1961 to the Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of 
South Africa. But not until 1962 was the prototype - in the form of North End Presbyterian Church, 
East London - founded (Robertson 1962:9, 1994:2; Regehr 1979: 162). In a separate development at 
almost the same time, St Peter's-by-the-Lake Lutheran Church in Johannesburg was deliberately 
constituted in 1961 by whites, a black couple, and an Asian couple as founding members (Identity 
1977bb:455,457-8) .In 1968 Methodist clergyman Rev (now emeritus Bishop) Peter Storey launched 
3. Segregation in Durban had been implemented by the Durban city council since 1871 (Maharaj 1992:74). 
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a programme which eventually incorporated some whites into a coloured congregation, the Buitenkant 
St Methodist Church in Cape Town. Storey and Robertson had corresponded about the idea of 
deliberate integration. When Storey became superintendent minister at the Central Methodist Church 
in Johannesburg, from 1976 onwards he deliberately opened the congregation to all races. 
Congregations which managed to remain integrated from their inception were usually located in 
~. , . . 
racially-mixed neighbourhoods.·Although some of these·mixed neighbourhoods survived until the mid-
1970s, many had been obliterated by the mid-1960s and would not reappear until the 1980s. An 
example of the former was St Antony's Congregational Church in Pageview, founded in 1975 in 
Johannesburg. St Mary's Catholic Cathedral in Cape Town reportedly remained racially-mixed (white, 
coloured) until the late 1 940s, due mainly to the mixed nature of the surrounding neighbourhood; but 
seating was racially patterned. Generally-speaking, the Catholic Cathedrals remained racially-mixed 
islands in a sea of apartheid segregation in Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Kimberley. 
Segregated seating occurred in many, such as in the Kimberley cathedral from its opening in 1951 to 
the 1970s (Cawood 1964:10; Brain 1991:157). 
An unexpected turn of events was the emergence of racially-diverse congregations in the mid-1980s 
at the height of state repression, due to two causes. 
First, people of colour increasingly moved into white areas in defiance of the Group Areas Act. Such 
"grey" neighbourhoods had emerged by 1988 in Johannesburg suburbs such as the Central Business 
District, Mayfair, Hillbrow, Joubert Park, and Berea (De Coning e.a. 1987:121; Fick e.a. 1988). So 
Christ Church (Anglican) in Mayfair became integrated when a coloured family moved to Mayfair from 
Natal and started attending in about 1986. A church whose integration similarly depended largely on 
the changing rhythms of racial demographics was St Francis Xavier Catholic Church in Johannesburg. 
Initially founded in 1929 for blacks, the neighbourhood eventually became the racially-mixed "freehold" 
area of Martindale,' in which blacks could own land. In addition, nearby a black township had been 
proclaimed after World War One. Black participation was effectively brought to an end in 1955 under 
the Group Areas Act, through forced removals. Few of these parishioners continued to attend. The 
area around the parish building became a white neighbourhood, and by the 1960s the church was 
predominantly white. Later the black township was declared a coloured area, and during the 1980s 
a smattering of people of colour started attending again. During the 1990s the neighbourhood steadily 
became mixed again (Venter 1998:72). 
The second cause was the re-emergence of deliberately mixed congregations in the 1980s, echoing 
the mid-1960s pattern. In 1985 an independent charismatic church called Johweto was founded in 
Sowet04 • In 1987 a small group of whites and Indians broke away with one of their (white) ministers 
from the Indian (Dutch) Reformed Church in Africa in Laudium to form the Reformed Confessing 
4. The name embodied the vision of crossing racial and economic lines drawn by apartheid between the predominantly 
white city of Johannesburg and Soweto. 
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Community. In 1992 it amalgamated with Melodi Va Tshwane5 (black) Dutch Reformed Church in 
Africa congregation in Pretoria. The Central Methodist Mission in Cape Town started integrating in 
1988, through amalgamation with Buitenkant St, on the insistence of the latter. 
"Congregants who chose to join racially-mixed congregations during this period often espoused and 
were bound together by a political ideology which ran counter to that of the apartheid regime. Certain 
integrated congregations provided a site for political meetings and so entered into a prolonged 
confrontation with government forces, e.g. Central Methodist Church (Johannesburg). Compared to 
the racial segregation prevalent in the wider society and in most churches, these congregations" had 
a strong anti-systemic political identity, "and saw themselves as representative of what non-
segregated society should be" (Venter 1998:67). 
"Such mixed congregations worked against assimilation into the dominant political ideology of the 
wider apartheid culture. Religious identities were brought into line with political identities, and church 
membership became a political statement. Legitimation of anti-apartheid political ideologies could be 
obtained through the social interaction within racially-diverse congregations, which sustained the 
plausibility structure of the ideology. The persistence of the ideal of integrated congregations show 
that religious ideology accompanied and contributed to the reproduction of non-racialism as political 
ideology" (Venter 1998:67). 
"In the post-apartheid era since 1990, integrating congregations have begun to emerge at a faster rate 
than in the previous two periods. Under the new regime previously homogeneous urban Christian 
congregations now have to manage an increasingly diverse racial, linguistic, and cultural membership. 
The year 1990 saw the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the liberation movements, 
which gave concrete impetus to those aspects of apartheid legislation which had been repealed just 
prior to this date (e.g. removal of restrictions on geographic mobility). Most of the congregations that 
are now integrating are located in neighbourhoods that became increasingly. diverse; particularly inner 
city areas" (Venter 1998:67). 
As a result people are increasingly drawn into multilingual settings alongside others previously 
classified as "other" in terms of race, language, and culture. These congregations also offer the 
possibility to be Western and African, although in practice most assimilate the latter into the former. 
South Africa's present non-racial ideology encourages cultural diversity within the same institution, 
across all sectors of society - from educational to economic institutions. The present post-apartheid 
era opens up new possibilities of renegotiating ascribed and enforced identities. Vet the old identities 
and linguistic preferences prove hard to do way with. 
"More-recently formed racially-diverse congregations feed into and is supported by the dominant 
5. Melodi Ya Tshwane (the song of Tshwanel was the name given to Pretoria before the whites came, by men listening to the birds 
as they brought their cattle to drink at the Fountains. Evangelist Piet Mabuza had suggested the name for the congregation. 
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political ideology of non-racialism, as exemplified by emeritus Archbishop Desmond Tutu's espousal 
of the "rainbow-nation" slogan. Non-racialism pressures religious people to form or join integrating 
congregations, and links up with historical attempts by church leaders to promote such expressions 
of pluralism. In addition many denominations have started exerting an increasing pressure on 
segregated congregations to integrate, such as Methodist and Anglican churches" (Venter 1998:67). 
Attempts to unite various racial groups in churches do not always meet with success. The Methodist 
Church of SA (MCSA) has attempted to unite previously racially segregated regional structures6 since 
1976, without complete success - despite the initial target date of January 1996. Both the Anglicans 
and Methodists are trying to integrate white congregations with black ones, which up to now have met 
at different times in the same building. These euphemistically-termed "afternoon services" are held 
primarily for domestic workers in vernacular languages under the authority of a black clergy-person 
based in a nearby black "township" congregation. The majority of English-speaking congregations 
continue to exhibit little or no integration due to the lasting effects of geographic separation. In some 
cases in Cape Town such racially segregated congregations are separated from one another by less 
than a kilometre. Lack of integration is of course not limited to the English-speaking churches: 
Afrikaans-speaking churches like the DRC remain hesitant to unite with the black and coloured Uniting 
Reformed Church. 
In the light of the above, the most remarkable aspect about racially-mixed local congregations in South 
Africa is not that they do not exist, but that some exist at all. 
1.2 Distribution of race by denominational affiliation 
While the English-speaking denominations were technically racially-mixed since their inception, the rate 
of integration of black clergy into national church structures was very slow. Compare for instance 
church founding dates with the appointment of e.g. blacks to denominational positions. The Catholic 
church was founded in 1834, and the Anglican church in 1848. In the Anglican church only white 
bishops were appointed until 1953, and all had been born in England. The first black bishop (Alpheus 
Zulu) was appointed in 1960, and the first black archbishop (Desmond Tutu) in 1986 (Goedhals 
1989:120,124; Cawood 1964:16,56; Hinchliff 1968:240). By 1980 only one diocesan and four 
suffragan (assistant) bishops were black. By 1988 nine out of 18 diocesan bishops and five suffragan 
bishops were black (Goedhals 1989: 121; Pato 1989: 172). 
The Methodist church was established in South Africa in 1814, but the first black Methodist president 
(Seth Mokitimi) was only elected in 1963 (Gish 1985:74).ln the whole history of the Methodist church 
only seven black presidents had been appointed by 1988 (Gish 1985:4,69). The current Presiding 
6. The areas under discussion are called "circuits" - a number of congregations grouped together in a specific 
geographic area. 
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Bishop (Mvume Dandala) is also black. Apart from most congregations, regional (circuit) structures 
were also segregated until 1976. 
Table 7: Race as percentage of denominational affiliation, 1993 
Black Coloured Asian White 
Anglican 46.62% 26.32% 1.5% 25.56% 
Catholic 69.27% 15.63% 5.73% 9.38% 
Methodist 14.37% 0.57% 15.52% 
Source: HSRC Omnibus Survey 1993. Used by permission of the Sociology Departments of 
Huguenot College and the University of Pretoria. 
As a percentage of denominational affiliation (Table 7), blacks form clear majorities in the Catholic, 
Anglican, and Methodist Churches. Blacks make up almost 70% in both Catholic and Methodist 
Churches, but less than half of the Anglican church. White Anglicans have decreased from 12.49% 
in 1960 to 7.72 % in 1993 according to HSRC data. Coloureds form a significant minority in the 
Anglican church, a factor which reportedly affects church politics in regions such as the Northern and 
Western Cape, where they form a majority. 
As a percentage of the total population, 12% of all black South Africans are Catholics, and 11 % are 
Methodists (Zaaiman 1994; Human Science Research Council's 1993 Omnibus survey). Eleven percent 
of all people formerly classified as "coloureds" claim affiliation to the Anglican denomination. 
1.3 Distribution of languages by denominational affiliation 
No single language group has been captured by a particular Christian brand but, as Table 8 shows, 
various languages are distributed across the three major Christian denominations involved in the study. 
A similar distribution occurs across other denominations. The exception is Afrikaans-speakers, who 
tend to belong to either the Uniting or Dutch Reformed Churches. 
Ten or more languages occur across most major Christian denominations, namely the African 
Independent, Reformed, Catholic, Methodist, Anglican, and Lutheran Churches (Kritzinger 1995:360). 
Zulu-speakers are spread out across the Catholic Church (32,7% in 1980; 37% in 1993). the 
Methodist churches (21 % and 27.6%). the Lutheran Church (32.9% in 1980) and the African 
Independent Churches (42 % in 1980; Kritzinger 1995:360). Northern Sotho- (24.9 % in 1980) and 
Zulu-speakers (35% in 1980) form the largest blocks among those practising African Traditional 
Religion (Kritzinger 1995:364). 
Historically missionaries had a strong influence on language development, as they learnt - and 
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standardised - indigenous languages. Yet from early on a division of labour emerged among 
missionaries who could speak indigenous languages, and other clergy who could not. For example, in 
the 1 800s few Catholic priests could speak indigenous languages, and so most served the white urban 
areas, where Mass was conducted in Latin and the sermon or instruction in English (Brain 1991 :71). 
In this way language and race became interrelated, so that language differences corresponded to racial 
segregation. 
Table 8: Language as percentage of denominational affiliation, 1993 
Eng Atr Xhosa Zulu Sotho Shal Swal DIE 
Tso Nde 
Anglican 39.1% 13.5% 15% 14.3% 0.8% 1.5% 0% .8% 
Catholic 19.3% 10.9% 6.8% 37% 22.9% 1% 1% 0.5% 
Methodist 16.1 % 14.9% 14.9% 27.6% 21.8% 1.7% 2.9% 0% 
Source: HSRC Omnibus Survey 1993. Used by permission of the Sociology Departments of 
Hugenote Kollege and the University of Pretoria. 
Note: Eng = English, Afr = Afrikaans, Sha/Tso = Shangaan/Tsonga; Swa/Nde = Swati/Ndebele; 
OlE = Other European; 0 = Other 
As social institutions, denominations are carriers of the social, cultural, economic, and political forces 
in society (see Villa-Vicencio 1988:42). And so congregations also have the values of European culture 
imprinted on the language, structures and processes of their denominations (Ramphele 1989: 179; see 
Cochrane 1987:26; Saayman 1994: 12; Bill 1994: 168). In South African pentecostal and independent 
charismatic churches the cultural overlay is usually that of the USA, due to historical links. Many South 
African Pentecostal churches were founded by US citizens. The pattern started in 1908, when US 
citizen John G Lake and others held the first pentecostal services in this country in Doornfontein, 
Johannesburg (Cawood 1964: 1 02). In 1866 the black African Methodist Episcopalian (AME) Bishop 
William Taylor visited and subsequently the AME was founded here. A variation is presented by the 
Rhema Bible Church, founded after Ray McCauley visited the US. 
2 LANGUAGE AND RACE IN CONGREGATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
2.1 Development and extent of racial diversity in congregations surveyed 
While Section 1.1 outlined the general history of racial integration in South African churches, here I 
focus specifically on the common features in the histories of the 60 responding congregations. This 
theme will be fleshed out by more detailed case studies in Section 3, below. 
Whites were obviously over-represented, and blacks underrepresented in the survey, as most of the 
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congregations were previously exclusively white (except those who were always mixed), so that they 
contained less than a quarter of blacks, coloureds, or people from Indian descent. Twenty 
congregations contained no-one from Indian descent; seven had no black congregants; six no 
coloureds; and only one church had no whites. In 17 cases whites formed a majority greater than 
75%, and in 10 formed a majority between 51 % and 75% of the congregation. In five congregations 
coloureds formed a majority greater than 75%, and in six cases made up between 50% and 75% of 
the congregation. Blacks were in two cases a majority greater than 75%, and in three made up 
between 50% and 74% of the congregation. 
Fifty-five congregations indicated that they had became increasingly racially diverse over a period 
spanning 166 years. Of all churches in the sample, St John's Church in Wynberg has been racially-
diverse the longest, since its founding in 1830. Three congregations (St Mary's, St Stephen's, and 
Shophar) represent the most recently-mixed, dating their racially-diversity to 1996. An arbitrary 
breakdown shows clearly that the rate at which congregations are integrating is speeding up. Thirteen 
racially-integrated congregations emerged during 1974-1989, compared to the 24 that did between 
1989-1997. In the 63 years from 1830 to 1899, seven congregations were racially integrated, 
compared to the seven that became mixed over the next 48 years (1 900-1 948). During the next 24 
years (1949-73) the integration-rate slowed down, with only four achieving this status. But the inverse 
happened over the subsequent 23-year period (1974-97), with 37 congregations becoming 
integrated7 • 
In constructing Table 9, 17 (32%) of the 54 valid cases were excluded, as these respondents indicated 
that their congregations had always been racially-mixed. For this reason they were deemed irrelevant 
to the discussion of factors which had contributed to increasing racial diversity. By themselves these 
congregations would have represented the highest single percentage of valid responses - far greater 
than I expected. Continuous racial diversity was a factor almost completely neglected in my previous 
research (Venter 1994, 1995). Several examples occur in the Cape Town area, notably the Anglican 
Churches of St Paul's (Rondebosch, founded in 1834), St Saviour's (Claremont, 1850), and Holy 
Trinity (Kalk Bay, 1855). Central Methodist Mission, represents a trajectory which moved from initial 
racial heterogeneity to homogeneity and then completed the cycle to its present integrated format. A 
particular sub-species here is the deliberately integrated congregations, which emerged in conscious 
defiance of the political system during the dark years of apartheid. 
A factor which Table 9 identifies quite clearly is the significance of external causes, reported by 70% 
(26 out of 37 valid cases) as affecting integration. Substantially fewer congregations became 
7. A more historically sensitive division could be arrived at, by noting the number that became racially-mixed under 
petty apartheid from 1948to 1966 (4 congregations), compared to those which initiated mixing under grand apartheid 
from 1967to 1986 (1 0 congregations). Special attention should be paid to the period marking the height of repression, 
arguably stretching from 1984 (the year before the first state of emergency) to 1989 (the year before the unbanning 
of the liberation movements) (8 congregations). But such alternative schemas do not alter my basic conclusion that 
the rate of integration is increasing. 
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Table 9: Factors cited for change towards increased racial diversity (N = 37) Source: Own 
data, 1997. 
Source of change 
External 
Legislation 
Creation of homelands 
Group Areas scrapped' 
[Demographics 
People moved through company policy 
Demographics of area changed 
Some demographic mix always present 
Only church in town 
[Den omina tionJ 
Black priest appointed 
Denominational programme 
Changed parish boundaries 
Subtotal: 
Internal 
Leaders' efforts 
Special programme implemented 
Subtotal: 
Unknown 
'A miracle' 
'Natural togetherness' 
'Gradual process' 
, Just opened our door' 
'Don't know' 
Subtotal: 
Totals: 
No response 
Invalid responses 
Frequency Valid Percent 
5 13.5%J 
3 8.1 % 
2 5.4% 
17 6.3%J 
1 2.7% 
13 35.1 % 
2 5.4% 
1 1.9% 
5 13.5% 
1 2.7% 
1 2.7% 
2 5.4% 
26 70.3% 
3 8.1% 
1 1.9% 
4 10.8% 
1 2.7% 
3 8.1% 
1 2.7% 
1 2.7% 
1 2.7% 
7 18.9% 
37 100% 
3 8.1% 
3 8.1 % 
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integrated as result of internal dynamics (11 %). (Le. pro-active processes initiated by congregational 
leadership). So although leadership do playa crucial role, their integrative function in most churches 
seems limited to a small percentage of cases, or at best is an intervening factor subsequent to 
ecological changes. A periodisation of the process indicates that the integrative function of clergy was 
greater under apartheid than in the post-apartheid era, when demographics played a more significant 
role. 
In all, almost three-quarter of respondents became integrated due to factors beyond the control of the 
congregation itself. The implication is that the greater majority of unintegrated congregations will not 
be able to induce integration deliberately, and that denominations were doing extremely little to 
proactively enhance the process. But such a conclusion is premature, as closer scrutiny of the dates 
of integration will show. Those who exercised some choice became integrated in recent years; while 
those who did not, changed some time ago. Only 11 % (4 cases) reported self-initiated integration, 
while an additional 11 % (4 cases) pointed to denominational actions as causes, such as clergy 
appointments (one case), or changes to parish boundaries (two cases). Some 19% of respondents (7 
cases) ascribed integration to other causes than the above, such as "a miracle" (one case), "natural 
togetherness" (three cases), or "a gradual process" (one case). 
The link between neighbourhood racial diversity and congregational racial diversity seems to be clearly 
demonstrated in Table 9. Almost half of the 37 responding congregations (48.7%, or 18 cases) 
indicated that demographic factors were primarily responsible for integration, This occurred through 
an increasing movement of people of colour into formerly white neighbourhoods, especially after the 
Group Areas Act was repealed. Obviously state legislation closely affected the internal organization 
of religious institutions in the apartheid and post-apartheid era. Yet apartheid legislation also 
unwittingly aided integration in instances where the composition of congregations were changed 
through the incorporation of their communities into the former homelands. Many congregations 
reported that three or more race groups are present in the neighbourhood surrounding the church 
buildings, and many also reported the presence of two race groups. 
Yet I would argue that no direct relationship exists between racial diversity in the neighbourhood and 
in the congregation, a point also argued by Massie (1993). In many cases congregants commute long 
distances to the church meetings, so that only where congregations draw most of their members from 
the immediate neighbourhood would there be any direct effect. The eight out of the 60 congregations 
who stated that no-one lived within walking distance to their church buildings are unlikely to be 
affected by the demographics of neighbourhood. The same is true for a further 29, who had less than 
10% of congregants resident in their neighbourhoods. My argument is substantiated by the three 
racially well-integrated congregations found in neighbourhoods with only one race group, and the three 
somewhat integrated congregations in similar areas. A further argument could be made on the basis 
of the two poorly integrated congregations located in areas with residents from three or more races. 
2.1 .1 Racial integration index 
Table 10 reviews the extent to which racial integration has occurred in responding congregations, 
measured by three categories in Question 10 - leadership, outreach programmes, and home groups. 
The index represents a ranking according to a composite score that was obtained by supplying a score 
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for every congregation in each category, and then adding up all the category scores. Table 10 reflects 
the overall ranking, and the scores for each category. For each category, a church was scored as 
follows: the response "not mixed" obtained a score of 1; "some mix" a score of 2; and 
"representative" (of the racial diversity of congregants) a score of 3. The subtotals from each of the 
three categories were then added up to give an overall score out of a possible 9. Churches with an 
overall score of between 1 to 3 were classified as poorly integrated; between 4 to 6 were regarded 
as somewhat integrated; and those with an overall score of between 7 to 9 as well-integrated. For 
example. St Peter's Anglican Church, Tzaneen, scored 2 for leadership; 3 for outreach programmes; 
and 2 for home groups. St Peter's overall score of 7 out of a possible 9 meant that it was regarded 
as well-integrated. 
One of the drawbacks of this index is that congregations whose leadership was un integrated could still 
appear well-integrated, if it scored highly on the other two categories. However. Boli (personal 
communication, 1999) indicates that "such mismatches are inherent in any index that combines 
several variables". In any case, this can be corrected by also considering overall integration along with 
leadership integration, as in Table 17, below. For example, while Rhema seems "somewhat" 
integrated. its leadership is only partly integrated. The same is true of St Peter's Church, whose "well-
integrated" ranking disguises a "somewhat" integrated leadership - a category for congregations which 
exhibit neither fully representative nor completely homogeneous leadership. Examples of the latter 
include 1 0 congregations which have no other races in their leadership, and 8 cases which have none 
in outreach programmes and home groups. 
Table 10: Racial integration index (N = 51)8 
Level Overall Leadership Programmes Home groups 
Poorly 5.9% 
integrated 3b 
Somewhat 39.2% 
integrated 20 
Well integrated 54.9% 
28 
100% 
Source: Own data, 1997. 
Note: 
17.6% 15.7% 
9 8 
37.3% 43.1% 
19 22 
45.1% 41.2% 
23 21 
100% 100% 
a Nine cases were discarded for including invalid or no response to the three 
categories 
b Refers to the number of cases. 
15.7% 
8 
43.1% 
22 
41.2% 
21 
100% 
Through use of this multidimensional method, 54.9% (28 of 52 cases) could be said to be substantially 
integrated, with 39.2 % (20 cases) somewhat integrated. and 5.9% (or 3 cases) poorly integrated. 
Table 10 shows that slightly more well-integrated congregations have racially-representative leadership 
(45.1 %) than those with well-integrated home groups (41.2 %). Yet the reverse is true for somewhat 
integrated congregations. Here home groups tend to be more racially-representative (43.1 %) than 
leadership (39.2 %) - and a similar pattern emerges among poorly integrated congregations. No hint 
emerged from the data to explain this. There may possibly be more resistance in somewhat integrated 
congregations to integrate leadership than there is in well-integrated congregations. but this remains 
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speculation. 
When the 21 cases of Anglican, Methodist, and Catholic churches that are racially well-integrated are 
compared, more Anglican (61.9% or 13 cases) than Catholic churches (33.3% or 7 cases) can be 
placed in this category. One Methodist congregation was well-integrated. Again, no data emerged to 
explain this. Perhaps the ongoing difficulties of Methodists to integrate have to do with the relative 
importance of smaller scale supra-congregational structures (circuits and their quarterly meetings) 
which were segregated in the past. These appear to set up racialised tensions regarding power and 
control of resources whenever circuit or congregational mergers are mooted. Not a single Anglican 
church indicated that they were poorly racially integrated, compared to one Methodist and three 
Catholic churches. 
Of the eight racially well-integrated congregations which claim always to have been integrated, three 
were already diverse in the 19th century (Christ Anglican Church, St John's Wynberg, St Saviour's 
Anglican Church Claremont), two in the early 20th century before apartheid (Vryheid Catholic Church; 
Our Lady Help of Christians Catholic Church), and three during apartheid (St Catherine Catholic 
Church; Ubunye Free Methodist Church; Sacred Heart Catholic Church). 
The average integration rates (time elapsed between founding and integration of congregants; see 
p.99) for the remainder are far longer for the Anglican (79-130 years) than for the Catholic (3-23 
years) - with one exception (Christ the Redeemer Catholic Church in Klerksdorp, 1896-1994). As can 
be expected, the integration rates for racially well-integrated IFCC congregations are shorter again than 
for any other denomination (1-4 years) of this type. This is due to their nature as churches which 
suffer neither the drag from long church traditions nor from de-centralised authority structures. 
2.2 Extent of language diversity in congregations surveyed 
2.2.1 Extent of language diversity 
Responding congregations were asked to indicate the approximate percentage of first language 
speakers in their respective congregations. Ten of South Africa's eleven official languages were 
distributed over the 59 valid responses, while the number of first languages of congregants in a 
particular congregation ranged from two to 11 languages, excluding foreign languages. 
The presence of up to four first languages in a congregation was fairly common, as Table 11 
\ 
illustrates. Forty-five congregations (76.3%) contained 1-4 first languages; 12 (20.3%) between 5 to 
8; and two (3.4%) had 9 to 12 first languages. A similar number of congregations had five (5 or 8.5%) 
languages than had six first language-speakers (4 or 6.8%). 
Despite the English-speaking label of the denominations to which these churches belong, in a quarter 
(16 cases) English first-language speakers made up 30% or less of the total membership, as Table 12 
illustrates. Three churches (5.4%) reported that no English was spoken by members of their 
congregations. In 11 congregations (19.7% of 59) surveyed, the number of people who spoke English 
as first language made up less than 20% of the total. English first-language speakers formed a majority 
(50% or more of all members) in 40 out of 59 congregations, which includes a two-thirds majority 
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(more than 65%) in 29 cases (or 49.6%). In all, English first-language speakers were found across 55 
congregations. 
Table 11: Number of first languages present in 
congregations (N = 59) 
Number of Number of % of responses 
languages cases 
2 14 23.7% 
3 18 30.5% 
4 13 22% 
5 5 8.5% 
6 4 6.8% 
7 1 1.7% 
8 2 3.4% 
10 1 1.7% 
11 1 1.7% 
Source: Own data, 1997. 
Afrikaans was spoken by more than 50% of the congregation in 8 out of 59 churches (i.e. 14.8%). 
Altogether 18 (35.9%) reported that 25% and more of their congregation was Afrikaans-speaking. In 
12 (20%) no Afrikaans-speakers were reportedly present. In 54% of all churches surveyed Afrikaans 
formed the first language of 8% or less of the total membership. Afrikaans first-language speakers 
were spread over 46 congregations. European first-language speakers (other than English) were 
distributed over 19 cases, and Asian first-language speakers over eight. 
Table 12: Distribution of English first language speakers by congregations 
(N = 59) 
% of English first language No. of Cases Percentage 
speakers 
None 3 3.6% 
1-33% 13 22% 
34-66% 17 28.8% 
67-100% 28 47.5% 
Source: Own data, 1997. 
In terms of African languages, Zulu were spread over 23 congregations, Xhosa over 18, Sotho over 
15, Tsonga over 6, Swazi over 5, Venda over 2, Shangaan over 4, Pedi over 4, Tswana over 3. Other 
African first-language speakers were distributed over 17 congregations (29%). 
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2.2.2 Linguistic integration index 
In order to assess the extent of linguistic diversity in each congregation, I constructed a linguistic-
diversity index as shown in Table 13. A different procedure was employed to devise this index than 
was used for the racial integration index. The level of linguistic integration was represented in terms 
of whether or not churches' services reflect the number of languages in the congregation. 
Overall ranking in the linguistic-integration index was determined in terms of three dimensions: 
monolingual, bilingual, or multilingual. These were used to describe (a) the number of languages in 
services, as well as (b) the number of language groups present in each congregation. 
The number of languages in services was determined by responses to Question 4, where respondents 
indicated whether "one", "two", or "three or more" languages were used in sermons, hymns, liturgy, 
praying, and readings. In order to be classified as bilingual, two languages had to be used in at least 
three out of the five categories. To qualify as a multilingual service, three or more languages had to 
be used in at least three out of the five categories. So St Peter's, for example, could be classified as 
"somewhat" linguistically integrated, as two languages were used in four of the five categories; with 
monolingual sermons as the exception. 
Table 13: Language integration index: number of languages in congregation and number used in 
services (N = 51)8 
Level of 
integration 
(index) 
Poorly integrated 
Somewhat 
integrated 
Well integrated 
N 
23 
9 
13 
4 
2 
Source: Own Data, 1997. 
Number of languages in 
congregation b 
Three or more 
(multilingual) 
Two 
(bilingual) 
Three or more 
(multilingual) 
Two 
(bilingual) 
Three or more 
(multilingual) 
Number of languages Total as % of 
used in service responses 
One 45.1% 
(monolingual) 
One (monolingual) 17.6% 
Two (bilingual) 25.5% 
Two (bilingual) 7.8% 
Three or more 3.9% 
(multilingual) 
Note: a Nine cases were discarded for including invalid or no response to the three categories. 
b Number of first languages spoken by congregants. 
The number of language groups present in each congregation was decided by responses to Question 
19. Here, respondents had to indicate in percentages the number of congregants who spoke any of 
thirteen first languages. While the given percentages could be dismissed as "guesstimates", the 
number of language groups identified is likelier to be underestimated. This is because respondents were 
conceivably only aware of the languages of members with whom they had had contact; additional 
languages may have been present. 
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Three rankings were devised from the data, based on how the three dimensions affected the 
configuration of languages in services and languages present in the congregation. These included (a) 
a multilingual-monolingual configuration, which I classified as "poorly" integrated; (b) bilingual-
monolingual or multilingual-bilingual arrangements, regarded as "somewhat" integrated; (c) multilingual-
multilingual o~ bilingual-bilingual groupings, categorised as "well-integrated". In other words, churches 
were regarded as linguistically "well-integrated" when the number of languages in services 
corresponded directly to the num~er of language groups present. In linguistically "poorly" integrated 
churches the disparity between the languages used in services and languages present in the 
congregations were greater than those which were placed in the "somewhat" integrated ranking. 
The linguistic integration index (Table 13) shows that six congregations could be ranked as "well-
integrated", compared to 22 that were "somewhat" and 23 that were "poorly" integrated. What Table 
1 3 disguises to a certain extent is that monolingual services are the norm in multilingual congregations. 
One language is used in the services of 62.7% of congregations (32 of 51 cases), which is remarkable 
as in 38 congregations (74.5% of 60 cases) three or more first language groups are present. In 33% 
of responding congregations two languages are used (17), and in only 3.9% (2) is three or more used. 
Given the presence of more than one first-language group in all congregations polled, bilingual services 
would have been the expected option, at the least. 
Table 14 shows a more detailed picture which emerges when the number of languages used in 
services (column three in Table 13) is broken down into its five constituent parts. Of the 51 valid 
responses in answer to the question of how many languages was used in the sermon, 72.5% (37 
cases) had monolingual preaching only; compared to the 27.5% who did not - including 13 which had 
bilingual (25.5%) and 1 (2%) multilingual sermons. The language of preference was usually English. 
Table 14: Number of languages used in services by number of congregations (N = 51)· 
Sermons Liturgy Prayers Hymns Readings 
One language 37 
used 
72.5% 
Two languages 13 
used 
25.5% 
Three or more . 
languages used 
Source: Own Data, 1997. 
Notes: 
1 
2% 
32 31 30 
62.7% 60.8% 58:8% 
16 17 17 
31.4% 33.3% 33.3% 
3 3 4 
5.9% 5.9% 7.8% 
a Nine cases were discarded for including invalid or no response to the three 
categories 
29 
56.9% 
19 
37.3% 
3 
7.8% 
Other than may be expected, there seems to be a correlation between a relatively low number of first 
languages present in a congregation, and whether language is perceived as a problem or not. While 
three out of the sample of 61 congregations reported 7 to 10 first languages present, all 28 other valid 
responses reported between 2 and 6 first language groups. Of the 28, seven had 2 first languages; 
seven had 3; eight had 4; three had 5; and three 6. In other words, 14 congregations with a maximum 
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of three language groups reported that language was a problem; and so did eight who had four. 
Generally-speaking, the more languages were used in the services, the more likely the congregation 
was to indicate that language would be a problem. Nine linguistically well-integrated congregations 
indicated that language was a problem; most were Catholic (Matatiele, Sacred Heart, St Patrick's 
Cathedral, St Augustine's, Immaculate Conception); some Anglican churches (St Barnabas Anglican 
Church Church, St Catherine's Catholic Church Church, St Michael & St George's Anglican Church) 
and Lighthouse Christian Centre. On the other hand, two congregations which ranked high on the 
language index indicated that language was not a problem: Sacred Heart and St Francis Catholic 
churches. 
There seems to be a fairly strong inverse correlation between first languages spoken and level of 
linguistic integration. Where a high number of first languages are present (ten or more). churches tend 
to fall into the somewhat integrated category. Conversely, where relatively fewer languages are 
present (2 to 6). higher rates of language integration are reported. This was true for all 11 most 
linguistically integrated congregations, including eight Catholic churches (Matatiele, Sacred Heart, St 
Patrick's Cathedral, St Augustine's, Immaculate Conception; St Catherine's Church; Sacred Heart; 
Vryheid). two Anglican churches (St Michael & St George's; St Barnabas'). and the Lighthouse 
Christian Centre. 
More congregations with higher levels of language integration (11 cases) reported language as a form 
of diversity which affects the congregation than those with high ratings which reported no such 
influence (3 cases: Sacred Heart Tongaat; Vryheid; Ubunye FMC). There were no substantial 
differences in level of language integration between congregations which did or did not report language 
as a influence at medium and lower ratings. 
In several cases congregations dealt with language differences by structuring separate services for the 
different language groups (St Dominic Catholic Church, Welkom - an example of a church with 
diversity but nil integration). 
2.2.3 Level and contribution of external linguistic diversity 
Most respondents perceived their congregations to be in neighbourhoods that were substantially 
linguistically diverse. In general, 75.9% of respondents (44 of 60 cases) reported that two or more 
language groups occurred in the neighbourhoods around their congregation's buildings - including 27 
(46.6%) which were in neighbourhoods where three or more languages are spoken. In other words, 
only 24.1 % (14) described their neighbourhoods as linguistically homogenous (see Table 15). 
One could reasonably expect that higher levels of linguistic diversity in neighbourhoods would support 
higher levels of linguistic diversity in congregations, but this does not seem to be the case. A crude 
cross-tabulation (Table 16) shows that neighbourhoods with high linguistic diversity is associated with 
congregations with medium levels of diversity. The number of cases for high levels of diversity is too 
low (3 cases) for any meaningful interpretation. Low levels of neighbourhood linguistic diversity is not 
strongly associated with any of the three levels for congregational diversity, as a fairly even number 
were distributed through all three categories. 
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Table 15: Number of languages in neighbourhoods (N = 58) 
One language 
Two languages 
Three or more 
languages 
Cases 
14 
17 
27 
Source: Own Data, 1997. 
Note: 1 Invalid response; 1 No response. 
Percentage of valid 
cases 
24.1% 
29.3% 
46.6% 
There seems to be a weak link between the languages and their associated regions (see Section 1.3) 
and the language distribution among the congregations. For instance, congregations with relatively 
significant percentages of Zulu, Swati and Pedi-speakers are found in provinces in which these 
languages feature prominently. But this does not appear to be the case for the other eight languages. 
Table 16: Language diversity in congregations by 
Language diversity in neighbourhood (N = 54) 
Congregation 
Levels of diversity: 
Low 
Medium 
High 
Source: Own Data, 1997. 
Neighbourhood 
Low 
7 
5 
o 
Medium 
9 
7 
1 
Note: Six invalid and no responses. 
High 
8 
15 
2 
3. CASES STUDIES OF LANGUAGE INTEGRATION IN RACIALLY-DIVERSE CONGREGATIONS 
3.1 General features of case studies 
Six case studies are presented below to flesh out the quantitative descriptions of racially diverse 
congregations supplied in Section Two, above. The cases were not selected randomly but rather for 
displaying certain features relevant to the discussion of linguistic integration in particular. and racial 
integration in general. Yet they do differ from one another in terms of features which also occur across 
the rest of the sample, namely manner of integration and the period during which this occurred, 
location, size, faith tradition, and levels of racial and linguistic integration. Table 17 on the next page 
represent three dimensions of linguistic integration and two of racial integration. The discussion will 
highlight the diversity and similarities in the sample that is submerged in the unavoidable but necessary 
reductionism inherent in tables such as these. 
I will now briefly highlight some of the more interesting features of each case, before turning to a more 
detailed discussion in the following subsections. 
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Sacred Heart Catholic Church represents the only case in the sample where black parishioners insisted 
on the inclusion in the service of their first languages. Their insistence was no doubt aided by their 
numerical superiority; yet, significantly, no other congregation with a majority of black congregants 
demonstrated this linguistic initiative. Yet in a few cases, non-whites did contribute significantly to 
racial integration. Perhaps Sacred Heart's sympathetic priest who could speak the majority black 
language of his parishioners helped to make the difference. 
St Joseph's Catholic Church is unusual for the way in which it integrates the linguistic diversity of its 
parishioners into its services. Fort Beaufort Presbyterian Church is also unique for a number of reasons, 
not least because racial integration involved in part the initiative of parishioners, most of whom were 
non-South African Africans. But Fort Beaufort is also rare because of the sensitizing role that the 
cultural background of the minister played in his approach to the congregation. 
Table 17: General features of six case studies 
Congregation Language Number of 
integration index languages used 
a 
in sermons 
Fort Beaufort 
Presbyterian 
Poorly integrated One 
St Peter's Somewhat One 
Anglican Church, integrated 
Pietersburg 
Sacred Heart 
Catholic Church, 
Tongaat 
Holy Trinity 
Catholic Church, 
Midrand 
Rhema Bible 
Somewhat 
integrated 
Somewhat 
integrated 
Somewhat 
Church, Randburg integrated 
St Joseph's 
Catholic Church, 
Howick 
Well-integrated 
Source: Own Data, 1997. 
Two 
? 
Two 
Two 
Racial integration Level of racial 
index 
Well-integrated 
Well-integrated 
Well-integrated 
Somewhat 
integrated 
Well-integrated 
Somewhat 
integrated 
integration of 
leaders 
Somewhat 
integrated 
Somewhat 
integrated 
Well-integrated 
Somewhat 
integrated 
Somewhat 
integrated 
Well-integrated 
Notes: a Number of first languages of congregants compared to number of languages used in 
services; i.e. if there are two languages spoken in the congregation and these two are used in 
the services, the congregation ranks as well-integrated linguistically. Compare Table 13. 
Like St Joseph's, Sacred Heart represents cases which were racially integrated from the start. By 
contrast Fort Beaufort, Holy Trinity, and St Peter's were all integrated after 1990. While St Peter's and 
Holy Trinity provide examples of the role played by demographic factors in racial integration, this was 
clearly not the case for Rhema, which represents congregations which became racially diverse during 
the latter period of the apartheid era. Rhema is located in a predominantly white suburb and yet 
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became racially-diverse a year after its founding. While a single race neighbourhood also exists around 
St Peter's Church, two other factors make this an interesting case. First, the pro-active environment 
created by the regional (diocesan) structures, and second, the use of an external consultant - the only 
such instance I know of. While the leadership of Holy Trinity and St Peter's were quite deliberate in 
creating more racially diverse congregations, Rhema's initial integration came almost by default. 
3.1 Congregations that rate as linguistically poorly integrated 
As indicated in Table 13,47.2% of congregations (25 out of 53) can be placed in this category, 
because they conduct primarily monolingual services for congregants who speak three or more 
different first languages. This includes 47.4% of Anglican, 42.1 % of Catholic, 62.5% of Methodist, 
and 66.7% of IFCC congregations. 
3.1.1 Fort Beaufort Presbyterian Church 
Fort Beaufort Presbyterian Church was founded in 1847 in the Eastern Cape rural town of Fort 
Beaufort, which, according to the church's minister, presently has a population of about 2500 families 
(Germiquet interview). 
When Rev Eddie Germiquet began his ministry at Fort Beaufort Presbyterian in 1985, the congregation 
comprised 35 white members, which met two to three times each month. Most were farming in the 
area surrounding Fort Beaufort. About 70% of the population is Afrikaans-speaking. Recently the ranks 
of residents were swelled by academics from Fort Hare University, in nearby Alice, who prefer to live 
in Fort Beaufort. Some of these university personnel were from African countries, which explains the 
presence of e.g. Nigerians, Ghanains, and Zairians in Fort Beaufort Presbyterian Church. 
In 1997 between 70 to 80 adults on average attended Fort Beaufort Presbyterian on Sundays, with 
45 to 50 people going to six Bible studies during the week. In racial terms the Sunday meeting consists 
of 60% white, 35% black, 2% Indian, and 6% coloured people. Of these, 62 people were, according 
to the church's records, officially members, while 17 were considered "constituents" (non-members 
who regularly attend). In ethnic terms the congregation's diversity embodied about 53 white English-
first language speakers, five white Afrikaners, a Polish couple, a Zambian couple, a Xhosa couple, a 
(Le)sotho couple, a Zairian couple, four Nigerians, four Ghanains, a Dutch couple, and a Ugandan. 
About fifteen of the English-speaking whites were from the farming community. Two of the six 
congregants who work at Fort Hare University were black. About 65% of the congregation was 
between 40-55 years old, with a few in the 30 and 60 year old categories. 
While the congregation is thus clearly multilingual, only English is used in the sermons, readings, and 
liturgy, with Xhosa and Afrikaans surfacing in the hymns or prayers. Some 53% of the congregation 
is English first-language speakers, with 10% Afrikaans and 6 % Xhosa first-language speakers. 
Although 35% of the congregation is black, 18% come from other African countries. 
Under Germiquet's leadership Fort Beaufort Presbyterian started holding combined alternating services 
three times a year with their black counterparts in Alice, a congregation which Germiquet also looked 
after. He recalls that he deliberately tried to make these combined services "top class" - his words. 
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Germiquet reasoned that this would help lower resistance to interracial contact. The services included 
a play and choir-singing, with tea afterwards. As a next step Germiquet suggested holding combined 
Sunday School picnics twice a year, which was billed as "a family thing so parents would come", he 
says. In about 1988 Germiquet invited Rev Luther Matheza of the Umtata Presbyterian Church to 
preach at one of the combined services. Matheza in turn invited Germiquet across, and later the 
process was repeated with the elders accompanying their respective ministers. This resulted in the 
white English-speaking farmers being exposed to "well-educated blacks [from the University of the 
Transkei in Umtata] who could express themselves". Meanwhile Fort Beaufort remained a white 
congregation. 
In 1991 a black woman (Zambian Mrs Janet Chisaka, whose husband worked at Fort Hare University), 
started attending the white congregation after the abolition of the Group Areas Act. Then a coloured 
woman, Mrs Marie Adonis, turned up in the service. Both were telephoned and visited by a member 
of the congregation. Chisaka spoke to and drew in her friends, and later became the first black Sunday 
School teacher. Today the Sunday School is staffed by four whites, two blacks (Chisaka and Sarah 
Arko-Cobba, a Nigerian) and one coloured teacher. In 1993 the Young People's group became 
integrated when boarders from the nearby Winterberg Agricultural School joined the all-white youth 
group. Among them where black pupils. The boarders brought the racial tensions which existed among 
them at school along, sitting separately, with white boys playing vindictive jokes upon their black 
counterparts. Germiquet attempted to deal with these tensions by "trying to make people sensitive". 
He "did not scold the congregation about apartheid or their fears of integration". Instead, he wanted 
to make them feel positive about the future, about integration. 
Germiquet acknowledges pursuing several conscious strategies in integrating the congregation: 
a. to arrange special occasions to which congregants come dressed up in "traditional" dress and hats, 
which allow especially the West Africans to show off their colourful garb. So, in 1994, Christmas was 
celebrated with a candlelit bring-and-share dinner. People had to bring along a dish and the national 
flag of their country of origin. During the meal people had to explain the name of the dish, where it 
was from, and what the ingredients were. At another candlelit dinner, each family was asked to 
present a song in a different language. One unexpected result, according to Germiquet, was that 
people realised the linguistic differences that exist in the white community. For instance, the 
Germiquets brought a French song, to honour their French-speaking Swiss missionary ancestors. Such 
occasions are also promoted as outreach events, to which people were invited to bring their friends. 
Through such events Germiquet hopes to bring about a positive appraisal of difference. And the 
evidence suggests that he has; 
b. to have a service conceived and conducted by Sunday School children between the ages of ten and 
twelve; 
c. to make congregants who do not respond favourably, and who do not attend the special occasions, 
"feel that they were the one who have lost out in some ways"; 
d. to ask families to introduce a song, using language and music peculiar to their cultural group. 
Another aspect is to emphasise that "it is not only English that we can sing", says Germiquet. 
So far the racial mix is reflected only to some extent in the elected leadership of the congregation. 
Germiquet explains that any member "first has to show that s/he is accepted as a leader before being 
elected". Professor Lukangaka Lusambe, initially from Zaire, and Trevor Rooy (coloured) already serve 
on the fifteen-member informal board of management which looks after the finances and the building. 
Lusambe is expected to be elected an elder by the congregation's members when next this is possible. 
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The mix at Fort Beaufort Presbyterian Church is obviously the result of both external and internal 
factors. The movement of African academics into the town meant that an educated black elite became 
potential members of the congregation. By itself this demographic shift need not have changed 
anything. By 1997 the neighbourhood around the church buildings were well-integrated; but only 10% 
of the congregants lived within walking distance. Some 40% of parishioners lived between one and 
two kilometres away, and a further 40% further than 6 kilometres. Integration was brought about by 
the initiative of two hesitant visitors and the reciprocal interest of the congregants and the minister. 
These two non-white members also played a key role in persuading friends that they would be 
welcomed as well. 
3.2 Congregations that rate as somewhat linguistically integrated 
As indicated in Table 13, 41.5% of congregations (22 out of 53) can be placed in this category. This 
includes 17% (9 cases) that has monolingual and 24.5% (13 cases) that has bilingual services. Of the 
22 cases, 36.8% is Anglican, 36.8% Catholic, 37.5% Methodist, and 33.3% IFCC congregations. 
3.2.1 Sacred Heart Catholic Church, Tongaat 
Sacred Heart Catholic Church was founded in 1950, in Tongaat, KwaZulu-Natal, a small, 
predominantly Indian town, with the black township of Hamalati nearby. As a result, Sacred Heart was 
racially diverse from its inception - attended by both Indian and white parishioners. In 1997 the largest 
of Sacred Heart's services was attended by 500 parishioners on average, of whom 70% was black. 
The parish programmes and leadership were reportedly well-integrated, due largely to the initiative of 
the white priest, Father Julian Davey. The church was attended primarily by people with low incomes. 
An estimated 40% had less than a Standard 10 (Grade 12) education, while another 40% had only 
Standard 10. 
Sacred Heart's low linguistic integration ranking is based on the fact that while all five aspects of the 
services referred to in Table 14 are consistently bilingual. Zulu, English, Xhosa (2%) and Sotho (1 %) 
are spoken as first languages by parishioners. The use of the integration index clearly presents a 
difficulty here, as Zulu and English represents 97% of the parishioners. Some 67% of the parishioners 
was Zulu-speakers and 30% English-speakers, of whom only 1 % was white. English is also spoken 
as first language by about a quarter (25%) of the parishioners who are of Indian descent. Despite the 
numerical superiority of Zulu-speakers, the dominant language is English, the language in which the 
services are conducted. The evidence suggests that the index could be adjusted so that the size of the 
language groups come into play, while a qualitative distinction between poorly-integrated 
congregations with monolingual and those with bilingual services could also be drawn. Yet it then 
becomes difficult to decide at which point a particular group should be recognized; any number seems 
arbitrary. 
Fr Davey, who can speak Zulu, has been at Sacred Heart since 1994. When he arrived, there were 
separate masses - one for the Zulu- and one for English-speakers (predominantly of Indian descent). 
The previous priest did not live in the area, and, at first, neither did Davey. He united the services, as 
well as the parish council. According to Davey, Zulu parishioners argued that "we live in the same 
town, why have separate services". Indian parishioners initially resisted the changes, and "a few hived 
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off to [the parish of] Verulam". 
Zulu is now incorporated in the services partly because some of the older generation Zulu-speakers on 
the parish council suggested this. Davey says he felt that the present setup is "the way God wanted 
it to be", that each parishioner should be able to "hear the word of God in their own tongue". He could 
not point to a specific origin for this belief, except that he had experienced culturally-mixed services 
at both St Peter's and St John Vianni Seminaries during his training for the priesthood. Although 
novices were taught about inculturation, this did not include specifics for implementation, nor any 
particular directives. Newly ordained English-speaking priests were sent to a black mission area to learn 
a black language; in the case of Davey this period lasted for six years. 
Mass at Sacred Heart has been Africanised in several ways: parishioners (a) form a procession before 
the first reading, (b) bring gifts [financial contributions] to the front of the church, (c) voluntary 
contribute their own prayers; and (d) sing in a "loud and joyful" way while clapping their hands. 
Davey suggests that the reason why black congregants elsewhere do not speak out in favour of 
Africanising their services is that "they [Zulus?] are usually polite, and not outspoken [in church 
contexts]". In contrast the youth like to show that they can use English. Davey recalled a youth service 
in which he asked questions of young people in English and in Zulu. Some of the Zulu youth preferred 
to answer in English. Many black youths in the area attend schools formerly reserved for Indians. His 
impression is that the Zulu-speaking youth "do not want a 'pure' Zulu service". 
Bishops leave the implementation of inculturation to each priest. The parish council usually follow the 
lead of the priest. Davey thinks that the reluctance of some black parishioners to Africanise their 
services were due to the fact that they wanted to identify themselves as Catholics over against (say) 
Zionists. When blacks join the Catholic church they may in fact be more conservative than their 
priests, many who know African culture only in theory [while black parishioners have experienced the 
negative aspects of their own culture]. Black parishioners may recognize that a song introduced by a 
zealous priest may in fact have its origin in a war song, and so resist it. Davey believes that some 
white clergy are waiting for African priests and parishioners "to come forward" and take the lead in 
Africanizing the church. 
3.2.2 Holy Trinity Catholic Church, Midrand 
Holy Trinity Catholic Church was founded in Midrand, north of Johannesburg in Gauteng Province, in 
1987 at the instigation of Fr Richard 0' Rourke. Initially the church building for the an all-white 
Catholic parish was located in Olifantsfontein. Then Rabie Ridge township was developed in Midrand 
to house coloureds who were moved from Alexandra Township. In response, and because he did not 
want to serve an all-white parish, 0' Rourke decided to establish a church in Midrand. At first the 
facilities of the Anglican church were used. When the present building was completed, the 
Olifantsfontein church was closed, and the newly mixed congregation of coloureds and whites met at 
Midrand. Later black professionals bought properties in the area, and by 1990 some had started 
attending Holy Trinity. 
By 1997 the parishioners numbered an estimated 300 strong, of whom 20% could be classified as 
coloured, 70% as white, and 10% as black. The parishioners fall primarily into the mid-income (75%) 
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and high income brackets (15%), and 90% live between 3 and 6 kilometres from the church buildings. 
Ten first languages were represented, of which the three largest groupings included English (70%), 
Afrikaans, (10%), and Zulu (5%). Several black and European minority languages occur, including 
Tsonga (2%), Shangaan (1 %); while 3% comprise Italian and German. Coloured parishioners speak 
Afrikaans, Sotho, and Zulu, while the whites are English-speaking. Black parishioners are mostly Zulu-
and Sotho-speakers, with some Tswana- and English-speakers. Sermons are delivered in English, and 
hymns are sung in Sotho and Zulu. The liturgy is in English, but accommodates liturgical practices of 
black parishioners, such as styles of music, singing and dancing. Respondents indicate that "the 
Pastoral Council, Choir, and Liturgy Committee all actively promote diversity". 
Today the leadership and programmes are fully representative, althoug~ this was not the case from 
the start. In 1991 coloureds were nominated and elected on to the Parish Council. In 1993 a black was 
elected on to the six-person council. By 1996 the Council numbered thirteen, of whom six were 
female. The Liturgy Committee comprised two blacks (Sotho/Zulu) and three whites. Of the lay 
Ministers of the Eucharist six were black, one coloured, and one white. 
3.2.3 Rhema Bible Church, Randburg 
Rhema Bible Church was founded as an independent pentecostal-type congregation in Johannesburg 
by Ray McAuley in 1979. Rhema was a founder member of the International Federation of Christian 
Churches (lFCC), which with some 400 000 members forms one of the larger independent pentecostal 
church groupings in South Africa - not counting the African Indigenous Churches. By 1980 blacks had 
already started attending Rhema. 
By 1997 the largest service numbered 3 500 congregants, and three other Sunday services were also 
held. The two predominant languages were listed as Afrikaans (30%) and English (70%), presumably 
spoken by the 50% white, 10% coloured, and 5% Indian congregants. An estimated 65% of 
congregants had achieved Std 10 education or less. About 2 % of the congregants are from Zaire and 
Nigeria. 
The predQminant language in all services but one is English, including the Bible readings. The choice 
to conduct services in particular language is indirectly determined by the predominant role of Ray 
McAuley in conducting the services. According to his spokesperson, McAuley "cannot conduct a 
service in Afrikaans, and so from the start services were conducted in English" (Steele interview). 
The languages of the 35% black members are not listed in the returned survey, although a separate 
2 pm vernacular service is held to meet the needs of domestic servants in area. The language spoken 
is usually Sotho, with translation into Zulu; although this depends on the language of the preacher. 
This service is now maintained by demand, with its own forms of music. 
According to Rhema spokesperson Reverend Ron Steele, the leadership was nervous about starting 
the service, as it seemed to perpetuate "an apartheid style thing, a step back into the past". Yet "it 
came as a demand from the black people in the congregation and the white congregation. The white 
congregation said 'we have domestics servants, who knock off work on Sunday afternoons, they want 
to come, but we want them to work'. First we said 'then you have to give them off work'. Then the 
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request from the black people came through the black pastor, they said that they were finding it 
difficult to follow the services, can we have an afternoon service, because we have to work on Sunday 
morning. Now we have 50 to 60 people in one of the halls, and get up to 700 people in one afternoon" 
(Steele interview). 
The integration of leadership structures happened "four to five years ago". Steele said that "we felt 
that we must identify black leadership, because of the changing nature of the congregation. We have 
always been racially mixed, but felt that with the whole change in South Africa there would be a move 
from traditionally black areas of people who want to escape and to lift themselves up, and that we 
have to be geared towards them in leadership. But in the church you cannot apply affirmative action 
as in business, you cannot hire and fire and manipulate. But we do have a definite policy now that the 
next pastor we will appoint is going to be black. Our black pastors are from [traditionally segregated] 
areas such as Alexandra, where we built a community centre, as well as Soweto and Eldorado Park" 
(Steele interview). 
Rhema's leadership structures consist of an advisory board, appointed by Pastor Ray McAuley. Of 
twelve people on the Board, two are black, ten white. The Board meet on a weekly basis with fifteen 
department heads. In addition the congregation is served by a pastoral staff of twenty-three pastors, 
of whom three are black, three coloured, and three women. Three pastors also serve on the Board. 
3.3 Congregations that rate as linguistically well-integrated 
As indicated in Table 13, 11.3% of congregations (6 out of 53) can be placed in this category, 
including 5.3% Anglican, 21.1 % Catholic, and none of the Methodist or IFCC congregations. 
3.3.1 St Peter's Anglican Church, Tzaneen 
St Peter's Anglican Church in Tzaneen in the northeastern province of Mapumalanga is located in the 
Letaba parish, one of the poorer Anglican parishes in the Diocese of St Mark. St Peter's is considered 
Mother church to the 12 congregations in the Letaba Parish, which encompass an area of some 1 900 
km around Tzaneen as centre point. Twelve people served on the general parish council, with each 
congregation electing its representative. Seven of the twelve are black, excluding the two black clergy, 
with the three white clergy completing the total. 
The greater Letaba area has been "multiplied" (divided) into two parishes, one with four congregations, 
the other with 8, and a third section is being established. Most of the outlying congregations are 
considered chapelries, who do not have their own clergy. The two town congregations are more 
multiracial than the outlying ones. Three of the congregations in the parish include relatively large 
Indian and Sri Lankan components. Black professionals have started moving into Tzaneen to the extent 
that housing is now hard to come by. Many black Anglicans now live in town, although few have 
become members at St Peter's, according to the main priest, Rev Lionel Whatley. 
In 1993 a diocesan planning conference was held which tried to anticipate future trends. Participants 
concluded that in 10 years time 70% of those living in the area would be under the age of 35 and 
black. At the time the diocese was not representative of the black population, "and was still 
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functioning along apartheid lines". So in order to have credibility, "we had to mix" (Whatley interview). 
A strategic plan was worked out in line with what the diocese would look like in 5 and 10 years' time, 
and staff appointments made accordingly. The first goal was to appoint a Sepedi-speaking priest. The 
next was to appoint a counsellor to help with the large amount of trauma which people experienced 
during the transition from apartheid. A woman was found to fulfil this position. A third goal was to 
integrate people into cell groups and bible studies. A fourth goal was to employ a person to work with 
youth - preferably a black woman. 
When Whatley arrived in 1993, the hymns were taken from the traditional Anglican hymnal, "Hymns 
ancient and modern". He has since brought in drums and guitars and flutes. "In the family service we 
try all kinds of things - using indigenous symbols, marimbas and shakers" (Whatley interview). These 
changes are confined to that service. Normal services at St Peter's are conducted according to the 
prayer book liturgy, with the hymns a mix of old and new, including Sepedi. 
In 1993 St Peter's was attended by well-educated and relatively prosperous whites. The decision to 
change in order to reflect society led to the loss of about half the leaders at St Peter's. During 1994 
blacks started moving into Tzaneen, and were encouraged to attend. A priest with experience in the 
multicultural parishes of St John's and St Margaret's in Singapore was invited to spend two years at 
St Peter's. He helped with mission outreach (to e.g. refugee camps), home groups, and specifically 
with integration strategies. The Singapore diocese helped financially in this scheme. The integration 
process still relies on various activities - including prayer - to draw people in. Two black Sepedi priests 
were appointed in 1994. Due to their own educational backgrounds, they tended to attract well-
educated blacks in turn. As a result there is some struggle to attract lesser-educated blacks, such as 
the labourers from nearby farms. 
The largest average service in St Peter's congregation in 1997 attracted some 126 people, including 
coloureds (3%), blacks (23%), Asians (2%), and whites (72%). Some 180-190 families were on the 
membership rolls of the congregation. The survey estimated that 70% of parishioners were 
professionals who belong to the middle income group, with a further 20% placing in the upper income 
bracket. Of these 45% was believed to have university degrees, and a further 20% another form of 
tertiary education. 
Parishio,ners included English-, Sepedi-, Setswana-, Shangaan-, and Tsonga-speakers, as well as 2% 
from Zaire, Kenya, and Uganda. Many of those from other African states were professionals, such as 
doctors. At St Peter's about 8% of the congregation was Afrikaans-speaking, 60% English-, 20% 
Sepedi-speaking, while 6 % spoke other African and 2 % Asian languages. The diversity has no relation 
to the neighbourhood around the church buildings, which remained predominantly white. While about 
a third of parishioners lived within walking distance from the church buildings, 40% came from further 
than 7 kilometres away. 
By 1 996 there were two Sepedi-speaking priests in the parish - a younger man who has been there 
for two years, and one who had been a priest for 12 years. Until two years ago the norm in the parish 
was for Sepedi clergy to look after Sepedi parishioners, while whites looked after whites. Whatley was 
trying to attract more Sepedi-speakers and other blacks into the Tzaneen congregation. He insisted that 
blacks be involved up front, in manning a welcoming desk, in teaching in the Sunday school, and in 
taking part in plays. Whatley spoke of consciously "trying to put blacks in, to try and create a visual 
[black] presence in church" (Whatley interview). In 1997 there were two white English- and two black 
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Sepedi-speaking clergy at St Peter's, alongside a woman deacon. When Whatley was away on leave 
in England for six months, black Sepedi priest Lazaruz Mokobake was in charge. This caused "a few 
hiccups, but by and large things went well" (Whatley interview). About 2% of the congregation left, 
but a number have since come back. Three of the four lay ministers are white, and one black (Sepedi). 
Regular parish get-togethers are held once every quarter "to see whether we are still on track". 
Whatley worries that "there is not enough lay leadership - the Sepedis [parishioners] expect their 
minister to do everything" (Whatley interview). During the service at these get-togethers three 
languages are used from Anglican prayer book, including English, Sepedi, and Afrikaans. These 
occasions are divided into the different languages, yet is conducted mostly in English. 
3.3.2 St Joseph's Catholic Church, Howick 
Howick is a small, middle-class town, populated mostly by white, retired English-speakers, which is 
situated in South Africa's eastern province of KwaZulu-Natal. Although a small black township exists 
nearby, and Howick has Indian and working-class coloured areas, there were always a small number 
of blacks and whites living in the town. 
St Joseph's Catholic Church was founded in 1914, "mainly as a mission to coloured and black people 
with only very few whites - as the town grew, more whites [attended] so the membership changed" 
(comment from survey). St Joseph's has been integrated "since the beginning", but more so since 
about 1986. The church buildings are on land previously occupied by coloureds, who were forceably 
moved out. By 1997 the neighbourhood around the church buildings was not racially mixed, and about 
70% of the congregants lived between 1 and 2 kilometres away. Presently the church is part of the 
Archdiocese of Durban. 
In 1997 St Joseph's largest service was attended by 200 parishioners, made up of 40% black, 25% 
white, 25 % coloured, and 10% Indian parishioners. An estimated 50% of the congregation worked 
in low status occupations, and 10% in high status positions. In terms of employment about 20% was 
retired people. The income of 65% of the congregation fell in the low income, as did 5% in the high 
income brackets. While 60% of the congregation was English-speaking, only 25% was white 
parishioners. Some 10% of the congregation was former Zimbabweans, and 10% British. Coloureds 
(25%) and Indians (10%) made up the rest of the English-speakers. Zulu-speakers made up 40% of 
the congregation. 
Integrated services had been held since 1986. A typical service would include an Old Testament 
reading in English, one Gospel reading in English and one in Zulu. The sermon was delivered in English, 
but interpreted in Zulu. Half of the eucharistic prayers were conducted in English, half in Zulu. The 
choir was integrated, and sang English-language hymns accompanied by the organ, and Zulu songs 
without accompaniment. Originally a segregated service was held once a month for Zulu-speakers, but 
this was no longer the case. But Zulu services were held on Good Friday. The daily liturgy was said 
in English, "but open to and attended by all groups", according to a respondent. 
Seating remains segregated involuntarily, with whites sitting mostly on one side, and blacks on the 
other. In opposition to the integration process a few whites left for another parish, "where they can 
have only English liturgy". Small faith groups were not integrated, .but separated into language and 
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neighbourhood groups. There were both blacks and whites on the parish council. "We have to make 
sure of wide representation on parish council and we try to make sure that all sections are involved -
but it goes more by feel than by structure", a respondent commented. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE DOMINANCE OF ENGLISH IN RACIALLY-DIVERSE 
CONGREGATIONS 
The data presented so far shows that while most congregations were fairly linguistically diverse (in 
terms of number of first language spoken by congregants), few reflected this diversity in their services. 
In terms of the services themselves, the lack of linguistic incorporation is visible in two ways: (a) the 
number of languages included in the specific parts of the service (e.g. sermons, readings) as measured 
by a linguistic integration index which is used to characterise the services as (b) either monolingual, 
bilingual, or multilingual. When compared, the racial and language indices developed show that far 
more congregations are racially well-integrated (54.9%) than are linguistically so (11.3%). 
Some of the major trends noted include: 
a. most congregations exhibit some form of linguistic diversity, but with low levels of 
multilingualism; 
b. most congregations prefer monolingual sermons; 
c. linguistic diversity tends to be expressed in the form of bilingualism; 
d. English predominates as language of choice in multilingual settings; 
e. integrating congregations are associated with neighbourhoods with high levels of diversity 
The extent to which external factors (linguistic diversity in the neighbourhood) or internal elements 
(proportion of English-speakers, race) are most likely to contribute to this condition varies. There does 
not seem to be any direct relationship between any of these factors and the levels of linguistic or racial 
diversity or integration. Most congregations do occur in racially diverse neighbourhoods, and many 
were affected by post-apartheid demographic shifts. Yet in several instances there appears to be no 
direct relationship between levels of diversity within the congregations and levels of linguistic or racial 
integration. A high number of Zulu-speakers in a congregation may correspond to a racially diverse 
neighbourhood but not necessarily so. Nor do their presence necessarily translate into the inclusion 
of Zulu in the service. The limited utility of such "narrowband" explanations again points at factors that 
operate beyond the local. 
The dominance of English can be explained with reference to majoritarian, racial, and pragmatic 
strategies employed by congregations, which overlap with language ideology to render congregations 
monolingual. While theorizing in terms of such strategies allows agency to be stressed, the point 
remains that they are exercised within broader global structures, norms and values. I return to a fuller 
exposition of this argument in the final chapter. 
A majoritarian outcome occurs where there is a linguistic majority which also comprises a racial 
majority, in a relatively linguistically homogenous neighbourhood. Like location, size of the 
congregation is also important; where language and race overlap, the size of the congregation would 
determine at what point the minority groups become visible and heard. A group of 10% in a 
congregation of 100 is less likely to make an impact than in one of 1 000, due to factors such as the 
enhanced symbolic effect of larger numbers. A few examples of majoritarian outcomes which occur 
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in the overall sample include English-, Zulu-, and Afrikaans-congregations (but exclude the seven 
congregations mentioned above). Damesfontein Catholic church is a Zulu-speaking congregation, with 
a separate English-language Mass. Most of the 90 congregants are black (94%); and the church is 
located in a rural Zulu-speaking area in northern KwaZulu-Natal. At Carrington St Methodist church, 
English dominates despite its 27% black congregants, due to the 63% white and 70% English-
speaking component among its 60-strong members. 
A racial strategy is in some senses the reverse of the majoritarian result; the outcome is determined 
by the language spoken by a minority group, which also happens to be a smaller racial group (usually 
white congregants) - regardless of the proportions of other race groups or number of other languages. 
Size and location (rural) also playa role. The most striking example is St Mark's Chapelry, a small rural 
congregation (average attendance 20) with a 70% black component, although a puzzling 75% was 
reported as speaking African languages: 60% Venda and 15% "Other African". English-speaking 
whites number only 20%. A similar situation existed at Sacred Heart Catholic Church, where an 
English-speaking Indian minority (25%) still manages to determine language usage in the services to 
the extent that English and Zulu have equal status - despite the 70% Zulu-speaking majority in a 
congregation that averages 500 parishioners per service. To the extent that those of Indian descent 
could also exhibit higher education levels than their fellow parishioners, Sacred Heart can serve as 
another example of the impact of the global value of English on local language options. In this case, 
the mechanism could be the status conferred by formal education8 • 
Pragmatic strategies occur where the number of first language speakers and racial proportions are 
relatively evenly divided. At Sacred Heart Cathedral in Pretoria four services were held predominantly 
in English, except for the 4 pm Mass for black workers in both Tswana and English. The priest 
explained that the two morning services "have many minorities", including 35% European languages 
(e.g. Portuguese and Italian) as well as blacks from different languages (Pedi 15%, Sotho 10%, 
Tswana 10%). Subsequently English was regarded as "the common denominator" - yet only 20% of 
the congregation spoke English as first language. The English Masses did include some aspects of 
African worship, namely an offertory procession, dancing and swaying to African music, and clapping 
hands during the hymns. The decision to have the services in English may have come from the Parish 
Council. Pragmatic considerations were also undoubtedly influenced by language ideologies, as evident 
by the reference to English as common denominator. 
In conclusion, Chapter Four indicated that in most congregations English is the language of preference, 
apparently of all race groups, in almost two-thirds of the cases surveyed. The question whether this 
language dominance is domain-specific or unique to South Africa will be examined in Chapter Five by 
reference to other local domains (education, state departments) and to official language practice in 
other African states. The point of this chapter is to ask, in Sherlock Holmes' famous words, why the 
dog did not bark. The silence by non-English language speakers about the dominance of English can 
partly be explained by the presence of high percentages of white English-speakers, yet also points to 
a collusion by non-English speakers in a form of linguistic self-subjugation. The reasons for their 
collaboration is found at the state level in the agenda of nation-building which I trace in Chapter Five, 
which is related in the structures of the world system, as I argue in Chapter Six. 
8. I am grateful to John Bali for pointing this out. 
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Chapter Outline 
- CHAPTER FIVE -
LANGUAGE DIVERSITY, IDEOLOGY AND 
NATION-BUILDING IN PERIPHERAL AFRICA 
As indicated in Chapter One, Chapter Five will show how language usage in Africa can be understood 
in terms of state attitudes towards nation-building on the continent, influenced by trends favouring the 
usage of English in the global arena. The ultimate point I want to make, with reference to my unit of 
analysis, is that language usage in congregations reflects the interplay between state and popular 
ideologies in establishing relations between different groups in the society at large, through the 
development of formal language policies and formal/informal ideologies. I also argue that the 
dominance of the English language in most of Africa (increasingly so even in non-English countries) 
should be explained by reference to the regional effects of pressures at work in the global arena. 
The discussion in this chapter is situated within the three geo-political contexts which affect South 
Africa more or less directly: the local (South Africa), regional (Southern and Sub-Saharan Africa), and 
the global contexts. Although I emphasise language in relation to the nation state, I do so with 
reference to "regional or global considerations that are steadily growing in significance" (Fardon & 
Furniss 1994: 16). By drawing attention to all three contexts, I wish to demonstrate how the local 
language situation is not only similar to what obtains in the rest of Africa, but also how the global 
system (see Wallerstein, Robertson), affects both the regional and local patterns of linguistic 
behaviour. While I am more interested in outlining similarities with the South African case, I will 
indicate where differences do occur. 
The sections of this chapter deal with language diversity in relation to state policies and ideologies in 
sub-Saharan Africa, Southern Africa and South Africa. I introduce cases studies of former British 
colonies, representing West Africa (Nigeria), East Africa (Kenya), and Southern Africa (Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Malawi, Botswana, Swaziland). Nigeria and Kenya were selected as the largest states in 
their regions which, like the selected Southern African countries, opted for English as language of 
wider communication. Where relevant, I refer to examples from non-English African countries (e.g. 
Mozambique, Benin), and non-African countries (e.g. India). References to the latter will be limited, 
because "particular care has to be exercised when choosing examples from elsewhere (e.g. India or 
Melanesia)" as the combination of circumstances affecting language use in Africa "has been 
particularly closeknit and visible" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:4). 
In such a discussion, attention to the education domain is essential as the primary system through 
which languages are acquired, because "what happens to languages in the domain of education is 
129 
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directly related to their fate in all other domains" (Goke-Pariola 1993:96; cf. Tollefson 1991). 
Education is central to debates about language due to its close relation to "assessments of the balance 
between the number of speakers using a language as mother tongue [i.e. within homogenous groups] 
and those using it as a lingua franca [i.e. between different ethnic groups]" (Fardon & Furniss 
1994:21). Yet from a bottom-up discursive perspective neither mother tongue nor lingua franca is "the 
objectively bounded entities these usages suggest" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:21). 
In relation to the preceding and successive chapter, this chapter has two overarching goals. First, to 
provide empirical support from case studies in the African region for the argument that the dominance 
of European languages (and in particular English) in Sub-saharan Africa results from institutional 
isomorphism between core and peripheral states. Second, to present empirical evidence for the 
argument that English dominance in religious institutions converge with similar practices and policies 
in state-controlled and semi-controlled institutions; for instance, state departments and schools. In 
other words, institutional isomorphism is visible not only within states, but across the various 
institutions within a particular society. 
Chapter Five also serves to link forwards to Chapter Six and backwards to Chapters Two and Four. 
Several themes from preceding chapters are returned to, and consequently there is some overlap with 
other chapters. For example, I re-introduce nation-building, which was first discussed in Chapter Two, 
at the same time extending the conclusions reached in Chapter Four to the regional level. Arguments 
presented here are in turn brought to a head in Chapter Six. The similarity in outline between Chapters 
Four and Five is deliberate, suggesting that diversity and integration are as much features of states as 
of congregations. In nation-building integration is achieved through ideologies which operate as much 
within policies as outside policies; or in the absence of policies. Similarly, the structuring of language 
practice in congregations is the outcome of submerged language ideologies. 
1 . LANGUAGE DIVERSITY & NATION-BUILDING IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
1.1 Language diversity in Africa 
, 
At the state level most of Africa's 54 countries Gan be defined as multilingual due to the cornucopia 
of languages which exists in the continent. So, for instance, over 400 indigenous languages occur in 
Nigeria, about 100 in Tanzania, and less than 100 in South Africa (Goke-Pariola 1993: 19). At the 
individual level multilingualism is also the African norm to a large degree. For example, in Benin 50% 
of the population speak 4 languages; 30% five; 30% six; and 10% seven or eight (Igue & N'oueni 
1994:58). One of Africa's most linguistically complex regions stretches from Senegal to Ethiopia - an 
area which includes Nigeria (Elugbe 1994:62). In the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa only ten states are 
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almost entirely monolingual (Bamgbose 1991). With reference to the rest of Africa, South Africa has 
a medium level of language and ethnic diversity. 
The multilingualism inherent in Africa implies that the multilingual citizen is "better integrated" than 
the monolingual one - contrary to current myths (Bamgbose 1994:34 quoting Kashoki' 1982:24; 
compare Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:72). In a multilingual context "an attitude which values the 
identity of the monolingual person higher than that of the bilingual or multilingual members of a 
community, is out of touch with the linguistic reality of the majority of the population of the world" 
(Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:72). "In multilingual countries integration into the national system 
cannot be measured by the ability to speak the official language of the state, but rather by the ability 
to communicate in several of its local languages" (Mansour 1 993: 1 27). 
Africa's multilingualism at the state and individual levels leads Laitin to the overstatement that Africa 
differs from other nation-states in that multilingualism is the norm (Laitin 1992:3; compare Fardon & 
Furniss 1994:4). Laitin misses an opportunity to point out that heterogeneity is the norm for most 
nation states outside Africa as well. Connor estimates that if homogeneity refers to nation-states in 
which one ethnic group makes up 90% of the population, then only 28% of 132 states are 
homogenous, while in 40% the population can be divided into at least five groups (Connor 19722 :320, 
referred to in 8amgbose 1994:38). Similarly De Swaan (1989) points out that "there may not be a 
single, entirely monolingual country in the world", as apart from Europe and the USA, "societal 
multilingualism is the rule rather than the exception". And "since interaction between speakers of 
different languages is inevitable in these countries also, many citizens are necessarily mUltilingual". 
Several schemas have been developed to describe the empirical language situation in Africa from 
above or below, focusing either on state policies or on existing language configurations. A "top-down" 
approach examines "from the perspective of the state" "the extremely large number of African 
languages, the enormous range in the numbers of their speakers (from a mere handful to m~ny 
millions), the poor correlation between the frontiers of speech communities and the boundaries of 
African nation states, and the important role of European languages, pidgins and of Arabic in particular 
functional or sectoral usages". The bottom-up view emphasises "the very high degree of 
multilingualism common in most of sub-Saharan Africa ... multilingualism is the African lingua franca" 
(Fardon & Furniss 1994:4). 
In what follows below I review three schemas before returning in the next section to Laitin's general 
, Kashoki, M 1982. Language policies and practices in independent black Africa: trends and prospects, in A Olabimtan 
(ed) African universities and the development and wider use of African languages. Lagos: UNESCO. 
2. Connor, W 1972. Nation building or nation destroying? World Politics 24:320. 
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suggestions as outlined in Chapter Two. Kaschula & Anthonissen's schema combines endoglossic and 
exoglossic distinctions with attention to whether the state actively or inactively pursues language 
policies. Bamgbose opts for two simpler schemas which evaluate, on the one hand, whether languages 
are dominant or non-dominant; and on the other, whether one or more languages are accorded official 
status. 
Following Kaschula & Anthonissen (1995), the African continent can be divided into either endoglossic 
states which actively encourage indigenous languages as national languages; or, exoglossic states, 
which inactively promote European languages. Most states are exoglossic, e.g. Uganda, where English 
is the national language, although 25 minority languages exist. In these, the European languages are 
usually spoken by a small elite, "fewer than 20 per cent" (Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995: 1 02,103). 
Endoglossic states include "Tanzania (Swahili), Somalia (Somali), Ethiopia (Amharic), Sudan (Arabic), 
and Guinea". (with eight languages, e.g. Fula, Manding). Other states which have indigenous languages 
but which do not actively promote their use include "Botswana (Tswana), Burundi (Rundi), Lesotho 
(Sotho), Malawi (Chewa), Rwanda (Kinyarwanda), and· Swaziland (siSwati)" . As eight of South Africa's 
11 national languages are indigenous, she can be said to officially pursue "a largely endoglossic 
approach" (Kaschula & Anthonissen 1 995: 1 02). I would add two qualifications to this characterisation: 
(a) an inactive policy does not necessarily mean that no sanctions are applied to non-speakers, as 
several examples below demonstrate (e.g. Van Binsbergen 1994); (b) whether active or not, in the end 
often a European language is also promoted (e.g. in Malawi). 
Bamgbose shuns endolexoglossic distinctions in favour of a division of sub-Saharan African states 
based on a dominant/non-dominant distinction (all states not included): 
, " 
1. States with a predominant language spoken by 90% of the population: Burundi, Lesotho, Somalia, 
Madagascar, Botswana, Seychelles, Rwanda, Mauritius, Swaziland; 
2. States with a predominant language spoken by less than 90% of the population: Tanzania, Mali, 
Senegal, Ghana, Central African Republic, Niger, Togo, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Gambia, Equatorial Guinea, 
Mauritania, Burkina Faso; 
3. States with more than one dominant language: Nigeria (Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo), Zaire (Lingala, 
Kikongo), Zambia (Bemba, Nyanya, Tonga), Sudan (Arabic, Dinka), Kenya (Swahili, Kikuyu, Luo), 
Ethiopia (Amharic, Oromo, Tigrinya), Angola (Umbumbu, Kimbundu, Kikongo), Guinea (Fulfulde, 
Malinke, Susu), Guinea-Bissau (Balanta, Fulfulde); 
3. States with several non-dominant languages: Cameroon, Cote d'ivoire, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Benin. 
Bamgbose's second schema is based on state recognition of official languages as criterium, which 
results in two types of states: 
1. those with a sole official language, which can be (a) a language of wider communication 
(LWC), such as English, Portuguese, French, Spanish); (b) Arabic; or (c) a major African language; 
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2. those with joint officia//anguages, which can be (a) a LWC and another language (French & 
Arabic; English & major African language; French & major African language), or (b) a LWC and a LNC3 
(Bamgbose 1991 :30). 
When these two situations are combined, the distribution of official languages can be represented as 
in Table 18: 
Table 18: Distribution of official languages across 
African states, 1991 (N = 54) 
Language: 
African 
Arabic 
European: 
French 
English 
Portuguese 
Spanish ~ 
Source: Bamgbose 1991 :31. 
No. of 
states 
8 
4 
19 
17 
5 
1 
Notes: Total no of Countries = 45 Total no. of 
countries x no. of official languages = 54 
Bamgbose does not apply either of his constructs to South Africa, and apparently has a synchronic 
analysis in mind. In terms of his first schema South Africa would fit into the third division, as it has 
Zulu, Xhosa, and Ndebele as major non-dominant languages, followed closely by Afrikaans (Kaschula 
& Anthonissen 1995). If his second schema is followed, different outcomes will result depending on 
the period to which it is applied. Under apartheid South Africa would have resorted under 2 (b), but 
the current eleven-official-Ianguages policy would not fit in at all, requiring instead the creation of an 
additional third major category. 
There is some confusion between Bamgbose's concepts of "national" and "official" languages and 
those of other scholars. Bamgbose argues that "national language" refers to the status of an 
indigenous language (e.g. Swahili in Kenya); while an "official" language (e.g. English in Kenya) is used 
in state-influenced educational and administrative domains (Bamgbose 1991 :29; see Schmied 1996, 
3. 8amgbose included Cameroon, with French and English, under 2 (b) - I am uncertain why, as both are surely LWCs? 
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Van Binsbergen 1994 for similar usage). Because "a Language of Wider Communication is never called 
a national language" only official languages can be compared to one another (Bamgbose 1991 :30). 
On the other hand, Kaschula & Anthonissen speak of indigenous languages as national languages (see 
Alexander 1989, Maake 1994 for similar usage). 
As an object of debate in Africa, language "finds itself subjected to, usually incompatible, desires for 
purity, authenticity, modernity, Africanness, national usage, equality and statal identity. Meanwhile, 
language as practice develops as if it had a life of its own under the influences of the pursuit of wealth 
or political influence, or more neutrally communication and sociality" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:5-6: 
compare Parkin 1994:229). 
And the question concerning the role of English in Africa continues to elicit manifold debates, often 
focusing on either the elite or the general populace, sometimes using similar concepts to convey 
divergent meanings. Two such confusing concepts arise in the discussion on whether English fulfils 
vertical or horizontal functions. 
For David Gough, English in Africa fulfils a vertical function of "social access and mobility", by contrast 
to vernaculars which provide a horizontal function of "social solidarity" (Gough 1996:57). By contrast 
Jean Benjamin concludes that English "makes possible only horizontal integration" (Benjamin 
1994: 1 02). By this she means that the 10-1 5 % of educated elites from various language groups are 
incorporated into a single social structure, which excludes the majority (Benjamin 1994: 102; compare 
Bamgbose 1 991 : 1 8) . 
Benjamin maintains that vertical integration is "only possible through an African language", which 
would link "elites with the masses" and allow "the vast majority" access to "the social, economic, and 
political system" (Benjamin 1994: 1 02). In support Bamgbose (1991) argues that African states with 
an indigenous national language has higher rates of grassroots political participation (e.g. Tanzania) 
than those using English (e.g. Uganda) (compare Mansour 1993: 126). But, contra Benjamin, Bamgbose 
contends that vertical integration is possible by two routes through which education can either (a) take 
the LWC of the elites to the masses, or (b) to "build on a base" of "one or more indigenous languages" 
(Bamgbose 1991 :22). Bamgbose questions whether a LWC really unites the elites, "for, having used 
the language to unite to fight and win independence, they continue to use it for their ethnic and 
political rivalries and divisions" (Bamgbose 1991 :23). 
Katupha (1994) employs horizontal to refer to the use of related languages (i.e. within the same 
language family), and vertical to the use of unrelated languages. The confusion comes from the 
contrast between horizontal and vertical communication (apparently Gough's intention) as opposed to 
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integration (seemingly Benjamin's). Horizontal communication was described by Heine (1979)4 as 
being "essentially oral" indigenous languages, which are acquired voluntarily and spontaneously by the 
masses (Bamgbose 1991 :53). In vertical communication LWCs are typically used, acquired formally 
"as a result of prescription or incentives", and associated with the elites - and therefore with status"5 
(Bamgbose 1991 :54). 
1.2 Language and nation-building in Africa 
In Africa nation-building is an attempt to manage the diversity of post-colonial states while creating 
a single overarching national identity. Institution-building is a subset of this process (Goke-Pariola 
1993, Bamgbose 1991:10). For Goke-Pariola nation-building is driven by an ideology of nationism 
and/or nationalism. 
African states have in common an origin largely defined by the colonial experience, during which time 
bureaucratization was institutionalised (Goke-Pariola 1993: 19; Mansour 1993: 120; Bamgbose 
1991 :69). The colonial educational system aided colonial administrations by preparing a small number 
of Africans to carry out public service (Goke-Pariola 1993:99; compare Mamdani 1996, Laitin 1992). 
The language situation in each country also "reflects largely the colonial history", so that former 
colonial languages remain sole or joint official languages. For instance, Cameroon's twin official 
languages reflect a history in which the French administered the eastern part of the country, and the 
British the west (Bamgbose 1991 :31). 
In the pre-independence liberation movements language was largely a neglected issue. The claims that 
language played "a central role ... in the struggle for power and legitimacy between colonized Africans 
and the colonial powers" and that language played a significant role in the process of constructing 
African identities in response to historical pressures (Goke-Pariola 1993: 18, 19) seem unsubstantiated. 
The attitudes of post-independence leaders -like Uganda's Milton Obote, or Senegal's Leopold Senghor 
- mostly confirmed the choice for colonial languages (Mansour 1993: 121.). European languages were 
seen as the most neutral and so the most likely to contribute to national integration. This demonstrates 
how post-colonial African states had to wrestle with the contradiction of "nominal political 
4. Heine, B 1979. Vertical and horizontal communication, Journal of the Language Assocation of Eastern Nigeria, 4 
(1), pp. 106-119. 
5. For Bamgbose, Heine's distinctions are generally valid with the following exceptions: (a) "the elites and masses 
often share the same indigenous language"; (b) an indigenous major regional language may function to communicate 
vertically (instead of an LWC) where other minority languages are present; (c) two vertical languages can co-occur 
(Bamgbose 1991: 54). 
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independence alongside economic, cultural, and psychological dependency on the foreign cultures and 
powers" (Goke-Pariola 1993:98). 
In the post-colonial period "the inheritors of political power have used language not only as an 
instrument of state construction, but also to assert legitimacy". Language emerges "as an instrument 
in the negotiation of power between different groups of the elite class and ethnicities as well as by 
individuals in interpersonal relationships" (Goke-Pariola 1993:19). The goal of integration through 
European language cannot be said to have been reached, as statistics "suggest that education in the 
official language is more of a barrier to integration than an aid, and thus becomes a useful tool of social 
control in the hands of the elite" (Mansour 1993: 124). In fact, in post-independence states the 
education system has changed little in terms of curriculum, or language of instruction. 
As noted in the discussion of nation-building in South Africa, alternative visions of state formation or 
central roles for indigenous languages did exist, but were ignored or overruled. For instance, the 
All-African People's Conference6 called in 1958 for post-independent nations to be shaped in terms 
of linguistic affiliation instead of arbitrary colonial boundaries (Mansour 1993: 119, 133). The 
Pan-African Union of Writers' suggested in the same year that a single African language be adopted 
across Sub-Saharan Africa, but failed to reach consensus to specify which one (Mansour 1993: 119). 
Attempts at regional co-operation, such as the East African Community (EAC)' formed between 
1967-77 by Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda, held out the hope of smaller-scale alternate language 
policies. But despite the ability of 90% of the Tanzanian population, 65% of the Kenyan and 35% of 
the Ugandan populations to speak Swahili, the EAC failed to establish this language as a regional 
lingua franca (Mansour 1993:123). Subsequently the task of promoting African languages in e.g. 
education passed to UNESCO and its African branch BREDA (Mansour 1993: 122). 
Discourse among elites often reveals an ambivalent attitude towards African languages. On the one 
hand there is a sense of pride in the number of African languages, which is in policy documents 
"countermanded by dictates of national integration and efficiency" due to the ongoing hegemonic 
influence of European 19th century "notions of the nation state as the embodiment of a unitary people, 
culture, and language" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:5; Bamgbose 1991:16; Mansour 1993:123). The 
nation-state model "is alien to most pre-colonial African contexts", which were multilingual and 
multiethnic, so that political power "was not ethnically marked" and "language boundaries were more 
fluid" (Van Binsbergen 1994: 169). 
Where national language debates continue, they tend to be either status quo, radical, or gra~ualist in 
approach (Bamgbose 1991 :31-3). Status quo approaches tend to favour nationism, and to promote 
6. The AAPC comprised Ghana, Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Ethiopia, and Liberia (Mansour 1993: 133). 
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L WCs as an official language - although no African state has proclaimed an L WC as national language 
(Bamgbose 1991 :32). The radical approach mobilizes for the recognition of an African language as 
national language and so favours nationalism. "The radical approach is not feasible in most African 
countries. For it to succeed, the language chosen must be ... already widely spoken ... there must be 
the political will and mobilization of the people to support the policy; and there must be a strong or 
revolutionary government to give the necessary impetus and backing to the formulation and 
implementation" (Bamgbose 1991 :33). The radical approach worked only in the cases of Tanzania 
(1961) and Somali (1972). The gradualist approach - which attempts to compromise by adopting a 
LWC for officiai and nationist functions, and an indigenous national language for authenticity under 
guise of seeking an indigenous national language - has been adopted by most African states. 
The founding of the Organisation for African Unity (GAU) in 1963 seemed finally to close the door on 
alternatives to colonial forms of state and language. This follows on the ~AU' s acceptance of 
"non-interference in the integral affairs of states" (Mansour 1993: 122). The OAU's adoption of French 
and English as working languages also sent a signal about member states' stance towards indigenous 
languages. Similar support for former colonial languages was conveyed within regional organisations 
such as OCAM, or within the OMVG and OMVS organizations for "countries which share the Gambia 
and Senegal rivers" (Mansour 1993: 130, 123). 
Not until 1987 did the OAU promote an alternate position supporting indigenous languages. The OAU 
Council of Ministers which met during that year in Addis Ababa brought out A Language Plan of Action 
for Africa, an overall language policy for African states (Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995: 1 01). In Part 
1 of the Plan the use of African languages to replace European languages in official communication, 
and in the education systems of each state, is encouraged - as is the recognition of all indigenous 
languages in each state (Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995: 101). 
Although individuals have rallied to the cause, implementation of "the plan seems generally to lack 
political will", and "itself has not even been translated into any African language" (Kaschula & 
Anthonissen 1995:99). Bamgbose's threefold distinction between radical, status quo, and gradualist 
language approaches helps to explain why such radical approaches are always suggested, but never 
implemented. European languages have in fact become so institutionalised that when Anglophone and 
Francophone African countries meet they use translators, even where participants share a common 
African language (Mansour 1993:130). 
To return to the issue of languages of instruction raised in the OAU's Language Plan, why do African 
states follow colonial practices in education? Bamgbose (1991) notes the existence of several 
constraints which make changes to the status quo unlikely. Yet what exactly the status quo is depends 
on who the former colonial power was. Former French and Portuguese colonies do not implement 
indigenous languages, while former British colonies do (Bamgbose 1991 :70). Changing the status quo 
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has been attempted in Somalia and Tanzania, but generally are constrained by historical, 
sociolinguistic, sociocultural, economic, pedagogical and political factors (Bamgbose 1991: 71-80): 
a. the historical constraint consists of the embedded ness of colonial practices, which undermined the 
function of African languages to convey science and technology; 
b. the sociolinguistic constraint entails language status, number of speakers, "and state of language 
development" - all of which determine whether a language is used in education (Bamgbose 1991 : 71); 
c. the sociocultural constraint involves the desire to preserve cultures (whether in the form of teaching 
language as a subject or as medium of instruction), which is often outweighed by the need to learn 
a LWC (Bamgbose 1991 :73); 
d. the economic constraint refers to the cost of implementing education in several languages - an 
argument which ignores the economic benefits of such a move (Bamgbose 1991 :74); 
e. the pedagogical constraint refers to "the conditions and facilities for teaching languages", which 
affect the effectiveness and availability of teachers in particularly minority languages (Bamgbose 
1991 :79); 
f. the political constraint is manifested on the one hand in a reluctance by the state to change existing 
policies and to pay lip-service to the implementation of indigenous languages; and on the other hand 
in the tendency of state leaders to promote their own languages (Bamgbose 1991 :79; Mansour 
1993:122). 
Laitin (1992: 18) elaborates on the political constraint when he argues that where nation-building in 
Africa is accompanied by state rationalization of language ("territorial specification of a common 
language for purposes of efficient administration and rule") one of three language outcomes is possible: 
mono-lingualism, bi-lingualism, or a combination of bi-/multi-Iingualism: 
a. the mono-lingualism of language rationalization is under way in Somalia, Tanzania, Botswana, 
Swaziland, Lesotho, Rwanda, Burundi, and Malagasy (Laitin 1992:18); 
b. the bi-lingualism of the two-language outcome seems to be developing in South Africa, Angola, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Togo, Morocco, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe (Laitin 1992:19). Here, "citizens 
maintain their own vernaculars but communicate with citizens who speak other vernaculars through 
a common international language [often in the form of a local variant or dialect]. No indigenous 
language is promoted by this state to serve as a lingua franca" (Laitin 1992:19); 
c. the bi-or-multi-lingualism of the "three-plus-or-minus-one" outcome is likely in Nigeria7 , Zaire, 
Kenya, and Ethiopia, with a similar process operating in Ghana, Senegal, Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
Mali, Malawi, Gabon, Chad, Benin, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Zambia (Laitin 1992:18-19). In this 
outcome, citizens will typically need a repertoire comprising: "their vernacular (their primary language) 
... the language in which they receive their elementary education"; "an African lingua franca, usually 
7. While appreciative of Laitin, Goke-Pariola does not agree with the former's suggestion that Nigeria is heading for 
a three-plus-one language outcome. Instead, based on his observations of the education system, Goke-Pariola suggests 
that a diglossic situation has developed (Goke-Pariola 1993: 1 05). 
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promoted by a class of nationalist politicians ... for extralocal communication . _. often taught as a 
compulsory subject in public school"; "the language of colonial contact ... as a means of international 
communication" and "as a key to business and technical communication" (Laitin 1992: 18). 
For citizens whose vernacular is the same as the former colonial lingua franca, the 
"three-plus-or-minus-one" repertoire requires only two languages (3-1); while those speaking a 
vernacular different from the regional language will have to learn four languages (3 + 1). Laitin argues 
that the "three-plus/minus-one" outcome will be the African norm, where "citizens seeking 
occupational mobility and middle-class urban opportunities" will use the language of colonial contact. 
Yet he does not believe that this outcome has been institutionalized in Africa (Laitin 1992: 18)_ 
Table 19: Effects of state rationalisation in nation-building on different language 
situations 
Language 
situation: 
Direction of state policy/practice: 
One predominant 
language, native 
to more than 
90% 
Mono-lingualism 
Botswana, Swaziland, 
Lesotho, Burundi, 
Rwanda, Madagascar, 
Somalia 
One predominant Tanzania 
language, native 
to less than 90% 
More than one 
dominant 
language 
More than one 
non-dominant 
language 
Namibia 
Source: Bamgbose (1991), Laitin (1992). 
Bi-lingualism 
Togo, Zimbabwe 
South Africa 
Angola 
Bi-or-multi-
lingualism 
Malawi 
Mali, Senegal, 
Ghana, Burkina 
Faso, Niger 
Zambia, Kenya, 
Nigeria 
Zaire, Ethiopia 
Sierra Leone, 
Benin, Liberia 
Laitin and Bamgbose's suggestions are combined in Table 19 above, which sets the eight countries 
selected as case studies in regional context. Gaps occur as Laitin did not include all African states in 
his schema. Table 19 raises several questions, relating in particular to Laitin's work: regarding the 
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divergent trajectories indicated for states in Southern Africa, the weakness of his last category, and 
lastly whether any relationships between national and organizational configurations of language. I will 
address the first two issues here, and reserve discussion of the latter for the final chapter. 
If the Southern African region is regarded as a periphery to South Africa's semi-periphery, and if it is 
relatively integrated economically, then one would expect similar language outcomes to develop, not 
least because of their shared British past - excluding the Lusophone states. The onus is on Laitin to 
provide grounds for placing, say, Lesotho and South Africa in different categories. I reverse Laitin's 
classification of Southern African countries and provide justification for it in the next section. 
2. LANGUAGE IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Section 1 delineates the language situation within which the congregations described in Chapter Four 
are embedded and by which congregants are directly influenced. Section 2 provides insight into how 
the language ideology which supports English at the elite and popular level was historically created and 
reproduced. I also use empirical data from recent studies of state and education institutions to indicate 
the present language situation, and to provide cross-domain support for the legitimacy of the 
conclusions of Chapter Four. 
2.1 The current language configuration in South Africa 
2.1.1 Spatial distribution of languages in South Africa 
A great deal of work has been done on language distribution in South Africa as well as on attitudes 
towards language which indicate language status (compare respectively Du Preez 1987; Desai 1994; 
see Popenoe e.a. 1997:29 as well as Webb 1992; De Klerk 1996a; De Klerk & Bosch 1993, 1995; 
Gough 1996). Others have examined language policy (Alexander 1989; Brown 1992; Wright 1993; 
Reagan 1986, 1995; Benjamin 1994; Maake 1994; Heugh 1995; Hartshorne 1995) and language 
planning (Alexander 1992; McLean 1992; Makoni 1995; Webb 1995). Studies of individual language 
preferences have often focused on universities, e.g. De Klerk's 1996 study of Rhodes students and 
Prah's 1993 study of six Southern African universities (including the predominantly black Universities 
of the Transkei and of the Western Cape). Studies of the general public have been conducted by the 
Human Sciences Research Council (e.g. Schuring 1979), the South African Broadcasting Corporation 
(see Gough 1996:55), and the Institute for a Democratic South Africa (unpublished 1997). Language 
policy and practice in schools have also come under scrutiny, most recently in David Brown's study 
of choice of languages of learning in Natal (Brown 1998). 
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More than 23 languages are spoken in South Africa, which can be subdivided into seven groupings 
(percentage of the total distribution of the eleven official languages in brackets) (Desai 1994:26; 
Popenoe e.a. 1997:29): 
a. Nguni languages: Zulu (22%)' Xhosa (17%), Ndebele (16%), Swati (2.6%) ; 
b. Sotho languages: North Sotho (9.7%), South Sotho (6.7%), Tswana (8.6%); 
c. Tsonga (4.4%); 
d. Venda (2.2%); 
e. European languages and derivatives: Afrikaans (15%), English (9%), and small percentages of 
Dutch, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, French; 
f. Asian languages: Tamil, Hindi, Telegu, Gujerati, Urdu, Chinese; 
g. Other (e.g. Hebrew). 
Table 20: Spatial coverage of dominant languages, 1991 
Dominant Percentage area per province 
language 
NP NW GT MP NC OFS KIN EC WC 
isiZulu 21.2 40.2 9.4 91.1 
Afrikaans 10.6 29.4 13.5 95.9 14.2 25.9 99.4 
Sesotho 
sa Leboa 53.4 22.3 22.3 
English 2.8 4.5 0.3 
isiXhosa 6.3 1.5 2.1 4.4 74.1 0.3 
Sesotho 5.4 65.0 
Xitsonga 5.4 
Setswana 8.9 100 12.7 0.9 2.6 9.3 
siSwati 22.2 
isiNdebele 1.8 
Tshivenda 21.5 7 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: 1995. Language in South Africa. Bellville: IMSA. 
Legend: 
NP: Northern Province NW: North West GT: Gauteng 
MP: Mpumalanga NC: Northern Cape OFS: Orange Free State 
KIN: K waZulu/Natal EC: Eastern Cape WC: Western Cape 
South Africa exhibits "a high level of bilingualism and even multilingualism", reflecting "educational 
levels" as well as "extensive intergroup contact" (Reagan 1995:321). Yet in 1990 an Human Sciences 
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Research Council survey found that 43 % of all South Africans cannot speak English or Afrikaans, while 
only 7.5% of non-blacks can speak an African language (Desai 1994:21). 
The 1991 dominant home language distribution pattern "reveals very little change over the intervening 
eleven years since the 1980 census. It is clear that each individual language dominates a separate and 
clearly identifiable area in South Africa" (Language in South Africa 1995). Zulu dominate in KwaZulu-
Natal, and Afrikaans in the Northern Cape, and Xhosa in the former Ciskei and Transkei regions 
(compare Desai 1994:21). Three African languages (Zulu, Xhosa, Swazi) "constitute 68% of the 
population" (Maake 1994: 112). And three languages are used specifically for religious purposes, 
namely Arabic, Sanskrit, and Hebrew (Reagan 1995:321). 
Table 20 above demonstrates the spatial coverage of each language across the nine provinces. The 
data should be treated as general indications due to difficulties with censuses, as well as with 
questions regarding language. 
2.1.2 Relative status of different languages in South Africa 
During the colonial period "colonial bilingualism" prevailed in South Africa, in which "vernaculars are 
undervalued in relation to the colonial language" (Gough 1996:57; Brown 1992:86 prefers 
trilingualism). During apartheid language was also used "to maintain relations of dominance" of Whites 
over those classified as not White (Benjamin 1994:97). Studies demonstrate that both teachers and 
students favour "British English Standard", although some urban blacks emulate American English (De 
Klerk & Bosch 1993, Gough 1996:58 - referring to De Kadt 19938). Localized new Englishes 
developed, which were "very often stigmatized in relation to more traditional standard varieties", 
signalling "different acquisitional contexts and different identities" (Gough 1996:58). 
In the post-apartheid era a four-tiered language system appears to be developing, with English 
occupying first status. The second level consists of languages whose speakers wield considerable 
economic power (Afrikaans) or numeric superiority (Nguni languages). Maake (1994:118) argues that 
Xhosa and Zulu "are becoming more widespread and generally acceptable as the main vehicles of 
communication among Africans, without any implication of political domination". The third tier is made 
up of officially recognized minority African languages. A fourth tier includes all the "invisible" 
non-official languages. The continued unofficial status of English as language of wider communication 
"undoubtedly work principally to the benefit of the native speakers of English" most of whom are white 
- just as it would if this was official policy (Reagan 1995:320). 
The four-tiered language status system makes Benjamin's conclusion (1994: 1 02) that the interim 
8. De Kadt, E 1993. Language, Power, and Emancipation in South Africa. World Englishes 12, 2: 157-168. 
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Constitution guarantees "the right of all [my emphasis) South African languages to enjoy equal status" 
inaccurate (compare Maake 1994: 120). While this may apply to 11 fortunate languages, at least 12 
others are left out in the cold - which does not include the fast disappearing languages of the Khoi and 
the San, nor the sign languages of deaf communities (compare Reagan 1995:321). 
The pre-eminence of English had not yet translated into increasing numbers of black English first-
language speakers by the 1980s. About 1 % of all English speakers - about 50 000 individuals (1983 
figures) - are black; a figure that "emerged largely since 1970" (Gough 1996:53). Native English 
speakers make up about 9% of the population as a whole - the largest proportion on the continent. 
While there is considerable disparity between figures given for those who "know" English, there is 
consensus "that knowledge of English is highest in urban areas and reveals a positive correlation with 
degree of education" (Gough 1996:54). This is because black South Africans switch from mother 
tongue education after the fourth year of schooling "to all English-medium instruction" (Gough 
1996:54). In this respect South African students are in line with the rest of Africa, which in 1977 
contained 30% of all primary school students in the world which studied through English as medium 
of instruction. By contrast 70% of primary school students in the rest of the world study English as 
a subject. Only 15,8% of all secondary students study through English-medium instruction (Conrad 
& Fishman 1977:17). 
The small percentage of black first language English speakers suggests that language shift from 
indigenous languages is limited in scale, and probably would remain so. Such a conclusion would 
converge with experiences elsewhere in Africa, where black first-language speakers of European 
languages are about 0.3% in Guinea Bissau and 0.22% in Senegal - albeit according to outdated 
statistics (Mansour 1993:125). Yet in the South African case unavailability of post-apartheid data 
makes a conclusion difficult. Some evidence suggests that the present generation of black urban 
children in private schools will likely add to the above percentage. 
In line with debates elsewhere on language and ideology, some South African scholars reject English 
as a supposedly neutral language. They argue that English "effectively prevents the meaningful 
participation of the majority in the democratic process while concentrating power in the hands of those 
who have the necessarily privileged access to English" (Gough 1996:58). "Native forms of deference 
towards superordinates may be carried over to English interaction", resulting in e.g. lack of 
participation on the part of younger or female persons in certain contexts (Gough 1996:65). For 
Benjamin, English contains "a liberal ideology", although she does not elaborate on what this means 
(Benjamin 1994: 1 05). Instead, she quotes Willemse (1991) to the effect that English proficiency holds 
the danger of "a concomitant internationalization of thought control". English has been criticized for 
its "potential for entrenching unequal class relations" between the urban African middle class and the 
rural African working class. Acquisition of English is determined by access to formal education, so that 
the distribution of English is increasingly "less a feature of race than of class" (Benjamin 1994: 1 05). 
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2.1 .3 Functional allocation of languages in South Africa 
As many of the congregants in the survey are black, and as I am interested in understanding how 
macrostructural constraints bring about the dominance of English, it is appropriate to look at the 
domains in .which English is used by blacks. 
Blacks use English most often in education and workplace settings, and usage "is typically restricted 
to formal communicative situations (such as political meetings)" (Gough 1 996: 1 996: 54). For most 
everyday interactions a vernacular language, or a mixture of English and vernacular, is used. Although 
English can function as a lingua franca among blacks speaking different first languages, an African 
urban lingua franca also can be used (Gough 1996:54). In the post"apartheid era blacks can now learn 
English in formerly white schools, and experience "parental pressure to speak English even at home. 
In some instances this appears to have led to at least partial language shift with a perceived decrease 
in competence in the mother tongue" (Gough 1996:55). Youths educated in private schools "perceived 
themselves as an elite group whose public use of English in particular marks them as a high-status 
group and signals their social distance from their peers in township schools" (Gough 1996:55). 
Most black publications are in English, although an South African Broadcasting Corporation survey 
found that urban blacks prefer television "broadcasts to be in a mixture of English and the vernacular 
rather than exclusively in either" (reported in Gough 1996:55). But black radio listeners prefer 
vernacular to English, despite the high black listenership of a black-oriented station like Radio Metro 
(Gough 1996:56). 
2.2 Language and nation-building in South Africa 
As language occurs in conjunction with power and with the ideologies which structure power, it is 
'. " . - .. 
important to examine how the high status of English developed historically within the framework of 
state-building. Remember that my focus is on how language and state power intersect, rather than just 
on state-building as such. 
2.2.1 A brief history of attitudes towards language in political discourse 
Language has always been a central theme in state-building projects in South Africa, from the colonial 
period to the present. This well-known history will only be covered broadly here in terms of two central 
themes: colonial and state policies as exhibited in schools; and the attitudes within liberation 
movements towards English and indigenous languages. Both themes intertwine, as the establishment 
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of a language ideology favouring English was institutionalised during the colonial period, and 
encouraged later by general opposition to the apartheid state. The latter eventually assumed the form 
of rejection of Afrikaans as the central cultural symbol of a hated regime. The dynamics throughout 
form a helix of action and reaction, as anglicization evoked nationalist mobilization around Afrikaans, 
in turn eliciting resistance and a bias towards English. While earlier schooling institutionalised English 
among the black elite, reaction to apartheid education entrenched the ideology at a popular level. 
During the colonial period Anglicization policies were implemented by the British, unexpectedly leading 
to nationalists yoking the recently coined patois of Afrikaans to their cause after the turn of the 
century. The Act of Union attempted to resolve the conflict between Afrikaners and English by 
declaring both official languages, so neglecting black languages (see Hartshorne 1992:307). From the 
1930s onwards Afrikaans was developed as "a symbol of exclusiveness and separateness" by D F 
Malan's Nationalists in conjunction with the secretive Broederbond (Hartshorne 1992:309). By 1938 
"Afrikaans and English had become compulsory subjects". At the same time Afrikaner Nationalist 
doctrine started to emphasise the extension of indigenous languages (Hartshorne 1992:309). 
In the liberation movements an endorsement of English emerged early and was increasingly favoured, 
eventually displacing prior language options which upheld indigenous languages. As early as 1912 the 
idea of English as the language of liberation had begun circulating, when" Abdhurahman, leader of the 
-African People's Organisation, advocated English as the national language" (Heugh 1992:341). This 
perception would continually re-emerge from the mid-1950s to the early 1990s (Heugh 1992:342). 
"With a few early exceptions, like the ANC newspaper A ban tu-Batho , African languages have always 
been perceived as a tool of division .. the liberation movements were concerned with making 
themselves understood to Whites". This neglect contributed to the lack of development of African 
languages in occupational and technical domains (Maake 1 994: 11 9). 
The roots of a pro-English bias in the black resistance movement originated in the vector formed by 
state, education, and religious institutions in the pre-apartheid era. Before 1948 English mission 
schools produced English-speaking black intellectuals, including the founders of the ANC (in its early 
guise as the African Native National Congress). Examples include Sol T Plaatje, Walter Rubusana, 
Pixley ka Isaka Seme, John L Dube, Sam Makgothi, and Saul Msane (Maake 1994: 114). The founders 
of the PAC were also schooled by the missions, "such as Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe, Anton Mziwakhe 
Lembede, Zaphania Mothopeng". These men were described by H F Verwoerd as "'Black Englishmen'" 
(Maake 1994: 114). 
Yet older notions favouring indigenous languages did not disappear overnight, receiving a telling blow 
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only when Bantu Education was rejected. From the 1930s9 onwards some argued that Nguni and 
Sotho languages should be standardised as unifying lingua francas onwards, while the SA Communist 
Party wanted to develop all African languages (Benjamin 1994: 1 02, 104; Kaschula & Anthonissen 
1995:98; Heugh 1992:341; Alexander 1989:31). The 1955 Freedom Charter noted that "'all people 
shall have equal rights to use their own language'" (Hartshorne 1992:315). Even by the 1960s the 
ANC "had not entirely dismissed the notion of the development of African languages" through 
Africans, rather than through the white controlled Language Boards. 
The pro-English ideology was supported by the practice in pre-apartheid government-aided schools of 
introducing English at an early stage and then using it as sole medium afterwards. British colonial 
policy stipulated "that English was a prerequisite for state aid in education" (Hartshorne 1992:308). 
By contrast the continental European missions (Swiss, German Lutheran, Catholic) supported 
indigenous languages as media for instruction (Hartshorne 1992:308). Some tension existed, then, 
between certain religious institutions and state policy from the start. Elsewhere language policies of 
missions have been attributed to a second tension between different missions for control over "their" 
affiliates. 
Little attention was given to vernaculars, with the exception of the present Kwazulu/Natal which 
prescribed Zulu from 1855 onwards (Hartshorne 1992:307-8, quoting from the Welsh Committee of 
1938). Yet by 1935 "a vernacular language was a compulsory subject" in black education "throughout 
the primary school and at teacher training colleges. At the secondary level almost all pupils took a 
vernacular language, but it was not a compulsory subject" (Hartshorne 1992:308). 
The apartheid government from 1 948 onwards instituted various acts to consolidate the position of 
Afrikaans in relation to English. Afrikaans was developed to compete with English at all levels 
(Benjamin 1994:97). The advancement of black intellectuals was contained by transferring school 
education from churches to the government with the Bantu Education Act of 1953. Protests were 
lodged by various organisations, and there were attempts to set up alternative community schools 
(Hartshorne 1992:311). The state's overt intention was to limit the education of Africans so that "their 
intellectual advancement" would "not be a threat to the state" (Maake 1994: 114). 
During the apartheid era vernaculars were promoted by the state as "the basic feature of state 
nationalism" (Benjamin 1994:99; see Brown 1992:82). At first education was conducted in mother 
tongues, which, given the denial of official status to Black languages, ensured White participation but 
Black exclusion at the national level (Benjamin 1994:97). At an institutional level black intellectuals 
9. In other parts of the world opposition to English was central to liberation movements. For instance, in the Philippines 
since the 1930s through to the 1980s the left (with some exceptions) favoured Tagalog (Pilipino), an indigenous 
Philippine language , while other vernaculars also enjoyed some "tactical value" (Tollefson 1991: 147-8). 
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were excluded even from English-speaking universities, which "excluded native speakers of African 
languages, except in some cases where the most highly qualified were employed in the lowest 
positions ... African academics were denied positions". Until 1975 Africans were also not appointed 
in white schools which introduced African languages (Maake 1994: 116). 
Control over African languages was enforced through the establishment of Language Boards and 
through control of media like the SA Broadcasting Corporation - both "subject to the control of 
Afrikaners" (Benjamin 1994:97; Maake 1994: 116, 117). The Central Bantu Language Board existed 
until 1977, when "autonomous" Language Boards were established "for each of the languages and 
handed over to native speakers" - although still under control of the state via the Publications Control 
Board (Maake 1994: 116). The "development of African languages was limited to the promotion of 
traditional ethnic identities", which in turn became the basis of segregation (Benjamin 1994:97). 
Languages formed the basis of racial and tribal groupings, and of the forceful removal of Blacks to 
Bantustans (Herbert 1992:2; Benjamin 1994:99; Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:98). From the 1950s 
onwards the ANC advanced English as a unifying language in response to state attempts to promote 
tribalism (Benjamin 1 994: 1 01 ). 
In black townships segregated sections were created for different ethnic groups and blacks were not 
supposed to advance beyond a functional multilingualism (Maake 1994: 114). Other measures included 
creating segregated rural homelands, and in urban areas "the destruction of mixed areas like 
Sophiatown, Lady Selborne, Marabastad, Eastwood, District Six". The apartheid government's 
attempts to separate language groups did not succeed completely, although it increased the distance 
between racial groups. 
Where languages were concentrated in industrialized areas, this led to "the mixing of people who 
spoke different Bantu languages in churches, work places, social gatherings and other situations", so 
promoting multilingualism. Urban dialects like Flytaal evolved since the 1940s in the townships, 
composed of elements from different South African languages (Maake 1994: 117; Calteaux 1996). 
Intermarriage between different groups produced a generation which could identify with more than one 
language group, especially in the Southern Transvaal (Maake 1994: 113, 118). Many of the African 
Independent Churches "provide examples of multilingualism without friction", e.g. the Zion Christian 
Church, which has branches in Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (Maake 1994: 118, 119). The St 
John's Apostolic Church "with headquarters in Katlehong in the East Rand (Bishop Masango) and 
Evaton (Bishopress Manku), uses both Southern Sotho and Zulu" (Maake 1994: 119). 
Until 1955 state policy in schools was for vernacular languages to be the medium of instruction for 
between six (Natal) and two years of schooling (Transvaal), followed by "in practice almost always 
English" (Hartshorne 1992:308). By 1959 Std 6 examinations were for the first time conducted "in 
one or the other vernacular languages instead of English". 'Independent' homelands' education policies 
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from 1963 onwards limited use of vernacular to the first four years of schooling, followed by English 
as sole medium of instruction - the outcome in all homelands by 1974 (Hartshorne 1992:311). "Both 
English and Afrikaans were made compulsory in all African teacher-training colleges and schools" 
(Hartshorne 1992:310). But "African opinion never became reconciled to the extension of 
mother-tongue medium beyond std 2, nor to the dual medium policy" (Hartshorne 1992:311). 
Unhappiness with this arrangement was ameliorated to _some extent by the provision of exceptions to 
the rule (Hartshorne 1992:311). 
In the 1970s Afrikaans was introduced as compulsory medium of instruction [alongside English] for 
"at least half the subjects taught in African schools", sparking widespread resistance in black schools 
against oppression in general (Maake 1994:118; (Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:99). Eventually 
English medium instruction was introduced to Black schools, but because of a systemic underfunding 
of black education this did not lead to a high standard of proficiency in English (Benjamin 1994:97). 
By 1975 a new policy reduced mother-tongue media to Std 4, with the result that the Std 5 
examination had to be written in Afrikaans and English. But this time no exemptions were allowed, 
which broadened "the base of dissatisfaction". Protests spread from primary schools to secondary 
schools, reaching the well-known tragic events of 16 June 1976 (Hartshorne 1992:312). 
The perception grew that mother tongue teaching structured the racial division of the labour market, 
and that the introd,uction of both official languages in black schools ensured its effective functioning. 
As a result of mounting opposition, a single medium of education became the norm by 1978, with 
"over 96 per cent of African pupils in Std 5 and above" taught in English (Hartshorne 1992:312). The 
next phase in the language struggle was the demand from parents and teachers to limit mother-tongue 
education to the first four years of schooling, a goal achieved by 1979 (Hartshorne 1992:313). This 
brought educational practice in line with that in most homelands. By 1989 "language policy was very 
much what it had been pre-1953" (Hartshorne 1992:312). 
For blacks the "rejection of Bantu Education ipso facto meant disowning or neglecting their own 
languages" , a strategy causing painful consequences to this day (Maake 1994: 11 5). Paradoxically the 
"rejection of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in the mid-1970s, spearheaded by students from 
the Black Consciousness tradition, had the uncalculated effect of advancing the position of English, 
not only over Afrikaans, but also over African languages" (Heugh 1992:342). Only with the re-
emergence of black trade unions in the 1970s and 1980s were African languages brought "to the 
forefront of the struggle" (Maake 1994:119). 
The ANC's earlier pro-English stance was affirmed at the organization's 1990 Language Workshop in 
Harare. The need for a linking language for "'a unified South Africa'" was interpreted as disqualifying 
'''any particular African language'" which '''carries a high source of potential conflict, since it will 
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elevate one cultural group above others'" (Hartshorne 1992:315) .. Pressure for the development of 
black languages came from the internal wing of the ANC and organizations such as the National 
Language Project (Hartshorne 1992:315). In 1992 the National Education Policy Investigation (NEPI) 
outlined the various options regarding media of instruction (Hartshorne 1992:315). 
The widespread acceptance of a English language education policy today has not changed the situation 
greatly; like elsewhere in the Third World this helps "to ensure that a great number of students fail" 
while producing "the necessary number of graduates" (Tollefson 1991 :151, referring to the 
Philippines). In the absence of racial divisions the effect of English language education is to structure 
society along class lines - not a view often raised in South Africa. The continued unequal distribution 
of resources and teacher skills across the rural-urban or the private-government school spectrum, 
coupled with university admission policies, doubtless have stratifying effects. The question should be 
asked: "who benefits from the continued dominance by English?" (Tollefson 1991 :152). 
Nation-building is one of the publicly-stated goals of the previous Government of National Unity (1994-
1999), specifically of the ANC. That the ANC's version of nation-building corresponds to nationism 
is clear from several sources. Former ANC President Oliver Tambo is quoted as speaking of the nation 
as all people '" and not a collection of Bantustans and racial and tribal groupings organized to 
perpetuate minority power'" (Jordan 1988: 117). In this conceptualisation the nation is defined "by 
individual acts of voluntary adherence, which require submergence of other loyalties in favour of this 
larger unit" (Jordan 1988: 118). 
The 1 996 Constitution attempts to affirm cultural and linguistic diversity without rewarding ethnic and 
cultural identity at the communal level (Venter 1996). The intention to de-politicize ethnicity has a 
relatively lengthy history in ANC policy, having been mooted in the 1989 ANC-Soviet Social Scientists 
Seminar Report (referred to in Degenaar 1991: 13) and also in the ANC's 1993 Regional Policy 
document (ANC 1993). In addition, cultural diversity has to be affirmed without invoking apartheid's 
divisive racial or ethnic notions, long regarded by the ANC as creating artificial social barriers (see 
Jordan, 1988: 116). In practice government policies lead to the affirmation of cultural diversity at 
personal and national levels, but not at a communal level (Venter 1996). 
The exclusion in the present Constitution of several languages from official status means that: 
a. "knowledge of the official language becomes a prerequisite for appointment and promotion in 
state institutions"; 
b. a "powerful official language, such as English ... can become irresistible even in non-state 
institutions such as the church"; 
c. "psychological pressure leads to parents preferring the official language as sole medium of 
education, sometimes leading to it becoming the home language of non-speakers", thus rendering 
demands for the use of non-official languages "meaningless or even counter-productive"; 
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d. negative attitudes towards non-official languages are developed (Benjamin 1994:98; 
summarising Webb 1990:2). 
Various proponents, most notably Neville Alexander (1989), have suggested alternative language 
policies to the prevailing one, the most notable being accommodation of regional languages under a 
single national language (Maake 1 994: 120). Anthropologist Wim Van Binsbergen refers to this as the 
graded model, which allows for the "generous provision for the use, preservation and propagation of 
such plurality of languages as actually exists within the national boundaries. In this way basic human 
rights are safeguarded" and "the intellectual and technological potential" of members of minority 
languages are not wasted (Van Binsbergen 1994: 173). At the same time effective communication can 
happen and "language-centred ethnic frustration is far less likely to threaten the stability and integrity 
of the state" (Van Binsbergen 1994: 173). Language learning and multilingualism would be encouraged 
(Benjamin 1994: 1 07). During the late 1980s several organizations supported this view, including the 
National Party, the Democratic Party, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the ANC, and the Azanian 
People's Organization (Heugh 1992:335). Despite receiving a wide range of support, Alexander's 
suggestions were not translated into policy or legislation. 
Past objections by blacks to the use of African languages in schools, and the relatively low status of 
black languages at present, should be understood against the above backgrou~d. At the same time the 
reluctance of whites to learn African languages should be addressed. "Whites of all political and. 
ideological persuasions have been so comfortable with the privileges which Apartheid offered them 
in the form of cheap black labour that they found no need to learn African languages - they were in 
a situation which never demanded that they associate with the African working class as equals at any 
time" (Maake 1994: 117). 
2.2.2 Language practice under direct and indirect control by the state: state departments and schools 
The evidence in the state sector is extremely ambivalent, as I reported elsewhere (Venter 1996, 1998). 
On the positive side, as Brown (1998) points out, "the founding provisions of the Constitution (Section 
6(2)) commit the state to 'elevate the status and advance the use of the indigenous languages' ". The 
Pan-South African Language Board (PANSALB) was finally established in 1998, with this purpose in 
mind. 
On the debit side, documents of state departments reveal a distance between an implicit formal policy 
of multilingualism, and a general option for monolingualism, which favours English as lingua franca. 
An audit by the Language Plan Task Group (Langtag), of annual reports published by government 
departments, found in 1996 that only two departments had been multilingual (Communication 
Services, Justice); seven bilingual (i.e. English and Afrikaans); while twelve used English only. In 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Language diversity & nation-building in Africa 151 
addition many other Government publications are published in English only, namely general notices 
(e.g. relating to the restitution of Land Rights Act in 1995), White papers (e.g. the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme of 1994) (Langtag 1996: 159-161). 
In short, official encouragement of multilingual diversity is often denied in practice in the public sector, 
with English achieving hegemony in Parliament and Senate by 1996, in provincial-national government 
communication, as well as in many local government meetings (Langtag 1996:47). A siSwati-speaking 
Constitutional Assembly official reportedly said that "we in the ANC do not believe in ethnic 
languages" (Leadership 14, 2: 13). 
In the second domain, that of education, I want to focus on the language of instruction, which the 
governing body of each school has to decide on, with approval by the provincial authority and the 
national Minister of Education (Brown 1998). According to Brown, these decisions have to conform 
to the Constitution, the South African Schools Act (1996), nine provincial Schools' Acts and 
regulations, and the policy document Norms and standards regarding language policy in education 
(1997). Governing bodies also have to decide about the languages their schools will offer as subjects. 
Indigenous languages are used as languages of instruction in the first few years of education, then 
taught as subjects (Brown 1998). Policy requires two official languages to be taught during the last 
three years of school. Parents of learners can insist that a particular official language be taught if 
between 35 to 40 pupils in the same grade can be found who express a similar desire. 
In a 1997 qualitative study of the opinions of teachers and pupils on language policy, David Brown 
found that in most cases the language of choice would be English as language of learning. "All other 
language choices usually coexist with English as the language of learning", he states; the obvious 
exception would be Afrikaans language schools. Brown limited his study to twelve primary and 
secondary schools in three extremely linguistically heterogeneous areas in KwaZulu-Natal, namely 
Umzimkhulu (Kokstad, Matatiele, Port Shepstone), Durban, and Newcastle. The languages in these 
regions included isiXhosa, isiZulu, Sesotho, English and Afrikaans, as well as siBaca dialect, Chinese, 
and Hindi. 
A high school in Newcastle represents an exceptional case, where an attempt to introduce isiZulu in 
1994 failed, reportedly due to resistance from African parents. Some African parents allegedly did not 
only want their children to speak English, but "wanted no other language to be spoken during school 
hours - something explicitly disallowed both in Norms and Standards and in the Constitution. The 
acquisition of English in a fee-paying state school was seen by African parents to be an important 
consideration in choosing the school" - a sentiment expressed several times elsewhere. 
This is not to say that the option for English was necessarily encouraged by either the teachers or 
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always supported by the learners. In some cases staff members felt that "many parents were doing 
their children a disservice by insisting they be educated in English", and some "believed in the full 
elevation of 'indigenous' (African) languages to languages of learning." Some of Brown's informants 
indicated that "the educational system was stratifying on the basis of class, and that English language 
assimilation and education was the key cultural manifestation of this phenomenon". This was 
particularly evident in a discernible movement from township schools to schools where English is a 
language of learning. Even in an informal settlement school north-west of Inanda, with mainly 
isiZulu-speaking learners, English is the language of learning (although her~ Zulu was taught as a 
subject). 
3. FEATURES OF NATION-BUILDING AND LANGUAGE OUTCOMES IN SELECTED SUB-SAHARAN 
AND SOUTHERN AFRICA STATES 
In Section 3 Botswana. Zambia, Kenya and Nigeria are selected as mini-case studies which display 
certain features - formed by the intersection of nation-building with education, language, and religion -
which generally also occur in other African states. With reference to Table 19, Botswana illustrates 
language rationalization in a country which has one predominant language, yet which opts for English. 
Zambia, Kenya and Nigeria exemplify countries like South Africa which has more than one dominant 
language and which appear to follow multilingual policies. Namibia represents a country located in 
Table 19 within the same category as South Africa; yet ultimately adopted monolingual policies - just 
as Botswana did. Unlike the general summaries supplied for other states, the discussion on Botswana 
and Zambia is grounded in Van Binsbergen's more detailed ethnographic examination of the fortunes 
of the Nkoya and Kalanga minority languages. The section closes with an overview of the prospects 
for English in Southern Africa. 
3.1 Language diversity and nation-building in Southern Africa 
Southern African states provide insight on South Africa in relation to her most adjacent region, and 
a broader understanding of the status and function of English in Southern Africa (Schmied 1996:304). 
At the same time the Southern African language situation can be compared to that of Africa's other 
regions, namely East, West, and Central Africa. Zimbabwe, Zambia. and Malawi were previously 
collectively known as Central Africa; but their present interrelatedness with South Africa. Botswana. 
Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland. and Mozambique is better captured in the name Southern Africa 
(Schmied 1 996: 30 1 ,31 7). Recent work on various aspects relating to the topic include that of Schmied 
(1991. 1996) and Van Binsbergen (1994). 
A comparative approach demonstrates that important differences and similarities occur between 
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Southern African states. State language policies in the colonial and post-colonial periods formalised 
the language statuses already achieved in the pre-colonial era. The "dynamics of state formation and 
hegemony, and the introduction of Christianity as a literate world religion, then engender an ethnic 
consciousness largely focussing on language" (Van Binsbergen 1 994: 1 61 ). The "recent political and 
economic history of the people who carry the minority language casts light on the extent, direction, 
degrees of organization, cultural and ethnico-historical elaboration, and success, of the 
language-centred ethnic strategies of each group" (Van Binsbergen 1994: 160). While the history of 
languages in South Africa generally aligns with Van Binsbergen's conclusions, the major differences 
are the lack of evidence of "language-centred ethnic strategies" - apart from the early stages of 
Afrikaner nationalism, and the more recent Inkatha-ANC wars on the Rand in the 1980s. 
Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi are usually viewed as exoglossic Anglophone countries (Schmied 
1996:304). Schmied suggests that English was brought into Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi 
successively by missionaries ("especially in Malawi"), miners ("especially in Zambia"), and settlers 
("especially in Zimbabwe") (Schmied 1996:1996:302). 
Missionaries in Malawi provided support for regional and local lingua francas (Tumbuka and Nyanja 
respectively), through favouring Bible translation into indigenous languages. This dual language 
approach lead to the eventual recognition in 1945 of Yao and Tumbuka as national languages in 
addition to English (Schmied 1996:302). Mining companies extended British administration over these 
areas, followed by small-scale colonial administration, e.g. when Britain "took over Rhodesia from 
Rhodes' British South Africa company" in 1822 (Schmied 1996:303). Education remained in the hands 
of missionaries, while mines "generated migration". Generally-speaking English was "favoured in 
colonial education", although lingua francas received some support in the Annual Report on Native 
Education for 1927 (Schmied 1996:303). 
An active language policy was absent in Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Malawi. No "coherent overall 
language policy was propagated (paying lipservice to African languages often went parallel with 
maintaining old requirements concerning English)" (Schmied 1996:305). Functional efficiency 
("modernity, mobility, access to international knowledge, modern methods of instruction") was 
favoured "above cultural authenticity". Both are "only possible through a multilingual policy" (Schmied 
1996:305). 
The kind of differences and similarities that occur between states can be demonstrated by the fortunes 
of the Botswana Kalanga and Zambian Nkoya languages. In Zambia Nkoya first waned then gained in 
importance, while in Botswana Kalanga remain suppressed. Yet the ratio of Nkoya speakers to the 
Zambian population is smaller than the ratio between Kalanga and the Botswana population. State 
organization in Zambia allowed for local, regional, and national rule, whereas the Kalanga faced a 
two-tiered structure. In both cases the respective languages had "unofficial" representatives in 
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government, usually in the form of people who could pass for another group. In Zambia language 
revitalisation was effective, unlike Botswana. In the post-colonial period the national political space 
was restructured so that an intermediate language level was created for six languages plus English in 
the case of Zambia, while no intermediate level was structured in Botswana (Van Binsbergen 
1994:162). 
In Zambia during pre-independence a multilingual policy recognized English as official language, 
alongside support for Bemba, Nyanja, Lozi, Tonga, Kaonde, Lunda, and Luvale, (Schmied 1996:304; 
Van Binsbergen 1994: 145, 150; Bamgbose 1991: 1 07). The Lozi, itself a combination of Luyana and 
the southern Sotho-related Kololo, was favoured by the colonial state and exploited eastern 
Barotseland - including the Nkoya (Van Binsbergen 1 994: 144). The Nkoya was formed during their 
political incorporation into the Lozi state in the 19th century. 
After independence "for fear of 'tribalism' and in the service of 'nation-building' no language other than 
English was used in state-citizen communication" (Van Binsbergen 1994:145; Heugh 1992:337). This 
practice became so entrenched that state officials would not use their own vernacular even if their 
audience consisted of people whose first language was the same as theirs (Van Binsbergen 1994: 145). 
As a result, ethnic associations were discouraged, and about sixty other non-official languages or 
dialects were ignored, if not suppressed - like Nkoya, in central western Zambia (Van Binsbergen 
1994). As late as 1973 a district governor told a political meeting that the language used could not 
be the locally spoken vernacular Nkoya, because "Nkoya does not exist" (Van Binsbergen 1994:149). 
Nkoya-speakers today number about 30 000 - or less than 1 % of the Zambian population (Van 
Binsbergen 1 994: 114). 
The English-only practice was reversed later, when "the impoverished and disintegrating Zambian state 
proved unable to mobilize popular support on the basis of services and benefits", and began to "appeal 
to a composite cultural heritage to which each ethnic and language group was now seen to contribute" 
(Van Binsbergen 1994: 150). After 1980 ethnic associations "became viable again", such as the 
Kazanga cultural society of the Nkoya, named after an ancient first-fruits festival for the king, first held 
again in 1988. Yet Nkoya remains excluded from the media and schools, although at the second 
Kazanga festival in 1989 the deputy Minister of Culture addressed the crowds in Nkoya (Van 
Binsbergen 1994: 150-1). After October 1991 , Nkoya politicians - or those identifying with them - were 
taken up at the national level in President Frederick Chiluba's new MMD coalition administration, 
although half of the Nkoya remained loyal to ousted President Kenneth Kaunda's UNIP (Van Binsbergen 
1994:151 ). 
The cause of the Nkoya (from the 1920s onwards) had already been helped by their alliance with 
evangelical missions (especially the South African General Mission) rather than with the local 
Lozi-orientated Catholic Mission (Van Binsbergen 1994: 147). "The mission pioneered literacy in Nkoya, 
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published school primers, had hymns and part of the Bible translated into Nkoya" (Van Binsbergen 
1994: 147) _ As a result a "remarkable form of ethnico-religious discourse emerged, in which local 
Christian leaders would also be the articulators of the budding Nkoya ethnicity" (Van Binsbergen 
1994:147). 
Yet Nkoya labour migrants were as peripheral as they had been at home, since "mission education in 
Nkoya hardly compared with the ... empowering languages of Lozi and English, which the Lozi 
aristocracy had managed to attract". As a result, Lozi and other ethnic groups dominated the labour 
markets (Van Binsbergen 1 994: 147). By the 1 970s the Nkoya "still felt the lack of recognition of their 
language to be the major sign of their powerlessness at the national and regional level, which they 
interpreted exclusively in terms of Lozi oppression" (Van Binsbergen 1994: 148). 
When the government took over primary school education the medium of instruction became Lozi, and 
communication with all levels of government had to be in either English or Lozi (Van Binsbergen 
1 994: 148) . At that stage" only about half the men and very few women had more than a smattering" 
of Lozi (Van Binsbergen 1 994: 148). 
Nkoya chiefs were initially incorporated into the political system as senior members of the Lozi; and 
later of the post-colonial rural administration - which provided a sense of continuity of traditional 
leadership. They did not lose any of the associated apparatus of chieftainship (e.g. enclosures, regalia, 
dwellings), and so "as political power brokers" could bring together the Nkoya and the state (Van 
Binsbergen 1994: 164). In the post-independence era, Nkoya ethnic claims "were met to a considerable 
extent", as a result of Nkoya support for the eventually victorious United National Independence Party, 
in contrast with Lozi support for a losing opposition party (Van Binsbergen 1 994: 149). As a result of 
increased development projects, economic opportunities expanded in the region, so that many Nkoya 
migrants returned home (Van Binsbergen 1994: 149). 
The Nkoya case demonstrates that "one cannot blindly generalize that all sub-national identity is 
divisive and leads to centrifugal tendencies away from the state" (Van Binsbergen 1994:164). 
Primordial and civic loyalties "are not necessarily mutually contradictory", as "a bifocal process of 
identification n can be promoted (Mansour 1993: 132). 
In more general terms the English-only policy can be regarded as a failure, for the limits of the Zambian 
economy meant that the majority could not achieve the competence required for participation in the 
political and economic domains (Heugh 1992:337). The goal of achieving national integration can also 
be said to have failed, for the rural communities remain marginalised. The language policy did not 
match the goal of integration, but rather that of neo-colonial assimilation, which could not be 
successful due to the small numbers of the elite (Heugh 1992:337). Education policies add to this, as 
teachers are usually appointed "in regions other than their own" (Bamgbose 1991 :79). 
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In Botswana today English and Tswana are the only official languages, while eight Tswana groupings 
are the only constitutionally recognized ethnicities. Vet several smaller language groups exist which 
constitute about 30% of the total population (Van Binsbergen 1994: 165) . Non-Tswana groups include 
the Kalanga, Mbukushu, Vei, Koba, Ndebele, Subiya, Herero, and Sarwa (Khoi-San) (Van Binsbergen 
1994:153). The Kgalagadi, although speaking a langu,age similar to Tswana, "share with the Sarwa 
a history of serfdom and humiliation at Tswana hands" (Van Binsbergen 1994:153). 
After independence in 1966 Botswana, "for fear of appearing disunited, emphatically proclaimed itself 
a monolithic Tswana state", and minority languages became "politically and socially suspect" (Van 
Binsbergen 1994: 1 53). According to popular Batswana perception, it is illegal to publish in any other 
language (Van Binsbergen 1 994: 1 57). 
Just how state policies impact on non-official languages is illustrated by Van Binsbergen's discussion 
of the Botswana minority language Kalanga. Kalanga is a dialect of western Shona, and occurs from 
"north-western Zimbabwe all the way into the North Central and North East districts of Botswana", 
as it has done since the late 17th century (Van Binsbergen 1994: 152). Kalanga-speakers, who number 
about 120 000, are at 13% of the total population "the largest non-Tswana speaking group in the 
country" (Van Binsbergen 1994: 153). As language Kalanga is excluded from the media and in schools. 
The Kalanga were placed under administration of the Ngwato Tswana group, whose chief became a 
member of the House of Chiefs in terms of the 1983 Botswana Constitution. Kalanga activists felt that 
the Constitution entails "a denial of the existence ... of languages other than Tswana, and of ethnic 
groups other than the eight Tswana-speaking ones". From the 1970s the Kalanga were represented 
(along with other ethnic groups of the area) by the non-Ngwato but Tswana-speaking Khurutshe, so 
that as a group they have no representation in the "far from nominal traditional political structures" 
(Van Binsbergen 1994:154). 
By contrast with the Zambian Nkoya, the Botswana Kalanga were deprived of an integrated role for 
their traditional leaders, who could have functioned "as foci of cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and historical 
identity" (Van Binsbergen 1994: 164). Under such conditions the heightened status of Kalanga could 
have engendered both ethnic loyalty from its own elite, and incorporation as an ethnic group could 
have functioned as the basis for a respectable and qualified integration. Under the present Constitution 
"refusing to speaking Tswana [apart from the domestic domain] can very well be interpreted as a 
subversive act" (Van Binsbergen 1994: 165). 
The control of the Ngwato over the Kalanga extended to religious ideology, as the Ngwato "did not 
permit any Christian diversification and upheld the monopoly of ... the London Missionary Society". 
For this reason the development of indigenous churches in the area from the 1 920s onwards, 
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prompted by the experience of migrant labourers during their sojourn in South Africa, "inevitably 
acquired overtones of ethnic and tribal defiance of Ngwato dominance" (Van Binsbergen 1994: 154). 
As people and ideas frequently moved across the borders during the pre-independence period, the 
Botswana Kalanga benefitted from the translation of the Bible into Kalanga by Christian Missions in 
what was then Rhodesia. Missions in that country "offered a great many Kalanga both the formal 
education and the ideological outlook that provided the basis on which to advance in colonial society, 
while increasingly challenging the premises of inequality on which that society was based" (Van 
Binsbergen 1994:155). 
Some immigrants into the area adopted Kalanga identities, while certain Kalanga adopted other 
identities - demonstrating the fluidity of ethnic identities which exist in such a context, and across th~ 
borders of territories. In Zimbabwe Joshua Nkomo chose to identify with Ndebele rather than with his 
Kalanga roots; while Kalanga activist K Maripe was a prominent trade unionist in the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and so could have represented himself as a citizen of Botswana, Zimbabwe, 
or Zambia. This implies that "appeal to an ethnic idiom in the context of formal, national level politics 
is not the expression of primordial attachments ingrained through socialization in early childhood ... 
but often the deliberate and strategic choice of a particular political instrument, identity and career 
from among alternatives" (Van Binsbergen 1994:155). 
Due to their" relative educational and entrepreneurial success" Kalanga individuals were not completely 
excluded from the political process, as long as they downplayed their Kalanga identity and did not 
challenge Tswana ethnic and linguistic hegemony. In this way the Kalanga were implicitly 
accommodated, and themselves only occasionally resorted to "overt ethnic confrontation". As a result 
"the very people who ... might have been involved in the production and consumption of Kalanga 
symbolic culture .... tended to have vested interests in not doing so" (Van Binsbergen 1994: 157). 
During the atrocities that followed the war of liberation in Zimbabwe, Botswana Kalanga in border 
communities stressed ("not always spontaneously") that "their first allegiance was to the Botswana 
state and not to an international Kalanga ethnic identity" - although help was offered through kinship 
networks to Kalanga victims (Van Binsbergen 1994: 158). The Kalanga also tend to reproduce "the 
erroneous Tswana view" that in Botswana "they are merely recent immigrants enjoying, but 
dishonouring, Ngwato hospitality" (Van Binsbergen 1994: 157). 
Secular domains in urban settings such as Francistown are characterised by "petty confrontations on 
language and ethnic issues, in relationships between neighbours and friends, on the work floor, in 
access to the informal sector of the economy, in amorous matters, in drinking and nightlife, and in the 
conceptualization of social relationships in terms of sorcery" . Urban society is marked by White/Black, 
Tswana/Kalanga conflicts, fuelled by "ethnic stereotypes and the failure or refusal to learn and 
understand each other's language" (Van Binsbergen 1994:160). 
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By contrast, in churches and non-Christian cults in the area there is little evidence of the more-or-Iess 
covert ethnic and linguistic antagonisms. Instead, "the accommodation of potential ethnic opposition 
within an encompassing idiom of religious transcendence of disunity are the catchwords to describe 
the local religious situation" in northeastern Botswana. Any religious event includes the use of 
"multiple and situational ethnic and linguistic identity, code switching, the mixture of songs and texts 
from Kalanga, Ndebele, Tswana (and even Shona and English)" (Van Binsbergen 1994: 159). Ethnic 
and linguistic diversity in rural areas appear to have "no negative impact on social relations" as 
evidenced by e.g. Khurutshe/Kalanga "bilingualism, intermarriage, patterns of residence, and the 
frequent passing of Khurutshe .. as Kalanga" (Van Binsbergen 1 994: 1 60). 
The inconsistencies in ethnic antagonism can be explained by reference to the distinction between 
"Tswana as a national state-backed language" and as "just another regional language at the 
sUb-national level" . Daily interaction at the local level is tempered by a reference to Tswana as just one 
other regional language, as well as a shared history of more than a century. This shows that "ethnic 
phenomena in the national political domain and those in the local domain" do not necessarily converge 
"on the same categories of ethnicity" (Van Binsbergen 1994: 163). When Kalanga is viewed as a 
commodity, the submission to Tswana and lack of success in mobilisation against it can be explained 
by the relative market values that obtain in both languages (Van Binsbergen 1994:170). 
Literature on the language situation in the other Southern African states follows the same pattern. As 
space does not permit a full discussion, I will here only outline the most salient features. In 
post-independence Malawi, English and Chewa were included in a bilingual policy until 1968, when 
Chewa was declared sole national language. This move evoked strong protests, as "language policy 
is always part of the general political development ... best interpreted in the context of the wider new 
national culture", and Chewa's prominence was "attributable to the fact that is based on the variety 
spoken in [former President] Banda's home area" of Central Province (Schmied 1996:305). Banda 
"used to address the public in English with a simultaneous translation into Chewa". In 1966 about 
50% of Malawians spoke Nyanja/Chewa as first language, and 26% as a second language (Schmied 
1996:304). The language situation was reversed in 1994, with .English accorded official status 
(Schmied 1996:305). 
English was introduced to Swaziland in 1903, and after independence in 1968 retained its status as 
official language alongside siSwati. No active language policy exists to date (Kamwangamalu & 
Chisanga 1996:285-286). English is used mainly within the educational system through which it is 
propagated, and "there is no need for English usage outside the classroom and in other formal 
situations. Consequently, English tends to be elitist in nature" and "restricted to a few domains" 
(Kamwangamalu & Chisanga 1996:286). Yet there is some evidence that a "Swazi Colloquial English" 
has become blended with Swazi culture (Kamwangamalu & Chisanga 1996:288,291 ).In the absence 
of a formal policy, "English will continue to have the edge over siSwati", as - despite some dissent -
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ordinary Swazis grant a higher status to English (Kamwangamalu & Chisanga 1 996: 291). Schmied 
notes that here (as in Zambia) students who desire university education must first pass the Cambridge 
Overseas School Certificate in English (Schmied 1991 :23). In Namibia, which became independent in 
1990, 18 indigenous languages are spoken (Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995: 102; for fuller discussion 
see P"utz 1995). 
In conclusion, the political, economic, and linguistic interconnectedness of Southern Africa 
demonstrate some of the mechanisms through which isomorphism occurred throughout the region. 
This overview of language usage in the Southern Africa region reveals that (a) to balance the needs 
"of efficient communication with the rights of minority or indigenous languages requires enormous 
skill", and that (b) the language policies pursued by the apartheid government had a "backwash effect" 
on neighbouring states (Schmied 1996:315-316). It also highlights how the region is interconnected 
not only economically, but also through the sharing of languages across borders: Tonga in South Africa 
and Mozambique; Ndebele in South Africa and Zimbabwe; Kalanga in Botswana and Zimbabwe; 
Tswana in South Africa and Botswana (ditto Sotho and Swazi), to name just a few linkages. Apartheid 
language policies lead to an emphasis on English not only in Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, but also 
in South Africa (Schmied 1996:315-316).ln Zimbabwe fluency in English is required for entrance into 
state agencies like the police and army (Schmied 1991 :23). 
That the role of English across Southern Africa will be strengthened in the future seems incontestable. 
This will be ensured through (among others) "the traditional ANC commitment to English" coupled to 
"the importance of English as an international language" in Lusophone Mozambique and Angola 
(Schmied 1996:316; Katupha 1994:94). Language dynamics in the region will be affected by the 
economic dependency of many Southern African countries on South Africa, and the lack of a clear 
alternative (like Swahili in East Africa) (Schmied 1996:316). 
3.2 Language diversity and nation-building in Nigeria 
Nigeria's 30 states contain 20% "of Africa's 2 000 odd languages". Of these, Bendel and Rivers 
States are among "the two most linguistically complex". While Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo are recognised 
as national languages, "English remains the official language" (Elugbe 1994:62). 
Nigeria demonstrates how nation-building in Africa has to accommodate both nationism and 
nationalism, the political objectives behind the language provisions in the 1979 and 1989 Nigerian 
Constitutions (Goke-Pariola 1993:72). The compelling need to create unity (nationism) is fulfilled by 
promoting both English and "national" languages through a trilingual policy (Goke-Pariola 1993:72; 
Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995: 1 02; Mansour 1993: 127). Nationalism is addressed in "the preservation 
of local cultures by preserving languages, and the development and projection of local languages" in 
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what boils down to a triglossic policy which recognises mother tongue, other community language, 
and English (Goke-Pariola 1993:69-70,72-73). This is balanced by attention to individual language 
rights (Goke-Pariola 1993:72). 
Nigerian education policies "are propelled by hidden group agenda", according to Goke-Pariola 
(1993:69-70). The agenda, he argues, surfaces in Nigeria's 1981 National Policy on Education (NPE). 
Significantly, here the aim of education is "to develop and project" Nigerian and world culture (note 
the singular) (Goke-Pariola 1993: 70), which is repeated in the 1988 Cultural Policy for Nigeria, 
alongside a desire to "'cultivate a common language for the nation'", a reference probably to Hausa 
(Goke-Pariola 1993:75). The spread of Hausa in the northern states, far from being a "natural" 
process, was engineered as part of a "northernization" policy by the Northern Nigerian Government 
between 1960 and 1967. This suggests that the acceptability of languages as LWCs can be successful 
be promoted when it is supported by political motives and regional resources. 
The emphasis in Nigeria on balancing power between Yoruba, Hausa, and Igbo ethnic groupings led 
to a strategy of the "deliberate underdevelopment" of certain languages (Fardon & Furniss 1994:22). 
Mother tongue and one of the three major languages (Hausa, lbo, Yoruba) are to be inculcated at 
pre-primary, primary and junior secondary levels (Goke-Pariola 1993:71). English is introduced in high 
schools, and senior secondary students have to do English and one Nigerian language (Goke-Pariola 
1993:72). The overall effect is "to encourage language versatility and to reduce the links between 
language, ethnicity and political affiliation" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:24). 
The outcome of Nigerian language policies is that English "is the primary language of legislation and 
governance at all levels" (i.e. national, state, loca!), with little recognition of the official status of 
Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba (Goke-Pariola 1993:68). In practice not all Nigerian states provide for minority 
languages (Goke-Pariola 1993:73). Ironically, the political elite in Nigeria who occupies government 
positions is also among those who deviate from official policy through their patronage of English 
educational institutions for their children (Goke-Pariola 1993: 1 02). 
Yet few instances exist where "extended language situations in Nigeria involve only groups of 
homogenous language groups". Hausa-speaking communities may switch to English, Yoruba, Igbo, 
Tuareg or Kanuri; while "in Taraba, Adamawa, or Borno states ... people sometimes use Kanuri or 
Fulfulde, sometimes Hausa or English, and on other occasions one or more of the less widely spoken 
languages of the region". In one Nigerian state the choice of a particular language could signal 
commitment to a particular culture and nationalism, in another state it may be a mere pragmatic desire 
to communicate between different language groups (Fardon & Furniss 1994:22). 
Heugh (1992:338-339) concludes that in linguistic terms Nigeria has provided a greater number of 
additional points of access to significant numbers of people who are competent in regional or national 
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languages than would have been the case if an English-only policy had been implemented. Yet the 
hierarchical arrangement of languages continue to present problems and to favour assimilation into 
English. 
Language and religion in Nigeria 
Goke-Pariola (1993: 139-40) notes that in Nigerian religious institutions, language signals class and 
rural urban divisions. In southern Nigeria most urban Christian congregations reveal "a linguistic 
dichotomy which roughly parallels class lines". The middle class prefers English above the vernacular, 
in contrast to the lower classes. For instance, in Anglican congregations an early morning hour-long 
service is conducted in English, followed later by a far longer vernacular service, which incorporates 
aspects of traditional culture and indigenous languages, with African-rhythm music. The earlier service 
is attended mostly by the middle class, because it is shorter, they prefer English, and are no longer 
fluent in their original mother tongue. "Therefore the medium of the service one attends says 
something about one's class, or one's aspirations ... language is closely related to individual ideology 
and group power. It is difficult to imagine anything more intimate than religious practice ... yet, for 
many, English dominates even in these innermost recesses of the soul". A similar divide can be 
observed between rural and urban religion, as in the former areas English is still little known. 
Denominations have also used language as tool to recruit or maintain followers; a denomination that 
promotes English would be more attractive in a context where vernaculars have been devalued. 
Certainly in Nigeria, "most parents see English as the key to the future" (Goke-Pariola 1993: 1 00). 
School pupils no longer need official sanctions against speaking vernaculars; instead, a "self-imposed 
and self-monitored" process favours English as "students struggle to climb up both economically and .. 
socially" (Goke-Pariola 1993: 1 05). The same could be said of South Africans. 
3.3 Language diversity and nation-building in Kenya 
In Kenya Swahili as national language and English as official language dominate completely, although 
both are primarily acquired languages. English is used in parliament, state bureaucracy, and in schools 
as medium of instruction. Swahili is a compulsory subject in schools. Vernaculars are not taught or 
used for official purposes, yet remain strongly linked to "expressions of regional and local identity". 
Consequently, competence in English is higher than (in rank order) in neighbouring Uganda, Tanzania, 
and Ethiopia. People prefer Swahili radio to English ones but reverse this preference for newspapers, 
while television is mainly in English (Parkin 1994:229). Arabic also occurs particularly along the coast. 
While Swahili and English obtain at the state level, the general populace prefers English as language 
of status and mobility, and Swahili as the language of neighbourhood and market (Laitin 1992: 11 0). 
In fact, people prefer English and the vernaculars, but the government maintains Swahili as language 
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of education - a nonrational choice, in terms of Laitin's game theory. Laitin concludes that "languages 
which symbolize national unity but have no strong local support nor strong bureaucratic support will 
be marginalized in Africa's educational systems of the future" (Laitin 1992: 112). 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Chapter Five extended the conclusions of Chapter Four - that English is dominant in congregations 
regardless of extent of internal linguistic diversity - to the societal and state levels. Similar linguistic 
configurations occur across the African region, where almost all states claim to support indigenous 
languages but in practice opt for a European language associated with former colonists. Such 
contradictory policies/practices by states and populations are related to the dynamics of the world 
economy, as I demonstrate in Chapter Six. In other words, English dominance viewed against larger 
settings (nation-states, regions) in which the language is not dominant - in terms of number of 
speakers'- summon explanations which go beyond micro-theories. Rational action theories at best 
serve to describe rather than to explain language choice in a satisfactory manner. This is not to deny 
that individuals choose to speak English, but to insist that their choices are not based on individual 
preferences alone, but on the role and status of English within society. That is, individual agency is 
influenced by norms operating at the national level, which in turn articulates with global structures and 
global norms. 
Chapter Five returns to a theme mentioned in earlier chapters, namely language practice as opposed 
to language policies. The evidence shows that the present South African state has in practice - as 
opposed to its policies - supported a global rather than indigenous language, and so (unintentionally?) 
established a form of cultural hegemony. This may be an example of the lingering effect of external 
(colonial) hegemony on cultural and political elites, as well as on the cultural subsystem (e.g. 
language), following Laitin. The discrepancy between language policy and practice introduced by 
Fardon & Furniss and by Goke-Pariola in this Chapter Two is a recurrent theme in this study. A central 
attempt to explain why this is so tends to be framed in economic terms, such as the suggestion that 
states do not have the financial resources to carry out their policies. Such a conclusion is only partly 
accurate, thus demonstrating the shortcomings of analysis which remains at the national level. The 
advantage of analysis at a global level in terms of world-polity, as advanced in Chapter Three, offers 
additional insight into why states find it necessary in the first instance to construct policies which they 
cannot carry out. 
In other words, Chapter Five empirically grounds the dimensions of a political sociology of language, 
as explored in Chapter One, in the language configurations of certain former British colonies in Africa 
- most notably in Southern Africa. The functional allocation of languages in these states is seen as a 
consequence not only of various forms of language rationalisation by African state elites, but as 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Language diversity & nation-building in Africa 163 
following on the predominance of English within the world-system - a position reinforced through 
language-linked development programmes. That only a small percentage of Africa's general population 
can express themselves functionally in English does not contradict my argument. The majority of 
non-English speakers remain poorly incorporated into the dominant political and cultural systems, due 
to the position of the state within the world-economy, the development of internal core-periphery 
relations within each state, and the function of globalized education systems which institutionalise a 
single global (and intrastate) division of labour. As a result, the majority of the population is rendered 
not only dysfunctional in English but often also in their indigenous first languages. 
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- CHAPTER SIX -
LANGUAGE INTEGRATION IN WORLD SYSTEM PERSPECTIVE 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter Six reiterates and ties together the major conclusions of the preceding chapters into broader 
theoretical constructs. Language practice in congregations - as in society - is shown to be affected by 
a world system comprising an economic structure, various globalization processes, and a political-
cultural institution. 
The "world system perspective" of the Chapter's title indicates that I chose to combine both world-
economy and world-polity concepts in my analysis. While I do not intend to pedantically point out 
which theory is in play in particular sections, I will occasionally acknowledge where specific features 
of world-polity or world-economy are used. I deem the spatial and structural stratification of the global 
system by the operation of the world-economy into the core, semiperiphery and periphery as relevant. 
Just as important is the notion of isomorphism within world-polity, that best explains how global norms 
are established and diffused - particularly when a distinction is drawn between structural and cultural 
forms of isomorphism. In general I tend to favour world-polity theory, which allows me to include 
aspects of neo-institutional theory as applied to organizations. 
In the sections that follow I distinguish between global, societal (national), and congregational levels 
of the environment (context), as well as between macro- and meso-levels of analysis. As a world 
system approach ultimately attempts to envelop all analytical levels in a hermeneutic dialectic, such 
distinctions are blurred and overlapping. I retain them for heuristic purposes, mainly to illustrate the 
point that congregations are immersed in and influenced by their societal environment, which is 
similarly affected by the global environment. At the same time it allows me to outline at the meso-level 
some of the local dynamics which I believe to be unique to these South African churches. By 
macro-level constraints I refer to several factors: attempts by state managers to construct a state 
through the development of national ideologies which resonate with global norms; popular support or 
opposition to these ideologies; and the effects of global capitalism on cultural diversity, e.g. through 
the establishment of a monolingual hegemony. By meso-level constraints I mean how perceptions of 
diversity within a congregation structure social interaction between groups within it. 
In effect I present an ecological (or environmental) argument in which global factors which support and 
hinder diversity and integration are highlighted. Such an ecology of integration also denotes an ecology 
of language, which relates to the surrounding state formation, which in turn operates within cultural 
values set by the global political-economic environment. For, as Williams (1991) observed, the ecology 
of language has much to do with how some cultures are legitimized while others are alienated in the 
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people and land, and of the granting or abrogating of social rights" (Williams 1991 :4). Some may 
object to the introduction of an ecological argument, as such explanatory frameworks are usually 
regarded as more relevant to micro-level and rational-actor concerns'. Yet I use "ecology" and 
"environment" here to highlight how isomorphic effects occur across macro- and meso-level units of 
the world system. 
The concept of "environment" refers to the "political context of organizations", that is, to the effects 
of interactions between organizations and the state. More specifically, environment refers to "those 
external events, actions and constraints occurring as a direct or indirect result of the organization of 
persons seeking to rule a particular domain, usually geographic in nature. The theoretical lens thus 
focuses on the polity, an organization designed to obtain compliance, even in the face of resistance 
... An ecological view of this environment pays attention to those phenomena that affect populations 
of organizations rather than individual organizations" (Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein 1988:361). 
The political environment consists, on the one hand, of global and local institutions which indirectly 
affect organizations by promoting cultural and structural models which claim their allegiance. On the 
other hand the state clearly increasingly and directly affects the types and structures of organizations 
through a progressive embodiment of central ideologies in legislation. For instance, the requirement 
in the Labour Equity Bill .that all organizations in South Africa above a certain size must reflect the 
racial composition of the population will radically alter the structures of organizations. Depending on 
how this law is policed, the number of organizations in a given organizational population may also be 
limited. My approach goes beyond that of Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein (1988:361), who concentrate 
on "structural relationships between polities and populations of organizations". Unlike them, I include 
"the ideological content of specific regimes". 
My argument in this chapter is in fact very straightforward. I maintain that the world system functions· 
as an institutional environment which affects language status at the global level, thus establishing 
English, the language of former and current hegemonic core states, as high language across the world 
system. Through global norms which affect the rational organization of nation-states the global status 
of English is institutionalized (sometimes unofficially) in the nation-building projects of many countries. 
core states as well as peripheries and semiperipheries, thus affecting language configurations in 
societies and in their subnational institutions and organizations. A global language system operates as 
part of a transnational system, another way in which culture contributes to the stratification and 
integration of world society. 
On the one hand the world-economy stratifies world society in such a way that the commodities of 
1 I am grateful to John Boli for pointing this out. 
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former world system hegemons (the UK, then the USA2) have become dominant across the 
semi periphery and periphery. This is not to deny that reciprocal influences from the periphery also do 
affect the core, nor that the periphery does not also contribute to world culture. I merely highlight 
cultural hegemony as most relevant to analysis of my data. The world-capitalist system often requires 
trade to be conducted in the supracentral language of the core, and aid agreements to be concluded 
in favour of the same language, namely English. On the other hand the norms circulating within the 
world-polity require that nation-states acknowledge and protect constitutionally the diversity of its 
peoples. Thus two ideologies have been established within the world system which in linguistic terms 
simultaneously promote monolingualism and multilingualism, homogeneity and heterogeneity, as well 
as hybridity. 
The global status of world languages is institutionalized at the societal level through several processes, 
primarily nation-building, and through several systems, primarily education - and, in this instance, 
religion. To be more precise, societal processes and systems reflect an attempt by state managers, 
elites, organizations (local and transnational), to institutionalize both diversity and unity in the form of, 
say, multilingualism and monolingualism. In organizational terms this paradoxical process has two 
effects: (a) loose coupling occurs between state policies and state conduct; and (b) (indirect) coercive 
isomorphism happens; that is, the norms circulating within the world system are institutionalized by 
state policies, which form a normative environment to which intrasocietal organizations must adjust. 
Institutional isomorphism thus explains the transnational diffusion of norms from the global to the 
societal levels as well as intranational diffusion of norms between institutions within societies. 
Subsequently language policies and practices of various states will be similar, just as within a particular 
society those of a state may converge with those of schools and churches. The state plays a central 
role in this diffusion process, as it adjusts to external rules and in turn institutionalizes them in 
constitutions and policies which affect societal organizations internally. With regards to the latter 
dynamic, Meyer (1983) argues "that organizations display structural features isomorphic with those 
of the state under which they exist" (Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein 1988:369). 
What general constraints occur in the political environment which can affect organizations? Meyer 
treats rationalization as central construct, which occurs "in organizational form or in the general 
culture". Rationalization "institutionalizes in society structures that both make organizing possible and 
constrain it". A pattern of organizing within a particular society "is a product of the structural elements 
that are institutionalized in society. Organizations are built up of these elements, but also constrained 
to employ them or take them for granted, which limits the possibilities for organizational structure and 
action" (Meyer 1983:272). 
2 There is some debate about whether the US is still a hegemon, or is a hegmon in decline. 
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The argument so far allows me to return to the issue of glocalization. I argue not that the global 
(norms, structures supporting language status) affects the local (language practice in congregations) 
directly, but instead emphasise that the state - the very organization accorded legitimacy and authority 
by the world system to act on behalf of societies - mediates global institutions. Evidence from other 
former African colonies, particularly those previously under British rule, suggests that official 
acknowledgement of multilingualism is required by global norms, as instituted in transnational 
organizations like the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. Yet at the same time 
communication with the core is required to be conducted in the global language of trade and 
commerce, namely English. At a secondary level it is important to recognize that the religious 
institutions (e.g. churches) also function as transnational organizations, and so should be expected to 
relay norms operating at the global level but which also affect their societies of origin, e.g. the UK and 
the USA. 
1. THE WORLD SYSTEM AS MACRO-ENVIRONMENT WHICH CONSTRAINS AND ENABLES 
LANGUAGE INTEGRATION 
The world system is taken as comprising at least the outcome of the globalizations of capitalism and 
of those institutions which regulate the interstate system. I also argue that these forces established 
the status of world languages, but particularly of English. As a result the world-economy is relevant 
in a discussion of language usage in South Africa, as it articulates with the dominance of English. The 
various subsections here take their cues from some of the structural features of the global formation, 
including the global division of labour, state development (nation-building), economic activities, and 
cultural hegemony. 
Subsection 1.1 is not a reprise of the structures of the world system, by itself the most global of all 
macro-constraints on linguistic integration, but places South Africa in focus. The global division of 
labour is effected through the nation-state as distributive unit. 
As a result the location of South Africa in the semiperiphery is crucial to an understanding of how the 
world system effects this society. Milkman (1979:264) argued that South Africa is "least satisfactorily 
dealt with" in world-economic literature, a point still generally true in terms of volume, if not 
substance. Very few local or international academics apply a world-systems perspective to this 
country. William Martin claimed in 1 990 that not a single book was "written in the last two decades 
... that seriously treats the country from a dependency, dependent-development, or world-systems 
perspective" (Martin 1990c:204). Martin's assertion is only diluted a little by the appearance of Vieira, 
Martin, and Wallerstein'S How fast the wind? (1992), which included several substantive chapters on 
South Africa but as part of a broader, sub-regional analysis. With the exception of Martin's sustained 
output (1984, 1986, 1987, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c, Wallerstein & Martin 1979, Thomas & Martin 
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1992), other examples remain few and far between, such as Arrighi (1979)'s thoughts on South 
Africa's peripheralization, or Ehrensaft (1976)'s comments on South Africa's dependent development 
in the world-economy. As a result I am forced to rely heavily on Milkman (1979)' Martin (1990, 1992), 
and Wallerstein & Vieira (1992). 
The number of local social science scholars who apply world-system analysis to South Africa are as 
few and far between as their international counterparts. Among the handful that I could locate is Johan 
Graaff (1990)'s critique of Wallerstein's notion of system, which uses South African examples. 
Jonathan Jansen (1991) reflected on knowledge production in the centre and periphery, using world-
system concepts. Both Graaff and Jansen, like myself, refer to the intra-national replication of the 
world system within South Africa. Few dissertations address the topic; I could locate only one, a 
Master's thesis on democratization in peripheral states (Keulder 1995). From within government 
quarters the Department of Foreign Affairs, for example, issued a parliamentary media briefing on 
South Africa's new place in the world (Foreign Affairs 1997). A number of anthologies have appeared 
which focus on South Africa's economic position in the world system, most recently from an 
international relations viewpoint (Handley & Mills 1996). 
A list of academic texts on South Africa in which globalization features as central construct is only 
slightly more extensive. These include my work on globalization and world-system influences on the 
formation of African Indigenous Churches (Venter 1998), Russon (1995)'s discussion of intrastate 
boundary disputes, Van de Walle (1997)'s reflection on globalization and democracy in Africa, and 
Coetzee and Wood (1993)'s comparative work on group identity formation in South Africa and 
Yugoslavia. The sparseness of sociological reflection on globalization contrasts sharply with the volume 
of articles on the subject in the popular press. 
But location should not only be read off from economic integration, but also from cultural integration 
into globalized norms. The latter requires state self-development (nation-building) as the legitimated 
process of achieving progress and justice. States are authorised to integrate diverse groups as the 
nation, defined as "constituent citizens of the modern state system" (Williams 1991 :4). World political 
culture requires states to devise and implement policies, usually reflected in constitutions, which deal 
with cultural and linguistic diversity. 
The world-polity arguments of Meyer, Boli and colleagues utilize institutional theory by extending 
concepts usually applied to organizations to the global realm. Boli suggests that the world-polity 
approach represents a type of neo-institutionalism, in which social action is regarded as the 
"enactment of broad cultural models - of individuals, organizations, states, and goals" with little 
"genuine departures from social prescriptions". The basis of the world-polity is a world culture, 
"fundamental assumptions about social reality". While global structures have an economic dimension, 
they are actually undergirded by institutional (cultural) structures, "which are universalistic in the sense 
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that they proclaim their applicability to all human experience and societies" (Boli 1999). 
Subsection 1 .2 outlines the economic activities and institutional norms within the world system which 
support the rise and ultimate status of English as the global language. The extension of economic 
dominance by former English-speaking core powers such as Britain and the United States of America 
was accompanied by cultural hegemony, including the religions and languages of the core. 
Subsection 1.3. considers how the global status of English and its supportive ideologies affect the 
socio-linguistic configuration of contemporary semiperipheral and peripheral states - such as African 
societies (Goke-Pariola 1993:18). Despite the waning of former core states and the ongoing attempts 
at restructuring the world system into a multipolar and multicultural entity, these effects continue. 
1 .1 The structure of the world system with reference to South Africa's location 
South Africa is clearly well-integrated into the global economy as a semiperiphery and into the world-
polity as a modern state, as befits a country with a long history of global and regional interaction. 
I describe the factors that indicate South Africa's location in the world-economy in detail, compared 
to a more general reprise of its integration into the world-polity, dealt with extensively and specifically 
in the section on nation-building in South Africa in Chapter Five. Next I briefly outline the relevance 
of structure and location in the world system, as a macro-environment, for language ideology and 
practice, a theme taken up again in subsection 1.2. 
As indicated above, I treat world-polity and world-economy as making up a single environment, and 
so make explicit my assumption that culture and economics are related in the world system. In De 
Swaan (1994)'s words: in "the transnational context, cultural practices are embedded in networks of 
economic exchange and political interdependence, all the while being contested and contentious, 
accommodating and subversive, emanating from core areas to peripheries". 
1.1.1 South Africa's incorporation of world-polity norms 
The construction of a nation on the basis of non-racialism is central to this discussion. Nation-building 
through development was especially encouraged in the now dispersed Reconstruction and 
Development Programme. Equally, nation-building was served by the final Constitution - as in the 
Interim one - at the political level, and by the Bill of Rights at the judicial level. From its inception the 
ANC has promoted a national instead of "tribal" consciousness in a unified state as a sign of "liberation 
and social advance" (Slovo, 1988:145). An emphasis on regional or cultural "exceptionalism" is 
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denounced as "an instrument of colonial, neo-colonial, or minority domination" (Slovo, 1988:145). 
Global awareness, transnational economic exchange, and the constraints and benefits of global norms 
have been part of South Africa's collective consciousness for over three hundred years. No doubt this 
has engendered a deep openness to giobal influences, as demonstrated by the country's early 
involvement in transnational organizations, such as the League of Nations. 
Among black South Africans the awareness of global interconnectedness emerged from the encounter 
with other Africans, Arabs, and Europeans as slavers, traders, colonists, administrators, and 
missionaries. During the colonial period the desire for foreign intervention into an oppressive situation 
was stimulated by events like the Crimean War. Russians, Americans, and the British were regarded 
at various historical points as potential military saviours. Black South Africans also participated in 
conflicts that involved global powers, throwing in their lot on both sides of two Anglo-Boer Wars, and 
on the Allied side during the two World Wars. 
Global consciousness among whites is no doubt related to their European origin, and the extensive ties 
that some still maintain with particularly Great Britain. South Africa was - and now is again - a 
prominent member of the Commonwealth (of former British colonies). At various points linkages were 
sought and established with e.g. nazi-Germany before the second world war, while South African 
volunteers participated in many theatres of world and proxy wars of the hegemonic states, for example 
in Korea. Sporting contests between South Africa and other countries also doubtless contributed, and 
date back to the 19th century. 
Apart from various colonial administrative structures, religious institutions constitute some of the 
earliest globalized organizations which linked South Africans to the rest of the world transnationally. 
On the one hand a strong European and missionary presence led to the establishment of education 
institutions which promoted "civilized" Western notions and economic practices. On the other hand 
indigenous appropriations of Christianity in the form of African Zionist churches were exported to other 
Southern African states. 
Historically South African liberation movements have long drawn upon pan-African and universal 
human rights notions, as revealed in the African National Congress' Freedom Charter (1955). This 
demonstrates a linkage to the then emergent human rights regime centred on the UN Charter of 1945. 
Global and regional interconnectedness increased rapidly along the liberative axis after these 
movements were banned in 1960. The role of the international connections of political parties like the 
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SA Communist Party (SACP) should not be forgotten. The origin of non-racialism3 lies within "the 
internationalist SACP tradition" of the 1920s, the SACP's 1924 decision to recruit blacks, and is based 
on a inclusive universalism (see Siovo, 1990; Adam, 1994:45; Filatova, 1994:55; O'Malley, 1994:78; 
Ellis & Sechaba, 1992: 15,42). The training of guerillas in all parts of the world, particularly the former 
USSR was a contributive factor. In addition many who went into exile were educated in diverse places 
like the United Kingdom, the USA, Cuba, and Eastern Europe. Some of the resulting influences can be 
traced in the policy and language debates outside South Africa prior to "the great shift" between the 
unbanning of liberation movements in 1990 and first general elections in 1994, as indicated in Chapter 
Five. Support for the liberation movements was obtained from other states, international organizations, 
subnational states, and individual cities. 
Along another axis global and regional interconnectedness decreased rapidly subsequent to the events 
which lead to the 1976 uprisings. While South Africa continued to be the object of negative global 
attention from both the nation-state system and from global institutions (for example the United 
Nations, the World Court, and the World Council of Churches) the country was gradually excised from 
participation in many of these forums. This doubtless reinforced awareness of global norms and the 
cost of ignoring them. 
Given the above dynamics, it is not difficult to conclude that South Africa is quite closely intertwined 
with the global norms that structure the world-polity. Meyer has suggested that "precisely because 
so many of its older institutions were delegitimated, the high forms of modernity may have great 
relative standing". Closeness to world society should be qualified as relative to local capacity to resist 
the power and legitimacy of world models. South Africa, like Namibia, lacks the proximity to world 
centres of states such as Sweden, and so has even less capacity to resist (Meyer 1999). 
How does South Africa's incorporation of global norms affect the language configuration? Meyer 
suggests that more support for local languages would have been available if these had not been "so 
delegitimated by very recent history". He argues that two forces in particular move towards 
establishing a strong consensus favouring English. The first is "the very problematic status of Afrikaans 
as an alternative"; the second "the use of the local languages by South Africa as a 
now-highly-delegitimated strategy of subordination". Meyer points out that "in Namibia these two 
forces produced a strong consensus for English despite the very low level of utilization of English in 
the actual population. I visited many classrooms (in the north) where teacher and students were trying 
3 • Introduced by SACP members into the ANC lexicon by the early 1950s, non-racialism was used as an ideological 
tool by the SACP to silence opposition to its plans for advancing non-African members into ANC leadership from within 
ethnically-based segments within the ANC. This was the case at the ANC's 1962consultative conference at Morogoro 
in Tanzania, where non-racialism was used to prize open the ANC's membership to all races, as at Kabwe (O'Malley, 
1994:78; Ellis & Sechaba, 1992:54-56). Far from being a neutral concept, non-racialism was used by the SACP to 
overcome the ANC's previously Africanist policies, and to obtain more control within the ANC (O'Malley, 1994:78; 
Ellis & Sechaba, 1992: 150). 
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without competence to function in English, and who clearly ... saw this as not only legally required 
but ideologically correct too n (Meyer 1999). 
While South Africa's multilingual language policies reflect global idealised norms of human rights, 
monolingual language practice4 illustrate the local effects of global language ideologies. In addition 
nation-building in the African context provides a regional habit of orientation towards European 
languages, and in particular towards English. Ramirez' (1987:326) suggestion, that the number of 
nation-states which adopt particular practices or structures predict the direction of isomorphism, 
appears to be borne out in Africa. Differences between state language policy and practice can also be 
viewed as loose coupling, a theme expanded in more detail in Section 4, below. 
I do not argue that world ideology directly affects local congregations, but rather that global norms 
affect the state-building project in terms of the direction taken by language practice ideology, which 
are reflected in the dynamics of congregations, as in education. 
1.1.2 South Africa's integration into the world-economy 
In what follows I draw on a comparison with other countries which are presently considered part of 
the semiperiphery to help substantiate my argument. Attention to historical periods is as crucial in any 
discussion about how to locate South Africa, and to the region (Africa) and sub-region (Southern 
Africa) to which it belongs. 
During its colonial history South Africa was incorporated into the world system as part of the 
periphery. According to Wallerstein, one of the primary indicators of periphery status is the 
overwhelming dependence of an economy on exports of raw material to the core. Milkman (1979) has 
drawn attention to colonial South Africa's exportation of raw materials (gold formed 60% of exports 
between 1909-1937) and importation of consumer goods. Different roles existed for non-mining settler 
capitalists and mining settler capitalists in the transition towards a semiperiphery (Milkman 
1979:269)5. Mining capitalists were mainly British, and engaged in a struggle with non-mining 
capitalists (mainly Afrikaner) to control the economy. During the pre-Second World War period mining 
capitalists were ascendant, but their influence declined directly afterwards. The efforts of non-mining 
capitalists eventually led to economic diversification in the form of a secondary (industrial) sector. 
Foreign investment in mining before the pre-Second World War period amounted to 60% of all 
4 The irony of state practices is that during negotiations on the final constitution it was the previous regime, in the 
form of the National Party, who insisted on monolingual education clauses, while the ANC fought for multilingual 
clauses (Ebrahim 1998:206). 
5. For contrary argument see Kruss (1985). 
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investments between 1909-1937. By 1979, 40% of all foreign capital was in manufacturing (Milkman 
1979:266-267,272) . 
South Africa moved into the semiperiphery around the time of the Second World Wars, aided by 
several factors. These include a global depression (or Kondratieff B-phase) which lasted from 1913/20-
1945 in the world-economy; "rivalry in the interstate system"; South Africa's role in the global division 
of labour (as main producer of gold); and the coming to power of a white minority (Martin 1990c:219; 
Wallerstein & Vieira 1992:5; Milkman 1979:262). After 1948 a manufacturing industry developed, 
supported by direct foreign investment, restrictions on consumer imports alongside an import 
substitution industry, and importation of capital goods (Milkman 1979:261,266-7). Yet, by 1972,60% 
of all exports continued to be of raw materials, of which 37% was gold (Milkman 1979:272). Milkman 
concludes that South Africa is a semiperiphery because it manifests continued technological 
dependence on advanced capitalist countries (Milkman 1979:262). 
South Africa's stature as semiperiphery is confirmed by both Milkman and Martin, even though they 
used different methodologies more than a decade apart. Milkman deduces the country's location from 
the extent of core states' investment in that country, from imports by the late 1970s, and from South 
Africa's exports to Africa (about 15% of total exports). South Africa supplied "about 80% of the trade 
in the southern Africa region". Up to 1976 Britain was the single largest importer to South Africa, but 
was overtaken by the U.S. (Milkman 1979:274). Martin (1990c) uses a global and regional 
comparative perspective, which tracks South Africa's trajectory against core states and against other 
semi-peripheries, as reported below. In the debate about whether the apartheid regime was upheld by 
foreign investment, Milkman and Martin offer two slightly different answers. While Martin (1990c), 
like Milkman, accepts that a link exists between the apartheid regime and South Africa's improvement 
in the world-economy (compare Wallerstein & Vieira 1992), he argues that apartheid increasingly 
disadvantaged the country's potential during the 1970s. 
From the mid-1960s to mid-1970s the hegemony of the USA "significantly constrained any further 
movement towards core status in the world-economy". Agreements with the International Monetary 
Fund and the Global Agreement on Trade & Tariffs prevented further protectionist policies and 
development of an export trade (Martin 1990c:216). The inflow of direct foreign investment stifled 
technological innovation while multinationals blocked exports. As a result, domination of the 
surrounding peripheries increased, with exports of "industrial goods for regional primary goods" - so 
that apartheid became a regional construct, through which a hierarchy of labour and production was 
established, "linked by flows of labor, capital, and commodities". "To a degree rare among members 
6 According to Milkman, South Africa's movement happened during and after the Second World War, but Martin 
comments that South Africa was restructured during the interwar period, with the Southern African sub-region 
restructured after the War. 
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of the semiperipheral zone, South Africa's position in core-peripheral networks was founded upon the 
emergence of a distinctive region of the world-economy" (Martin 1990c:217). 
The general consensus that South Africa is part of the semiperiphery in the world-economy is not 
unproblematic. After all, this perception was coined in the 1970s and accepted until the late 1980s, 
so is it still valid at the end of the millennium? Has the change in political regime - manifested in 1990 
and effected in the 1994 election - affected South Africa's location in the world system? If so, 
positively or negatively? In short, is South Africa an ascendent or a declining semiperiphery? 
Wallerstein (1979b) stated that nation-states which are semi-peripheries because they are ascending 
in the world system will look different from declining semi-peripheries. Presumably, because they 
assume more characteristics of core states while descending semiperipheries exhibit increasingly more 
characteristics of peripheries. 
As part of problematizing the notion of South Africa's status, one should note its regional location, and 
the strategies used to move into the semi periphery. Semi peripheries may differ qualitatively from one 
another, depending on the location of their region in the world-economy. South Africa is a 
semiperiphery in Africa, a region which is part of the periphery. Secondly, the strategies utilised by 
peripheral countries to move to the semiperiphery may result in qualitatively different types of 
semiperipheries, manifested in social or political structure (Milkman 1979:264). At least three 
strategies exist by which peripheral countries can move to the semiperiphery, namely import-
substitution during world-economic contraction, as happened in South Africa; invitation during periods 
of world-economic expansion, for example the Ivory Coast; and self-reliance, e.g. China (Wallerstein 
1974:9-16, according to Milkman 1979:282 footnote 2). The differences can be illustrated by 
reference to the polarized nature of Brazilian society, or the state socialism of China (Milkman 
1979:264). 
At the end of the millennium, indicators of South Africa's status are ambiguous, with internal self-
perception differing from external interpretations. The current image projected by the South African 
state, business, and media is of a semiperiphery. State policies map out a high-wage, high-technology 
route, supported by a discourse of global competitiveness (compare Nattrass 1994). Greater 
integration into the world-economy is firmly supported by the business sector. An argument for 
semiperiphery status is supported by renewed South African exploitation of other Sub-Saharan nation-
states, while it continues to be exploited by the core. Some South African textile industries are 
exploiting lower minimum wages in neighbouring countries such as Malawi, and chain stores are 
expanding into Africa, opening branches in Uganda (Shoprite) and Ghana (Pep Stores). During the 
1970s South Africa behaved towards other nation-states in southern Africa as though it was part of 
the core; and treated these states as though it was the centre and they its hinterland (Wallerstein & 
Vieira 1992:12: Martin 1992:35). 
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Some core agencies create perceptions which appear to ascribe peripheral status to South Africa. 
Investment analysts like Standard and Poore grade South Africa in the same risk category as Russia, 
and rates the country's economy as on par with other crises-stricken emerging markets. A Purchasing 
Power Parity index was published recently by The Economist on 29 countries, which measures 
whether currencies are under- or overvalued against the dollar (Sunday Times, Business Times section, 
20 December 1998:1). South Africa was rated in the bottom third of the table, below Thailand and 
Poland; above Hong Kong, Hungary, Philippines, Russia, China, and Malaysia (in that order). The South 
African currency, which continues to be devalued, is considered to be 45% undervalued against the 
dollar. 
I argue that the ambiguity and historical trajectory of indicators suggest that South Africa is a 
semi periphery in decline. A downward slide can be explained in terms of Milkman's hypothesis that 
more progressive regimes lose favour with global capital. Milkman notes that South Africa in the 1970s 
was a dependent industrializing country, aided by a racial division of labour, with an internal dualism 
between highly developed urban areas and underdeveloped rural peripheries. She argues that this 
situation was in/directly supported by foreign capital7 , as evident from an increase in U.S direct 
investment in the six years following the Sharpeville massacre of 1960 (Milkman 1979: 281). 
International capital desires "stable" economies in the semiperiphery, and so encourages strong 
suppressive regimes there (a la Meyer) to provide class-based alliances between core and 
semiperiphery elites. Milkman (1979:281) concluded in 1979 that "South Africa's apartheid system 
is bolstered by its location within the world-economy". 
Others confirm a characterisation of South Africa as a semiperiphery in decline (Martin 1992, 1990c; 
Thomas & Martin 1992; McGowan 1993). Overall, the southern African region retained its position 
relative to the core in the world-economy during the post-1945 upturn (which lasted from 1945-
1967173) but declined since the 1970s, coinciding with the next B-phase in the world-economy 
(compare Wallerstein & Vieira 1992:5). Yet measured against other semiperipheries, South Africa 
shows a slide which started about 1973, coinciding with the current B-phase in the world-economy. 
While all semi-peripheries were affected, some moved ahead of South Africa during this period; e.g. 
South Korea. In part this is due to the political turmoil across the southern Africa region, but also to 
shifts in the global division of labour. During the downturn, core states shed manufacturing to the 
semiperiphery, so that some who were well-positioned did in fact benefit during this period. In terms 
of growth rate per capita semi-peripheries like Taiwan and South Korea moved beyond South Africa. 
South Africa's manufacturing (measured as employment across all economic sectors) declined over 
the same period. 
7 For a contrasting argument, i.e. that globalization supports democracy, see Van de Walle (1997). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Language integration in a world system perspective 177 
1.2 The status of English in the global language system of the world system: core cultural hegemony 
and glocal language statuses 
Having established that South Africa is firmly embedded in the world systemS, I will now indicate the 
implications for language usage. I argue that the status of a language depends on its status in the 
world system, which is partly linked to the position that its speakers occupied - or occupy - within the 
world-economy. 
1.2.1 English as supercentral language in the world language system 
De Swaan (1989, 1994) intimated that a major aspect of transnational society is an emergent world 
language system, which consists of twelve central languages dominated by English. Chinese, Arabic, 
Russian, Hindi, Indonesian (Malaysian), Spanish, French, English each has "well over hundred million 
speakers and each connect a series of languages that are central at the national level. Portuguese, 
German and Japanese have a comparable number of speakers but perform less of an interlinguistic 
connecting function. Swahili, while less numerous, fulfils important functions of transnational 
communication. Together, these twelve languages allow direct access to some 60% of the world's 
citizens." They act as "central codes for dozens of other, national languages, and many of these are 
in turn in a central position with respect to several regional languages or dialects n. One can speak of 
a world language system "because interdependences exist between languages of the world. The 
mechanisms driving interdependence consists of bilingualism and translation through which speakers 
interact" (De Swaan 1994). 
Most of the central languages owe their status to imperialism, trade, or warfare, which are also 
responsible for the exponential growth of language interactions. In non-English countries the 
dominance of English is associated with colonial dominance and the concomitant used of English by 
subsequent governments (cf. Conrad & Fishman 1977). The four features associated with the spread 
of imperial languages (military conquest and subsequent enduring occupation, accompanied by the 
imposition of imperial administration over a multilingual context, and the opportunity of gaining material 
advantages through the imperial language) are not necessarily all relevant in explaining the global 
dominance of English. To these could be added urbanization, economic development (especially 
exports to English-speaking countries), educational attainment, religious composition, and political 
affiliation, among others (Fishm~n, Cooper & Rosenbaum 1977). 
When the dominance of English is superimposed onto the hierarchical geographical ordering of the 
8 Other data could have been used to establish South Africa's incorporation into the world system, such as trade 
data or membership in international nongovernmental organizations. 
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world-economy as De Swaan implies, it becomes clear that it is the language of two former core states 
- the former hegemon, Britain, and the more recently dominant USA - which is the "supercentral" 
language. The pre-eminent status of English as global language (Crystal 1997) is confirmed by its 
global reach as official language in 36 countries out of 152 listed in 1975: as sole official language in 
21 countries, and co-official language in another 15 (Conrad & Fishman 1977:7). In addition, "in all 
supranational languages bilingual speakers exist who are competent in English" (De Swaan 1989). 
In De Swaan's hierarchical global model, speakers of peripheral languages will generally "choose to 
learn the central language rather than any peripheral language, since that is the language from which 
translation to every other peripheral and the next higher central language is available". However, 
"speakers of only the central language do not gain much by learning a second language themselves, 
but do profit when others, peripheral language speakers, learn their language and in so doing also 
increase the formers' opportunities for direct communication and passive translation". As Mazrui 
(1990) has argued, global stratification is at least in part linked to language and culture. 
The explanation of the dominance of English is incomplete without attention to two related issues, 
namely the expansion of cultural hegemony through economic means, and of Western education 
systems as part of development. English is often promoted through education itself, as a subject or 
teaching medium. Most textbooks used in universities are also only available in English. 
Culture and development cannot easily be separated. Fardon & Furniss insist that "all development" 
is embedded in language. For example, all economic activity takes place "under particular conditions 
of language", whether "the language of farm or factory or financial institution" (Fardon & Furniss 
1 994: 1 9). Thus the global status of English hinges both on the world-economy and world-polity. From 
this perspective language status in South Africa is a direct reflection of the language situation in the 
world system, and in the global hierarchy of languages, so that language ideology locally is tied to the 
global language ideology. 
As the world-economy is dialectically linked to cultural change, cultural hegemony accompanies the 
expansion of the world capitalist system. Commercial exchange (e.g. the production and consumption 
of Western mass culture) often requires the use of English, which is also often tied to aid packages 
(Mazrui 1997). The initial expansion of the world-economy and its need for cheap migratory labour was 
sustained by "development" and a concomitant drive towards modernization. The world-economy with 
the nation-state as primary unit in the division of labour divides the world into "developed" and 
"underdeveloped" countries, dominated by a USA-European Communities-Japan triad (cf. Jessop e.a. 
1993:228). 
Development in turn was accompanied by the globalization of education, intended as a system of 
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social control9 , by which cultural hegemony is established by the state over its subjects. De Swaan 
(1989) has shown with reference to Europe that mass education served to cement and expand central 
languages into universal languages in a particular society. Similarly, in former colonies, the central 
language happens to be the former colonial language, "taught to students and officials from all regions 
under the colonial administration". The colonial language helped "to unite persons from very different 
ethnic and linguistic background" and was used "as the language of the anti-colonial opposition which 
in many cases took over state power after liberation". But although the supercentral language is also 
"the medium for intellectuals and scientists in the territory", it usually far from universally distributed 
throughout the country. 
Within each nation-state, education serves to structure the division of labour between the bureaucrats 
and technocrats essential for the functioning of the state within the world-system, and the rest, who 
are marginalised. This is particularly true when education is presented through a non-indigenous 
medium of instruction such as English (Tollefson 1991). The role of education in promoting English in 
the colonial period up to the mid-twentieth century, and the use of the apartheid state to promote 
Afrikaans as national language, was noted in the section on nation-building in South Africa (2.2.4, 
above). 
Another way in which English, education, and development coincides is through aid packages which 
ties development to educational language programmes. English Second Language or English as Foreign 
Language programmes mostly devalue local languages by promoting subtractive bilingualism (Heugh 
1995:330). Literacy programmes aimed at the socio-economic development of e.g. the agricultural 
sector are among the major socio-historical forces affecting language attitudes in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Goke-Pariola 1993:32,39,41). An analysis of the activities of the Ford Foundations and USAID has 
shown that '''education plays a crucial role in the organization of the market as colony .... Without 
mass education the market system of the corporations cannot function effectively either in terms of 
the jobs it creates or the consumption patterns it establishes'", e.g. a market for schoolchildren's 
uniforms (Goke-Pariola 107, quoting Chinweizu 1975:335,338'°). 
Tollefson contends that a world system "that is more just and equitable depends upon an 
understanding of how people can gain control of their own institutions. A key issue is the role of 
language in organizing and reproducing those institutions" (Tollefson 1991 :201). When English 
"becomes the lingua franca of a community, an English mother tongue-speaker is seldom under any 
9 While some may object to this perspective, the intended purpose of education under the British colonial regime, 
as under Afrikaner apartheid ideologues, was to turn the population into co-operative subjects who embraced the core 
cultural and political values of the state. By this I do not deny that education also had the largely unintended side 
effect of proving useful in liberative struggles. 
10. Chinweizu 1975. The West and the rest of us: white predators, Black slavers, and the African elite. New York 
: Random House. 
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form of pressure to become proficient in any of the other local or national languages. Such a person 
will most probably expect people with any other mother tongue to switch to English when the 
company is bi- or multilingual. It may even be that the monolingual person wonders at the inability of 
bilingual people to use the lingua franca appropriately" (Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:72). 
1.2.2 Language, cultural hegemony and religion 
Like language, religion is an institution closely linked to socio-political structures, which in turn are. 
sensitive to ideas generated and accepted globally (e.g. "development"). Understanding the importance 
of English in South African religious systems requires a perception of how historical changes in e.g. 
African cultural and religious identities relates to the world system. In contrast to the communal 
orientation of African world views, the world-political culture promotes and encourages the 
institutionalisation of individualism through state structures and through the activities of 
non-governmental organisations - such as development organisations (Robertson 1992: 1 05). 
Proliferation of aid and literacy programmes also indicate multiplication of international non-
governmental agencies (INGOs), one of the criteria of integration into world-polity. 
Not only do social, political, and economic factors playa role in promoting a particular language and 
in affecting types of religious organization, but these factors are underpinned by global forces. I have 
tried to show elsewhere (Venter 1998) that mainstream Christianity contributed to the establishment 
of a global European cultural hegemony, opposed symbolically by the emergence of local religious 
identities (like Zionism). But even local developments were constrained by the global system, so that 
even Zionism have to refer to the global; i.e.incorporate aspects of global Christianity. 
Of particular relevance to my study is the findings of Fishman, Cooper & Rosenbaum (1977) which 
concern the role of religion in advancing or delaying the advancement of English. Fishman e.a. 
(1977: 1 05) concluded that religious composition was among the two most important categories in 
predicting the status of English in former English colonies. These scholars found that the occurrence 
of traditional belief systems were substantially correlated to the presence of English as medium of 
instruction in primary and secondary schools - even when former Anglophone colonies were excluded; 
probably as result of low rates of economic development (Fishman, Cooper & Rosenbaum 1977:95-6). 
Peter Smith (1 986) has theorized that religion is strengthened inside a core state as that state achieves 
hegemony within the world system. Subsequently the core state extends its religious system to the 
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periphery 11. The dominance of religion within the world system is tied to the fortunes of its core state 
of origin. The dominance of Christianity in sub-saharan Africa is thus the residue of the core states that 
dominated this region. 
Economic forces are primarily responsible for the achievement or loss of hegemony. A state that seeks 
hegemony has to gain a competitive advantage in agricultural and industrial production on the world 
market, followed by commercial and financial advantage. Historica"y, these advantages coincide with 
such a state achieving military superiority. Once a state dominates the world market, it seeks to keep 
barriers to world trade to a minimum so that it can freely sell its goods. At the same time it tries to 
force its competitors to give up their control of trade with their former colonies. A hegemonic state 
loses its productive advantage through a combination of factors, such as heavy military spending to 
ensure the international order; high domestic wages to placate its own labour force; "under-investment 
in new technology and in the educational and research facilities. During periods of struggle, 
competitors try to extend their power over the periphery to "secure their own economic zones". This 
usually results in war. A state rival could also gain the upper hand through innovation (inventing new 
forms of technology) (Smith 1986:90). 
Hegemonic states need to generate such ideologies and institutions as they think is necessary in order 
to get and maintain hegemony. Smith argues that religion is a significant part (although not the only 
part) of an "ideological expression of well-being" which is shared among the upper and middle classes 
which benefit from their state's dominance. Churches which cater for these classes flourish in periods 
of dominance, and subside in periods of decline. Establishment religiosity is part of the dominant class 
ideology, which maintains the position of one class over others, ensures its internal unity, defines the 
differences between classes, and controls how property is owned and passed on. 'Early' capitalism 
"was supported by an ideology stressing individual moral responsibility, self-regulation and ... 
conscience". The religious element of this ideology supported the need for middle and upper classes 
to participate in religion "as an expression of 'respectability' and propriety". But ~"Iate' or monopoly 
capitalism appears to require little ideological legitimation or coherence", content to rely on a mixture 
of elements and an "ethic of consumerism", and so "would be expected to be associated with the 
decline or privatization of religion" (Smith 1986:91). 
The dominance of religion within the world system waxes and wanes with the fortunes of its core 
state, as it does within that state. For example, Britain's global political and economic decline was 
matched by a decrease in the public religiosity of its dominant classes. Upper and middle class 
11 Smith's ideas have been evaluated and criticized in Burdick & Hammond (1991). They provide a long-term 
analysis of the number of mission workers sent out by British and American mainline churches, and conclude that 
Smith thesis needs to be revised, as mainline mission workers have decreased since 1960, but contrary to the 
implications of Smith's interpretations, the number of evangelical non-mainline missionaries have actually increased 
since then. 
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membership in major Protestant churches steadily increased between 1830 and 1870 from 16.6% to 
20.1 % of the adult population, which started declining sometime "after the onset of the Boer War 
(1899-1902). People started turning to new religious movements, while in Ireland, Wales and Scotland 
religious involvement increased and reinforced the separatist nationalism there (Smith 1986:93). 
During British religious decline, religious participation among the populations of Britain's rival states 
(Germany and the USA) were expanding. In Germany, participation in basic Christian rituals (baptism, 
marriage, confirmation and burial) increased in the period before the First World War, and political 
leaders proclaimed themselves Christian. Many Christians were in favour of German expansionism, and 
"most of the leading theologians enthusiastically endorsed the German war effort" in 1914. 
Meanwhile, in the USA church membership almost doubled between 1865 (25%) and 1915 (45%) 
(Smith 1986:94). With the dominance of the three Protestant nations came increased opportunity for 
missionary activity (Smith 1986:95). By contrast, the decline of the USA after 1945 is paralleled by 
a similar decrease in establishment religiosity (Smith 1986:88). 
With the decline of British hegemony in the world system from 1870 onwards, a global conflict ensued 
to establish a new dominant state in the core 12 • The result was the First World War, which led to the 
defeat of Germany and the weakening of Britain. Although "no new stable international order was 
established to replace the old", the USA emerged stronger and wealthier. During the transition in the 
world system between the First (1914-1918) and Second World War (1939-1945), the three states 
tried to protect their economies against one another and to extend their political power across the 
globe (Smith 1986:96). Religious involvement declined further in Germany and Britain; and eventually 
also in the USA due to the isolationist policies of its leaders and the Great Depression of the 1929. 
People who felt marginalised began to identify more with the pentecostal subculture. When the USA 
re-entered world affairs and stabilised its economy in the 1930s, religious affiliation increased from 
45% (1935) to over 50% (1945) (Smith 1986:97). 
After World War Two the global order consisted of the communist East and the capitalist West, with 
the USA dominant in the world system from about 1 946 to 1 963. Many countries formed military 
alliances with the USA, and many had American military bases established in them (Smith 1986:98). 
In the USA civil religion developed to cement "commitment to the American nation both as a 
successful hegemonic power and as a godly bastion against communism" (Smith 1986: 1 00). This 
period peaked in the period 1950-1954 (Smith 1,986:99). Religious affiliation increased from 49% in 
1940 to almost 65% in 1970, but the elite Protestant denominations started declining after the mid-
1960s. Church attendance also decreased between 1963 (47%) and 1971 (40%)' and stopped 
growing at all from 1971 onwards (Smith 1986:99). Yet more conservative Christian denominations 
12 • The role of dominant state in the world system was eventually assumed by the United States after the First World 
War - a position challenged since the late 1960s. 
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(e.g. Southern Baptists) started growing rapidly, and new religious movements (e.g. Unification 
Church) also benefitted (Smith 1 986: 1 00). 
Between, 1968-1973 the USA's hegemony started to decline in military terms as evident in losses in 
South-east Asia; and in economic terms through the emergence of independent oil producers and 
economically strong states in Europe and the East (Smith 1986:98). Internal dissension emerged, 
visibly in the Civil Rights movement, opposition to the Vietnam war, and a loss of faith in the 
establishment and its associated institutions, including religion - civil or otherwise. Three major 
responses followed: decline in mainline church affiliation; support for privatized eastern and new age 
religious movements; growth of the conservative pentecostal and evangelical churches (Smith 
1986:101). 
In South Africa the global struggle assumed economic, linguistic, and racial forms, evident in e.g. the 
elevation of English and Afrikaans to official languages during Union in 1910, and the subsequent 
devaluation of indigenous cultural forms - including belief systems. Mother tongue teaching during the 
initial years of education in black schools followed by the introduction of both official languages 
structured the racial division of the labour market, while ensuring the effective functioning of the 
economic market. A small educated black elite class was created, capable of co-operating in the divide 
and rule strategies over distant rural areas and of participating in the extension of Western institutions. 
Linguistically, as De Swaan (1989) has noted, "indigenous elites occupied the peripheral role Of 
bilingual mediators between the colonial language and the language of their region". 
Today the continuing spread of English as language of choice in state and civil society (despite official 
policies of multilingualism) entrenches class divisions of labour, and the core-periphery continuum 
between metropolitan and rural areas. Differential access to English, dependent on level of state 
funding of education, structures and integrates marginal groups into the peripheral economy (compare 
Tollefson 1991:132-3). 
South Africa's peripheral incorporation in the world-economy also caused an internal replication of the 
core-periphery dualism, with the homelands constituting the periphery. Because this was accompanied 
by the hegemony of European culture and language, labour migrants who opted to remain outside the 
education system became peripherally integrated into the economy (as Van Binsbergen demonstrated 
for the Nkoya of Zambia; Van Binsbergen 1994:147). African Indigenous Churches (AICs) emerged 
during the late colonial period (1880-1925) as an African initiative to span the rural/urban, 
African/Western, local (African) and global (Western) continuums generated by the process of 
globalization. Shifts from traditional African religious identity to AICs are linked to attempts to 
overcome the peripheral position assigned to Africans in the world system. Christianity (and Islam) 
offered Africans entry into a global identity through conversion to a world religion. Like other newer 
forms of African religion, and unlike mainstream religion at that point in time, AICs provided 
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possibilities of "inter-ethnic and transcultural associative networks" through "overarching symbols and 
doctrine" (Jules-Rosette 1989: 157). 
One effect of globalization on African cultural identities was to promote assimilation into the 
hegemonic culture, seen as inevitable and even desirable. Brandel-Syrier (1978) in her study of the 
emergence of an African elite in a South African townships in the 1960s outlines the mechanisms of 
assimilation which accompanied the acceptance of Christianity. These include enrolment in Western 
education systems. which produce an elite eager to assimilate Western society. 
From a Marxist perspective changes in religious institutions can also be linked (although not in a crude 
causal manner) to changes in the relations of production which established the dominance of capitalist 
production in South Africa. For example. Kruss (1985) has argued that three major phases of transition 
occurred, each generating a particular class. During the colonial period a trade-based (mercantile) 
relation of exchange was established in competition with a pre-capitalist African social formations. 
The first transition occurred during the period 1870 to late 1930s. which established an industrial 
capitalist system (Kruss 1985:73-4). During this period a black middle-class emerged. who accepted 
that political equality was possible if they assimilated European values through the education system. 
culture. and religion of the Western colonists. Disappointment with the outcome led them to link up 
with an existing pan-Africanist movement. Black aspirations concentrated on generating parallel 
systems of politics. education, and commerce to those of the colonists (Kruss 1985:97,108). During 
the earlier part of this century capitalist production over the country was extended. resulting in the loss 
of land on which the African middle-class had depended. and the increasing destruction of agrarian 
systems of production (Kruss 1985: 113). A black. semi-educated peasant class emerged, who 
emphasised the establishment of self-supporting religious communities on their own land (Kruss 
1985:125,137). 
The second transition occurred from the 1940s to the present. resulting in the establishment of 
dominance of the capitalist mode of production along with the impoverished black working class (Kruss 
1985:73.152). Before the Second World War the absence of a large proportion of the white working 
class led to a rapid increase of the black industrial labour force. while the black labour force on the 
mines, comprised essentially of landless people from" Reserves" • also grew steadily (Kruss 1985: 1 54). 
Along with industrialisation came urbanisation and proletarianisation, creating a sizeable but 
impoverished urban black working class between 1939 and 1952 (Kruss 1985: 155). 
From Kruss's perspective. the incorporation of blacks into formerly white congregations is made 
possible through the presence of a black urbanized working class. but increasingly so through the 
recent expansion of the black middle class and the development of the formerly minute black upper 
class. Congregational leadership is far likelier to be racially integrated on the basis of class affinities 
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rather than disparities. 
1 .3 Nation-building and language usage in global perspective 
Below I return to the effects of interactions between organizations and the state, and how this relates 
to isomorphism, as part of establishing an ecological theory of linguistic integration. As an introduction 
I start with a brief review of the notion of isomorphism, and also of the theories of state-organization 
interaction as advanced by Meyer (1983) and utilised by Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein (1988). Then 
I move to a discussion of nation-building and language practice in South Africa as institutionally 
congruent with other nation-states. 
Institutional isomorphism can be defined as a homogenizing effect demonstrated by organizations 
which conform to social rules, rituals, "norms, standards, and expectations held by relevant 
stakeholders and common to all" (Kraatz & Zajac 1996:812,813). Isomorphic organizations tend "to 
adopt uniform, institutionalized structures and practices that conform to the mandate of the 
institutional environment" (Kraatz & Zajac 1996:813). As noted in Chapter Two, institutional 
isomorphism is driven by coercive, mimetic, or normative mechanisms (DiMaggio & Powell 1991 :70). 
Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein distinguish between structural and cultural isomorphism in explaining 
state effects on organizations. They argue that states constrain organizations through five general 
processes which: determine the types of organizations through regulations (e.g. non-profit), describe 
required forms of interaction (e.g. taxation), induce or create types of organizations, establish and 
maintain training institutions, and cultivate professional organizers (Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein 
1988:370-71). These state constraints limit the variety of organizational forms, and promote "a 
cultural blueprint on how to organize". The blueprint is "diffusely present throughout the national 
society" and affects, for example, the founding of organizations. Organizational decision makers do 
not rationally weigh up all possible alternative structures or elements, but select between those marked 
as viable. So organizational outcomes are not directly determined by the environment, but through the 
cultural blueprint which limits and orders "concepts and potentialities". 
Structural isomorphism between organizations and states can take three forms, according to Carroll, 
Delacroix & Goodstein (1988:371), who lean strongly on Meyer. Meyer (1983:272-280), in his theory 
of the effects of varying politicc;ll and cultural forms on organizations, combines vertical-horizontal 
distinctions with a focus on where patterns of institutionalization locate collective commitment and 
competence. These distinctions enable Meyer to differentiate between three types of "more developed 
societies" (fragmented centralized states, centralized states, corporatist states) which exhibit greater 
institutionalization of collective rationalization outside organizational forms. By comparison, in 
peripheral societies such institutionalization occurs primarily within organizational forms. 
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Fragmented centralized states like the USA "promote the establishment of highly differentiated and 
complex organization with permeable and flexible boundaries" (Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein 
1988:371). According to Meyer (1983:273-76), such states locate competence and commitment in 
the individual. Weak vertical and horizontal organizational networks exist in which the state has limited 
functions. The result is a proliferation of organizations which tend to be highly structured (e.g. job 
titles, sections, roles, linkages and recordkeeping), complex, but less formally rational. Isomorphism 
occurs as structures interpenetrate weak organizational boundaries, and as organizations copy newly 
rationalized functions. Subsequently each one has similar functionaries with regards to safety, 
affirmative action, accounting and so on. 
Centralized states such as France "promote the establishment of specialized organizations with highly 
formalized structures and sharply defined boundaries" (Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein 1988:371). 
Meyer (1983:276-78) argues that such states locate competence and commitment in the state. 
Organizations occur in strongly structured state-centred vertical networks, with a clearly defined lateral 
organizational division of labour. Consequently organizations tend to be limited, highly specialized, 
differentiated, and rationalized; with fewer formal organizational structures. Organizational structures 
are few and hierarchical, and clearly laterally differentiated, as organizations are highly isomorphic in 
relation to the prescriptive state. 
Corporatist states like Germany "promote the establishment of organizations with low levels of 
differentiation and complexity but with elaborate informal structures based on occupational status" 
(Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein 1988:371). For Meyer (1983:278-80) these states locate competence 
and commitment in the groups that make up society. Vertical authority is determined by education and 
lateral differentiation occurs through clearly demarcated professions as corporate groups with social 
responsibility. Organizational networks are highly structured vertically and laterally, but determined by 
diffuse status relationships. Organizations exhibit low levels of structural rationality and complexity 
which are highly defined, and low levels of interpenetration, due to being highly bounded laterally. 
Although Meyer does not specify how isomorphism occurs, intra-occupational channels seem likely. 
By cultural isomorphism Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein (1988:373) mean the reproduction of state 
rhetoric and ideology "in the cultural fabric of organizations", particularly in centralized socialist states. 
Such isomorphism is not necessarily revealed in the behaviour of individuals, who may subvert it 
routinely and covertly. Subversive behaviour in this instance is causally but inversely related to the 
state-imposed culture, which generates a negative form of cultural isomorphism. Thus "a systematic 
decoupling between the formal and behavioral behavior systems of an organization" may occur, in 
which the "formal system may be culturally isomorphic with values embodied by the polity". In sum, 
"cultural systems in organizations formally reflect the ideology legitimizing the polity", but where such 
systems are politically imposed "they often generate behavior contradictory to that intended" . 
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I will apply both structural and cultural isomorphism to explain congruence between nation-states, and 
within nation-states. Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein's cultural distinction seems to be a subtype of 
structural isomorphism, which to a significant extent is subsumed by Meyer's and Boli's insistence that 
structures are culturally determined by global institutions. Nevertheless, as long as the distinctions are 
not pushed too far, structural and cultural notions provide some help in defining isomorphic processes. 
For example, in world-polity theory all nation-states undergo degrees of cultural isomorphism, which 
involves limited types of legitimated polity structures. Intranational isomorphism in South Africa seems 
to involve cultural congruence between the state and organizations, rather than structural 
convergence. 
1.3.1 Nation-building as global isomorphism 
Nation-building is isomorphic between nation-states in the world-polity, and influences institutions to 
be isomorphic with one another within the same society. Norms are institutionalised in the global 
political system which limits the available options about how nation-states can be structured. Yet, 
nation-state isomorphism does not imply exact resemblance. What Meyer and Boli are saying is that 
both the norms structuring the world-polity and the nation-states that result form part of an 
institutional environment which affects organizations (like congregations). 
One way in which institutionalization of global norms become visible is in a constitution and in human 
rights discourse. Boli draws attention to how constitutions show similar tendencies over time, 
particularly by extending individual rights which are counterbalanced by the expansion of state 
jurisdiction. Constitutions form part of the institutionalization of a human rights regime. He concludes 
that citizen rights (civil, political, social) function to extend political control over citizens, that is, they 
are incorporative. As nation-states are part of the institutional environment of congregations, the norms 
that they institutionalize in turn limit the options available for how congregations deal with diversity. 
This section provides additional insight into South Africa's embeddedness in the world polity by 
illustrating isomorphism between it and other states at two levels. At the international level 
isomorphism becomes visible in similarities between constitutions and bills of rights. Similarly, at the 
regional level similarities appear between language policies of African states. As the latter has been 
dealt with extensively in Chapter Five, I restrict myself below to a reflection on constitutions and bills 
of rights. 
International isomorphism can be demonstrated through highlighting linkages between the South 
African and other constitutions, and preceding conceptualizations which anticipate the human rights 
clauses of the final Constitution. South Africa's constitution is both home grown but also dependent 
upon other constitutions. The historical precedent was set by the first constitution of the Union of 
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South Africa (1910), drafted by a convention in South Africa in 1908, but passed by the British House 
of Commons in 1 909. Linkages to constitutional arrangements elsewhere were symbolized by 
Mandela's attempt during the period preceding constitutional negotiations to assuage white fears by 
referring to Zimbabwe's Lancaster House constitutional negotiations, which included short-term 
arrangements to accommodate whites (Ebrahim 1998: 101). 
The 1996 Constitution reflects the unique ways in which it arose, such as the first and second 
Conventions for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA I & II; 1991-1992) which paved the way for a 
Constitutional Assembly, solicited input from the public, and borrowings from the Namibian, Canadian, 
and especially the German constitutions. The use of 34 constitutional principles to guide the drafting 
of the 1 993 Constitution was based on the Namibian precedent, which had in 1 989 adopted as 
guidelines the constitutional principles contained in United Nations Resolution 435, laid down by the 
Western Contact Group in 1982 (Ebrahim 1998: 178). 
From Germany the principle of co-operative governance was borrowed, which, "based on a strong 
provincial dispensation, ensures that all levels of government co-operate with each other for the greater 
good of the country as a whole." Not only were models for the Constitution sought internationally, but 
so were its formulations regarding the role and status of civil services (Ebrahim 1998:258,84). Some 
human rights clauses in the interim Constitution were borrowed "virtually verbatim" from the Bill of 
Rights in the Basic Law of Germany (De Waal 1995:3). 
Among the actors which facilitated isomorphism in this instance were legal experts, government 
officials, political elites, and state-created organizations. For example, a six-person Independent Panel 
of Constitutional Experts was constituted by the Constitutional Assembly to help the process of 
drafting the 1996 constitution through providing advise and resolving conflicts. The panel attended 
workshops in Germany and the United Kingdom. During the latter visit they were hosted by the 
Commonwealth Secretariat, and the workshop included participants from Botswana, India, the USA, 
Germany, Hong Kong, Australia, Canada, and Zimbabwe (Ebrahim 1998: 186,343), In addition senior 
negotiators "from all parties visited a number of different countries in a bid to study different models. 
Similarly, leading international experts in a number of fields were incited to make presentations. This 
experience ensured that the Constitution was not only comparable with the best in the world, but 
could become a point of reference in constitutional debates internationally" (Ebrahim 1998:258). 
The 1993 Constitution was perceived locally and internationally as of great value, symbolized by the 
support voiced by US President Bill Clinton in his 1994 State of the Union address (Ebrahim 
1998: 171). The "significant international influence evident in the Constitution" derived from the 
"attempt to ensure that Constitution was comparable with the most advanced constitutions in the 
world" (Ebrahim 1998:258). 
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Documents which preceded the interim (1 993) and final (1996) South African constitutions in spelling 
out human rights as central concern include those developed by non-South African agencies, and those 
developed by South Africans themselves. Du Plessis & Corder (1994) produced a classification system 
for such documents, based on liberal and liberationist, external and internal categories l3 • Prominent 
external examples in the external, liberal tradition includes the Human Rights Charter of the United 
Nations (1945); as well as the earlier Atlantic Charter (1941) concluded between the USA and Britain, 
who did not conceive of applying it to her colonies. Internal, liberal examples include the Molteno 
Report, the KwaZulu/Natallndaba bill of rights, and the Business Charter of Social, Economic, and 
Political Rights (Du Plessis, 1994:96). External, liberationist instances include a Resolution on 'the 
South African question' adopted by the Executive Committee of the Communist International 
(1928)14, and Sections 15 and 16 of the Harare Declaration of the OAU (1989). The Harare 
Declaration also envisioned a constitution "based on universally agreed constitutional principles" in 
order to arrive at what Section 1 7 described as " 'an internationally acceptable solution which shall 
enable South Africa to take its rightful place as an equal partner among the African and world 
community of nations' " (Ebrahim 1998:35,452). 
In keeping with the notions of globalization and of isomorphism, South African discourse on human 
rights shows the interpenetration of global and local concerns, as exemplified by the effect of the 
Atlantic Charter of 1941 on the ANC's 1943 conceptualization of a Bill of Rights. The correspondence 
in titles is probably not incidental. Some argue that the universalism inherent in socialist thinking 
provides an early example of the globalization of human rights. The late SACP leader Joe Siovo 
remarked on the "crucial connection between socialism and internationalism and the importance of 
world working-class solidarity ... Working class internationalism remains one of the most liberating 
concepts in Marxism and needs to find effective expression in the new world conditions" (Slovo, 
1990; Chapter 3, Marxist Theory under Fire). 
An awareness of global norms surfaces in Schedule 4 of the Interim Constitution, which states that 
"all universally accepted fundamental rights" shall prevail. Similarly the Schedule contains a 
commitment to equality "between men and women and people of all races" in keeping with the world 
polity notions of equality (compare Ebrahim 1998:619). The link between the 1996 Constitution and 
human rights was also symbolised when President Nelson Mandela signed the Constitution into law 
in Sharpeville on Human Rights Day, 10 December 1996 (Ebrahim 1998:670). 
Certain provisions in the Bill of Rights in earlier and final Constitutions draw strongly on international 
human rights documents. Section 31 in the final Constitution, on Cultural, Religious and Linguistic 
13 Clearly these categories are not mutually exclusive; from a world system perspective one would expect some 
dialectic interaction to have occurred between individuals and documents involved. 
14. The Resolution called for" 'full equal rights for all races, black, coloured and white' " (Ebrahim 1998:376). 
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Communities, "more or less follows the wording of article 27 of the [UN] International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (1966)", to which South Africa is a signatory (Strydom 1998:374). Similarly 
the anti-hate speech clause of Section 16 (2) corresponds considerably with Article 20 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Johannessen 1997: 142, see footnote 30). Clearly, 
"in drafting the social and economic provisions of the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Assembly, (with 
the assistance of the technical committee and panel of [constitutional] experts) closely followed the 
formulations adopted in international human rights instruments, especially the [UN] Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (De Vos 1997:76, and see footnote 32). Section 39 (1)(b) of 
the final Constitution (Section 35 in the interim version) states that courts "must consider international 
law" when interpreting the Bill of Rights (compare Ebrahim 1998:651). Thirteen sections'S of the 
interim Constitution were "directly or indirectly related to the rights protected in the [UN] Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (Liebenberg 1995:375). The Human Rights Commission is 
required by Section 116 (2) of the interim Constitution to report "any proposed legislation ... contrary 
.. 
to international human rights law" (Liebenberg 1995:374, compare footnote 60). The overall effect 
is to enforce "consistency between domestic law and South Africa's international obligations" 
(Liebenberg 1995:375; De Vos 1997:76). 
The discussion above demonstrate that constitutions and language policies are linked through human 
rights clauses. Choice of language is considered to be among those human rights which guarantee 
cultural freedoms in a bill of rights. For instance, the Bill of Rights in the 1996 South African 
Constitution recognizes language rights as part of clauses on Education (section 29), Language and 
culture (30), and Cultural, religious and linguistic communities (31) (compare Ebrahim 1998:641-642). 
1.3.2 Language usage as intranational isomorphism 
Language ideology is driven by the same logic of functional efficiency which operates in the work 
domain, creating a similar sense of alienation while disguising relations of power and domination 
(Tollefson 1991 :206). As a result language practices are viewed as following natural trends in domains 
perceived to be outside the political domain, and so also as "outside politics and policy making" 
(Tollefson 1991 :208). For these reasons, where the evidence in Chapter Four points to the 
unquestioned use of a second language like English in the religious domain, the functioning of a 
language ideology can be assumed. 
The end:result of language ideology is that state policies surface in non-state institutions as common-
sense notions about "'natural' language practices" (Tollefson 1991 :208). Consequently the demand 
that one dominant language be used comes to be seen as unrelated to the state. Dominant linguistic 
15 Sections 8,10,11,12,17,22,23,24,27,29,30,31,32. 
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groups can "exercise an unquestioned, 'natural' (i.e. ideological) monopoly" over the language used 
in a congregation, and so over the congregation itself (compare Tollefson 1991 :208). Just as language 
practice in e.g. the workplace is regarded as determined by "the market", so language usage in 
congregations is accepted and not debated because "dominance and inequality are not perceived to 
exist". Non-English first language speakers "cannot legitimize the use of their languages" (Tollefson 
1991 :208)' except in township churches which cater exclusively for them. 
By accepting that the religious domain "is outside the realm of politics or of citizenship rights, including 
language rights", non-English first language speakers participate in their own disempowerment 
(Tollefson 1991 :208). This is often due to their exclusion from decision-making bodies, in the context 
of "hostility from speakers of the dominant language " (Tollefson 1991 : 209). The fact that some people 
must use English to participate in a congregation, is (as Tollefson 1991 :210 noted in a different 
context) "a result of unequal relationships of power - not a solution to them". One effect of not being 
allowed to use one's own language in a particular domain is that individual becomes alienated from 
his/her activities. Language policies "that deny individuals the use of their own languages", whether 
at work or in the congregation, "are unnatural, antihuman, and anticultural" (Tollefson 1991 :207). 
If the aim was to merely obtain a common language, then "dominant groups would acquire minority 
languages and change their linguistic repertoire to accommodate other groups" while "accents and 
other variable features would not be stigmatized" (Tollefson 1991 :210). Second language learning as 
an option for one group while others need not do so "is not a solution to exclusivity, privilege, and 
domination, but rather a mechanism for them" (Tollefson 1991 :210). "Every time a society requires 
some people to learn another language in order to carry out human activities necessary for survival, 
an act of injustice has occurred that places those people at a disadvantage" and has "nothing to do 
with the 'common sense' or 'practical' value of having a common language to communicate" 
(Tollefson 1991:210). 
As I argued above, language usage in non-state institutions are strongly affected by "a broader set of 
beliefs about language and citizenship that provide the basis for the exercise of state disciplinary 
power" (Tollefson 1991 :207). State disciplinary power refers to the capacity of the state to control 
wage labour through covertly limiting the very rights which the state promotes. In the case of 
language, this is done by requiring facility in the dominant language, but providing differential means 
of achieving the goal (Tollefson 1991 :207). The state structures "into the institutions of society the 
differentiation of individuals into 'insiders' and 'outsiders'" by tying language to nationalism (Tollefson 
1991 :207-8). Language policies not only create these two groups, but provide a system of managing 
both through language requirements which control access "to education, employment, and political 
participation" (Tollefson 1991 :208). This view counters the belief that the role of the state is to 
gradually extent resources (education, employment, power) to larger percentages of its citizens. 
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In the South African case the state explicitly promotes the equal value of 11 languages, a policy which 
surfaces in most integrating congregations in an awareness of the need for inclusion of samples of 
linguistic diversity in hymns and readings. Yet, while these acknowledgements of diversity are 
symbolically necessary, their limited scale of usage means regrettably that they will have little effect 
on existing class or status relations between congregants. Should such practices continue, the national 
policy of multilingualism will not be advanced, but instead the marginal status of black languages will 
be confirmed and confined to "minority" rankings. 
Yet paradoxically the explicit multilingualism implicitly enhances the status of English, stigmatizes other 
languages, and leads to a form of linguicism - a form of discrimination against minority groups based 
on language preference. The attitudes of congregational leaders in regard to indigenous languages can 
be compared to those of policy makers and educationists, who maintain one of three attitudes towards 
languages (adapted from Tollefson 1991 :47): (a) languages are important in themselves, is a right of 
individual speakers, and should be promoted as resources within congregations and explicitly protected 
by the state along with bilingualism; (b) indigenous languages are important until vernacular speakers 
can express themselves in English, and so are important as transitional; (c) indigenous languages are 
important in society, and can be used in private, but are divisive when given official recognition and 
so should not be accorded any rights; (d) indigenous languages should not be used in congregations 
or in public as they are inherently divisive. While South African state policies explicitly opt for (a), state 
practices seem to cluster around (c) or (d). While none of the congregational leaders expressed a 
preference for (b), and a few preferred (a), I would argue that congregations in which expressions of 
linguistic diversity is absent are influenced by the institutions of state. 
While there is evidence in South African society of counter-hegemonic language movements (e.g. 
around Afrikaans, Venda 16), the effect of religious identities and the promotion of a unified national 
identity can be said to undercut competing loyalties to language and ethnic groups. While elsewhere 
language and religion have contributed powerfully to ethnic identity formation, this has not happened 
in South Africa, as more missionaries were at work here during the colonial era than elsewhere on the 
continent. Ethnic groups were broken up among the denominations, so that religion and ethnicity were 
different sources of identity with little overlap between them. Membership in mainstream and 
pentecostal Christianity tends to neutralize the attraction of local ethnic identities by offering global 
alternative identities, of being Catholic, etc. Anecdotal and personal experience suggest that believers 
tend to place loyalty to the Christian identities above other identities. 
Institutional isomorphism has a dampening effect on perceptions of racial identity, as can be seen in 
16 For instance, in 1996 Afrikaners launched a language lobby which seemed not to have survived (The Cape 
Times, p. 7; 2 Dec 1996). More recently a political party for Vendas were mooted as a result of perceptions that the 
Venda language is being sidelined. 
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the way that denominations and congregations deal with this issue. In accordance with the dominant 
non-racial ideology, racial identities are downplayed by denominational and congregational leaders 
(incidentally also in line with similar sentiments in the social sciences here and abroad). Just as the 
state claims to be the only legitimate instrument of violence, so it seems to claim to be the only 
legitimate institution which is allowed to acknowledge race (in the form of quotas in the latest labour 
equity bill) while paradoxically adhering to the denial of race as group marker. 
Some congregations have little racial integration of leadership structures, but generally speaking racial 
integration is more noticeably present than is cultural or linguistic integration. In line with their formal 
anti-apartheid position, many of the churches actively espouse non-racialism in the sense of playing 
down the salience of race as category. In some denominations (CPSA) clergy are no longer required 
to report membership in terms of race. However this does not mean that awareness of race has 
diminished, or that racial integration has taken place. In some cases relations between black and white, 
or black and coloured are still strained. In the opinion of a clergy respondent the Black Consultative 
Forum in the CPSA was unhappy with the disproportionately large number of white bishops. Another 
clergy respondent stated that the (black) bishop in his diocese reportedly wanted to be "the first one 
who had no white clergy". 
Yet race demonstrably continues to affect the structures of religious organisations and the interactions 
within them. This is illustrated by the existence of a separate black caucus in some denominations 
(Anglicans, Methodists); the apparent need by church officials to (re-)claim a history of racial 
integration (e.g. Catholics); the election of denominational church leaders from certain racial 
backgrounds (Methodists); the exclusion of white clergy from certain regions (e.g. United Reforming 
Church, Anglicans); and a general reluctance from those formerly designated as blacks and whites, 
as well as blacks and coloureds, to unite in regional or local congregational structures. 
Language and religion, in an integrative setting favours middle class aspirations and formation. A lot 
of ink has been spilled recently about the emergence of a black middle class, for whom English fits 
better with their class aspirations. Most mixed congregations seem to follow the ideal set by the black 
political elite, namely assimilation into the English-language, and so offer a natural home to this group 
who are easily integrated into existing leadership structures without affecting the internal functioning 
of congregations. Black languages and customs are seldom allowed any space to function, with the 
exception of hymns translated into Bantu languages. In this way current integration in practice 
reinforces class diviSions, structures of exclusion, and internal colonisation with respect to indigenous 
languages and cultures .. Lower income blacks are assimilated in terms of their existing class position. 
As can be seen from the preceding, these practices stretch back to colonial times, and apparently have 
been systemically reproduced to the present day. Under the impact of the Christian missions 
indigenous societies divided between those who used tradition to oppose domination, those who 
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accepted the cultural dominance of settlers, and those who opposed political exclusion and economic 
exploitation in Christian terms. The so-called English-speaking churches incorporated indigenous 
peoples into a European-derived belief system, in which the economic and political structures of the 
settlers were replicated. 
In these integrating congregations blacks, now as in the colonial period, are allowed into leadership 
if they show evidence of being fully acculturated and occupy the same class positions as their white 
peers. On the other hand blacks are utilising religious institutions to gain access to economic resources 
through assimilating themselves and their offspring. Meanwhile the marginalised segments of the 
population, in trying to emulate the status language of the elite, may be losing their ability to express 
themselves in indigenous languages, without developing adequate standards of English. 
But the increasing domination of class values in congregations (as in society) does not move churches 
away from race as an issue, for it is European upper and middle class interests which now dominate 
local congregational structures. These configurations of power enforce white standards of living (e.g. 
dress codes, even within black congregations), and deny other races access to leadership (see 
Ramphele 1989:187). Class structures in South Africa coincide with race in an 'internal hegemony', 
a tempered domination of power and privilege in which race no longer appears as the primary criterion. 
This structure is revealed in attempts to de-racialise (church) systems without loss of [white] power, 
an exercise based on the recognition that dismantling privilege based on race must result in the 
collapse of (most ?) social infrastructures (Villa-Vicencio 1988:83,84). 
2. RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AS MESO-LEVEL ENVIRONMENT WHICH CONSTRAINS AND 
ENABLES LANGUAGE INTEGRATION 
Congregations are meso-level phenomena sensitive to the mutually interactive structures and agencies 
which form their meso-environment. These include the institutional environment, language ideology, 
class formation, and denominational membership. Other factors discussed in the preceding chapters 
but which could have been included here include the size of the congregation, the ratio of language 
groups to one another, the congregation's neighbourhood, its geographic location (rural-urban), and 
the policies of the denomination. 
2.1 The effects of congregational culture on language use 
The congregation as setting constrains the ability of some linguistic or ethnic identities to advance their 
own interests, while advantaging other groups. While the congregations as organizations are 
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multilingual, their white and Indian members (and to a lesser extend coloured members) are most often 
monolingual (in the case of English first-language South Africans), or at best bilingual (in the case of 
Afrikaans first-language speakers). In such a setting, even where they present a majority, indigenous 
languages have to take a back seat. In effect, regardless of the number of people present in the 
congregation or society at large, indigenous languages become minority languages in two senses: (a) 
they are afforded little or marginal space in the processes of the congregation; (b) they are considered 
to have lower status than English, which symbolises the most desired religious and class identities. 
Monolingual English-speakers have the biggest impact on language preference in multilingual settings. 
In the case of integrating congregations, this means white congregants. Foreign congregants, who may 
technically be multilingual but not in any South African language, have the same effect. This is only 
overcome where a critical mass of mother-tongue congregants is so large that another language cannot 
be avoided. I would suggest that the favouring of English by non-English speakers is explained in terms 
of the higher status of English, as numerous studies have pointed out. 
In other words, while the purpose of the setting is to reinforce a particular social identity, that of 
Christian believer, church members also bring multiple identities into that setting, some which are 
repressed and others which are selected. Language symbolises which identity is deemed more relevant 
to that setting, and demonstrates status differentials perceived to exist between different language 
groups. As rational agents, congregants, denominational leaders, clergy, lay leadership all consciously 
or subconsciously bring the contestations between groups into congregations with them, while 
choosing to represent themselves in a particular way. Yet such micro-level actions are also constrained 
by other actors in the meso-level setting, such as the cultural ideology at work in society at the macro-
level and in the organization at meso-level. 
Apparently institutional culture continues to favour the unofficial national language English, and in a 
few cases the old official language, Afrikaans, in the setting of "English-speaking" Christian 
denominations. The same ambiguity which marks official policies (good intentions contradicted in 
practice) occurs here. Linguistic diversity is now reflected in most liturgical publications (Prayer Book 
of the CPSA) and hymnals, but evidence shows that this is not necessarily translated into 
congregational life. It is hard not to conclude that South African mainline congregations are "still 
dominated by European Christian forms" (Ramphele 1989:179). 
2.2 The effects of popular language ideology on linguistic integration 
Evidence on the predominance of English in government publications and communications (Langtag 
1996), and from research on language attitudes of university students (Prah 1993, De Klerk 1996) and 
the general populace (Schuring 1979, De Klerk & Bosch 1993) confirms that a language ideology 
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(attitudes towards languages) is operating in the wider South African society, and has been doing so 
for a very long time. It structures languages (and so intergroup relations) in a status hierarchy in 
relation to one another, and deems that English is the only language fit for interstate, sub-state, and 
intergroup communication. 
The origin of the ideology lies in the Anglicization policies of the colonial and Union periods, but can 
also be located in global politico-economic factors which favour the domination of particularly English 
and North American cultural forms. The increasing dominance of English in South Africa can also be 
explained by the indebtedness of major institutions here to the UK - and the USA, as is the case with 
other Commonwealth nations. As a result, structures and organisational cultures discriminate against 
other language and cultural groups, ensuring that European-derived languages dominate (cf. Castles 
1992). Other critical elements include the enforced use of Afrikaans under Afrikaner nationalism and 
the negative reaction to that by the majority of South Africans, the educational backgrounds of 
liberation movement leaders (earlier leaders were educated in English-language mission schools, as 
were a significant number of the present elite in the UK). The language ideology can clearly be traced 
in studies which examine the language attitudes of South Africans. 
In the politics of difference, a pertinent question is which language/s will dominate public and private 
institutions. Across many institutions languages are in competition, and perhaps only the economically 
powerful will survive in the public domain. English has achieved a renewed status as the unofficial 
official language, despite all the good policy intentions. English is increasingly advanced by some 
politicians as the dominant language for use in most major institutions (e.g. education, business, 
government) . 
Critics of my position may argue that the role of English in congregations as linking language is purely 
an instrumental issue, rather than one concerned with "sociolinguistic identity or the cultural values 
and resources of a language", as Mansour (1993: 129) argues for state policies. If so, the only concern 
would be whether everyone in the congregation understands English or not. But Mansour's argument 
elsewhere, although aimed at the level of state organization, is relevant here: does an indigenous lingua 
franca exist which can fulfil the same role? The problem is that alternative lingua francas do exist 
(Xhosa, Zulu, Sotho), but whites mostly cannot use them. So Mansour's suggestion does not move 
us away from the power differential between English speakers and others. To use Mansour's terms, 
the problem does not lie in the socio-cultural (identity) dimension of language but in the realm of 
linguistic power relations. And in turn, I argue, these relations are linked to the global value of English 
in the world system. 
The status and role of languages in meso-level interactions in South Africa are now affected by the 
same language ideology that operates at the societal and global levels. Informal language pOlicies set 
in the organizational culture of religious institutions supports language statuses, as evidenced by the 
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"English-speaking" label of some mainline denominations. Such a language ideology functions to 
dictate where and when a particular language is appropriate, and to enforce monolingualism. 
Congregations where the majority of members are not English-speaking, yet this is the language 
preferred, illustrate the point. There seems to be some popular consensus that the public realm is 
unsuitable for any language other than English, while the room for indigenous languages seems to be 
contracting. Afrikaans is an obvious example, as indicated by Minister of Education Sibusiso Bengu's 
pressure on the University of Stellenbosch to adopt English as an additional medium of instruction. 
Obviously none of the above examples are purely about language, nor as straightforward as I represent 
them. 
2.3 The effects of denominational membership 
So far the analysis has proceeded as though the congregations were equal units in similar settings, yet 
the variation between them shows that other factors could also be taken into account, for instance, 
denominational membership, polity, spatial organization, and worldview. Moberg (1962) maintains that 
theological differences affect structure and ritual; for instance, how authority is reproduced (apostolic 
succession versus priesthood of all believers) affects a central ritual like communion/mass. Such. 
elements are difficult to factor in as the small sample and the scale of heterogeneity limits the 
universality of generalisations, and so I offer the following as theoretical hypotheses. 
With regards to polity, there are more structural similarities among Catholics, Anglicans, and 
Methodists, than between these three churches and other denominations such as pentecostals. 
Anglicans and Catholics have similar episcopal polity systems; and the recent introduction of bishops 
in the Methodist church brings these three closer. According to Moberg church polities mirror the 
political institutions favoured at the time of their founding, so that the episcopal polity is similar to a 
monarchy, the presbyterian polity to an aristocracy, and the congregational polity to a democracy. 
Under the influence of the state institutions, and between institutions within a particular organizational 
field, these polities may become isomorphic - as has been the case in the USA (Moberg 1962:94-
5,372). In South Africa a similar isomorphic process has affected church polities, with e.g. Catholic 
parishes become more democratic, with elected lay Parish Councils assisting priests in governing 
parishes; as a result of the twin influence of increasing democracy in South African political institutions 
and Vatican II. The democratization of Catholic lay leaders has also emerged in the USA since 1954 
(Moberg 1962:417 
But there are also important differences: Methodist bishops do not have the power and economic 
infrastructure to appoint clergy as do their Anglican and Catholic counterparts; this power rests with 
the congregation. Pentecostal churches like the IFCC combine elements from all three polity types: 
sharing independence of the local church with congregational polity, a modified system of elders with 
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the presbyterian polity (albeit sans deacons and elections), with the supreme authority vested in the 
pastor as in catholic polity. As a result episcopal and pentecostal hierarchies have a greater chance 
of forcing or delaying the pace of integration, regardless of the reaction from congregants/parishioners, 
than do presbyterian and congregational polities. The Catholic or Anglican priest is more independent 
from his (or her, in the latter instance) congregations, as is the pentecostal pastor (depending on the 
church), than is the presbyterian or congregational clergy. 
In terms of spatial organization Catholics regard the parish as the most basic unit, which may contain 
more than one local church. Given this structure, Catholics may chose to integrate the local churches 
within the parish through constituting a combined Parish Council, while retaining segregated local 
churches. This stems in part from the strong universal emphasis of Catholics, who route the activities 
of the parish through national or global Catholic organizations. 'So the St Francis Xavier Society 
undertakes welfare work within each parish, just as do the Knights of Oa Gama. By contrast non-
Catholic congregations tend to emphasise the local congregation, and it is at this level which 
integration must .work or fail. 
But regardless of polity and spatial organization, congregational leadership (clergy, lay leaders) plays 
a vital role in constraining or enabling integration. Reluctance on the part of leadership can effectively 
inhibit the operation of multilingual or multicultural identities. The congregational leadership arbitrates 
between the different levels of the congregation and the multiple identities which congregants bring 
with them, much in the same way as someone directing (ideological) traffic. On the other hand 
multilingual interaction is often associated with sympathetic leadership, such as a sympathetic clergy 
person. The constraints of institutional culture are only overcome where the critical mass of mother-
tongue congregants is so large that another language cannot be avoided. But cases were black 
congregants insist on cultural or linguistic inclusion seem very rare. 
3. TOWARDS A THEORY OF THE EFFECT OF MESO AND MACRO LEVEL INTERACTION ON 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
In this section I present a theoretical discussion of cultural and structural isomorphism, through which 
I explore the dialectic effect of meso- and macro-level interactions on linguistic diversity in 
congregations. The discussion centres on two age-old sociological problems, that of systemic stability, 
which I address in subsection 3.1, below; and that of variance, which I tackle in subsection 3.2. Given 
that isomorphism operates within the world system, how does one explain the cultural and structural 
variety across the same units of analysis (e.g. nation states)? On the other hand, why does 
isomorphism not lead to a decreasing number of variants? In my theoretical answer I take seriously 
the idea that globalization institutionalises both homogeneity and heterogeneity within the world 
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system, and that nation-states are not free to ignore the global17 • Isomorphism leads to both similarity 
and variety between and within units of the world system. 
In the discussion so far I have attempted to fuse two central elements of the world system (world-
polity, world-economy) in order to explain linguistic integration in congregations in terms of their 
societal and global political environments - an ecology of integration. This allows endogenous change 
in congregations to be viewed as the result of a dialectic operating in various forms and at different 
levels of change in the institutions (language, race, leadership) which intersect them. Two assumptions 
underlie this: that (a) linguistic and racial integration of churches exemplifies institutional change, and 
(b) that the sources of change are primarily extra-institutional. Yet some intra-institutio.nal sources of 
change also operate, as I indicate below. 
At a metatheoreticallevel an ecological perspective brings together institutional and ecological theories 
from the sociology of organizations with the sociology of the world system (especially world-polity 
theory). Institutional and ecological approaches have been in some tension as they are sometimes 
perceived to be analytically separate. Ecological theories tend to focus on changes in populations of 
organizations, such as "founding and death rates of different organizational forms" (Singh, Tucker & 
Meinhard 1991 :390). Institutional theories emphasise how organizations are affected by the 
institutional environment - "socially created beliefs and cognitions, widely held in society and 
reinforced by corporate actors" (Singh, Tucker & Meinhard 1991 :390). This theoretical opposition has 
been resolved by world-polity theorists like Meyer and Boli who implicitly synthesised both, and who 
also involved organizational sociologists like Scott in combined research projects (compare Meyer & 
Scott 1983; Scott & Meyer 1994). 
As integrating congregations can be viewed as a population of religious organizations, as well as 
embodiments of institutions in a organizational form, a combined institutional and ecological approach 
seems justified. The congregation-environment approach has a long history in the sociology of religion 
in the USA, from 1926 onwards (Metz 1967:25). To consider congregations as both organizations and 
social institutions have an equally venerable history (see Moberg 1962), as has the application of 
organizational theory to congregational analysis (see Carroll e.a. 1986). 
An individual congregation can be seen as a relatively open social system which - like other 
organizations - is also defined by formal boundaries, formal purpose, formal membership, and formal 
patterns of authority (Metz 1967:26). Yet unlike many other organizations, congregational goals are 
often wide and unspecified, while membership is open and voluntary (Metz 1967:29-33). I regard 
congregations (and denominations) as different structural expressions of the same religious institution; 
while proposing that various other institutions (language, gender, leadership) simultaneously intersect 
17 I am thankful to John Boli for drawing this to my attention. 
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congregation (and denomination). 
3.1 Institutional change as a consequence of cultural isomorphism across global, national and meso-
level organizations 
Where cultural isomorphism occurs between global norms and national policies, structural isomorphism 
will probably emerge across different sectors of a particular society. Yet, isomorphism does not 
produce uniform results between units of the world system, which is why structural dissimilarity 
appears between South African congregations. Homogenous congregations continue to be in the 
majority; and heterogenous congregations do not exhibit greater similarities. Cultural and structural 
convergence between social units in the same society may vary because of the extent to which state 
ideologies have or have not been institutionalised. That is, the structures of types of integrating 
congregations are the result of different levels of the institutionalisation of non-racialism and 
multiculturalism' 8. 
Global, local, and meso-level norms operate dialectically with one another in the institutional 
environment, and so contribute to institutional change. Language integration in congregations is a form 
of institutional change which can be brought about in several ways. For example, institutional change 
can be brought about through extra-institutional mechanisms such as values and norms in the 
institutional environment, e.g. nonracialism, nation-building. Or, change can result from intra-
institutional mechanisms, such as antagonistic actors who oppose one another in the same institution 
(compare Koelble 1995:235). A congregation and the denomination to which it belongs represent 
different aspects of the same religious institution. 
In the societal environment notions of nonracialism and multiculturalism are being institutionalised by 
the South African state as part of nation-building, through policy and supportive structures (e.g. 
through Constitution, policies, laws, the envisaged Commission for the Promotion and Protection of 
the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities; and the Pan-South African Language 
Board). Within such an environment other organizations and their supportive institutions conform to 
these notions, but to varying degrees. That is, organizations become isomorphic in an uneven manner, 
ranging from those who fully exhibit the ideals, to those who merely appear to do so, to those who 
totally reject them. Rhetorically, all will want to be seen to accept the newer state-sponsored ideals, 
while those who explicitly do not will attempt to phrase resistance in terms of other globalized norms. 
Resistance and acceptance can both be viewed as indicating the extent to which successful 
institutionalization has occurred (compare Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein 1988). 
18 This is a paraphrase of an argument that I applied to the institutionalization of gender equity (Swemmer, 
Kritzinger & Venter 1998). 
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In congregations that resist full linguistic and cultural integration, organizational inertia takes the form 
of loose coupling. That is, racial integration of leadership structures is the price paid in order not to 
deal with language. Conformity to notions of multiculturalism is apparently not regarded as essential 
to organizational survival. Hypothetically, conformity to external policies depends on the extent to 
which intra-institutional support exists for the values which they represent. Congregations which 
initiated integration before the formation of the post-apartheid state were arguably more influenced at 
an extra-institutional level by the relations of its leaders to global organizations like the World Council 
of Churches. Yet, given the policies of the present state, it would become increasingly difficult for 
institutions dependent on state recognition to resist some measure of implicit conformity to these 
norms of behaviour. Hence institutional isomorphism is likely to develop more rapidly in South Africa 
under the present post-apartheid state. Cultural isomorphism suggests the following sequence: norms 
are institutionalized in world culture, which in turn are incorporated by the nation-state, which has a 
knock-on effect on organizations. 
Language usage in a congregation represents an institutionalized behaviour pattern, effected by an 
encompassing institutional environment. The denomination, the state, and other congregations form 
the institutional environment of the congregation. A congregation is a unit of a state-recognized 
denomination, and forms an institutionalized, voluntary and associational organization (compare 
Moberg 1962: 19-20). Associations refer to a regulated form of relationship between individuals, while 
institutions refer to patterns of social behaviour (Moberg 1962:21). A congregation can be understood 
at different intersecting levels: as a central aspect of Christian institutions; as an institution by itself; 
or as an organization or an association. Some prefer to draw distinctions between these parallel 
conceptualizations. While a denomination is a diffused institution, congregations are institutionalized 
groups, nucleated institutions located in a specific place. 
Integration in congregations can be viewed in terms of a dialectic cycle through which institutional 
change occurs in a local organization. Only if values are institutionalised will they be successful; they 
will only be institutionalised if they are broadly accepted. Institutionalisation implies acceptance of 
ideas (values and norms), and their implementation in roles and behaviour. On this basis I would argue 
that congregations which are racially integrated only (and those that are not integrated at all in 
contexts which would allow this) present instances of the partial institutionalisation of multiculturalism. 
By contrast nonracialism (racial equality) has been more fully institutionalised, to the extent that it has 
penetrated the consciousness of individual con!;Jregants (visibly expressed in the equal inclusion of all 
races) and has been accommodated in the creation of formal roles (black lay leaders). Yet the norms 
that determine the status and roles that languages may play (English should dominate) remain 
unaffected. As a result indigenous languages are not included, and those congregants or clergy who 
would support their incorporation are rendered ineffective by the attitudes of both English-speakers 
as well as other language groups, which also accept English dominance. 
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Extra-institutional values (in the sense that they are apparently not shared by most congregants) such 
as multiculturalism are incorporated and unevenly distributed across the structures of the 
denomination. Among denominational representatives positive racial values are most clearly 
institutionalised as evidenced by church polity decisions, but without affecting the language norms 
governing congregations. At the congregational level there is an obvious acknowledgement of the 
different value-set contained in denominational and state policy, but this has not as yet ousted the 
dominant language ideology. While there is little disagreement about the usefulness of allowing other 
races to be integrated, the roles and status associated with language and culture remain unaffected. 
The difficulties that congregations have in integrating linguistic diversity demonstrate how problematic 
the replacement of one set of values and associated norms and roles with another is, in a context of 
coercive isomorphism formed by state and denominational policies - however admirable. 
3.2 Institutional change as a consequence of structural isomorphism across global, national and 
meso-level organizations 
Where structural isomorphism exists between congregations and states, similarities occur because both 
have to organize the same type of diversity in terms of the same globalized norms. This implies, first, 
that congregations and states within the same society will evolve similar structures because they 
institutionalize similar norms; second, that these norms include representations of more or less 
legitimated models of appropriate structures; and third, that congregations and states in different 
societies will evolve similar structures as they attempt to resolve similar problems in terms of similar 
globalized models. 
The concept of structural isomorphism suggests that similarities will emerge between congregational 
and state structures because they deal with the same problem: a growing awareness of and rising 
levels of ethnic and linguistic diversity19. Core, semi peripheries and peripheral states all experience 
increasing ethnic diversity: First World countries experience this as a consequence of immigration from 
Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America. In the Third World internal migration through the 
ongoing urbanisation of ethnically diverse rural populations feeds the complexity of the urban areas. 
In both cases the forced movement of refugees also has an impact, in the case of Africa often 
affecting the rural areas near national boundaries as much as they do the urban areas. Mozambican 
refugees near South Africa's Ea$tern borders present a case in point. 
19 This raises several questions, most of which is beyond the scope of this section. For instance, can conclusions 
about the structure of large scale institutions (nation-states) be transferred to those of smaller scale (congregations) 
if the problematic and basic organization of both share enough similarities, allowing for differences of scale? Under 
which conditions is this possible; can such a transfer happen only within the same societal parameters? Or can 
guidelines about certain state policies and structure be transferred to congregations within another state? 
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In order to deal with diversity, state and non-state organizations develop and institutionalize various 
policies and structures. This may take the form of constitutions, legislation, statements by politicians, 
and official policies. Implementation happens through state structures such as departments of 
immigration, home affairs, culture, and education. Specialised organisations can also be created at the 
local level (e.g'. Britain's-Race'Relations Units, Vertovec 1996:63) or national level (e.g. Singapore's 
Presidential Council for Mino.rity .. Rig~ts, Brown 1989:59). The state's intentions can be contradicted 
by the actions of its officials, or disregarded by the public, so that an unofficial "policy" often overrides 
the ideals promoted by the state. By the same token benign policies can have unforeseen negative 
consequences. 
Policies imply assimilative, culturally plural, or multicultural modes of incorporation, all of which often 
produce segregated and segmented institutions. In the post-World War II period multiculturalism gained 
ascendancy ~nside and outside the British Commonwealth of Nations. The dual pressure of nationalism 
and the economic untenability of maintaining colonialism led to independence for the colonies, and 
arguably also forced a global shift towards the acknowledgement of ethnic and cultural diversity. 
Implemented as official policies in Canada and Australia in the 1 970s, multiculturalist policies now also 
occur in Britain, Singapore, and in other forms elsewhere, such as in South Africa. 
Religious institutions in multi-,ethnic societies, like other social institutions, face the same challenges 
and have to produce their own structural responses. My research in South Africa and the USA shows 
that two major modes of dealing with diversity in integrating congregations emerged: (a) internally 
united types, with unified leadership structures and cultural integration at all levels; and (b) internally 
differentiated types, with unified leadership structures but with segregated structures at other levels 
(Venter 1994b, 1998). As represented in Figure 1 on the next page, these arrangements seem similar 
to the cultural pluralist and multiculturalist modes employed by states. The discussion so far implies 
that some correlation exists ,between the origin of structures of incorporation that emerge at national, 
macro-level, and those at the local, meso-level. 
Two self-contradictory gobal, norms are generated within the world system that pushes towards 
heterogeneity while pulling towards homogeneity. Organizational responses lead to a limited number 
of structural forms, depending on the extend to which each norm is incorporated. Various modes of 
incorporation evolve, which appear to be based on state rationality but in effect are but local attempts 
to resolve global paradoxes. The difference between modes depend on the extent to which 
homogeneity is more or less valued than heterogeneity is within a particular unit of analysis. From this 
perspective, the dominance of English in South African institutions exemplifies the homogenizing effect 
of globalization, with the retention of indigenous languages in the private sphere as a weak form of 
heterogenization. Within the same unit of analysis homogeneity can be constructed at some and 
heterogeneity at other levels. 
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So theoretically a limited number of forms emerge based on how the accommodation of diversity is 
institutionalized. The rationalized environment of the world-economy, which values functional 
efficiency highly, operates restrictively. Consequently structural similarities appear between states who 
deal with ethno-cultural pluralism, and congregations who deal with the linguistic dimension of the 
same issue, as Figure 1 on the next page shows. While states cannot ignore globalized norms of 
equality and human rights, they can attempt to avoid the consequences of violating these. They can 
for instance suppress ethnic and language diversity, while claiming that this leads to greater progress. 
States which embrace global norms more fully can recognize ethnic and linguistic diversity through 
include representatives of different groupings at all levels of government, and in all institutions. In 
short. policies, ideologies, and structures emerge which are strikingly similar to those of particular 
types of congregation. The similarity seems to be produced by the modes through which conflicting 
global norms are incorporated by states and congregations. 
Within the world-polity three modes of incorporation of ethnic pluralism can be distinguished (Vertovec 
1996. following M G Smith). Structural pluralism incorporates ethnies differentially, and is marked by 
exclusionary practices. South Africa during the late colonial period and under apartheid provides an 
example of a pluralist post-colonial state formation, with the institutionalisation of segregated forms 
of social, religious and political organisation. This process was also duplicated in other colonial states. 
Social pluralism involves institutional differences and "virtually closed social sections" for various 
groups, as exemplified by Switzerland. Cultural pluralism lacks corporate divisions but retains "distinct 
institutional practices". so that individuals are incorporated in a uniform mode which plays down the 
relevance of group membership (Vertovec 1996:58-9). The latter mode. according to Vertovec. 
institutionalises multiculturalism in societal form, and characterises societies such as Britain and Burma 
(Brown 1989). 
Various state forms develop through interaction with these distinct modes of incorporating citizens. 
Within the same society different state forms can emerge over time which result in policies that evolve 
or regress. Successive governments in South Africa illustrate the point! as do regime changes in 
Australia under the Australian Labour Party (1972-75) and the Liberal-Country Party Coalition (1975-
1982) (Castles 1992:554-59). 
In the rather crude formulation of Figure 1, a social pluralist mode of incorporation is associated with 
a Type A state structure, where unified leadership structures occur alongside segregated institutions 
at other levels. Each large ethnic. group may be assigned some autonomy in a particular region. This 
Figure 1: Structural isomorphism between congregations and states, according to internal 
organisation 
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Type A: Type B: Internally integrated structures 
Internally 
differentiated 
structures 
Congregations Class I: Class II: Class III: Class IV: 
Examples Woodlands- Central Johweto St Joseph 
Montclair Flushing NY 
Language usage monolingual monolingual bilingual multilingual 
Structures joint leadership, joint leadership, joint leadership, jOint 
segregated monolingual, mostly leadership, 
peoples, some combined combined combined 
segregated programmes programmes programmes 
programmes 
States Social pluralism Cultural pluralism 
Examples Switzerland Britain, Canada Yugoslavia, 
Australia, Brazil USSR 
Language policies multilingual monolingual bilingual 
Structures joint central some institutions segregated, minorities 
leadership, others integrated acknowledged, 
other regions 
institutions dominated by 
segregated ethnic 
majorities 
state form is similar to a Class I congregation which has joint leadership but separate meeting places 
for segregated services. Culturally pluralist modes of incorporation exemplifies Type B state structures, 
with some institutions segregated and others integrated (e.g. the marketplace). A similar form of 
organization exists among congregations of Class II-III. A variant of Type B state structures exists 
which has unified leadership structures and integrated institutions at other levels. For example, 
minorities may be acknowledged within regions dominated by other ethnic groups, as was the case 
in Yugoslavia, or the old Union of Soviet Socialist Republics before their collapse. These arrangements 
are similar to those in Class IV congregations. 
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The discussion so far logically implies that because globalized norms constrain structural possibilities, 
congregations and states will evolve similar structures of dealing with diversity even when these 
organizations do not occur in the same society. The concept of isomorphism has to be seen to produce 
both variety and similarity, so that differences between organizations within the same society can be 
explained, as well as similarities between organizations across different societies. Different state forms 
can be constructed from the same global cultural building blocks; and different congregational forms 
can arise within the same society. Yet enough similarity exist among nation-states to identify ideal 
types, just as similar types of congregations occur across different societies. 
My argument in 3.1 and 3.2 runs the risk of reductionism and of determinism. Reductionism is implied 
in the act of selecting certain features of states and congregations and disregarding others. The 
rationale for doing so needs to be clearly developed. Second, my argument seems to imply that the 
institutional environment is the only causative factor of similarity or variety in organizational structures. 
This is certainly not my intention; as the meso-level section of this chapter indicates, I recognize that 
other factors which operate at different levels also play a role, such as the constraints posed by 
denominational tradition and the linguistic abilities of white congregants. My arguments can also be 
read as implying that the institutional environment operates so as to directly determine specific 
outcomes. This is certainly not my intention, nor that of Meyer, Boli or Scott who all leave room for 
organizational actors to select between available models rather than to slavishly copy them. 
3.3 The dialectic effects of meso- and macro-level interactions on linguistic diversity 
Next I want to offer a dynamic system-wide explanation of the observed inverse relationships between 
racial integration in congregations and state ideologies of the apartheid regime. Remarkably, the data 
suggests that as apartheid intensified, the number of racially integrated congregations increased. 
Paradoxically, racial discrimination was diminishing as legitimate strategy within the world system, 
having been displaced as norm by equality. 
In the South African context language and race are sometimes perceived to indicate (but also to 
submerge) ethnic and so language differences. For this reason racial integration can be used as an 
approximate indicator of linguistic diversity. In this way I will tie together some of the observations in 
this chapter, as well as elements from the two subsections above, into a more coherent structural 
theory of language integration in South African congregations. Chase-Dunn has pointed out that 
structural approaches have lost some currency in the social sciences. This is due to a renewed 
emphasis on the individual, who is seen as more concrete than the alleged abstractness of system-
wide forms of analyses. Yet, as he maintains, it is possible, by viewing nomothetic and idiographic 
(historicist) analyses as two points on a continuum, to employ a structural approach which does allow 
for agency. 
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The first inverse relationship appears when the racial ideologies which came to dominance in South 
Africa during the apartheid period are compared to the dominant ideologies in the world system during 
the same periods. Of particular interest is the slow rate of ideological change within the South African 
regime compared to the rate at which the norms of equality and progress achieved dominance in the 
world-polity. 
The second inverse relationship becomes visible when rates of racial integration in congregations are 
compared to the relative strength of state policies of segregation. When the population of integrating 
congregations as a whole are considered, the rate at which racially integrating congregations emerged 
under apartheid seems to increase in direct proportion to state efforts at enforcing segregation. This 
suggests that these congregations tapped into a resistance ideology, while the majority succumbed 
to racial segregation. In addition, a very small number of congregations became increasingly integrated 
as the state intensified its efforts. In the post-apartheid environment the rate of increase is exponential, 
~uggesting the institutionalization of a different ideology. 
The conundrum of these inverse relationships is best solved by a dynamic explanation which 
accommodates spatial and temporal dialectics operating simultaneously, but at varying rates and at 
different levels, within the total world system. The spatial notion that I use is Graaff's "Giddensian" 
conceptualization of the world system as constituted by overlapping systems - similar to the notion 
of institutional embeddedness. The temporal notion that I use derives from Thomas Hall, that of 
"feedback loops" of various lengths which are built into the interaction of different systems as well 
as within a particular system20 • Where short loops exist, feedback is obtained relatively quickly, as 
opposed to long loops where the effects take a long time to be noticed. One could also speculate that 
compared to the world-economy, world-polity norms are tied into longer feedback loops between the 
core and the periphery, so that changes in one will generally take some time to affect the other. Hall 
suggests that "economic feedbacks are faster, and under capitalism take precedence". 
The combination of spatial and temporal notions helps to explain how changes in one part of the world 
system (e.g. in ideology) may take various lengths of time to become visible in different parts of the 
system (e.g. states). In this way the distribution and sequencing of political, cultural and economic 
trends in the world system can be mapped. For example, apartheid emerged as 19th century racist 
notions became widespread and dominant throughout the world system, diffused through colonial 
political, economic, and cultural systems, but taking effect at different times. The negative reactions 
20 • Thomas Hall in a discussion on the World Systems Network recently referred to feedback loops in discussing the 
relationships between humans across time with their natural environment. He argued: "When the material adaptation 
is precarious, in a volatile environment, with rapid [one, 2, 3 years or less) feedbacks, groups and their attending 
cultures will be closely attuned to 'nature: or the environment--those which are not, do not survive long. The more 
robust the adaptation and the longer the feedback times, the less attentive they can be and continue to survive. One 
reading of our contemporary green crisis is that the loops are so long, the adaptations have been so robust that we 
[industrial states) have gotten away with devastating actions." 
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from the periphery to enforced inequality, in the form of universal human and political rights, would 
arguably take about five decades to affect attitudes towards oppression at the core. Once 
institutionalized in human rights treaties, the return effects would take less time - about two decades -
to reach the periphery in the form of decolonization, spurred by the economic crisis in the world 
system just after World War Two. 
The dynamic becomes clearer when more detail is added. Apartheid after 1948 (as opposed to earlier 
colonial instances of urban and social segregation) linked into dominant but declining system-wide 
ideologies, which came to the fore during South Africa's post-war transition into the semiperiphery. 
Paradoxically, like sediment deposited by a withdrawing tide, the racist ideology continued to 
strengthen nationally just as the rising wave of universal human and political rights diffused across the 
system. Once institutionalised in constitutions and in the UN Declaration of Universal Human Rights, 
global norms legitimated the roles of nation-states in world-polity, along with their relationships to their 
citizens. 
By the 1 960s the emergence of post-colonial nation-states confirmed the institutionalisation of notions 
of the equality of societies. Probably it is no coincidence that universal notions of equality arose in the 
world-polity during a time of military crisis for the hegemon in the world-economy. Wallerstein has 
argued that egalitarianism enlarges the global market, thus increasing capitalist accumulation. The 
ideology of apartheid was particularly odious in this context and the apartheid state rightly became a 
pariah in the world system. 
During the post-1960s period, anti-apartheid organisations in South Africa emerged as anti-systemic 
movements that opposed the dominant Southern African political regional system, but that were linked 
to increasingly dominant global ideologies of equal political and civil rights. The success of anti-
apartheid movements depended on aligning their cause with the emergent global norms, while the 
divergence of state policies from these norms increasingly delegitimated the apartheid regime and 
eventually proscribed it as anti-systemic with reference to the world-polity. These changes in the world 
system may correspond to both economic, political and cultural changes, which caused similar 
progressive events across the globe at more or less the same time: the collapse of the USSR; 
reunification of East and West Germany; and US decline in hegemony. All these happened immediately 
before or after the lifting of the ban on the anti-apartheid political movements in 1990. 
In the light of the above, system-wide diffusion of institutional norms at varying rates can be 
understood by analogy to ripples in a pond as phenomena which exhibit temporal and spatial qualities. 
First, feedback effects may either decrease or increase over time. Second, the length of the delay is 
affected by the degree to which states are integrated into the system. Third, attention to historical 
periods demonstrates that feedback happens faster during certain periods compared to others. Fourth, 
during different periods feedback could alternately take paths that are predominantly unilinear, bilinear, 
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or multilinear. Fifth, the direction of diffusion would at various periods reflect the struggle for 
dominance in the world system. For example, during the colonial period technological changes in the 
core diffused towards the periphery, but little of what happened in the periphery affected the core. As 
the world system became more integrated, response time shortened. Arguably after the Second World 
War the fee'dback loops became increasingly multidirectional, coinciding with the founding of the 
United Nations. The ripple anal,ogy is best understood when viewed as occurring in a narrow channel. 
The first ripple (economic forces?) sets in motion a second one (cultural change?)' which causes a 
ripple to return from the borders of the channel (the world system?) and to interfere with the first 
wave. 
Given the above, how can my argument that the predominant language ideology in the world system 
favours English, countered by a weaker bias towards multilingualism, be applied to language 
integration in South African congregations? The evidence seems to indicate that integrating 
congregations demonstrate the acceptance of the global and the devaluation of the local, rather than 
a rejection of global identities and statuses. For this reason denominations, congregations, and 
individual agents who attempt to promote multilingualism and multiculturalism are at an disadvantage. 
Those that are successful will be marginalized, or already exist at the periphery. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Chapter Six identified the macro-influences which affect language usage in South Africa, and so in 
congregations which exhibit little linguistic integration. The world system serves as a 
macro-environment which constrains levels of linguistic diversity and integration in state as in civil 
society organizations. A secondary meso-influence was revealed in the extent to which congregations 
are integrated into the dominant societal language norms, as revealed at the micro-level by the 
attitudes of monolingual members and leaders towards language integration. Denominations seemed 
to be particularly weak and irrelevant meso-influence, due to the lack of guidelines that they provide 
for integrating congregations; 'despite the apparent support by denominational officials for 
multiculturalism and nonracialism. 
Institutional isomorphism explains the tendency in integrating congregations to use English by referring 
to the embeddedness of religious organization in ever widening concentric contexts of national and 
global institutions, particularly polity and economy. The preference for English in congregations is thus 
linked to forces operating at the national level within a nation-building paradigm. In the previous 
chapter nation-building and the dominance of English were shown to exhibit similar patterns across 
the African region, demonstrating that systemic forces were producing isomorphic effects at the 
societal level. In this way the local context was connected via the region to political, economic, and 
cultural features of the world system. The expansion of the world system in polity and economic terms 
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contributed to the spread of colonialism, and to the diffusion of state forms. Instruments of state 
control - education - and state legitimation - ambivalently, Christianity as a world religion - had a 
coercive21 function in the world-system of the colonial period. Both mission education and imperialism 
aided the cultural hegemony in British colonies, which ascribed to English a higher status than to 
indigenous languages. Local elites were drawn into these institutions and in this way a language 
ideology was institutionalized and reproduced. Isomorphism also explains the structural similarities 
between African states noted in Chapter Five in terms of global norms that operate in the world system 
of nation states. Through isomorphism global and local norms are distributed between institutions 
within the same society by the state, and by civil society as agencies. 
The features outlined in this chapter explain why multilingual language outcomes in Chapter Four were 
less likely to occur than monolingual ones. The cultural norms of the world system, namely equality 
and progress, aid the continuous need in the capitalist system for economic expansion. Equality, in the 
form of liberal democracy, enabled the removal of ethnic and racial barriers which could hinder the 
creation of new markets, a process undergirded by the diffusion of English as a global language 
through tertiary education and financial aids programmes. The globalization of liberal values supported 
the establishment of various charters of human rights, including the Freedom Charter, the present 
South African constitution22 , and the ideologies of nonracialism and multiculturalism. These values 
are expressed in state policies and legislation. 
Even meso-factors which contribute to racial23 and particularly linguistic integration in congregations 
could be explained in global terms. The preference for English is supported through the example of the 
state and various elites, but also through the common understanding that English is the language of 
status and commerce. Anecdotal evidence points to an understanding in certain black circles that the 
state's multilingual policy is merely an ideological mechanism for the devaluation of Afrikaans and 
other minority languages (like Venda). This view, for instance, was aired by black clergy at a recent 
workshop for a denomination not included in this study. This explains why, generally speaking, both 
white and black in integrating congregations dominated by English accept the status quo. For speakers 
of minority African languages, English represents a neutral alternative ,to the linguicism expressed by 
major language speakers such as Zulu or Xhosa. For whites the use of English maintains the 
21. Coercive isomorphism between state and religious institutions is clearly visible throughout South African history, 
for example in the consequences of segregative state legislation on institutional racial integration. Other examples to 
hand include the prohibition of Mennonites by the apartheid state, as well as the difficulty that independent churches 
experienced with the state in registering as churches. The latter is a particularly interesting example of coercive 
isomorphism, as state requirements imposed structure and function on the African Indigenous Churches (AICs), which 
was necessary in order to obtain the necessary official sanction for the acquisition of land (compare Claassen 1995), 
22. Constitutional guarantees of religious rights is an example of an USA invention which has become globalized in 
part through its adoption by the United Nations - as is the separation of religion and state (compare Moberg 
1962:369). 
23. For example, the presence of non-South Africans as a result of in/voluntary migration; or white flight from inner 
cities to the suburbs in response to the relocation of, at first, industries, then trade, and later service organizations. 
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dominance of European cultural values while appearing to conform to nonracialism; while for blacks 
it confers entry into a higher status and symbolizes the upward aspirations modelled by the new elite. 
At the same time the fact that some congregations incluae other languages do point to the conflicting 
and contesting ideologies of multiculturalism versus monoculturalism. For this reason the contribution 
that churchgoers make to the language situation in their congregations and in their country should not 
be neglected. Any argument which correctly points to power differentials involved in the choice for 
a global language over against a local language should also address the co-operation of the dominated 
in their own subjugation. Ideological explanations and the national and global factors which support 
them were introduced in the first and second chapters, and were more broadly discussed in this 
chapter. 
In answer to the base question set out in Chapter One, whether a world system perspective was useful 
in helping to explain the lack of linguistic integration in racially-diverse congregations, I would argue 
in the affirmative. In what follows I expand on this by noting first population ecology as an additional 
avenue that may have been pursued. Next I evaluate two alternative arguments, one based at the 
micro-level in terms of rational choice theory, the other following a "majoritarian" argument. 
My argument may have been enhanced by a population ecology approach which focuses on all 
organizations at once, noticing such aspects as founding and death rates as well as organizational 
interactions. Considering integrating congregations as a population of organizations which are affected 
by social institutions would open up interesting analytical avenues and help to isolate contextual 
affects. For instance, founding rates can be described in terms of geographic location and 
denominational membership, as well as larger economic, political and historical forces. The knock-on 
effect of institutional isomorphism could then be seen to be reflected in the choices exercised by 
leadership with regards to language usage. While little is known about the death of integrating 
congregations, those which were deliberately formed in townships during the height of apartheid (e.g. 
Johweto, Soweto) required high levels of commitment. Their ability to attract members seems to have 
been weakened considerably in the post-apartheid era by a changing political regime and by the 
distances individuals have to travel. By contrast, those which diminished physical distance by 
relocating to racially integrating inner-cities (e.g. Melodi ya Tswane, Pretoria), or which were founded 
there (e.g. Central Methodist Mission, Johannesburg) survived and grew. 
Logically the most likely alterna~ive to a macro-explanation could be posed at the micro-level, for 
example in terms of rational choice theory, as Laitin did. Accordingly, individuals seek to maximise 
individual advantage by rationally weighing up the cost of different choices. English is the rational 
choice, because of its greater value and enhanced status. I argue that even such an micro-argument 
only makes sense once the issue of Why this language - English - and not others are deemed of more 
value is addressed. As I demonstrate for the rest of Africa, this requires a global approach, for the 
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value and status of English is fixed in the global market. 
My arguments also have the advantage of including attention to the dynamic interaction between 
agents and structures, at macro-, meso-, and also micro-levels - although the latter is clearly not 
primary in my analysis. The choice for English in most integrating congregations is not merely a matter 
of communicative necessity, but rather is informed by settings (present and past state formations, 
denominational and congregational culture, global norms) and dominant popular and state ideologies 
(nationism, language ideology, modernisation) which, along with the dampening effect of religious 
identity, actively discourage the use of indigenous languages and suppress their associated ethnic 
identities. State elites and the popular masses; ministers, lay leaders and congregants; educationists 
and denominational leaders; all contribute to structures which simultaneously constrain them 
dialectically. As a result, ideas and people circulate in a dynamic way between civil and state 
institutions, with contestations for power producing a hegemonic linguistic ideology in favour of 
English and its associated British and USA cultures. Other ethno-cultural groups are incorporated 
tangentially into the norms and values of the dominant culture, so that relations of class inequality are 
reproduced between groups. Subordinate non-English groups remain mostly excluded from political 
power in the broad sense, and partly in conflict with the dominant language ideology. 
Another argument contrary to mine could be based on the idea that the majority language should 
"naturally" dominate. After all, 67% of congregations (40 out of 59 cases) reported a majority of 
English-speakers. Yet such a contention distracts from the fact that the 10 languages distributed 
among these congregations to varying degrees were most often not reflected in congregational 
processes or programmes. As noted earlier in Table 13, 62.7% of congregations (32 of 51 cases) had 
monolingual services - compared to the 37.3% which did not. And Table 14 showed that 72.5% (37 
cases) used only one language - usually English - for preaching sermons. The majoritarian argument 
also does not explain why English dominates in the few congregations where black-language speakers 
formed more than a two-thirds majority or a sizeable presence, for instance where Sotho and Xhosa-
speakers constituted between 30-40% of the congregation; or even where Zulu-, Siswati-, and Venda-
speakers make up between 60-90% of the congregation. In seven congregations blacks represent 
between 25% and 70% of the congregants, yet English is used for most of the services24 • 
Lastly, some may criticize my implicit endorsement of multilingualism, and argue that in state building 
indigenous languages should" 'for the sake of larger unity ... give way to others for official functions'" . 
They could also conclude that "'individuals who demand scarce resources to publish, teach, and revive 
all languages in the name of human rights threaten the cohesion of the national community' n 
24 This is true for St Mark's Anglican (70% black), Carrington St Methodist (27% black), Christian Community 
(38% black), Our Lady of the Assumption Catholic (25% black), Rhema Bible Church (35% black), Sacred Heart 
Catholic Church (30% black), and St John's Anglican (45% black). 
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(Bamgbose 1991 :82, quoting Weinstein 1983: 13825). Similarly, they could say, if cultures are about 
adjusting to an environment, then cultures not only should change, but those which no longer function 
in a modernised context should be discarded. Such instrumentalist arguments often falsely assumes 
that monolingual ism or monoculturalism is the answer. 
In response I would point out that the value of multilingualism can be demonstrated by reference to 
education. Should indigenous language be used in a way that supports additive bilingualism, a bridge 
would be built between social and educational worlds, and the dysfunction could be avoided that arise 
from having to learn written and conceptual skills through an unfamiliar language (Bamgbose 1994:82). 
Bilingual language strategies, which recognize both indigenous languages and Languages of Wider 
Communication, are more relevant in a multiethnic world than monolingualism. 
25 Weinstein, B 1983. The civic tongue: political consequences of language choice. New York: Longman. 
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APPENDIX ONE: QUESTIONNAIRE 
INTEGRATING 
CONGREGATIONS 
SURVEY 
March-April 1 997 
Instructions 
a. To ensure greater accuracy, please ask at least 5 lay leaders to check your 
answers. 
b. Congregation refers to the average number of those people, no longer of 
schoolgoing age, who attended all services on all Sundays during March 1997; 
i.e. the "congregants". 
c. Categories exclude one another, e.g. people who have degrees should not be 
counted with those who have Std 10 in Question 17. 
d. Please answer all questions, even if you have to give rough estimates. 
e. Use the back cover if you need more space for answers. 
Contact person: Dr Dawid Venter Tel: (021) 808-2100 Fax: 808-2143. 
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INTEGRATING CONGREGATIONS SURVEY 
Official name and denomination of congregation: 
Physical address of congregation's meeting place: 
Founding date of congregation: 
SECTION ONE: CURRENT DIVERSITY 
1. Which forms of diversity at present most influence your congregation's structures (e.g. 
leader~hip) and functioning (e.g. services), whether positively or negatively?: 
Language [] Culture [] Race [ ] Class [] 
Other (PLEASE ELABORATE): 
2.1. Do people in your congregation comment on the diversity in their midst? [TICK ONE BOX]: 
Yes [] No 
2.2. If yes, is diversity seen as positive [ or as causing difficulties [ ] ? 
3. Do people in your congregation think that cultural diversity (language, music styles, and ways 
of understanding life) should change the way that the congregation is run? [TICK ONE BOX]: 
Yes [ ] No [] Why? 
4. How diverse is your congregation's services in terms of languages used in: 
Hymns one ] two [ ] three or more [ ] 
Readings one [ ] two [ ] three or more [ ] 
Prayers one [ ] two [ ] three or more [ ] 
Sermons one [ ] two [ ] three or more [ 
Liturgy one [ ] two [ ] three or more [ ] 
5. Would you describe the musical styles used in your congregation's services as: 
Western 
[ ] 
Western" + 
African [] 
Western 
+ other [ ] 
Western + African 
+ other [ ] 
6.1 . Have any structures or processes been developed to deal with cultural diversity in your 
congregation (e.g. in styles of singing, praying, communion, decision-making) ? [TICK ONE 
BOX]: Yes [J No [] 
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6.2. PLEASE GIVE EXAMPLES TO ILLUSTRATE YOUR ANSWER IN 6.1. 
ONLY COMPLETE QUESTIONS 6.3 AND 6.4 IF YOUR ANSWER TO 6.1 WAS YES. 
6.3. In which year were these structures or processes adopted? 
6.4. What has happened as a result of such structures or processes, if anything? 
7. How diverse is the neighbourhood around your congregation's buildings in terms of: 
Language 
Culture 
Race 
mostly one [] 
mostly one [] 
not mixed [] 
two [] 
two [] 
some [ ] 
three or more ] 
three or more [ ] 
very mixed [] 
231 
8.1. How many "official" church activities does your congregation have - i.e. how many Sunday 
schools, youth groups, fellowship groups, soup kitchens, etc. are there ? __ _ 
8.2. In how many of these do people from all the different language groups in your congregation 
take part? __ _ 
9. Do more than half of congregants from different language groups meet with one another: 
9.1. in informal church activities (i.e. not mentioned in 8.1) - braais, camps, volleyball games: 
Never [ ] Once or twice a year [ ] Once or twice a month [ ] 
9.2. in one another's homes for informal visits: 
Never [ ] Once or twice a year [.] Once or twice a month [ ] 
10. How diverse is your congregation in terms of racial mix in: 
Top lay leadership not mixed [ ] some [ ] representative [ I 
Outreach programmes not mixed [ ] some [ ] representative [ ] 
Home groups not mixed [ ] some [ ] representative [ I 
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SECTION TWO: DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE 
11.1. How many services are held for your congregation on a Sunday? [CIRCLE ONE] 
1 2 3 4 More 
11.2. What was the average number who attended each Sunday service during March 1996? 
First service: Second: Third: Fourth: 
11.3. Does the same group of people (e.g. young whites) go to all the services, or is each service 
attended by a different group of people? [TICK ONE): Same [ ) Different [ 
11.4. Is the total number who attended all March 1997 services [TICK ONE BOX]: 
More [] or Less [] compared to those for March 1 996 ? 
11 .5. Are any separate services held for a particular language group at present ? 
Yes [] No [ ]. If yes, for which group? (GIVE DETAILS): 
12. In terms of gender, approximately what percentage of those in the congregation who are no 
longer of schoolgoing age would you say is: Male % Female % 
13.1. What is the average age of males and females who are no longer of schoolgoing age in your 
congregation: Male Female 
13.2. What percentage of your congregation falls into the following age-groups: 
Pre-schoolers % Adults (35-49 years) % 
Primary and high schoolers % Middle-aged (50-64 yrs) % 
Young adults (19-34 yrs) % Seniors (65 and over) % 
14. What is the marital status of congregants who are no longer of schoolgoing age: 
Single (never married) 
Married 
Separated, divorced 
% 
% 
% 
Living together 
Widower, widow 
% 
% 
15. What do congregants each earn per month? (as indicated by e.g. lifestyle) 
16. 
Low income (less 
than R 2 000) 
% Mid-income 
(up to R 6 000) 
% High-income (above _ % 
R 6 000) 
How far do congregants live from your congregation's Sunday meeting place: 
Walking distance (less than 1 km) % Quite far (3 to 6 km) 
Some way (1 to 2 km) % A great distance (7 to 10km) 
% 
% 
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17. What percentage of your congregation who work fall into the following occupations: 
Those which others may see as of low status, e.g. labourers etc % 
- ..." 
Those which others may see as of middle status, e.g. plumbers etc % 
Those which others may see as of high status, e.g. professionals etc % 
18. In terms of education levels, about how many members of your congregation have: 
Less than Std 1 0 
Only std 10 . 
Apprenticeship 
% 
% 
% 
Collegeltechnikon diploma 
Degrees 
1 9. Which percentage of your congregation speaks as a first language: 
SiZulu % SiTsonga % 
SiSwati % SiXhosa % 
English % SeSotho % 
Sepedi % 
* Other African % * GIVE DETAILS: 
* Other European % * GIVE DETAILS: 
* Other Asian % * GIVE DETAILS: 
20. What nationalities are represented in your congregation ? 
South African % GIVE DETAILS: 
Other African 
Other 
% 
% 
GIVE DETAILS: 
GIVE DETAILS: 
TsiVenda 
Afrikaans 
Shangaan 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
21. Which percentage of your present congregation could in the past have been considered: 
White % Coloured % Indian % Black % 
22.1. When did your congregation come to have a more racially diverse membership? 19 __ 
22.2. How did this happen? . 
233 
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THANK YOU FOR YOUR CO-OPERATION! 
Which of the following would be of use to your congregation as it deals with 
cultural and other forms of diversity [tick appropriate box]: 
a. workshops focusing on solutions [ ] 
b. analysis with consultants of internal and external dynamics [] 
c. news of what other "mixed" congregations are doing [ ] 
d. Other (specify): 
IF YOU HAVE ANY FURTHER COMMENTS, PLEASE ADD THEM HERE: 
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APPENDIX TWO: SAMPLE CONGREGATIONS 
All Saints CPSA, Melmoth 
All Saints CPSA, Robertsham 
All Saints CPSA, Barberton 
All Saints CPSA, Stanger 
Brooklyn MCSA, Pretoria 
Carrington St MCSA, Mafikeng 
Christ Church CPSA, Addington 
Christ Church CPSA, Pietersburg 
Christ the Redeemer RC, Klerksdorp 
Christian Centre IFCC, East London 
Christian Community Church IFCC, 
Pietersburg 
Claremont Methodist Church MCSA, 
Claremont 
Damesfontein RC, Damesfontein 
Fort Beaufort PCSA, Fort Beaufort 
Holy Trinity RC, Halfway House 
Holy Trinity CPSA, Kalk Bay 
Immaculate Conception RC, Pinetown 
Kokstad MCSA, Kokstad 
Kriel RC, Kriel 
Ladysmith MCSA, Ladysmith 
Lighthouse Christian Centre, Goodwood 
Maranatha Community Church IFCC, 
Kempton Park 
Matatiele RC, Matatiele 
Mossel Bay Community Church IFCC, 
Mossel Bay 
Our Lady Help of Christians RC, Lansdowne 
Our Lady of Lourdes RC, Westville 
Our Lady of the Assumption RC, Sasolburg 
Plumstead MCSA, Plumstead 
Port Shepstone MCSA, Port Shepstone 
Prestbury Methodist Church MCSA, 
Pietermaritzburg 
Rhema Bible Church IFCC, Randburg 
Sacred Heart RC, Pretoria 
Sacred Heart RC, Tongaat 
Sea Point MCSA, Sea Point 
Shophar Fellowship Ministries IFCC, 
Stellenbosch 
St Augustine's RC, Upington 
St Barnabas Church CPSA, Lichtenburg 
St Catherine's Church RC, Kleinvlei 
St Cyprian's CPSA, Kimberley 
St Dominic RC, Welkom 
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St Francis of Assisi RC, Standerton 
St John's RC, Estcourt 
St John the Baptist CPSA, Mtubatuba 
St John's CPSA, Mafikeng 
St John's, Wynberg 
St John's RC, Maitland 
St Joseph's RC, Howick 
St Katherine's CPSA, Port Shepstone 
St Mark's CPSA, Louis Trichardt 
St Mary's CPSA, Rosettenville 
St Michael & St George's CPSA, 
Grahamstown 
St Patrick's Cathedral RC, Kroonstad 
St Paul's CPSA, Durban 
St Peter's CPSA, Tzaneen 
St Saviour's CPSA, Claremont 
St Stephen's CPSA, Vryburg 
Ubunye Free Methodist Church, 
Pietermaritzburg 
Vryheid RC, Vryheid 
Warmbaths CPSA, Warm baths 
Woodlands-Montclair CPSA, Woodlands 
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